docs(us2): Soft Serve → Gitea 迁移事实与参考镜像 (Plane VPS-94)

- hosts/us2: Gitea 1.27.3-rootless 部署实况 (repo.windy.me SSH:2222/Web), 16 仓迁移核对, 备份/回滚; soft-serve 停用保留作回滚 - compose/gitea: 参考镜像 (rootless compose + 备份 sidecar + 一次性迁移脚本留档) - AGENTS/inventory/compose README: 服务表与索引同步
docs(us2): 根盘清理 71%→23% 事实记录 (Plane VPS-93)
2026-09-18 17:24:35 +08:00 · 2026-09-18 11:46:17 +08:00 · 2026-09-13 19:34:04 +08:00 · 2026-09-13 19:13:06 +08:00 · 2026-09-13 19:12:32 +08:00 · 2026-09-13 19:12:32 +08:00
128 changed files with 12202 additions and 366 deletions
@@ -15,8 +15,21 @@ id_*
 .ansible/
 facts/

+# Local agent-harness / tooling config (not repo content).
+.agents/
+.claude/
+.omp/
+.opencode/
+.zcode/
+.mcp.json
+WATCHDOG.yml
+skills-lock.json
+
 # Editor and operating-system files.
 .DS_Store
 .vscode/
 .idea/
 *~
+# Agent working scratch (not repo content).
+.agent-work/
+.tmp-*
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+repos:
+  - repo: local
+    hooks:
+      - id: validate-repo
+        name: validate repository
+        entry: scripts/validate-repo.sh
+        language: system
+        pass_filenames: false
@@ -2,33 +2,58 @@

 This repo is the **agent ops handbook + fact source** for maintaining personal VPS hosts. Prefer verifying live state over assuming docs are complete.

-Also readable as `agent.md` (symlink → this file).
-
 ## How to work

 1. Read [`inventory/hosts.md`](inventory/hosts.md) for the machine list.
 2. Open the matching [`hosts/<name>.md`](hosts/) for SSH, roles, paths, and quirks.
-3. For common tasks, follow a runbook under [`runbooks/`](runbooks/).
+3. For common tasks, follow a runbook under [`runbooks/`](runbooks/). Pick the
+   most specific applicable one from [`runbooks/README.md`](runbooks/README.md);
+   the spec is [`RUNBOOKS.md`](RUNBOOKS.md) and new runbooks start from
+   [`runbooks/_template.md`](runbooks/_template.md).
 4. Prefer read-only checks first; change only after confirming current state.
 5. For routine checks and approved service reconciliation, run the matching
   Ansible playbook from `ansible/`; see [routine Ansible operations](runbooks/ansible-operations.md).
 6. Default SSH access (`ssh -4 windy@<host>`) is for focused diagnostics,
   imperative upstream procedures, and incident work. Prefer **IPv4** from this
   WSL client (AAAA often exists but IPv6 route does not).
+
+   > **Agent sandbox SSH quirk (verified 2026-08-20):** the agent shell runs in
+   > a sandboxed user namespace — system files such as
+   > `/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/20-systemd-ssh-proxy.conf` appear owned by `nobody`,
+   > so plain `ssh` aborts with `Bad owner or permissions on ...`. Always use
+   > `ssh -F /dev/null` from the agent shell and pass options explicitly
+   > (`~/.ssh/config` is skipped; e.g. `ssh -F /dev/null -p 2222
+   > -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 windy@repo.windy.me`). `sudo` never works in the
+   > sandbox (`NoNewPrivs`, no capabilities, `/` read-only). The host itself is
+   > healthy — to inspect or act on the real host from the sandbox use
+   > `/mnt/c/WINDOWS/system32/wsl.exe -u root -- <cmd>` (real root: keep
+   > read-only unless a change is approved).
+
 7. Record each material VPS operation, incident, configuration change, or
-   verification outcome in the corresponding **Linear `vps` project**. Include
-   scope, action, verification, and remaining follow-up; never put passwords,
-   tokens, private keys, recovery keys, or private room IDs in Linear.
+   verification outcome in the corresponding **Plane `vps` project**
+   (self-hosted `plane.chans.xyz`, Plane MCP `mcp__plane__*`, following the
+   `plane-workflow` skill). **Linear is retired as a record source (2026-09-03)
+   — do not create Linear issues;** existing W1N-* entries are read-only
+   history. Include scope, action, verification, and remaining follow-up; never
+   put passwords, tokens, private keys, recovery keys, or private room IDs in
+   Plane or Linear.

-## Active hosts (quick map)
+### Runbook execution rules

-| Host | Role | SSH | Facts |
-|------|------|-----|--------|
-| **mx2.windy.me** | mailcow (`/opt/mail`, project `cow`) | `ssh -4 windy@mx2.windy.me` | [hosts/mx2.windy.me.md](hosts/mx2.windy.me.md) |
-| **us2.wsvc.info** | Vaultwarden + Traefik (+ Soft Serve, …) | `ssh -4 windy@us2.wsvc.info` | [hosts/us2.wsvc.info.md](hosts/us2.wsvc.info.md) |
-| **hk2.chans.xyz** | PowerDNS auth ns1 (`/opt/pdns`) | `ssh -4 windy@hk2.chans.xyz` | [hosts/hk2.chans.xyz.md](hosts/hk2.chans.xyz.md) |
-| **gfw.windy.lan** | OpenWrt LAN gateway / OpenClash | `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1` | [hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md](hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md) |
-| **ubnt** | UniFi Network Controller | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.46` | [hosts/ubnt.md](hosts/ubnt.md) |
+Before operational work: inspect `runbooks/`, select the most specific
+applicable runbook, follow its steps in order, do not skip verification steps,
+and respect its STOP and approval conditions. If no runbook applies, diagnose
+only — do not mutate production state. When live state conflicts with a
+runbook's assumptions, `STOP` and report; never invent missing parameters or
+bypass failed checks. The spec is [`RUNBOOKS.md`](RUNBOOKS.md).
+
+## Active hosts
+
+The canonical machine list (roles, SSH endpoints, Ansible coverage, status) is
+[`inventory/hosts.md`](inventory/hosts.md) — the single human-readable source
+of truth. Per-host facts live in [`hosts/`](hosts/). The Ansible execution
+inventory is [`ansible/inventory/hosts.yml`](ansible/inventory/hosts.yml). Do
+not maintain a second copy of the machine table here.

 ### Public services

@@ -38,7 +63,7 @@ Also readable as `agent.md` (symlink → this file).
 | SMTP `mx2.windy.me:587` (STARTTLS) or `:465` | mx2 | client submission; full email + mailbox password — [runbook](runbooks/mailcow-smtp-client.md) |
 | IMAP `mx2.windy.me:993` | mx2 | same mailbox credentials |
 | https://auth.wsvc.info | us2 (`/opt/vaultwarden`) | Vaultwarden (Postgres, **operational**) — client Server URL |
-| `repo.windy.me:2222` | us2 (`/opt/soft-serve`) | Soft Serve (stub details) |
+| `repo.windy.me` (git SSH `:2222` / web HTTPS) | us2 (`/opt/gitea`) | Gitea — 1.27.3-rootless pinned, backup sidecar; details in [hosts/us2.wsvc.info.md](hosts/us2.wsvc.info.md) |
 | DNS `ns1.wsvc.info:53` | hk2 (`/opt/pdns`, Auth **5.0.6**) | PowerDNS auth — zones `windy.me`, `wsvc.info`, `chans.xyz` |
 | https://pdns.wsvc.info | hk2 (`poweradmin`) | Poweradmin UI |
 | https://pgweb.wsvc.info | hk2 (`pgweb`) | PowerDNS Postgres browser |
@@ -46,6 +71,7 @@ Also readable as `agent.md` (symlink → this file).
 | https://synapse.chans.xyz | synapse | Synapse Client-Server + Federation API |
 | https://account.chans.xyz | synapse | Matrix Authentication Service (local passwords) |
 | https://admin.chans.xyz | synapse | Element Admin console (MAS admin auth) |
+| https://plane.chans.xyz | synapse (`plane`, Helm `plane-ce` 1.8.0 / v1.4.1) | Plane project management (self-hosted, K3s) |

 ### Upstream docs

@@ -55,11 +81,15 @@ Also readable as `agent.md` (symlink → this file).

 **Matrix (ESS on synapse):** Matrix homeserver running on `synapse.chans.xyz` via the official ESS (Element Server Suite) Helm chart with Synapse + MAS + Element Web + Admin. DNS zone `chans.xyz` managed by hk2 PowerDNS. Before changing config, read [docs/matrix-upstream.md](docs/matrix-upstream.md) and [hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md](hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md). K3s cluster on this node has hostPort 80/443 for Traefik (no ServiceLB). Health: [matrix-health](runbooks/matrix-health.md).

+**Plane (on synapse):** Self-hosted Plane project management at `plane.chans.xyz`, Helm release `plane-app` (chart `plane-ce-1.8.0`, app `v1.4.1`) in ns `plane` on the same K3s node as Matrix. Config from `/home/windy/plane-k3s/values.yaml`; workload/cert/ingress details in [hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md](hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md). Its Postgres/MinIO PVCs are **not** backed up.
+
+**RustDesk:** Self-hosted RustDesk server on `hk2.chans.xyz` (`/opt/rustdesk`, containers `hbbs`/`hbbr`, image pinned `1.1.14`). The `hbbs -r` relay hostname must resolve to the host's public IP `154.36.174.161` — use `hk2.chans.xyz` (never `hk2.wsvc.info`, which has no DNS record). Health: [rustdesk-health](runbooks/rustdesk-health.md).
+
 ## Runbooks & scripts

 | Task | Path |
 |------|------|
-| mailcow health | [runbooks/mailcow-health.md](runbooks/mailcow-health.md) · `./scripts/check-mx2.sh` |
+| mailcow health | [runbooks/mailcow-health.md](runbooks/mailcow-health.md) |
 | mailcow update | [runbooks/mailcow-update.md](runbooks/mailcow-update.md) |
 | mailcow SMTP/IMAP client | [runbooks/mailcow-smtp-client.md](runbooks/mailcow-smtp-client.md) |
 | Vaultwarden health | [runbooks/vaultwarden-health.md](runbooks/vaultwarden-health.md) |
@@ -68,16 +98,48 @@ Also readable as `agent.md` (symlink → this file).
 | PowerDNS health (hk2) | [runbooks/pdns-health.md](runbooks/pdns-health.md) |
 | PowerDNS upstream refs | [docs/pdns-upstream.md](docs/pdns-upstream.md) |
 | Matrix health | [runbooks/matrix-health.md](runbooks/matrix-health.md) |
+| Plane health | [runbooks/plane-health.md](runbooks/plane-health.md) |
+| RustDesk health (hk2) | [runbooks/rustdesk-health.md](runbooks/rustdesk-health.md) |
+| AdGuard Home health | [runbooks/adguard-home-health.md](runbooks/adguard-home-health.md) |
+| Host disk cleanup | [runbooks/host-disk-cleanup.md](runbooks/host-disk-cleanup.md) |
+| Home Assistant maintenance | [runbooks/home-assistant-maintenance.md](runbooks/home-assistant-maintenance.md) + [scripts/ha-maintenance.sh](runbooks/scripts/ha-maintenance.sh) |
+| matrix_e2ee update (hass.windy.lan) | [runbooks/matrix-e2ee-update.md](runbooks/matrix-e2ee-update.md) |
 | Matrix upstream refs | [docs/matrix-upstream.md](docs/matrix-upstream.md) |
 | Hermes Agent Matrix channel | [docs/hermes-matrix.md](docs/hermes-matrix.md) |
 | UniFi local-service proxy bypass | [docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md](docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md) |
+| UniFi SSO login setting (Ansible) | `cd ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/unifi-sso.yml --limit unifi` |
 | Routine Ansible operations | [runbooks/ansible-operations.md](runbooks/ansible-operations.md) |
+| Routine make commands | `make help` (wraps `ansible-operations.md` read-only + gated flows) |
+| Issue → mergeable change | [runbooks/issue-to-merge.md](runbooks/issue-to-merge.md) |
+| Fix failing health/playbook run | [runbooks/fix-ci.md](runbooks/fix-ci.md) |
+| Release a reviewed change | [runbooks/release.md](runbooks/release.md) |
+| Roll back a change | [runbooks/rollback.md](runbooks/rollback.md) |
+| Controlled network change | [runbooks/network-change.md](runbooks/network-change.md) |
+| Network outage recovery | [runbooks/network-recovery.md](runbooks/network-recovery.md) |

-```bash
-./scripts/check-mx2.sh
-```
+Full index: [runbooks/README.md](runbooks/README.md). Spec: [RUNBOOKS.md](RUNBOOKS.md).

-`check-mx2.sh` defaults to IPv4; set `MX2_ALLOW_IPV6=1` to allow IPv6. DNS checks use `1.1.1.1` / `8.8.8.8` (local stub is flaky).
+Routine mailcow health: `cd ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/health-report.yml --limit mailcow`. The local stub resolver is flaky; DNS probes use `1.1.1.1` / `8.8.8.8`.
+
+## Agent skills
+
+### Issue tracker
+
+Issues are tracked in **Plane** — self-hosted at `plane.chans.xyz`, project
+`vps` — and created/updated via the Plane MCP (`mcp__plane__*`), following the
+`plane-workflow` skill. **Linear is retired as a record source (2026-09-03); do
+not create Linear issues.** Existing W1N-* entries are read-only history.
+`docs/agents/issue-tracker.md` documents the retired Linear workflow and is
+stale; treat this section as authoritative.
+
+### Triage labels
+
+Default triage labels: needs-triage, needs-info, ready-for-agent, ready-for-human, wontfix. See `docs/agents/triage-labels.md`.
+
+### Domain docs
+
+Domain-documentation conventions, including lazily created `CONTEXT.md` and
+`docs/adr/` entries when needed, are described in [`docs/agents/domain.md`](docs/agents/domain.md).

 ## Safety

@@ -110,10 +172,14 @@ Bills, rough notes, and personal clutter stay in the Obsidian vault. This repo h
 ## Layout

 ```
-AGENTS.md / agent.md   # this entry (agent.md → AGENTS.md)
-inventory/hosts.md     # machine index
+AGENTS.md              # this entry
+RUNBOOKS.md            # runbook spec (six-field model, naming, review rules)
+inventory/hosts.md     # machine index (human-readable source of truth)
+ansible/               # playbooks, roles, sanitized control-plane inventory
+compose/               # repo-owned non-secret Compose sources (+ .env.example)
 hosts/                 # per-host facts
-runbooks/              # step-by-step ops
-docs/                  # upstream doc indexes / design notes
-scripts/               # read-only helper scripts
+runbooks/              # step-by-step ops (README.md = index, _template.md = template)
+docs/                  # upstream refs / design notes / research records (active + archive/)
+scripts/validate-repo.sh  # repo-wide validation (run before merging)
+Makefile               # routine validate / health / gated ansible wrappers
 ```
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+# VPS ops hub — routine validate / health / gated Ansible wrappers.
+# See runbooks/ansible-operations.md for playbook semantics.
+
+SHELL := /usr/bin/env bash
+.SHELLFLAGS := -eu -o pipefail -c
+
+.DEFAULT_GOAL := help
+
+REPO_ROOT := $(CURDIR)
+ANSIBLE_DIR := $(REPO_ROOT)/ansible
+export ANSIBLE_LOCAL_TEMP := $(REPO_ROOT)/.ansible/tmp
+export ANSIBLE_HOME := $(REPO_ROOT)/.ansible
+
+LIMIT ?=
+EXTRA ?=
+VERBOSE ?= 0
+CONFIRM ?= 0
+TARGETS ?=
+TRAEFIK ?= 0
+
+LIMIT_FLAG := $(if $(LIMIT),--limit $(LIMIT),)
+VERBOSE_FLAG := $(if $(filter 1,$(VERBOSE)),-v,$(if $(filter 2,$(VERBOSE)),-vvv,))
+
+.PHONY: help validate check deps galaxy syntax ansible-prep \
+	ping inventory audit health health-mailcow health-matrix \
+	maint-preview baseline compose-check \
+	install-healthchecks install-matrix-healthchecks compose-deploy reconcile
+
+help:
+	@printf '%s\n' \
+		'VPS ops hub — make targets (run from repo root)' \
+		'' \
+		'Variables: LIMIT=<group|host>  CONFIRM=1  TARGETS=<svc[,svc]>  TRAEFIK=1  VERBOSE=0|1|2  EXTRA=...' \
+		'' \
+		'Local / repo:' \
+		'  validate, check     scripts/validate-repo.sh (pre-merge gate)' \
+		'  deps, galaxy        ansible-galaxy collection install' \
+		'  syntax              ansible-playbook --syntax-check all playbooks' \
+		'' \
+		'Read-only remote (ansible):' \
+		'  ping                ansible managed -m ping' \
+		'  inventory           ansible-inventory --graph' \
+		'  audit               playbooks/audit.yml' \
+		'  health [LIMIT=…]    playbooks/health-report.yml' \
+		'  health-mailcow      health --limit mailcow' \
+		'  health-matrix       health --limit matrix' \
+		'  maint-preview       playbooks/maintenance-preview.yml' \
+		'  baseline            playbooks/baseline.yml' \
+		'  compose-check       compose-deploy --check --diff (requires LIMIT=)' \
+		'' \
+		'Mutating (require CONFIRM=1; host-scoped targets require LIMIT=):' \
+		'  install-healthchecks        playbooks/healthchecks.yml' \
+		'  install-matrix-healthchecks playbooks/matrix-healthchecks.yml' \
+		'  compose-deploy              playbooks/compose-deploy.yml' \
+		'  reconcile                   playbooks/compose-reconcile.yml (requires TARGETS=)' \
+		'' \
+		'Examples:' \
+		'  make validate' \
+		'  make health LIMIT=mailcow' \
+		'  make compose-check LIMIT=vaultwarden' \
+		'  make compose-deploy LIMIT=vaultwarden CONFIRM=1' \
+		'  make reconcile LIMIT=powerdns TARGETS=auth CONFIRM=1' \
+		'  make reconcile LIMIT=vaultwarden TARGETS=vaultwarden TRAEFIK=1 CONFIRM=1' \
+		'' \
+		'Advanced (not wrapped — use ansible-playbook directly):' \
+		'  us4-firewalld, unifi-sso, k3s-server, matrix-stack, wireguard-harden,' \
+		'  restic, rustdesk, email-alerts, mailcow update runbook'
+
+validate check:
+	@bash "$(REPO_ROOT)/scripts/validate-repo.sh"
+
+deps galaxy: ansible-prep
+	@command -v ansible-galaxy >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "ansible-galaxy not found; install Ansible first." >&2; exit 1; }
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-galaxy collection install -r requirements.yml
+
+syntax: ansible-prep
+	@if ! command -v ansible-playbook >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
+		echo "ansible-playbook not found; syntax check skipped." >&2; \
+		exit 0; \
+	fi
+	@fail=0; \
+	for p in "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)"/playbooks/*.yml; do \
+		if ! (cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook --syntax-check "playbooks/$$(basename "$$p")" >/dev/null 2>&1); then \
+			echo "syntax-check failed: $$p" >&2; \
+			fail=1; \
+		fi; \
+	done; \
+	exit $$fail
+
+ansible-prep:
+	@mkdir -p "$(ANSIBLE_HOME)/tmp" "$(ANSIBLE_HOME)/ssh-control"
+
+define require_ansible
+	@command -v ansible-playbook >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "ansible-playbook not found; install Ansible first." >&2; exit 1; }
+endef
+
+define require_limit
+	@if [ -z "$(LIMIT)" ]; then \
+		echo "LIMIT is required (e.g. LIMIT=mailcow, LIMIT=vaultwarden, LIMIT=powerdns)." >&2; \
+		exit 1; \
+	fi
+endef
+
+define require_confirm
+	@if [ "$(CONFIRM)" != "1" ]; then \
+		echo "Mutating operation blocked. Re-run with CONFIRM=1" >&2; \
+		exit 1; \
+	fi
+endef
+
+define require_targets
+	@if [ -z "$(TARGETS)" ]; then \
+		echo "TARGETS is required (comma-separated service names, e.g. TARGETS=auth or TARGETS=vaultwarden)." >&2; \
+		exit 1; \
+	fi
+endef
+
+ping: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible managed -m ping $(LIMIT_FLAG) $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+inventory: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-inventory --graph $(EXTRA)
+
+audit: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/audit.yml $(LIMIT_FLAG) $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+health: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/health-report.yml $(LIMIT_FLAG) $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+health-mailcow: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/health-report.yml --limit mailcow $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+health-matrix: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/health-report.yml --limit matrix $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+maint-preview: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/maintenance-preview.yml $(LIMIT_FLAG) $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+baseline: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/baseline.yml $(LIMIT_FLAG) $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+compose-check: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	$(require_limit)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/compose-deploy.yml --check --diff --limit $(LIMIT) $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+install-healthchecks: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	$(require_confirm)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/healthchecks.yml $(LIMIT_FLAG) $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+install-matrix-healthchecks: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	$(require_confirm)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/matrix-healthchecks.yml $(LIMIT_FLAG) $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+compose-deploy: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	$(require_limit)
+	$(require_confirm)
+	@cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/compose-deploy.yml --limit $(LIMIT) \
+		-e '{"compose_deploy_confirm": true}' $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
+
+reconcile: ansible-prep
+	$(require_ansible)
+	$(require_limit)
+	$(require_targets)
+	$(require_confirm)
+	@json=$$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; t=[x.strip() for x in sys.argv[1].split(",") if x.strip()]; \
+		(not t) and sys.exit("TARGETS must contain at least one non-empty service name"); \
+		d={"service_reconcile_confirm": True, "service_reconcile_targets": t}; \
+		(sys.argv[2]=="1") and d.update({"service_reconcile_restart_traefik": True}); \
+		print(json.dumps(d))' "$(TARGETS)" "$(TRAEFIK)"); \
+	cd "$(ANSIBLE_DIR)" && ansible-playbook playbooks/compose-reconcile.yml --limit $(LIMIT) \
+		-e "$$json" $(VERBOSE_FLAG) $(EXTRA)
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# RUNBOOKS — 仓库级规范
+
+本文件统一所有 Runbook 的字段、命名、评审与变更规则。上游参考：[docs/archive/agent-runbook-guide.md](docs/archive/agent-runbook-guide.md)。
+
+## 目录结构
+
+```text
+runbooks/
+├── README.md                 # 意图 → 文件 路由索引（本目录的入口）
+├── _template.md              # 新建 runbook 的标准模板（复制后填写）
+├── <intent>.md               # 每份 runbook 只描述一种可识别的操作意图
+└── ...
+```
+
+## 最小字段模型
+
+每份 runbook 必须显式包含以下控制信息，否则盲目执行或错误恢复的风险会升高：
+
+| 字段 | 作用 | 写作要求 |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Action** | 定义当前要执行的动作 | 可观察、可执行的动词；避免“检查一下”“适当调整” |
+| **Expected** | 描述正常状态或预期输出 | 具体信号、阈值、状态码、测试结果或页面表现 |
+| **Decision** | 定义分支与下一跳 | “条件 → 下一步”；无法判断时指向 `STOP` |
+| **Verification** | 确认变更真正生效 | 每个有副作用的步骤后执行，不可跳过 |
+| **Stop condition** | 规定何时不得继续 | 列出信息缺失、状态冲突、权限不足、验证失败等 |
+| **Rollback** | 如何恢复到变更前状态 | 触发条件、前提、撤销步骤、回滚后验证 |
+
+> 只读类 runbook 不产生副作用，可省略 Rollback；但必须保留 Stop condition（状态与预期冲突即 `STOP` 并记录证据）。
+
+**只读类变体（read-only variant）**：只读 runbook（health 类、参考类）不强制
+六字段模型，但必须包含以下最小结构，否则不视为达标：
+
+- `## Purpose`（1–2 行）+ `## Scope`（适用/不适用）
+- `## Safety` 或等效章节，其中**必须**含显式 Stop condition（状态与预期冲突即
+  `STOP` 并记录证据；不得在执行中自行"顺手修复"）
+- 只读健康类另含可观察的 `## Pass criteria`（或等效的 Expected 信号）
+- 每份 runbook 顶部/元信息区必须标注 `Last reviewed: <YYYY-MM-DD>`
+
+## 命名与拆分规则
+
+- 文件名采用小写连字符，反映**操作意图**而非目标主机，例如 `mailcow-health.md`、`release.md`。
+- 一份文件只描述一种意图。流程出现明显分叉时拆分为独立文件，不堆叠“万能流程”。
+- 只读诊断与变更操作应分离：health 类 runbook 保持只读，变更走 `ansible-operations.md`、`release.md`、`rollback.md` 或对应 gated playbook。
+
+## 章节约定
+
+- 每份 runbook 顶部含 `## Purpose`（1–2 行）与 `## Scope`（适用/不适用情形）。
+- 变更型 runbook 必须记录明确的审批门：门控命令式使用 `## Approval gates` 表；
+  流程式在步骤中记录审批动作、证据位置和未批准时的 `STOP`。破坏性/不可逆操作必须获得明确批准。
+- 语言约定：**runbook 正文统一使用英文**（由 agent 逐字执行，降低二义性）；
+  元规范文件（AGENTS.md / RUNBOOKS.md / 模板注释）可保留中文。
+- 变更型 runbook 的两种形态：
+  - **流程式（Procedure 型）**：使用六字段模型，适用多分支/多步骤变更
+    （现有：`fix-ci.md`、`issue-to-merge.md`、`network-change.md`、
+    `network-recovery.md`、`release.md`、`rollback.md`）。
+  - **门控命令式（gated command reference）**：已稳定、低歧义、可验证的
+    操作以命令集 + 门控呈现（现有：`mailcow-update.md`、
+    `ansible-operations.md`、`home-assistant-maintenance.md`、
+    `matrix-e2ee-update.md`、`vaultwarden-sqlite-to-postgres.md`），必须含 Approval gates 或确认变量
+    要求 + 显式 STOP，不替代流程式形态。新写的变更 runbook 默认用流程式。
+- 统一在 `## Safety` 或正文中复用以下通用安全规则（更严格要求优先）。
+
+```markdown
+## Safety Rules
+
+- Never delete an existing configuration as the first recovery action.
+- Prefer read-only diagnosis before mutation.
+- After every mutation, verify the expected state.
+- If actual state conflicts with this runbook, STOP.
+- Do not invent missing parameters.
+- Do not bypass failed tests.
+- Destructive actions require explicit approval.
+```
+
+## 评审与变更规则
+
+- 新建/修改 runbook 与代码同仓评审，随系统演进更新。
+- 每份 runbook 标注 `Last reviewed`；流程执行过程中发现的偏差记入对应的 Linear `vps` 项目 issue。
+- 破坏性流程（迁移、删除、DNS 变更、网络变更）保持人工审批，不自动下沉。
+
+## 成熟路径
+
+1. **人工处理** → 现场处置与复盘，记录证据。
+2. **Markdown runbook** → 固化步骤与证据要求，Agent 可辅助诊断。
+3. **Agent + runbook** → 严格按流程执行，受 Stop/Approval 约束。
+4. **Script / Ansible / Skill** → 把已稳定、低歧义、可验证的操作程序化（本仓库的执行层是 Ansible playbook）。
+5. **人工审批 + 自动执行** → 审批门控下的自动变更（如 gated playbook + 确认变量）。
+
+原则：先证据后变更，先小范围后扩大，先验证后结束，不确定则停止。
@@ -11,3 +11,8 @@ host_key_checking = True
 become = True
 become_method = sudo
 become_ask_pass = False
+
+[ssh_connection]
+# Keep SSH control sockets inside the repo (gitignored .ansible/) so playbook
+# runs work in sandboxed/CI environments without touching ~/.ansible.
+ssh_args = -C -o ControlMaster=auto -o ControlPersist=60s -o ControlPath=.ansible/ssh-control/%h-%p-%r
@@ -15,18 +15,23 @@ all:
        mx2:
          ansible_host: mx2.windy.me
          ansible_host_ipv4: 194.163.160.244
+          display_name: mx2.windy.me
          service_role: mailcow
          compose_project_dir: /opt/mail
-          healthcheck_profile: mailcow
+          healthcheck_profiles: [mailcow]
          service_reconcile_services:
            all:
              compose_args: [--force-recreate]
        us2:
          ansible_host: us2.wsvc.info
          ansible_host_ipv4: 193.9.44.165
+          display_name: us2.wsvc.info
          service_role: vaultwarden
          compose_project_dir: /opt/vaultwarden
-          healthcheck_profile: vaultwarden
+          compose_repo_project: vaultwarden
+          compose_remote_file: docker-compose.yml
+          healthcheck_profiles: [vaultwarden]
+          restic_backup_profile: vaultwarden
          service_reconcile_services:
            vaultwarden:
              compose_args: [--force-recreate]
@@ -34,9 +39,13 @@ all:
        hk2:
          ansible_host: hk2.chans.xyz
          ansible_host_ipv4: 154.36.174.161
+          display_name: hk2.chans.xyz
          service_role: powerdns
          compose_project_dir: /opt/pdns
-          healthcheck_profile: pdns
+          compose_repo_project: pdns
+          compose_remote_file: compose.yml
+          healthcheck_profiles: [pdns, rustdesk, hk2aux]
+          restic_backup_profile: pdns
          service_reconcile_services:
            auth:
              compose_args: [--force-recreate]
@@ -45,6 +54,32 @@ all:
            backup:
              compose_args: [--no-deps, --force-recreate]
          service_reconcile_traefik_restart_targets: [poweradmin]
+          # RustDesk server (same host, separate compose project)
+          rustdesk_compose_dir: /opt/rustdesk
+          rustdesk_relay: hk2.chans.xyz:21117
+          rustdesk_image: rustdesk/rustdesk-server:1.1.14
+        us4:
+          ansible_host: us4.wsvc.info
+          ansible_host_ipv4: 185.201.226.122
+          display_name: us4.wsvc.info
+          service_role: wireguard
+          compose_project_dir: /opt/wireguard
+          healthcheck_profiles: [wireguard]
+          wireguard_image: >-
+            lscr.io/linuxserver/wireguard@sha256:ac43e1226878d2611315172d6ea357a95cb326ee73124b91108118efc8666889
+          service_reconcile_services:
+            wireguard:
+              compose_args: [--no-deps, --force-recreate]
+        dns_windy_lan:
+          ansible_host: 192.168.66.36
+          ansible_host_ipv4: 192.168.66.36
+          display_name: dns.windy.lan
+          service_role: adguardhome
+          compose_project_dir: /opt/adguardhome
+          healthcheck_profiles: [adguardhome]
+          service_reconcile_services:
+            adguardhome:
+              compose_args: [--no-deps, --force-recreate]
    mailcow:
      hosts:
        mx2:
@@ -54,11 +89,34 @@ all:
    powerdns:
      hosts:
        hk2:
+    rustdesk:
+      hosts:
+        hk2:
+    wireguard:
+      hosts:
+        us4:
+    adguardhome:
+      hosts:
+        dns_windy_lan:
+    unifi:
+      hosts:
+        ubnt:
+          ansible_host: 192.168.66.46
+          ansible_host_ipv4: 192.168.66.46
+          display_name: ubnt
+      vars:
+        service_role: unifi
+        compose_project_dir: /home/windy/unifi-9
+        unifi_container: unifi-controller
+        unifi_mongo_port: 27117
    docker_hosts:
      children:
        mailcow:
        vaultwarden:
        powerdns:
+        wireguard:
+        adguardhome:
+        unifi:
    # Matrix is a dedicated K3s node and intentionally remains outside the
    # Docker-oriented managed group.
    k3s_servers:
@@ -66,6 +124,7 @@ all:
        matrix_vps:
          ansible_host: 169.58.86.13
          ansible_host_ipv4: 169.58.86.13
+          display_name: synapse.chans.xyz
          service_role: matrix_k3s
          matrix_server_name: chans.xyz
          matrix_synapse_host: synapse.chans.xyz
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
      ansible.builtin.debug:
        msg:
          host: "{{ inventory_hostname }}"
-          profile: "{{ healthcheck_profile }}"
+          profiles: "{{ healthcheck_profiles | default([]) | join(', ') }}"
          os: "{{ ansible_distribution }} {{ ansible_distribution_version }}"
          kernel: "{{ ansible_kernel }}"
          compose_rc: "{{ audit_compose_ps.rc }}"
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---
+# Deploy repo-owned Compose declarations (compose/<project>/compose.yml) to
+# inventory hosts. Non-secret source; server-local .env provides the values.
+# Gated: apply requires compose_deploy_confirm=true; --check is a read-only
+# diff + validation. See runbooks/ansible-operations.md.
+- name: Deploy repo-owned Compose declarations
+  hosts: docker_hosts
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  serial: 1
+  roles:
+    - role: compose_deploy
+      tags: [compose, deploy, mutating]
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+# Deploy/reconcile the self-hosted RustDesk server (hbbs + hbbr) on hk2.
+#
+# Safe by default: run with --check for a read-only report, or supply
+# rustdesk_confirm=true to deploy the compose file and recreate the stack.
+#
+#   # Read-only report
+#   ansible-playbook playbooks/rustdesk.yml --limit rustdesk --check
+#
+#   # Apply (deploy compose + recreate hbbs/hbbr)
+#   ansible-playbook playbooks/rustdesk.yml --limit rustdesk \
+#     -e '{"rustdesk_confirm": true}'
+- name: Deploy and reconcile RustDesk server
+  hosts: rustdesk
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  serial: 1
+  roles:
+    - role: rustdesk
+      tags: [rustdesk, mutating]
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+---
+# Reconcile the UniFi controller SSO login setting
+# (super_sdn.sso_login_enabled = "Sync Local Admin with Ubiquiti SSO").
+#
+# Safe by default: run with --check for a read-only status report, or supply
+# unifi_sso_confirm=true to apply the declared target value.
+#
+#   # Read-only status
+#   ansible-playbook playbooks/unifi-sso.yml --limit ubnt --check
+#
+#   # Apply (disable SSO login; local accounts use local passwords, no MFA)
+#   ansible-playbook playbooks/unifi-sso.yml --limit ubnt \
+#     -e '{"unifi_sso_confirm": true, "unifi_sso_target_value": false}'
+#
+#   # Rollback (re-enable SSO login)
+#   ansible-playbook playbooks/unifi-sso.yml --limit ubnt \
+#     -e '{"unifi_sso_confirm": true, "unifi_sso_target_value": true}'
+- name: Reconcile UniFi SSO login setting
+  hosts: unifi
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  serial: 1
+  roles:
+    - role: unifi_sso
+      tags: [unifi, sso, mutating]
@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+---
+# Narrow reconciliation for the audited us4 public zone. This playbook never
+# reloads or restarts firewalld and deliberately does not manage Docker rules.
+- name: Safely remove audited stale firewalld allowances from us4
+  hosts: wireguard
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  serial: 1
+  any_errors_fatal: true
+  vars:
+    us4_firewalld_confirm: false
+    us4_console_confirm: false
+    us4_firewalld_zone: public
+    us4_firewalld_keep_services:
+      - dhcpv6-client
+      - http
+      - https
+      - smtp
+      - ssh
+    us4_firewalld_stale_services:
+      - imap
+      - imaps
+      - smtp-submission
+      - smtps
+    us4_firewalld_stale_ports:
+      - 24/tcp
+      - 6443/tcp
+      - 8443/tcp
+    us4_firewalld_expected_containers:
+      - nghttpx-proxy
+      - semaphoreui-postgres-1
+      - semaphoreui-semaphore-1
+      - squid-backend
+      - traefik
+      - trlm-server-trilium-1
+      - wireguard
+    us4_firewalld_backup_root: /var/backups/us4-firewall
+
+  tasks:
+    - name: Require the audited host and explicit apply confirmations
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - inventory_hostname == 'us4'
+          - ansible_host == 'us4.wsvc.info'
+          - ansible_host_ipv4 == '185.201.226.122'
+          - ansible_check_mode or (us4_firewalld_confirm | bool)
+          - ansible_check_mode or (us4_console_confirm | bool)
+        fail_msg: >-
+          Apply is allowed only for audited host us4 after the provider console
+          has been tested. Set both us4_firewalld_confirm=true and
+          us4_console_confirm=true. Check mode does not require confirmation.
+
+    - name: Verify the remote host identity
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [hostname, -f]
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+      register: us4_firewalld_hostname
+
+    - name: Reject an unexpected remote host
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - us4_firewalld_hostname.stdout == 'us4.wsvc.info'
+
+    - name: Verify required services are active
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [systemctl, is-active, --quiet, "{{ item }}"]
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+      loop:
+        - atd
+        - firewalld
+
+    - name: Verify firewalld Python bindings used by ansible.posix
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [python3, -c, "import dbus, firewall, firewall.client"]
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+
+    - name: Verify the default firewalld zone
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [firewall-cmd, --get-default-zone]
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+      register: us4_firewalld_default_zone
+
+    - name: Read runtime public-zone services
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [firewall-cmd, --zone=public, --list-services]
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+      register: us4_firewalld_runtime_services
+
+    - name: Read permanent public-zone services
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [firewall-cmd, --permanent, --zone=public, --list-services]
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+      register: us4_firewalld_permanent_services
+
+    - name: Read runtime public-zone ports
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [firewall-cmd, --zone=public, --list-ports]
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+      register: us4_firewalld_runtime_ports
+
+    - name: Read permanent public-zone ports
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [firewall-cmd, --permanent, --zone=public, --list-ports]
+      check_mode: false
+      changed_when: false
+      register: us4_firewalld_permanent_ports
+
+    - name: Normalize the audited public-zone state
+      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+        us4_firewalld_pre_services: "{{ us4_firewalld_runtime_services.stdout.split() | sort }}"
+        us4_firewalld_pre_permanent_services: "{{ us4_firewalld_permanent_services.stdout.split() | sort }}"
+        us4_firewalld_pre_ports: "{{ us4_firewalld_runtime_ports.stdout.split() | sort }}"
+        us4_firewalld_pre_permanent_ports: "{{ us4_firewalld_permanent_ports.stdout.split() | sort }}"
+
+    - name: Fail closed on public-zone drift or unknown allowances
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - us4_firewalld_default_zone.stdout == us4_firewalld_zone
+          - us4_firewalld_pre_services == us4_firewalld_pre_permanent_services
+          - us4_firewalld_pre_ports == us4_firewalld_pre_permanent_ports
+          - us4_firewalld_keep_services | difference(us4_firewalld_pre_services) | length == 0
+          - us4_firewalld_pre_services | difference(us4_firewalld_keep_services + us4_firewalld_stale_services) | length == 0
+          - us4_firewalld_pre_ports | difference(us4_firewalld_stale_ports) | length == 0
+        fail_msg: >-
+          The public zone differs from the audited baseline. Stop and review it;
+          this playbook will not infer whether an unknown allowance is required.
+
+    - name: Select only audited stale entries that currently exist
+      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+        us4_firewalld_cleanup_services: >-
+          {{ us4_firewalld_stale_services | intersect(us4_firewalld_pre_services) | sort }}
+        us4_firewalld_cleanup_ports: >-
+          {{ us4_firewalld_stale_ports | intersect(us4_firewalld_pre_ports) | sort }}
+
+    - name: Report the proposed reconciliation
+      ansible.builtin.debug:
+        msg:
+          keep_services: "{{ us4_firewalld_keep_services }}"
+          remove_services: "{{ us4_firewalld_cleanup_services }}"
+          remove_ports: "{{ us4_firewalld_cleanup_ports }}"
+          reload_or_restart: false
+
+    - name: Create rollback material when cleanup is required
+      when:
+        - not ansible_check_mode
+        - us4_firewalld_cleanup_services | length > 0 or us4_firewalld_cleanup_ports | length > 0
+      block:
+        - name: Create the protected firewall backup root
+          ansible.builtin.file:
+            path: "{{ us4_firewalld_backup_root }}"
+            state: directory
+            owner: root
+            group: root
+            mode: "0700"
+
+        - name: Create a backup timestamp
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [date, +%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%z]
+          changed_when: false
+          register: us4_firewalld_backup_timestamp
+
+        - name: Set the protected backup directory
+          ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+            us4_firewalld_backup_dir: >-
+              {{ us4_firewalld_backup_root }}/{{ us4_firewalld_backup_timestamp.stdout }}
+            us4_firewalld_rollback_command: >-
+              {{ us4_firewalld_backup_root }}/{{ us4_firewalld_backup_timestamp.stdout }}/rollback-phase1.sh
+
+        - name: Create the protected backup directory
+          ansible.builtin.file:
+            path: "{{ us4_firewalld_backup_dir }}"
+            state: directory
+            owner: root
+            group: root
+            mode: "0700"
+
+        - name: Back up the complete firewalld configuration
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv:
+              - tar
+              - --create
+              - --gzip
+              - "--file={{ us4_firewalld_backup_dir }}/firewalld.tgz"
+              - --directory=/etc
+              - firewalld
+          changed_when: true
+
+        - name: Capture the pre-change runtime ruleset
+          ansible.builtin.shell:
+            cmd: >-
+              umask 077 && nft list ruleset >
+              {{ us4_firewalld_backup_dir | quote }}/nft-ruleset.txt
+            executable: /bin/bash
+          changed_when: true
+
+        - name: Install the exact pre-change rollback script
+          ansible.builtin.copy:
+            dest: "{{ us4_firewalld_rollback_command }}"
+            owner: root
+            group: root
+            mode: "0700"
+            content: |
+              #!/bin/sh
+              set -eu
+              exec >>/var/log/us4-firewalld-phase1-rollback.log 2>&1
+              printf '%s rollback start\n' "$(date -Is)"
+              add_service() {
+                service=$1
+                /usr/bin/firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=public \
+                  --query-service="$service" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+                  /usr/bin/firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=public \
+                    --add-service="$service"
+                /usr/bin/firewall-cmd --zone=public \
+                  --query-service="$service" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+                  /usr/bin/firewall-cmd --zone=public --add-service="$service"
+              }
+              add_port() {
+                port=$1
+                /usr/bin/firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=public \
+                  --query-port="$port" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+                  /usr/bin/firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=public \
+                    --add-port="$port"
+                /usr/bin/firewall-cmd --zone=public \
+                  --query-port="$port" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+                  /usr/bin/firewall-cmd --zone=public --add-port="$port"
+              }
+              {% for service in us4_firewalld_cleanup_services %}
+              add_service {{ service }}
+              {% endfor %}
+              {% for port in us4_firewalld_cleanup_ports %}
+              add_port {{ port }}
+              {% endfor %}
+              /usr/bin/firewall-cmd --check-config
+              printf '%s rollback complete\n' "$(date -Is)"
+
+        - name: Schedule the 15-minute automatic rollback
+          ansible.builtin.shell:
+            cmd: |
+              set -euo pipefail
+              output=$(printf '%s\n' {{ us4_firewalld_rollback_command | quote }} | at now + 15 minutes 2>&1)
+              job_id=$(printf '%s\n' "$output" | sed -n 's/^job \([0-9][0-9]*\).*/\1/p')
+              test -n "$job_id"
+              printf '%s\n' "$job_id"
+            executable: /bin/bash
+          changed_when: true
+          register: us4_firewalld_rollback_job
+
+        - name: Record the automatic rollback job
+          ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+            us4_firewalld_rollback_job_id: "{{ us4_firewalld_rollback_job.stdout }}"
+            us4_firewalld_rollback_cancelled: false
+
+        - name: Persist the rollback job ID beside the backup
+          ansible.builtin.copy:
+            dest: "{{ us4_firewalld_backup_dir }}/phase1-at-job-id"
+            owner: root
+            group: root
+            mode: "0600"
+            content: "{{ us4_firewalld_rollback_job_id }}\n"
+
+    - name: Reconcile and verify the audited public zone
+      block:
+        - name: Remove audited stale firewalld services
+          ansible.posix.firewalld:
+            zone: "{{ us4_firewalld_zone }}"
+            service: "{{ item }}"
+            state: disabled
+            permanent: true
+            immediate: true
+          loop: "{{ us4_firewalld_stale_services }}"
+
+        - name: Remove audited stale firewalld ports
+          ansible.posix.firewalld:
+            zone: "{{ us4_firewalld_zone }}"
+            port: "{{ item }}"
+            state: disabled
+            permanent: true
+            immediate: true
+          loop: "{{ us4_firewalld_stale_ports }}"
+
+        - name: Verify the permanent firewalld configuration
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [firewall-cmd, --check-config]
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          changed_when: false
+
+        - name: Read reconciled runtime services
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [firewall-cmd, --zone=public, --list-services]
+          changed_when: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          register: us4_firewalld_after_runtime_services
+
+        - name: Read reconciled permanent services
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [firewall-cmd, --permanent, --zone=public, --list-services]
+          changed_when: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          register: us4_firewalld_after_permanent_services
+
+        - name: Read reconciled runtime ports
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [firewall-cmd, --zone=public, --list-ports]
+          changed_when: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          register: us4_firewalld_after_runtime_ports
+
+        - name: Read reconciled permanent ports
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [firewall-cmd, --permanent, --zone=public, --list-ports]
+          changed_when: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          register: us4_firewalld_after_permanent_ports
+
+        - name: Require the exact audited post-change public zone
+          ansible.builtin.assert:
+            that:
+              - us4_firewalld_after_runtime_services.stdout.split() | sort == us4_firewalld_keep_services | sort
+              - us4_firewalld_after_permanent_services.stdout.split() | sort == us4_firewalld_keep_services | sort
+              - us4_firewalld_after_runtime_ports.stdout.split() | length == 0
+              - us4_firewalld_after_permanent_ports.stdout.split() | length == 0
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+        - name: Verify a fresh independent SSH and sudo path
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv:
+              - ssh
+              - -4
+              - -o
+              - BatchMode=yes
+              - -o
+              - ConnectTimeout=10
+              - -o
+              - ControlMaster=no
+              - -o
+              - ControlPath=none
+              - windy@us4.wsvc.info
+              - sudo -n true
+          delegate_to: localhost
+          become: false
+          changed_when: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          vars:
+            ansible_become: false
+
+        - name: Verify public HTTPS routes
+          ansible.builtin.uri:
+            url: "{{ item.url }}"
+            follow_redirects: all
+            status_code: "{{ item.status }}"
+            validate_certs: true
+            use_proxy: false
+          loop:
+            - {url: https://update.wsvc.info/, status: 200}
+            - {url: https://us4-gate.wsvc.info/, status: 401}
+            - {url: https://trlm.wsvc.info/, status: 200}
+          delegate_to: localhost
+          become: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          vars:
+            ansible_become: false
+
+        - name: Verify the secondary MX TCP listener externally
+          ansible.builtin.wait_for:
+            host: "{{ ansible_host_ipv4 }}"
+            port: 25
+            state: started
+            connect_timeout: 5
+            timeout: 10
+          delegate_to: localhost
+          become: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          vars:
+            ansible_become: false
+
+        - name: Verify all expected containers are running
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [docker, ps, --format, "{{ '{{.Names}}' }}"]
+          changed_when: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          register: us4_firewalld_running_containers
+
+        - name: Reject missing application containers
+          ansible.builtin.assert:
+            that:
+              - us4_firewalld_expected_containers | difference(us4_firewalld_running_containers.stdout_lines) | length == 0
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+        - name: Verify Fail2ban remains active
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [fail2ban-client, status]
+          changed_when: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          register: us4_firewalld_fail2ban
+
+        - name: Require all audited Fail2ban jails
+          ansible.builtin.assert:
+            that:
+              - item in us4_firewalld_fail2ban.stdout
+          loop:
+            - postfix-postscreen
+            - postfix-sasl
+            - recidive
+            - sshd
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+        - name: Verify the deployed WireGuard health check
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [/usr/local/lib/vps-health/run]
+          changed_when: false
+          when: not ansible_check_mode
+          register: us4_firewalld_wireguard_health
+
+        - name: Cancel automatic rollback only after all checks pass
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [at, -r, "{{ us4_firewalld_rollback_job_id }}"]
+          changed_when: true
+          when:
+            - not ansible_check_mode
+            - us4_firewalld_cleanup_services | length > 0 or us4_firewalld_cleanup_ports | length > 0
+
+        - name: Mark the automatic rollback as cancelled
+          ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+            us4_firewalld_rollback_cancelled: true
+          when:
+            - not ansible_check_mode
+            - us4_firewalld_cleanup_services | length > 0 or us4_firewalld_cleanup_ports | length > 0
+
+      rescue:
+        - name: Preserve the automatic rollback and stop
+          ansible.builtin.fail:
+            msg: >-
+              A reconciliation or verification task failed. No reload was
+              attempted. If cleanup was required, its automatic rollback remains
+              scheduled; do not remove it manually.
+
+      always:
+        - name: Report backup and rollback disposition
+          ansible.builtin.debug:
+            msg:
+              backup: >-
+                {{ us4_firewalld_backup_dir |
+                   default('not-created-in-check-mode' if ansible_check_mode else 'not-required') }}
+              automatic_rollback: >-
+                {{ 'not-created-in-check-mode' if ansible_check_mode else
+                   ('cancelled-after-success' if (us4_firewalld_rollback_cancelled | default(false)) else
+                    'scheduled-or-executed') if
+                    (us4_firewalld_cleanup_services | length > 0 or us4_firewalld_cleanup_ports | length > 0)
+                    else 'not-required' }}
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+# This owns the non-secret Compose declaration only. WireGuard key material
+# remains under the server-local /opt/wireguard/config bind mount.
+- name: Apply the reviewed WireGuard Compose hardening
+  hosts: wireguard
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  serial: 1
+  vars:
+    wireguard_harden_confirm: false
+    wireguard_compose_candidate: "{{ compose_project_dir }}/compose.yml.candidate"
+  tasks:
+    - name: Require explicit WireGuard hardening confirmation
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - wireguard_harden_confirm | bool
+        fail_msg: >-
+          This operation replaces the non-secret Compose declaration. Run only
+          during the approved maintenance window after a rollback archive exists.
+
+    - name: Verify that a protected pre-change archive exists
+      ansible.builtin.find:
+        paths: "{{ compose_project_dir }}/backups"
+        patterns: 'pre-hardening-*.tar.gz'
+        file_type: file
+      register: wireguard_pre_hardening_archives
+
+    - name: Require a pre-change rollback archive
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - wireguard_pre_hardening_archives.matched | int > 0
+        fail_msg: >-
+          Create a protected pre-hardening archive before replacing compose.yml.
+
+    - name: Render the candidate non-secret Compose declaration
+      ansible.builtin.template:
+        src: ../templates/wireguard-compose.yml.j2
+        dest: "{{ wireguard_compose_candidate }}"
+        owner: root
+        group: root
+        mode: "0644"
+
+    - name: Validate the candidate Compose declaration
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv:
+          - docker
+          - compose
+          - --project-directory
+          - "{{ compose_project_dir }}"
+          - --file
+          - "{{ wireguard_compose_candidate }}"
+          - config
+          - --quiet
+      changed_when: false
+
+    - name: Atomically activate the validated Compose declaration
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv:
+          - mv
+          - "{{ wireguard_compose_candidate }}"
+          - "{{ compose_project_dir }}/compose.yml"
+      changed_when: true
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+---
+# Deliberately narrow maintenance path for the us4 WireGuard service. The
+# Compose file and all private key material remain on the server; this playbook
+# only pulls its declared immutable image and recreates the named service.
+- name: Update and recreate the approved WireGuard service
+  hosts: wireguard
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  serial: 1
+  vars:
+    wireguard_maintenance_confirm: false
+  tasks:
+    - name: Require explicit WireGuard maintenance confirmation
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - wireguard_maintenance_confirm | bool
+        fail_msg: >-
+          This operation pulls the image declared in /opt/wireguard/compose.yml
+          and briefly recreates WireGuard. Set wireguard_maintenance_confirm=true
+          only during the approved maintenance window.
+
+    - name: Create the local WireGuard rollback directory
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: "{{ compose_project_dir }}/backups"
+        state: directory
+        owner: root
+        group: root
+        mode: "0700"
+
+    - name: Create a timestamp for the rollback archive
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [date, +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ]
+      changed_when: false
+      register: wireguard_backup_timestamp
+
+    - name: Create a protected local rollback archive of WireGuard configuration
+      ansible.builtin.shell:
+        cmd: >-
+          umask 077 && tar --create --gzip
+          --file={{ compose_project_dir }}/backups/config-{{ wireguard_backup_timestamp.stdout }}.tar.gz
+          --directory={{ compose_project_dir }} config
+        executable: /bin/bash
+      changed_when: true
+
+    - name: Verify the compose declaration uses an immutable image digest
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv:
+          - docker
+          - compose
+          - --project-directory
+          - "{{ compose_project_dir }}"
+          - config
+      changed_when: false
+      register: wireguard_compose_config
+
+    - name: Reject mutable WireGuard image declarations
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - "'@sha256:' in wireguard_compose_config.stdout"
+        fail_msg: >-
+          Pin the WireGuard image to an approved immutable digest before using
+          this maintenance playbook.
+
+    - name: Pull the declared WireGuard image
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv:
+          - docker
+          - compose
+          - --project-directory
+          - "{{ compose_project_dir }}"
+          - pull
+          - wireguard
+      changed_when: true
+
+    - name: Recreate the WireGuard container
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv:
+          - docker
+          - compose
+          - --project-directory
+          - "{{ compose_project_dir }}"
+          - up
+          - -d
+          - --no-deps
+          - --force-recreate
+          - wireguard
+      changed_when: true
+
+    - name: Verify WireGuard container state
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv:
+          - docker
+          - compose
+          - --project-directory
+          - "{{ compose_project_dir }}"
+          - ps
+          - --all
+      changed_when: false
+      register: wireguard_compose_ps
+
+    - name: Display WireGuard container state
+      ansible.builtin.debug:
+        var: wireguard_compose_ps.stdout_lines
+
+    - name: Run the deployed WireGuard health check
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [/usr/local/lib/vps-health/run]
+      changed_when: false
+      register: wireguard_health_report
+      failed_when: wireguard_health_report.rc not in [0, 1]
+
+    - name: Display sanitized WireGuard health result
+      ansible.builtin.debug:
+        msg: "{{ wireguard_health_report.stdout | default(wireguard_health_report.stderr, true) }}"
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+collections:
+  # us4-firewalld.yml was source-reviewed and exercised with this version.
+  - name: ansible.posix
+    version: 2.2.2
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+---
+# Allowlist of compose/ projects this playbook may deploy. A host may only
+# reference a project listed here (see tasks: "Require a repo compose project").
+compose_repo_projects:
+  - vaultwarden
+  - pdns
+  - adguardhome
+  - unifi
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+---
+# Deploy the repo-owned, sanitized Compose declaration to the host.
+#
+# Safety model:
+# - Only hosts with an inventory `compose_repo_project` (allowlisted) are valid.
+# - The repo file is staged to `<file>.dsh-new` and validated with
+#   `docker compose config --quiet` against the server-local .env BEFORE it
+#   replaces anything. A failed validation never touches the live file.
+# - The current file is kept as `*.bak-<timestamp>` before promotion.
+# - Apply mode requires `compose_deploy_confirm=true`; `--check` gives a
+#   read-only diff + validation without writes.
+# - The playbook never writes, reads, or transfers the server .env.
+
+- name: Require an allowlisted repo compose project for this host
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - compose_repo_project is defined
+      - compose_repo_project in compose_repo_projects
+    fail_msg: >-
+      No allowlisted compose_repo_project for {{ inventory_hostname }}.
+      Supported: {{ compose_repo_projects | join(', ') }}.
+
+- name: Require explicit confirmation for apply mode
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - ansible_check_mode or (compose_deploy_confirm | bool)
+    fail_msg: >-
+      This playbook replaces the server compose file and may recreate
+      containers. Run with --check for a read-only diff, or supply
+      compose_deploy_confirm=true to apply.
+
+- name: Stage the repo compose file next to the live one
+  ansible.builtin.copy:
+    src: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../../compose/{{ compose_repo_project }}/compose.yml"
+    dest: "{{ compose_project_dir }}/{{ compose_remote_file | default('compose.yml') }}.dsh-new"
+    mode: "0644"
+  diff: true
+  register: compose_stage
+
+- name: Validate staged compose against the server .env (read-only)
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv:
+      - docker
+      - compose
+      - -f
+      - "{{ compose_project_dir }}/{{ compose_remote_file | default('compose.yml') }}.dsh-new"
+      - --project-directory
+      - "{{ compose_project_dir }}"
+      - config
+      - --quiet
+  register: compose_validate
+  changed_when: false
+  failed_when: compose_validate.rc != 0
+
+- name: Show staged-vs-live difference
+  ansible.builtin.debug:
+    msg: "{{ compose_stage.diff | default('(no change)') }}"
+  when: ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: Back up the current compose file (apply mode)
+  ansible.builtin.shell:
+    cmd: >-
+      cp -a '{{ compose_project_dir }}/{{ compose_remote_file | default('compose.yml') }}'
+      '{{ compose_project_dir }}/{{ compose_remote_file | default('compose.yml') }}.bak-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)'
+  when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: Promote the validated compose file (apply mode)
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv:
+      - mv
+      - "{{ compose_project_dir }}/{{ compose_remote_file | default('compose.yml') }}.dsh-new"
+      - "{{ compose_project_dir }}/{{ compose_remote_file | default('compose.yml') }}"
+  when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: Apply the compose declaration (apply mode)
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv:
+      - docker
+      - compose
+      - --project-directory
+      - "{{ compose_project_dir }}"
+      - up
+      - -d
+  when: not ansible_check_mode
@@ -7,7 +7,13 @@ healthcheck_timer_on_calendar: '*-*-* 06:15:00'
 healthcheck_timer_randomized_delay_sec: 15m
 healthcheck_backup_max_age_hours: 30
 healthcheck_tls_warn_days: 21
-healthcheck_profiles:
+# Map of profile name -> installed script filename. A host selects which
+# profiles it runs via the `healthcheck_profiles` list (inventory).
+healthcheck_profile_scripts:
  mailcow: mailcow.sh
  vaultwarden: vaultwarden.sh
  pdns: pdns.sh
+  wireguard: wireguard.sh
+  adguardhome: adguardhome.sh
+  rustdesk: rustdesk.sh
+  hk2aux: hk2aux.sh
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 ---
- name: Validate known health-check profile
+- name: Validate known health-check profiles
  ansible.builtin.assert:
    that:
-      - healthcheck_profile in healthcheck_profiles
-    fail_msg: "Unsupported healthcheck_profile: {{ healthcheck_profile }}"
+      - item in healthcheck_profile_scripts
+    fail_msg: "Unsupported healthcheck_profile: {{ item }}"
+  loop: "{{ healthcheck_profiles }}"

 - name: Install health-check directories
  ansible.builtin.file:
@@ -28,13 +29,14 @@
    group: root
    mode: "0755"

- name: Install service health-check script
+- name: Install service health-check scripts
  ansible.builtin.template:
-    src: "{{ healthcheck_profiles[healthcheck_profile] }}.j2"
-    dest: "{{ healthcheck_install_root }}/{{ healthcheck_profiles[healthcheck_profile] }}"
+    src: "{{ healthcheck_profile_scripts[item] }}.j2"
+    dest: "{{ healthcheck_install_root }}/{{ healthcheck_profile_scripts[item] }}"
    owner: root
    group: root
    mode: "0755"
+  loop: "{{ healthcheck_profiles }}"

 - name: Install health-check dispatcher
  ansible.builtin.template:
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+source '{{ healthcheck_install_root }}/health-common.sh'
+
+require_command docker
+require_command curl
+require_command dig
+require_command ss
+require_command df
+check_compose
+
+container='adguardhome'
+if ! docker inspect "$container" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  record critical 'adguardhome_container_missing'
+else
+  running="$(docker inspect "$container" --format '{{ '{{' }}.State.Running{{ '}}' }}' 2>/dev/null)"
+  [[ "$running" == true ]] || record critical 'adguardhome_container_not_running'
+fi
+
+config_check="$(docker exec "$container" /opt/adguardhome/AdGuardHome --check-config \
+  -c /opt/adguardhome/conf/AdGuardHome.yaml 2>&1 || true)"
+if grep -qiE 'error|invalid|fatal' <<<"$config_check"; then
+  record critical 'adguardhome_config_invalid'
+else
+  record ok 'adguardhome_config_valid'
+fi
+
+if ss -H -ltn 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}' | grep -Eq '(^|:)53$'; then
+  record ok 'dns_tcp_53_listening'
+else
+  record critical 'dns_tcp_53_missing'
+fi
+if ss -H -uln 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}' | grep -Eq '(^|:)53$'; then
+  record ok 'dns_udp_53_listening'
+else
+  record critical 'dns_udp_53_missing'
+fi
+if ss -H -ltn 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}' | grep -Eq '(^|:)80$'; then
+  record ok 'ui_http_80_listening'
+else
+  record critical 'ui_http_80_missing'
+fi
+
+dns_a="$(dig +time=5 +tries=1 @192.168.66.36 example.com A +noall +answer 2>/dev/null)"
+[[ -n "$dns_a" ]] && record ok 'dns_example_a' || record critical 'dns_example_a_failed'
+dns_aaaa="$(dig +time=5 +tries=1 @192.168.66.36 example.com AAAA +noall +answer 2>/dev/null)"
+[[ -n "$dns_aaaa" ]] && record ok 'dns_example_aaaa' || record warning 'dns_example_aaaa_none'
+dns_local="$(dig +time=5 +tries=1 @192.168.66.36 hass.windy.lan A +noall +answer 2>/dev/null)"
+[[ -n "$dns_local" ]] && record ok 'dns_local_name' || record warning 'dns_local_name_unresolved'
+
+ui_code="$(curl --silent --show-error --output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 http://192.168.66.36/ 2>/dev/null || true)"
+case "$ui_code" in
+  200|301|302) record ok "ui_http_${ui_code}" ;;
+  '') record critical 'ui_unreachable' ;;
+  *) record critical "ui_http_${ui_code}" ;;
+esac
+
+usage="$(df -P /opt/adguardhome/work 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==2 {print $5}' | tr -d '%')"
+if [[ "$usage" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
+  if (( usage >= 90 )); then record critical 'disk_usage_high'
+  elif (( usage >= 80 )); then record warning 'disk_usage_elevated'
+  else record ok 'disk_usage_ok'; fi
+else
+  record unknown 'disk_usage_unknown'
+fi
+
+logs="$(docker logs --since 30m "$container" 2>&1 || true)"
+if grep -qiE '\[(error|warn|fatal)\]|level=(error|warn|fatal)' <<<"$logs"; then
+  record warning 'adguardhome_log_errors'
+else
+  record ok 'adguardhome_logs_clean'
+fi
+
+emit_result
+exit "$EXIT_CODE"
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ set -uo pipefail
 RESULT_DIR='{{ healthcheck_state_dir }}'
 LOG_DIR='{{ healthcheck_log_dir }}'
 HOST_NAME="$(hostname -f 2>/dev/null || hostname)"
-CHECK_NAME='{{ healthcheck_profile }}'
+CHECK_NAME="$(basename "$0" .sh)"
 STATUS=ok
 EXIT_CODE=0
 DETAILS=()
@@ -31,9 +31,27 @@ compose_ps() {
 }

 check_compose() {
-  local output
-  output="$(compose_ps)" || { record critical 'compose_ps_failed'; return; }
-  if grep -qiE 'Exited|Restarting|[[:space:]]Dead[[:space:]]' <<<"$output"; then
+  local output services bad
+  # Only flag containers of *active* services (config --services excludes
+  # debug/profile-gated services such as vaultwarden's pgweb, which is
+  # intentionally stopped unless started with --profile debug).
+  services="$(docker compose --project-directory '{{ compose_project_dir }}' config --services 2>/dev/null)" || { record critical 'compose_ps_failed'; return; }
+  output="$(docker compose --project-directory '{{ compose_project_dir }}' ps --all --format json 2>&1)" || { record critical 'compose_ps_failed'; return; }
+  bad="$(printf '%s\n' "$output" | python3 -c '
+import json, sys
+services = set(sys.argv[1].split())
+for line in sys.stdin:
+    line = line.strip()
+    if not line:
+        continue
+    try:
+        c = json.loads(line)
+    except Exception:
+        continue
+    if c.get("Service") in services and c.get("State") in ("exited", "restarting", "dead"):
+        print(c.get("Service"))
+' "$services")"
+  if [[ -n "$bad" ]]; then
    record critical 'compose_unhealthy_container'
  else
    record ok 'compose_ok'
@@ -77,8 +95,11 @@ check_tls_days() {
 }

 emit_result() {
-  local tmp detail_json
-  tmp="$(mktemp "${RESULT_DIR}/latest.json.XXXXXX")"
+  # Per-check JSON at latest-<check>.json. The dispatcher merges these into
+  # latest.json so multiple profiles on one host do not overwrite each other.
+  local tmp path detail_json
+  path="${RESULT_DIR}/latest-${CHECK_NAME}.json"
+  tmp="$(mktemp "${RESULT_DIR}/.latest-${CHECK_NAME}.XXXXXX")"
  detail_json="$(printf '%s\n' "${DETAILS[@]:-unknown:no_details}" | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.dumps([line.rstrip() for line in sys.stdin if line.strip()]))')"
  python3 - "$tmp" "$HOST_NAME" "$CHECK_NAME" "$STATUS" "$EXIT_CODE" "$detail_json" <<'PY'
 import json, sys
@@ -90,6 +111,75 @@ with open(path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
    f.write('\n')
 PY
  chmod 0640 "$tmp"
-  mv "$tmp" "${RESULT_DIR}/latest.json"
+  mv "$tmp" "$path"
+  cat "$path"
+}
+
+aggregate_result() {
+  # Merge the just-run per-check files into latest.json. With a single complete
+  # check this is a verbatim copy, preserving the historical one-object shape.
+  # With several checks it emits one object whose status is the worst of all
+  # checks; each check's own status/details are retained under `checks`. An
+  # expected check with no fresh result file (profile crashed before writing)
+  # is aggregated as `unknown`, so latest.json can never go stale while the
+  # dispatcher reports a failure.
+  case "$#" in
+    0) return 0 ;;
+    1) if [[ -f "${RESULT_DIR}/latest-$1.json" ]]; then
+         cp -f "${RESULT_DIR}/latest-$1.json" "${RESULT_DIR}/latest.json"
+       else
+         python3 - "$RESULT_DIR" "$HOST_NAME" "$@" <<'PY'
+import json, os, sys
+rdir, host = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+checks = sys.argv[3:]
+levels = {'ok': 0, 'warning': 1, 'unknown': 2, 'critical': 3}
+worst, worst_code = 'ok', 0
+items = []
+for c in checks:
+    p = os.path.join(rdir, 'latest-%s.json' % c)
+    if os.path.exists(p):
+        d = json.load(open(p))
+        st, code = d['status'], d['exit_code']
+        items.append({'check': d['check'], 'status': st,
+                      'exit_code': code, 'details': d['details']})
+    else:
+        st, code = 'unknown', 3
+        items.append({'check': c, 'status': st, 'exit_code': code,
+                      'details': ['unknown:check_did_not_complete']})
+    if levels[st] > levels[worst]:
+        worst, worst_code = st, code
+out = {'schema': 1, 'host': host, 'check': 'aggregate', 'status': worst,
+       'exit_code': worst_code, 'checks': items}
+open(os.path.join(rdir, 'latest.json'), 'w').write(
+    json.dumps(out, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')) + '\n')
+PY
+       fi ;;
+    *) python3 - "$RESULT_DIR" "$HOST_NAME" "$@" <<'PY'
+import json, os, sys
+rdir, host = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+checks = sys.argv[3:]
+levels = {'ok': 0, 'warning': 1, 'unknown': 2, 'critical': 3}
+worst, worst_code = 'ok', 0
+items = []
+for c in checks:
+    p = os.path.join(rdir, 'latest-%s.json' % c)
+    if os.path.exists(p):
+        d = json.load(open(p))
+        st, code = d['status'], d['exit_code']
+        items.append({'check': d['check'], 'status': st,
+                      'exit_code': code, 'details': d['details']})
+    else:
+        st, code = 'unknown', 3
+        items.append({'check': c, 'status': st, 'exit_code': code,
+                      'details': ['unknown:check_did_not_complete']})
+    if levels[st] > levels[worst]:
+        worst, worst_code = st, code
+out = {'schema': 1, 'host': host, 'check': 'aggregate', 'status': worst,
+       'exit_code': worst_code, 'checks': items}
+open(os.path.join(rdir, 'latest.json'), 'w').write(
+    json.dumps(out, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')) + '\n')
+PY
+  esac
+  chmod 0640 "${RESULT_DIR}/latest.json"
  cat "${RESULT_DIR}/latest.json"
 }
@@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -uo pipefail
-exec '{{ healthcheck_install_root }}/{{ healthcheck_profiles[healthcheck_profile] }}' >> '{{ healthcheck_log_dir }}/healthcheck.log' 2>&1
+set -o pipefail
+source '{{ healthcheck_install_root }}/health-common.sh'
+# Run every enabled health-check profile, exit with the worst (max) code, and
+# merge the per-check results into /var/lib/vps-health/latest.json.
+rc=0
+# Drop per-check results from any prior run so a profile that crashes before
+# reporting cannot leak a stale healthy result into the aggregate.
+{% for profile in healthcheck_profiles %}
+rm -f '{{ healthcheck_state_dir }}/latest-{{ healthcheck_profile_scripts[profile] | replace('.sh', '') }}.json'
+{% endfor %}
+{% for profile in healthcheck_profiles %}
+'{{ healthcheck_install_root }}/{{ healthcheck_profile_scripts[profile] }}' 2>&1 | tee -a '{{ healthcheck_log_dir }}/healthcheck.log'
+this_rc="${PIPESTATUS[0]}"
+[ "$this_rc" -gt "$rc" ] && rc="$this_rc"
+{% endfor %}
+# Collect profile check names line-by-line (robust against Jinja trim_blocks
+# whitespace control, which would otherwise merge this into one line).
+aggregate_args=""
+{% for profile in healthcheck_profiles %}
+aggregate_args="$aggregate_args {{ healthcheck_profile_scripts[profile] | replace('.sh', '') }}"
+{% endfor %}
+aggregate_result $aggregate_args
+exit "$rc"
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+source '{{ healthcheck_install_root }}/health-common.sh'
+
+require_command docker
+require_command ss
+
+# Auxiliary services co-located on hk2.chans.xyz (separate compose projects
+# under /opt, fronted by Traefik). Verified live 2026-08-12.
+
+# traefik
+if docker inspect traefik >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  [[ "$(docker inspect traefik --format '{{ '{{' }}.State.Running{{ '}}' }}' 2>/dev/null)" == true ]] \
+    && record ok 'traefik_running' || record critical 'traefik_not_running'
+else
+  record critical 'traefik_container_missing'
+fi
+
+# adguardhome (hk2 variant: DoH 5443, DoT 853)
+if docker inspect adguardhome >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  [[ "$(docker inspect adguardhome --format '{{ '{{' }}.State.Running{{ '}}' }}' 2>/dev/null)" == true ]] \
+    && record ok 'adguard_running' || record critical 'adguard_not_running'
+else
+  record critical 'adguard_container_missing'
+fi
+
+# remark42
+if docker inspect remark42 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  [[ "$(docker inspect remark42 --format '{{ '{{' }}.State.Running{{ '}}' }}' 2>/dev/null)" == true ]] \
+    && record ok 'remark42_running' || record critical 'remark42_not_running'
+else
+  record critical 'remark42_container_missing'
+fi
+
+# nginx-manager was removed 2026-08-12 (leftover config, never running).
+# Warn if a container by that name ever reappears.
+if docker inspect nginx-manager >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  record warning 'nginx_manager_unexpectedly_running'
+else
+  record ok 'nginx_manager_not_running'
+fi
+
+# Listening ports (Traefik 80/443/8080, AdGuard DoH 5443 / DoT 853).
+ss -H -ltn 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}' | grep -Eq '(^|:)80$' \
+  && record ok 'traefik_http_80' || record critical 'traefik_http_80_missing'
+ss -H -ltn 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}' | grep -Eq '(^|:)443$' \
+  && record ok 'traefik_https_443' || record critical 'traefik_https_443_missing'
+ss -H -ltn 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}' | grep -Eq '(^|:)8080$' \
+  && record ok 'traefik_dashboard_8080' || record warning 'traefik_dashboard_8080_missing'
+ss -H -ltn 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}' | grep -Eq '(^|:)5443$' \
+  && record ok 'adguard_doh_5443' || record critical 'adguard_doh_5443_missing'
+ss -H -ltn 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}' | grep -Eq '(^|:)853$' \
+  && record ok 'adguard_dot_853' || record critical 'adguard_dot_853_missing'
+
+emit_result
+exit "$EXIT_CODE"
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+source '{{ healthcheck_install_root }}/health-common.sh'
+
+require_command docker
+require_command dig
+
+# hbbs / hbbr must both be running (separate compose project at /opt/rustdesk).
+output="$(docker compose --project-directory /opt/rustdesk ps --all 2>&1)"
+if grep -qiE 'Exited|Restarting|[[:space:]]Dead[[:space:]]' <<<"$output"; then
+  record critical 'rustdesk_unhealthy_container'
+else
+  record ok 'rustdesk_compose_ok'
+fi
+
+# hbbs must advertise the relay hostname that resolves to this host's public IP.
+cmd="$(docker inspect hbbs --format '{{ '{{' }}json .Config.Cmd{{ '}}' }}' 2>/dev/null)" || record critical 'rustdesk_hbbs_missing'
+grep -q 'hk2.chans.xyz:21117' <<<"$cmd" || record critical 'rustdesk_relay_misconfigured'
+
+# The advertised relay hostname must resolve to this host's public IP.
+resolved="$(dig +short hk2.chans.xyz A 2>/dev/null)"
+grep -q '154.36.174.161' <<<"$resolved" || record critical 'rustdesk_relay_dns_missing'
+
+emit_result
+exit "$EXIT_CODE"
@@ -15,11 +15,12 @@ grep -Fq 'vw-db' <<<"$health" || record critical 'postgres_missing'
 check_https 'https://auth.wsvc.info/' '^200$'
 check_tls_days auth.wsvc.info 443

-# Read effective config only inside the service and report booleans/fingerprints,
-# never its SMTP password or other secret fields.
-smtp_result="$(docker compose --project-directory '{{ compose_project_dir }}' exec -T vaultwarden python3 - <<'PY' 2>&1
+# Read effective config from the mounted vw-data dir on the host and run the
+# SMTP AUTH probe from the host (the vaultwarden image has no python3; the
+# host does). Never print the SMTP password.
+smtp_result="$(python3 - <<'PY' 2>&1
 import json, pathlib, smtplib, ssl
-cfg=json.loads(pathlib.Path('/data/config.json').read_text())
+cfg=json.loads(pathlib.Path('{{ compose_project_dir }}/vw-data/config.json').read_text())
 host=cfg.get('smtp_host'); port=int(cfg.get('smtp_port') or 0)
 user=cfg.get('smtp_username')
 smtp_secret=cfg.get('smtp_password')
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+source '{{ healthcheck_install_root }}/health-common.sh'
+
+require_command docker
+require_command ss
+check_compose
+
+container='wireguard'
+if ! docker inspect "$container" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  record critical 'wireguard_container_missing'
+else
+  running="$(docker inspect "$container" --format '{{ '{{' }}.State.Running{{ '}}' }}' 2>/dev/null)"
+  [[ "$running" == true ]] || record critical 'wireguard_container_not_running'
+
+  interface="$(docker exec "$container" wg show interfaces 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  grep -qw 'wg0' <<<"$interface" || record critical 'wireguard_wg0_missing'
+
+  configured_peer_count="$(docker exec "$container" sh -c 'find /config -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d -name "peer_*" | wc -l' 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  runtime_peer_count="$(docker exec "$container" wg show wg0 dump 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR > 1 { count++ } END { print count + 0 }')"
+  [[ "$configured_peer_count" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || record unknown 'wireguard_configured_peer_count_unknown'
+  [[ "$runtime_peer_count" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || record unknown 'wireguard_runtime_peer_count_unknown'
+  if [[ "$configured_peer_count" =~ ^[0-9]+$ && "$runtime_peer_count" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
+    [[ "$configured_peer_count" -eq "$runtime_peer_count" ]] || record warning "wireguard_peer_count_mismatch_${configured_peer_count}_${runtime_peer_count}"
+  fi
+fi
+
+if ss -H -uln 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}' | grep -Eq '(^|:)51820$'; then
+  record ok 'wireguard_udp_51820_listening'
+else
+  record critical 'wireguard_udp_51820_missing'
+fi
+
+emit_result
+exit "$EXIT_CODE"
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 ---
 restic_enabled: false
+# Approved Restic source profile (a key of restic_sources) for the host. Set
+# per-host in inventory; the role fails if it is not an approved source.
+restic_backup_profile: ""
 restic_binary: /usr/bin/restic
 restic_config_path: /etc/vps-restic/repository.env
 restic_state_dir: /var/lib/vps-restic
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
 - name: Validate supported Restic source profile
  ansible.builtin.assert:
    that:
-      - healthcheck_profile in restic_sources
-    fail_msg: "No approved Restic source profile for {{ healthcheck_profile }}."
+      - restic_backup_profile in restic_sources
+    fail_msg: "No approved Restic source profile for {{ restic_backup_profile }}."

 - name: Verify Restic binary exists on target
  ansible.builtin.stat:
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ set -euo pipefail
 # Repository and password credentials are host-local in {{ restic_config_path }}.
 # shellcheck source=/dev/null
 source '{{ restic_config_path }}'
-exec '{{ restic_binary }}' backup --tag '{{ healthcheck_profile }}' --tag "$(hostname -s)" {% for source in restic_sources[healthcheck_profile] %}{{ source | quote }} {% endfor %}
+exec '{{ restic_binary }}' backup --tag '{{ restic_backup_profile }}' --tag "$(hostname -s)" {% for source in restic_sources[restic_backup_profile] %}{{ source | quote }} {% endfor %}
@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 # shellcheck source=/dev/null
 source '{{ restic_config_path }}'
-exec '{{ restic_binary }}' forget --prune --keep-daily {{ restic_keep_daily }} --keep-weekly {{ restic_keep_weekly }} --keep-monthly {{ restic_keep_monthly }} --tag '{{ healthcheck_profile }}'
+exec '{{ restic_binary }}' forget --prune --keep-daily {{ restic_keep_daily }} --keep-weekly {{ restic_keep_weekly }} --keep-monthly {{ restic_keep_monthly }} --tag '{{ restic_backup_profile }}'
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 [Unit]
-Description=Restic backup for approved {{ healthcheck_profile }} sources
+Description=Restic backup for approved {{ restic_backup_profile }} sources
 After=network-online.target
 Wants=network-online.target

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---
+# RustDesk server deployment (hbbs + hbbr) on hk2.
+# Safe by default: without rustdesk_confirm=true the role only reports whether
+# the declared compose file matches live state and refuses to recreate the stack.
+rustdesk_confirm: false
+# Compose project directory.
+rustdesk_compose_dir: /opt/rustdesk
+# Relay (hbbr) hostname:port advertised to every client via `hbbs -r`.
+# MUST resolve to this host's public IP (154.36.174.161). The known-bad value
+# 'hk2.wsvc.info' has no DNS record and must never be used.
+rustdesk_relay: hk2.chans.xyz:21117
+# Pinned server image (used for both hbbs and hbbr).
+rustdesk_image: rustdesk/rustdesk-server:1.1.14
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+---
+# Deploy/reconcile the self-hosted RustDesk server (hbbs + hbbr).
+# Idempotent: deploys the declared compose file; only recreates the stack with
+# explicit confirmation.
+
+- name: Validate relay address is set and not the known-bad value
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - rustdesk_relay | length > 0
+      - "'hk2.wsvc.info' not in rustdesk_relay"
+    fail_msg: >-
+      rustdesk_relay must be a resolvable relay address. The known-bad
+      'hk2.wsvc.info' has no DNS record and must not be used.
+
+- name: Ensure compose project directory exists
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: "{{ rustdesk_compose_dir }}"
+    state: directory
+    owner: windy
+    group: root
+    mode: "0755"
+
+- name: Deploy compose file
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: compose.yml.j2
+    dest: "{{ rustdesk_compose_dir }}/compose.yml"
+    owner: windy
+    group: windy
+    mode: "0644"
+  register: rustdesk_compose_deployed
+
+- name: Report no change needed
+  ansible.builtin.debug:
+    msg: "compose.yml already matches declared state; no change needed."
+  when: not rustdesk_compose_deployed.changed
+
+- name: Refuse to recreate without explicit confirmation
+  ansible.builtin.fail:
+    msg: >-
+      compose.yml differs from declared state but rustdesk_confirm is not true.
+      Supply rustdesk_confirm=true to deploy the file and recreate the stack.
+  when:
+    - rustdesk_compose_deployed.changed
+    - not (rustdesk_confirm | bool)
+    - not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: Apply compose stack
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv:
+      - docker
+      - compose
+      - --project-directory
+      - "{{ rustdesk_compose_dir }}"
+      - up
+      - -d
+  when:
+    - rustdesk_compose_deployed.changed
+    - rustdesk_confirm | bool
+  changed_when: true
+  register: rustdesk_apply
+
+- name: Verify hbbs relay command
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv:
+      - docker
+      - inspect
+      - hbbs
+      - --format
+      - '{{ "{{" }}json .Config.Cmd{{ "}}" }}'
+  register: rustdesk_hbbs_cmd
+  changed_when: false
+  when:
+    - rustdesk_compose_deployed.changed
+    - rustdesk_confirm | bool
+    - not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: Assert hbbs advertises the declared relay
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - "'{{ rustdesk_relay }}' in rustdesk_hbbs_cmd.stdout"
+    fail_msg: "hbbs is not advertising the declared relay {{ rustdesk_relay }}."
+  when:
+    - rustdesk_compose_deployed.changed
+    - rustdesk_confirm | bool
+    - not ansible_check_mode
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+networks:
+  rustdesk-net:
+    external: false
+
+services:
+  hbbs:
+    container_name: hbbs
+    ports:
+      - 21115:21115
+      - 21116:21116
+      - 21116:21116/udp
+      - 21118:21118
+    image: {{ rustdesk_image }}
+    command: "hbbs -r {{ rustdesk_relay }}"
+    volumes:
+      - ./hbbs:/root
+    networks:
+      - rustdesk-net
+    depends_on:
+      - hbbr
+    restart: unless-stopped
+
+  hbbr:
+    container_name: hbbr
+    ports:
+      - 21117:21117
+      - 21119:21119
+    image: {{ rustdesk_image }}
+    command: hbbr
+    volumes:
+      - ./hbbr:/root
+    networks:
+      - rustdesk-net
+    restart: unless-stopped
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+---
+# Reconcile super_sdn.sso_login_enabled on the UniFi Network Controller DB.
+# Safe by default: without unifi_sso_confirm=true the role only reports the
+# current state and refuses to change anything.
+unifi_sso_confirm: false
+# Declared desired state (true = Sync Local Admin with Ubiquiti SSO ON).
+unifi_sso_target_value: false
+# Restart the controller container after applying a change. Only needed when
+# the setting was changed directly in the DB while the controller was running
+# (the UI path applies it immediately without a restart).
+unifi_sso_restart_controller: false
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+---
+# Reconcile super_sdn.sso_login_enabled on the UniFi controller DB.
+# Idempotent: reads the current value, reports compliance when it already
+# matches the target, and only mutates with explicit confirmation.
+
+- name: Require a boolean target value
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - unifi_sso_target_value | type_debug == 'bool'
+    fail_msg: "unifi_sso_target_value must be a boolean (true or false)."
+
+- name: Read current SSO login setting
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv:
+      - docker
+      - exec
+      - "{{ unifi_container }}"
+      - mongo
+      - --port
+      - "{{ unifi_mongo_port }}"
+      - --quiet
+      - ace
+      - --eval
+      - 'db.setting.findOne({key:"super_sdn"}).sso_login_enabled'
+  register: unifi_sso_current
+  changed_when: false
+  failed_when: unifi_sso_current.rc != 0
+  check_mode: false
+
+- name: Report current setting
+  ansible.builtin.debug:
+    msg: >-
+      sso_login_enabled={{ unifi_sso_current.stdout | trim }}
+      (target={{ unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower }})
+
+- name: Report already compliant
+  ansible.builtin.debug:
+    msg: "Already compliant; no change needed."
+  when: unifi_sso_current.stdout | trim | lower == unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower
+
+- name: Refuse to change without explicit confirmation
+  ansible.builtin.fail:
+    msg: >-
+      Change required (sso_login_enabled={{ unifi_sso_current.stdout | trim }}
+      != target {{ unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower }}) but
+      unifi_sso_confirm is not true. Supply unifi_sso_confirm=true to apply.
+  when:
+    - unifi_sso_current.stdout | trim | lower != unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower
+    - not (unifi_sso_confirm | bool)
+
+- name: Apply SSO login setting change
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv:
+      - docker
+      - exec
+      - "{{ unifi_container }}"
+      - mongo
+      - --port
+      - "{{ unifi_mongo_port }}"
+      - --quiet
+      - ace
+      - --eval
+      - >-
+        db.setting.updateOne({key:"super_sdn"},
+        {$set:{sso_login_enabled: {{ unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower }}}})
+  when:
+    - unifi_sso_confirm | bool
+    - unifi_sso_current.stdout | trim | lower != unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower
+  changed_when: true
+  register: unifi_sso_update
+
+- name: Restart controller to apply setting when requested
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: [docker, restart, "{{ unifi_container }}"]
+  when:
+    - unifi_sso_restart_controller | bool
+    - unifi_sso_current.stdout | trim | lower != unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower
+  changed_when: true
+
+- name: Verify setting after change
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv:
+      - docker
+      - exec
+      - "{{ unifi_container }}"
+      - mongo
+      - --port
+      - "{{ unifi_mongo_port }}"
+      - --quiet
+      - ace
+      - --eval
+      - 'db.setting({key:"super_sdn"}).sso_login_enabled'
+  register: unifi_sso_verify
+  changed_when: false
+  check_mode: false
+  when:
+    - unifi_sso_current.stdout | trim | lower != unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower
+    - not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: Assert verified value matches target
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - unifi_sso_verify.stdout | trim | lower == unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower
+    fail_msg: >-
+      Verification failed: sso_login_enabled is
+      {{ unifi_sso_verify.stdout | trim }} but expected
+      {{ unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower }}.
+  when:
+    - unifi_sso_current.stdout | trim | lower != unifi_sso_target_value | string | lower
+    - not ansible_check_mode
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+services:
+  wireguard:
+    image: {{ wireguard_image }}
+    container_name: wireguard
+    cap_add:
+      - NET_ADMIN
+    environment:
+      - PUID=1000
+      - PGID=1000
+      - TZ=Asia/Shanghai
+      - SERVERURL=us4.wsvc.info
+      - SERVERPORT=51820
+      - PEERS=ha,phone,mbp
+      - PEERDNS=1.1.1.1
+      # Intentional: client IPv6 traffic is not tunneled.
+      - ALLOWEDIPS=0.0.0.0/0
+    ports:
+      - 51820:51820/udp
+    volumes:
+      - ./config:/config
+    read_only: true
+    tmpfs:
+      - /run:exec
+    restart: unless-stopped
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# compose/ — repo-owned Compose declarations
+
+Non-secret Compose sources for the Docker hosts. Secrets are **never** in these
+files: every secret is a `${VAR}` reference resolved from the **server-local
+`.env`** (docker compose reads `.env` from the project directory automatically).
+
+## Source-of-truth matrix
+
+| Project | Host | Compose source | Mechanism |
+|---------|------|----------------|-----------|
+| `vaultwarden` | us2 (`/opt/vaultwarden`) | `compose/vaultwarden/compose.yml` | static file + `compose-deploy.yml` |
+| `pdns` | hk2 (`/opt/pdns`) | `compose/pdns/compose.yml` | static file + `compose-deploy.yml` |
+| `pgdb` | pgdb (`/opt/database`, 无 ansible) | `compose/pgdb/compose.yml` | static file（手动部署：scp → `docker compose config -q` → `up -d`；服务器文件名 `docker-compose.yml`） |
+| `soft-serve` | us2 (`/opt/soft-serve`, 已退役停用) | `compose/soft-serve/compose.yml` (+ `Dockerfile.backup`, `scripts/`) | static file（参考镜像; 2026-09-18 被 gitea 替换 VPS-94, 数据保留作回滚） |
+| `gitea` | us2 (`/opt/gitea`) | `compose/gitea/compose.yml` (+ `Dockerfile.backup`, `scripts/`) | static file（参考镜像, 未接入 compose-deploy; 服务器文件为准; 2026-09-18 替换 soft-serve, VPS-94） |
+| `adguardhome` | dns.windy.lan (`/opt/adguardhome`) | — (待从 LAN 提取) | static file (pending) |
+| `unifi` | ubnt (`/home/windy/unifi-9`) | — (待从 LAN 提取) | static file (pending) |
+| `wireguard` | us4 (`/opt/wireguard`) | `ansible/templates/wireguard-compose.yml.j2` | role-rendered (inventory vars) |
+| `rustdesk` | hk2 (`/opt/rustdesk`) | `ansible/roles/rustdesk/templates/compose.yml.j2` | role-rendered (inventory vars) |
+| `mailcow` | mx2 (`/opt/mail`) | — (mailcow update generator owns it) | excluded by design |
+
+Mechanism rule: **static** `compose/<project>/compose.yml` for declarations that
+do not vary per host; **role-rendered j2** for declarations driven by inventory
+vars (image pins, relay host). One mechanism per project; do not duplicate a
+project in both.
+
+## Deploying a static project
+
+```bash
+cd ansible
+
+# Read-only diff + validation against the server .env (no writes)
+ansible-playbook playbooks/compose-deploy.yml --limit vaultwarden --check --diff
+
+# Apply: stage repo file → validate `docker compose config -q` → backup current
+# file → promote → `docker compose up -d` (gated)
+ansible-playbook playbooks/compose-deploy.yml --limit vaultwarden \
+  -e '{"compose_deploy_confirm": true}'
+```
+
+See [`../runbooks/ansible-operations.md`](../runbooks/ansible-operations.md).
+
+## Adding a project
+
+1. Sanitize the live compose so every secret is `${VAR}` from `.env`
+   (prefer `${VAR:?missing VAR}` for required keys).
+2. Commit `compose/<project>/compose.yml` + `.env.example` (key names only).
+3. Add `compose_repo_project` (+ `compose_remote_file` if not `compose.yml`) to
+   the host in `ansible/inventory/hosts.yml`, and allowlist the project in
+   `ansible/roles/compose_deploy/defaults/main.yml`.
+4. Verify with `--check --diff` (zero diff) then a gated apply.
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# compose/gitea — 秘密一律走服务器本地 .env, 不入库
+# 迁移期一次性: Gitea 管理员生成的 token (mirror-migrate.sh 读取, 用后撤销)
+GITEA_MIGRATE_USER=
+GITEA_MIGRATE_TOKEN=
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+FROM alpine:3.20
+RUN apk add --no-cache sqlite rsync tzdata
+WORKDIR /scripts
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Gitea on us2 — reference compose (Plane VPS-94, 迁移完成 2026-09-18)
+# 参考镜像, 服务器 /opt/gitea 文件为准 (同 soft-serve 约定, 未接入 compose-deploy)
+# rootless 镜像: uid 1000 原生非 root; 数据 /var/lib/gitea (宿主 ./data), 配置 /etc/gitea (宿主 ./config)
+# SSH: 容器内监听 2322 (非特权, SSH_LISTEN_PORT), 对外 repo.windy.me:2222 经 Traefik TCP entrypoint `ssh`
+services:
+  gitea:
+    image: gitea/gitea@sha256:1c17ecaead42eb3b5391553d8708103a4beb0e86edf5b9ebc1eb269c318845f2 # 1.27.3-rootless
+    container_name: gitea
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    user: "1000:1000"
+    environment:
+      TZ: Asia/Shanghai
+    volumes:
+      - ./data:/var/lib/gitea
+      - ./config:/etc/gitea
+      - ./secrets:/secrets:ro # 复用的 soft-serve host key (SSH_SERVER_HOST_KEYS)
+    networks:
+      - traefik
+    labels:
+      - traefik.enable=true
+      # Web UI: repo.windy.me (2026-09-18 操作者决定复用现有域名, 免 DNS 变更)
+      - traefik.http.routers.gitea-web.rule=Host(`repo.windy.me`)
+      - traefik.http.routers.gitea-web.entrypoints=websecure
+      - traefik.http.routers.gitea-web.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt
+      - traefik.http.services.gitea-web.loadbalancer.server.port=3000
+      # SSH: 接管 :2222 (entrypoint 已存在, router 动态生效, 无需重启 Traefik)
+      - traefik.tcp.routers.gitea-ssh.entrypoints=ssh
+      - traefik.tcp.routers.gitea-ssh.rule=HostSNI(`*`)
+      - traefik.tcp.routers.gitea-ssh.tls=false
+      - traefik.tcp.services.gitea-ssh.loadbalancer.server.port=2322
+
+  gitea-backup:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: Dockerfile.backup
+    container_name: gitea-backup
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    volumes:
+      - ./data:/data:ro
+      - ./config:/config:ro
+      - ./backups:/backup
+      - ./scripts:/scripts
+    environment:
+      TZ: Asia/Shanghai
+      BACKUP_UID: 1000
+      BACKUP_GID: 1000
+    entrypoint: >
+      /bin/sh -ec "
+        umask 077 &&
+        touch /backup/backup.log &&
+        crontab /scripts/crontab.txt &&
+        echo '[INFO] gitea backup cron installed' &&
+        crond -f -l 8
+      "
+
+networks:
+  traefik:
+    external: true
+    name: vw-net
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+umask 077
+D() { date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"; }
+TS=$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
+OUT="/backup/gitea_${TS}"
+mkdir -p "$OUT"
+echo "[$(D)] Starting gitea backup -> $OUT"
+# rootless 布局: app.ini=/etc/gitea(宿主 ./config), db+repos=/var/lib/gitea/data(宿主 ./data/data)
+# app.ini 含 SECRET_KEY/INTERNAL_TOKEN — 恢复 2FA/session/mirror 凭据必需
+tar czf "$OUT/app.ini.tar.gz" -C /config app.ini
+sqlite3 /data/data/gitea.db ".backup '$OUT/gitea.db'"
+rsync -a /data/data/git/repositories/ "$OUT/repos/"
+tar czf "$OUT/repos.tar.gz" -C "$OUT" repos
+rm -rf "$OUT/repos"
+chmod 600 "$OUT"/*
+if [ -n "${BACKUP_UID:-}" ] && [ -n "${BACKUP_GID:-}" ]; then
+  chown -R "$BACKUP_UID:$BACKUP_GID" "$OUT" /backup/backup.log
+fi
+echo "[$(D)] Backup OK: $(du -sh "$OUT" | cut -f1)"
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Run gitea backup daily at 02:00
+0 2 * * * /bin/sh /scripts/backup.sh >> /backup/backup.log 2>&1
+# Prune backups older than 14 days daily at 03:00
+0 3 * * * /bin/sh /scripts/prune.sh >> /backup/backup.log 2>&1
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# 一次性迁移辅助 (Plane VPS-94 Phase 2): 在 gitea 容器内执行。
+# 已于 2026-09-18 执行完成 (16 仓), 留档备查; 复用时按 VPS-94 流程重生成一次性 token。
+# 用法:
+#   GITEA_MIGRATE_USER=<user> GITEA_MIGRATE_TOKEN=<token> \
+#   docker exec -e GITEA_MIGRATE_USER -e GITEA_MIGRATE_TOKEN gitea \
+#     /scripts/mirror-migrate.sh [public_repo ...]
+# 每仓: API 建仓 (默认 private, 参数中列出的为 public) -> push --mirror。
+# default_branch 按源仓 symbolic-ref HEAD 设置, 避免非 main 源仓在 Gitea 显示为空。
+# 结束后按 VPS-94 Phase 3 逐仓核对 git ls-remote ref 全集。
+set -eu
+MUSER="${GITEA_MIGRATE_USER:?need GITEA_MIGRATE_USER}"
+TOKEN="${GITEA_MIGRATE_TOKEN:?need GITEA_MIGRATE_TOKEN}"
+SRC="/migration-src"
+API="http://localhost:3000/api/v1"
+PUBLIC_REPOS=" $* "
+
+migrate_one() {
+  dir="$1"
+  git -C "$dir" rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "[SKIP] $dir (not a git repo)"; return 0; }
+  name=$(basename "$dir"); name=${name%.git}
+  def_branch=$(git -C "$dir" symbolic-ref --short HEAD)
+  case "$PUBLIC_REPOS" in *" $name "*) private=false ;; *) private=true ;; esac
+  echo "[MIGRATE] $name (default=$def_branch private=$private)"
+  code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "$API/user/repos" \
+    -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+    -d "{\"name\":\"$name\",\"private\":$private,\"default_branch\":\"$def_branch\",\"auto_init\":false}")
+  case "$code" in
+    201) : ;;
+    409) echo "  [WARN] $name 已存在, 直接补推" ;;
+    *)   echo "  [FAIL] create HTTP $code"; return 1 ;;
+  esac
+  git -C "$dir" push --mirror "http://$MUSER:$TOKEN@localhost:3000/$MUSER/$name.git"
+  echo "  [OK] $name pushed"
+}
+
+for dir in "$SRC"/*.git "$SRC"/cdia; do
+  [ -d "$dir" ] || continue
+  migrate_one "$dir"
+done
+echo "[DONE] 全部处理完毕; 迁移后记得撤销一次性 token"
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+D() { date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"; }
+ls -dt /backup/gitea_* 2>/dev/null | tail -n +15 | xargs -r rm -rf
+echo "[$(D)] Pruned. Kept $(ls -d /backup/gitea_* 2>/dev/null | wc -l) backups (max 14)"
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# .env.example — PowerDNS stack (hk2.chans.xyz, /opt/pdns)
+#
+# Non-secret key reference ONLY. Real values live in the server-local .env
+# (never commit them). Compose requires the `:?`-marked keys to be present.
+
+# Runtime
+TZ=Asia/Shanghai
+
+# Postgres superuser (db + backup + pgweb)
+PGUSER=
+PGPASSWORD=
+DB_HOST=db
+DB_PORT=5432
+
+# Application database (auth / poweradmin / backup)
+DB_NAME=pdns
+DB_USER=pdns
+DB_PASS=
+ADMIN_DB=pdnsadmin
+
+# Backups
+CRON_SCHEDULE=0 3 * * *
+RETENTION_DAYS=7
+MAX_BACKUPS=7
+DUMP_ROLES=true
+
+# PowerDNS auth API
+PDNS_API_KEY=
+
+# Poweradmin (first-run admin + session)
+PA_SESSION_KEY=
+PA_ADMIN_USERNAME=
+PA_ADMIN_PASSWORD=
+PA_ADMIN_EMAIL=
+PA_ADMIN_FULLNAME=
+
+# pgweb debug profile
+PGWEB_USER=
+PGWEB_PASS=
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+networks:
+  frontend:
+    name: traefik
+    external: true
+
+  backend:
+    internal: true
+
+  edge:
+
+services:
+  db:
+    image: postgres:16
+    container_name: pdns-db
+    environment:
+      POSTGRES_DB: postgres
+      POSTGRES_USER: ${PGUSER:?missing PGUSER}
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${PGPASSWORD:?missing PGPASSWORD}
+      TZ: ${TZ:-Asia/Shanghai}
+      PGTZ: ${TZ:-Asia/Shanghai}
+    volumes:
+      # Keep the existing mount path to avoid moving the current data directory.
+      - dbdata:/var/lib/postgresql
+      - ./db-init-generated:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d:ro
+      - ./backup:/backup:ro
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U \"$${POSTGRES_USER}\" -d \"$${POSTGRES_DB}\""]
+      interval: 10s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 10
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    networks: [backend, edge]
+
+  auth:
+    image: powerdns/pdns-auth-50:5.0.6
+    container_name: pdns-auth
+    depends_on:
+      db:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    ports:
+      - "53:53/udp"
+      - "53:53/tcp"
+      - "127.0.0.1:8081:8081"
+    environment:
+      PDNS_API_KEY: ${PDNS_API_KEY:?missing PDNS_API_KEY}
+      DB_NAME: ${DB_NAME:?missing DB_NAME}
+      DB_USER: ${DB_USER:?missing DB_USER}
+      DB_PASS: ${DB_PASS:?missing DB_PASS}
+      TEMPLATE_FILES: secrets
+    volumes:
+      - ./auth/pdns.conf:/etc/powerdns/pdns.conf:ro
+      - ./auth/templates.d:/etc/powerdns/templates.d:ro
+      - ./auth/keys:/var/lib/powerdns
+      - ./auth/import:/import
+      - ./auth/export:/export
+      - ./auth/logs:/var/log/pdns
+    healthcheck:
+      test:
+        [
+          "CMD-SHELL",
+          "python3 -c \"import json, os, urllib.request; req = urllib.request.Request('http://127.0.0.1:8081/api/v1/servers/localhost', headers={'X-API-Key': os.environ['PDNS_API_KEY']}); data = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=3)); assert data['daemon_type'] == 'authoritative'\""
+        ]
+      interval: 10s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 12
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    networks: [backend, edge]
+
+  poweradmin:
+    image: poweradmin/poweradmin:stable
+    container_name: poweradmin
+    depends_on:
+      db:
+        condition: service_healthy
+      auth:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    environment:
+      DB_TYPE: pgsql
+      DB_HOST: ${DB_HOST:-db}
+      DB_PORT: ${DB_PORT:-5432}
+      DB_NAME: ${DB_NAME:?missing DB_NAME}
+      DB_USER: ${DB_USER:?missing DB_USER}
+      DB_PASS: ${DB_PASS:?missing DB_PASS}
+      PA_PDNS_API_URL: http://auth:8081
+      PA_PDNS_API_KEY: ${PDNS_API_KEY:?missing PDNS_API_KEY}
+      PA_DNS_BACKEND: sql
+      PDNS_VERSION: ${PDNS_VERSION:-50}
+      DNS_NS1: ${DNS_NS1:-ns1.wsvc.info}
+      DNS_NS2: ${DNS_NS2:-ns2.wsvc.info}
+      DNS_HOSTMASTER: ${DNS_HOSTMASTER:-hostmaster.wsvc.info}
+      PA_APP_TITLE: ${PA_APP_TITLE:-Poweradmin}
+      PA_TIMEZONE: ${TZ:-Asia/Shanghai}
+      PA_SESSION_KEY: ${PA_SESSION_KEY:?missing PA_SESSION_KEY}
+      PA_CREATE_ADMIN: ${PA_CREATE_ADMIN:-1}
+      PA_ADMIN_USERNAME: ${PA_ADMIN_USERNAME:?missing PA_ADMIN_USERNAME}
+      PA_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${PA_ADMIN_PASSWORD:?missing PA_ADMIN_PASSWORD}
+      PA_ADMIN_EMAIL: ${PA_ADMIN_EMAIL:?missing PA_ADMIN_EMAIL}
+      PA_ADMIN_FULLNAME: ${PA_ADMIN_FULLNAME:?missing PA_ADMIN_FULLNAME}
+      TRUSTED_PROXIES: private_ranges
+      DEBUG: "false"
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    networks: [backend, frontend]
+    labels:
+      - "traefik.enable=true"
+      - "traefik.docker.network=traefik"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.poweradmin.rule=Host(`pdns.wsvc.info`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.poweradmin.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.poweradmin.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
+      - "traefik.http.services.poweradmin.loadbalancer.server.port=80"
+
+  backup:
+    # Use postgres:16 so bash/pg_dump/flock exist without runtime package installs.
+    # backend is internal:true — Alpine apk at start cannot reach mirrors.
+    image: postgres:16
+    container_name: pdns-backup
+    depends_on:
+      db:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    environment:
+      TZ: ${TZ:-Asia/Shanghai}
+      DB_HOST: ${DB_HOST:-db}
+      DB_PORT: ${DB_PORT:-5432}
+      DB_USER: ${PGUSER:?missing PGUSER}
+      DB_PASS: ${PGPASSWORD:?missing PGPASSWORD}
+      DB_NAME: ${DB_NAME:?missing DB_NAME}
+      RETENTION_DAYS: ${RETENTION_DAYS:-7}
+      MAX_BACKUPS: ${MAX_BACKUPS:-7}
+      DUMP_ROLES: ${DUMP_ROLES:-true}
+      CRON_SCHEDULE: ${CRON_SCHEDULE:?missing CRON_SCHEDULE}
+    volumes:
+      - ./backup:/backup
+      - ./scripts:/scripts:ro
+    entrypoint: ["/bin/bash", "/scripts/backup-scheduler.sh"]
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    networks: [backend]
+
+  pgweb:
+    image: sosedoff/pgweb:0.16.2
+    container_name: pdns_pgweb
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      PGWEB_DATABASE_URL: "postgres://${PGUSER:?missing PGUSER}:${PGPASSWORD:?missing PGPASSWORD}@${DB_HOST:-db}:${DB_PORT:-5432}/${DB_NAME:?missing DB_NAME}?sslmode=disable"
+      PGWEB_AUTH_USER: ${PGWEB_USER:?missing PGWEB_USER}
+      PGWEB_AUTH_PASS: ${PGWEB_PASS:?missing PGWEB_PASS}
+      TZ: ${TZ:-Asia/Shanghai}
+    depends_on:
+      db:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    networks: [backend, frontend]
+    labels:
+      - "traefik.enable=true"
+      - "traefik.docker.network=traefik"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.pgweb.rule=Host(`pgweb.wsvc.info`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.pgweb.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.pgweb.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
+      - "traefik.http.services.pgweb.loadbalancer.server.port=8081"
+
+volumes:
+  dbdata: {}
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# pgdb compose secrets — copy to /opt/database/.env on the host, chmod 600.
+# NEVER commit the real values. Generate: openssl rand -hex 24
+POSTGRES_PASSWORD=change-me-strong-hex
+PGWEB_AUTH_USER=pgweb
+PGWEB_AUTH_PASS=change-me-strong-hex
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# pgdb (192.168.55.15) — TimescaleDB + pgweb GUI + nightly backup
+#
+# Deploy: copy this file to /opt/database/docker-compose.yml on pgdb,
+# create /opt/database/.env (chmod 600) from .env.example, plus
+# /opt/database/pgweb-bookmarks/{hass,scribe}.toml (chmod 600, contains DB password).
+# Then: docker compose config --quiet && docker compose up -d
+#
+# Rollback: previous launch command is kept at /opt/database/run
+# (container is stateless; data lives on /srv/pgdata).
+services:
+  timescaledb:
+    image: timescale/timescaledb:latest-pg18
+    container_name: timescaledb
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    ports:
+      - "192.168.55.15:5432:5432"   # bind VM IP only (no IPv6 wildcard)
+    environment:
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
+    volumes:
+      - /srv/pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql   # data disk (ext4 /dev/sdb1)
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U postgres"]
+      interval: 30s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 5
+      start_period: 10s
+
+  pgweb:
+    image: sosedoff/pgweb:latest
+    container_name: pgweb
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    # bind/listen/readonly/sessions/bookmarks-only/bookmarks-dir are CLI flags (no env equivalent in v0.17.0)
+    command: ["pgweb", "--bind", "0.0.0.0", "--listen", "8081", "--readonly", "--sessions", "--bookmarks-only", "--bookmarks-dir", "/bookmarks"]
+    ports:
+      - "192.168.55.15:8081:8081"   # LAN only + basic auth (see .env)
+    environment:
+      PGWEB_AUTH_USER: ${PGWEB_AUTH_USER}
+      PGWEB_AUTH_PASS: ${PGWEB_AUTH_PASS}
+      PGWEB_BOOKMARKS_DIR: /bookmarks
+    volumes:
+      - ./pgweb-bookmarks:/bookmarks:ro   # bookmark .toml files (contain DB password, keep 0600)
+    depends_on:
+      timescaledb:
+        condition: service_healthy
+
+  pg-backup:
+    image: prodrigestivill/postgres-backup-local:latest   # latest = postgres 18 base (pg_dump 18.x)
+    container_name: pg-backup
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      POSTGRES_HOST: timescaledb
+      POSTGRES_DB: "hass scribe postgres"
+      POSTGRES_USER: postgres
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
+      POSTGRES_EXTRA_OPTS: "-Fc"          # custom-format dumps (pg_restore)
+      SCHEDULE: "0 2 * * *"               # nightly 02:00 (TZ=Asia/Shanghai -> local 02:00)
+      BACKUP_ON_START: "TRUE"             # immediate backup on first start
+      BACKUP_SUFFIX: ".dump"
+      HEALTHCHECK_PORT: "80"              # go-cron health endpoint for the image healthcheck
+      TZ: "Asia/Shanghai"                 # match original host-cron 02:00 local (container default is UTC)
+    volumes:
+      - /opt/database/backups:/backups    # POSIX fs required; root disk, separate from data disk
+    depends_on:
+      timescaledb:
+        condition: service_healthy
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Reconcile pgdb compose stack (timescaledb + pgweb + pg-backup) at boot
+Documentation=file:///opt/database/docker-compose.yml
+After=network-online.target docker.service
+Wants=network-online.target
+Requires=docker.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+WorkingDirectory=/opt/database
+# Idempotent boot-time reconcile. docker's own restore can fail to bind the
+# published ports (192.168.55.15:5432/8081) when the VM IP is not yet usable
+# right after boot (EADDRNOTAVAIL, observed 2026-08-30): timescaledb/pgweb
+# then stay stopped until a manual `docker compose up`. This unit retries
+# `docker compose up -d` (a no-op when the stack is healthy) until the port
+# listens, and force-recreates as a last resort to recover a network-detached
+# container. Data lives on bind mounts (/srv/pgdata, /opt/database/backups),
+# so recreation is safe.
+ExecStart=/bin/bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 12); do docker compose up -d --remove-orphans; sleep 2; if ss -tln | grep -q "192.168.55.15:5432"; then exit 0; fi; sleep 3; done; echo "pgdb-compose: retries exhausted, force-recreating"; docker compose up -d --force-recreate; sleep 10; ss -tln | grep -q "192.168.55.15:5432"'
+TimeoutStartSec=180
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Soft Serve initial admin public key (used only on first boot)
+SOFT_SERVE_INITIAL_ADMIN_KEYS=ssh-ed25519 AAAA... # replace with admin public key
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+FROM alpine:3.20
+RUN apk add --no-cache sqlite tzdata
+WORKDIR /scripts
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+services:
+  soft-serve:
+    image: charmcli/soft-serve:v0.12.2
+    container_name: soft-serve
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    # non-root (uid 1000 = windy; 与 backup sidecar BACKUP_UID 一致)
+    user: "1000:1000"
+
+    environment:
+      SOFT_SERVE_DATA_PATH: /var/lib/soft-serve
+      SOFT_SERVE_INITIAL_ADMIN: windy
+      SOFT_SERVE_INITIAL_ADMIN_KEYS: ${SOFT_SERVE_INITIAL_ADMIN_KEYS}
+
+    volumes:
+      - ./data:/var/lib/soft-serve
+      - soft-serve-app:/soft-serve
+
+    networks:
+      - traefik
+
+    labels:
+      - traefik.enable=true
+
+      # SSH over TCP via Traefik (entryPoint ssh -> container port 23231)
+      - traefik.tcp.routers.softserve-ssh.entrypoints=ssh
+      - traefik.tcp.routers.softserve-ssh.rule=HostSNI(`*`)
+      - traefik.tcp.routers.softserve-ssh.tls=false
+      - traefik.tcp.services.softserve-ssh.loadbalancer.server.port=23231
+
+  soft-serve-backup:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: Dockerfile.backup
+    container_name: soft-serve-backup
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    volumes:
+      - ./data:/data:ro
+      - ./backups:/backup
+      - ./scripts:/scripts
+    environment:
+      TZ: Asia/Shanghai
+      BACKUP_UID: 1000
+      BACKUP_GID: 1000
+    entrypoint: >
+      /bin/sh -ec "
+        umask 077 &&
+        touch /backup/backup.log &&
+        crontab /scripts/crontab.txt &&
+        echo '[INFO] soft-serve backup cron installed' &&
+        crond -f -l 8
+      "
+
+volumes:
+  soft-serve-app:
+
+networks:
+  traefik:
+    external: true
+    name: vw-net
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+umask 077
+D() { date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"; }
+TS=$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
+OUT="/backup/soft-serve_${TS}"
+mkdir -p "$OUT"
+echo "[$(D)] Starting soft-serve backup -> $OUT"
+tar czf "$OUT/repos-config.tar.gz" -C /data repos hooks config.yaml ssh
+sqlite3 /data/soft-serve.db ".backup '$OUT/soft-serve.db'"
+chmod 600 "$OUT/repos-config.tar.gz" "$OUT/soft-serve.db"
+if [ -n "${BACKUP_UID:-}" ] && [ -n "${BACKUP_GID:-}" ]; then
+  chown -R "$BACKUP_UID:$BACKUP_GID" "$OUT" /backup/backup.log
+fi
+echo "[$(D)] Backup OK: $(du -sh "$OUT" | cut -f1)"
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Run soft-serve backup daily at 02:00
+0 2 * * * /bin/sh /scripts/backup.sh >> /backup/backup.log 2>&1
+# Prune backups older than 14 days daily at 03:00
+0 3 * * * /bin/sh /scripts/prune.sh >> /backup/backup.log 2>&1
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+D() { date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"; }
+ls -dt /backup/soft-serve_* 2>/dev/null | tail -n +15 | xargs -r rm -rf
+echo "[$(D)] Pruned. Kept $(ls -d /backup/soft-serve_* 2>/dev/null | wc -l) backups (max 14)"
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# .env.example — Vaultwarden (us2.wsvc.info, /opt/vaultwarden)
+#
+# Non-secret key reference ONLY. Real values live in the server-local .env
+# (never commit them). Copy the keys below into the server .env if a key is
+# missing; the compose file requires them via ${VAR} / env_file.
+
+# Service identity
+DOMAIN=https://auth.wsvc.info
+TEMPLATES_FOLDER=
+
+# Postgres (compose services vaultwarden / backup / pg / pgweb)
+DB_HOST=pg
+DB_PORT=5432
+DB_NAME=vaultwarden
+DB_USER=vaultwarden
+DB_PASS=
+
+# pgweb debug profile
+PGWEB_USER=
+PGWEB_PASS=
+PGWEB_DATABASE_URL=
+
+# SMTP (mailcow mx2.windy.me:587 starttls)
+SMTP_HOST=mx2.windy.me
+SMTP_PORT=587
+SMTP_SECURITY=starttls
+SMTP_USERNAME=
+SMTP_PASSWORD=
+SMTP_FROM=
+HELO_NAME=
+
+# Admin console
+ADMIN_TOKEN=
+
+# Runtime
+UID=1000
+GID=1000
+IP_HEADER=X-Forwarded-For
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+services:
+  vaultwarden:
+    image: vaultwarden/server:1.37.2
+    container_name: vaultwarden
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    env_file: ".env"
+    environment:
+      DOMAIN: "https://auth.wsvc.info"
+      DATABASE_URL: "postgresql://${DB_USER}:${DB_PASS}@${DB_HOST}:${DB_PORT}/${DB_NAME}"
+    volumes:
+      - ./vw-data:/data
+    extra_hosts:
+      - "mx2.windy.me:194.163.160.244"
+    networks:
+      - net
+    depends_on:
+      pg:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    labels:
+      - "traefik.enable=true"
+      - "traefik.docker.network=vw-net"
+
+      - "traefik.http.routers.vaultwarden.rule=Host(`auth.wsvc.info`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.vaultwarden.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.vaultwarden.tls=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.vaultwarden.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
+
+      - "traefik.http.services.vaultwarden.loadbalancer.server.port=80"
+
+  backup:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: Dockerfile.backup
+    container_name: vaultwarden-backup
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    volumes:
+      - ./backups:/backup
+      - ./scripts:/scripts
+    #user: "${UID:-1000}:${GID:-1000}"
+    
+    environment:
+      DB_HOST: ${DB_HOST}
+      DB_PORT: ${DB_PORT}
+      DB_USER: ${DB_USER}
+      DB_NAME: ${DB_NAME}
+      DB_PASS: ${DB_PASS}
+      BACKUP_UID: ${UID:-0}
+      BACKUP_GID: ${GID:-0}
+      TZ: Asia/Shanghai
+    entrypoint: >
+      /bin/sh -ec "
+        umask 077 &&
+        printf '%s:%s:*:%s:%s\n' \"$$DB_HOST\" \"$$DB_PORT\" \"$$DB_USER\" \"$$DB_PASS\" > /root/.pgpass &&
+        chmod 600 /root/.pgpass &&
+        touch /backup/backup.log &&
+        crontab /scripts/crontab.txt &&
+        echo '[INFO] Backup cron installed' &&
+        echo '[INFO] Starting crond...' &&
+        crond -f -l 8
+      "
+    networks: [net]
+
+  pg:
+    image: postgres:16
+    container_name: vw-db
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      POSTGRES_DB: ${DB_NAME}
+      POSTGRES_USER: ${DB_USER}
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${DB_PASS}
+      TZ: Asia/Shanghai
+      PGTZ: Asia/Shanghai
+    volumes:
+      - vwdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
+      - ./backups:/backup           # to import existing dump
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${DB_USER} -d ${DB_NAME}"]
+      interval: 10s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 10
+    networks: [net]
+
+  pgweb:
+    profiles: ["debug"]
+    image: sosedoff/pgweb:0.16.2
+    container_name: vaultwarden-pgweb
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      # 用 Vaultwarden 的数据库参数拼接连接串
+      #DATABASE_URL: "postgres://${DB_USER}:${DB_PASS}@${DB_HOST}:${DB_PORT}/${DB_NAME}?sslmode=disable"
+      PGWEB_AUTH_USER: ${PGWEB_USER}
+      PGWEB_AUTH_PASS: ${PGWEB_PASS}
+      TZ: Asia/Shanghai
+    #ports:
+    #  - "8082:8081"     # 本地访问 http://localhost:8082
+    depends_on:
+      pg:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    networks: [net]
+
+networks:
+  net:
+    name: vw-net
+    external: true
+
+volumes:
+  vwdata: {}
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+# AdGuard Home official configuration review basis (2026-08)
+
+This page is the **official source basis and recommendation baseline** used
+during the on-site review of AdGuard Home (AGH) on `192.168.66.36`. It does not
+claim to have read that host's configuration and contains no credentials.
+On-site conclusions must be based on the live `AdGuardHome.yaml`, OpenWrt
+`dnsmasq`/DHCP, firewall, routing, and actual client leases.
+
+Official sources (AdGuard only):
+
+- [Configuration](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/)
+- [Setting up AdGuard Home securely](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/running-securely/)
+- [Getting started](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/getting-started/)
+- [DHCP](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/dhcp/)
+- [DNS encryption](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/encryption/)
+
+## Recommended role split (for the existing OpenWrt gateway)
+
+Preferred: keep **OpenWrt/dnsmasq as the single DHCP and local-domain
+authority, with AGH as the LAN DNS filter/forwarder**: DHCP option 6 hands
+clients `.36`; AGH sets the router's local DNS (usually the gateway LAN IP) as
+`local_ptr_upstreams` and, where needed, uses domain-specific upstreams to route
+the LAN search domain / local names back to dnsmasq. Clients are filtered while
+still keeping DHCP lease names, static hosts, local reverse resolution, and
+gateway-internal service discovery.
+
+Rationale: AGH supports dnsmasq-style domain-specific upstreams for internal
+private name servers; private PTR should be configured in **Private reverse DNS
+servers** / `local_ptr_upstreams` rather than regular upstreams; when not
+explicitly configured, it falls back to the OS default resolver, which shifts as
+host networking changes. [Official config: domain-specific upstreams](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#configuring-upstreams);
+[private rDNS](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#private-addresses).
+
+Do not have OpenWrt dnsmasq and AGH both listen on `:53` at the same LAN IP;
+port conflicts, or pointing dnsmasq's upstream at AGH while AGH points back at
+dnsmasq, cause failures/forwarding loops. When AGH runs on a separate `.36`
+host, the simplest topology is clients → AGH `.36:53` → public/encrypted
+upstreams, forwarding only local resolution (PTR, LAN domain) → gateway dnsmasq.
+This is an operational inference based on the official capabilities above and
+must be validated against the live `ss -lntup`, dnsmasq config, and query path.
+
+AGH also has built-in DHCP, but it should only be enabled after **disabling the
+existing gateway DHCP, explicitly migrating leases/reservations and verifying
+options 3/6**. The official docs describe it as an alternative when the router
+cannot hand out custom DNS, not as a dual-DHCP setup; the DHCP docs also state
+leases/static leases are managed by AGH. [Getting started: router DHCP/DNS
+handout and alternative DHCP](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/getting-started/#router);
+[DHCP configuration](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/dhcp/).
+
+## Exposure and access control
+
+1. `dns.bind_hosts` should bind only loopback and the actual LAN address (here
+   prefer `.36`'s LAN address); do not use `0.0.0.0`/public interfaces for a
+   home recursive resolver. The official docs note full-interface binding
+   exposes DDoS risk; a small isolated network should pick local service
+   interfaces and may add loopback alongside. [Secure deployment: server
+   addresses](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/running-securely/#choosing-server-addresses);
+   [`bind_hosts` definition](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+2. In the firewall, allow only managed LAN/VLAN → `.36` TCP/UDP 53; bind the web
+   admin UI to the management network/loopback and avoid WAN forwarding. At the
+   app layer, further restrict with `allowed_clients` to the local subnets; when
+   non-empty, only the CIDR/IP/ClientIDs in it are accepted, and it overrides
+   the effect of `disallowed_clients`. [Official access
+   control](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+3. Keep `refuse_any: true` and a non-zero `ratelimit` (default 20 qps), unless
+   on-site evidence shows the service can never be reached from the internet and
+   LAN high-concurrency needs are data-backed; the official docs list both as
+   protection against reflection/DDoS. [Configuration
+   notes](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+4. The web UI must have a user with login-failure lockout enabled;
+   `users: []` disables authentication, and `auth_attempts` or `block_auth_min`
+   of 0 disables the corresponding lockout logic. [Web/auth
+   parameters](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#users).
+
+## Upstreams, encryption, and DNSSEC
+
+- Use two trusted, differently-networked DoH/DoT/DoQ upstreams for normal public
+  resolution; AGH supports these protocols and DNS Stamps. If an upstream
+  URL/hostname needs resolving, `bootstrap_dns` is its initial resolver; do not
+  point bootstrap at a name that requires AGH itself to resolve, and use
+  directly reachable, stable IPs. A `fallback_dns` can be set separately; it is
+  used only when primary upstreams do not respond. [Upstream protocols and
+  bootstrap/fallback](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+- If local IPv6's actual egress path is unstable, do not enable
+  `bootstrap_prefer_ipv6`; the official docs note it makes DoH/DoQ/DoT bootstrap
+  prefer IPv6. Decide on-site based on each upstream's IPv4/IPv6 reachability,
+  latency, and failure rate. [Same reference](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+- Consider enabling `enable_dnssec`, choosing recursive upstreams that actually
+  handle DNSSEC; but understand precisely: officially AGH sets the DO flag on
+  requests to upstreams; it does not perform recursive validation itself. On
+  site, query a known-bad-signature domain and observe AD/failure responses to
+  confirm upstream validation behavior. [DNSSEC parameter
+  definition](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+- Prefer `upstream_mode: load_balance` unless measurement shows `parallel` first
+  answer latency is clearly worth the privacy/traffic cost of querying all
+  upstreams. The former picks by failure rate and average latency weighting; the
+  latter queries all upstreams concurrently; this is an operational judgment
+  based on documented behavior. [Upstream
+  modes](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+
+## Cache, ECS, and privacy
+
+- Keep DNS cache enabled; use `cache_ttl_min`/`cache_ttl_max` overrides
+  cautiously to avoid stale or unnecessarily short TTLs. `cache_optimistic`
+  answers with a 10-second TTL after expiry and attempts refresh — good for
+  low-latency scenarios that tolerate briefly stale results, not to be enabled
+  blindly on internal domains sensitive to immediate changes. [Cache
+  parameters](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+- ECS is off by default: when enabled, AGH adds EDNS Client Subnet to upstream
+  requests; if CDN geo-scheduling is truly needed, use `use_custom: true` with a
+  coarse, non-real-client-subnet `custom_ip`, then compare hit rate vs. privacy
+  impact. [ECS parameters](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+- Review log retention and who can read it. If device identity is not needed,
+  consider `anonymize_client_ip: true`; this anonymizes client addresses in logs
+  and stats. [Anonymization
+  parameter](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+
+## Proxy / OpenClash coexistence
+
+If OpenClash/transparent proxy redirects DNS, validate hop by hop to ensure:
+client DNS requests reach AGH uniquely; AGH's outbound traffic to public
+encrypted upstreams is not hijacked back to AGH; and the router's local dnsmasq
+PTR/local-domain requests return to dnsmasq. Create explicit proxy/hijack
+exceptions for `.36` and its upstreams, or explicitly design the proxy to take
+over AGH's outbound resolution; do not rely on "it seems to resolve" to conclude
+there is no loop.
+
+This is not an AGH-official OpenClash instruction (the official docs do not
+maintain that integration), but an on-site verification requirement derived from
+AGH's independent listening, upstream forwarding, and local-PTR-split
+capabilities. The officially supported mechanisms are referenced at
+[`bind_hosts`/upstreams/PTR](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns).
+
+If serving DoH via a reverse proxy, `trusted_proxies` must list only the actual
+proxy IP/CIDR; AGH will only trust `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-For`, etc. from
+those sources. Do not write the whole LAN/WAN for convenience;
+`http.doh.insecure_enabled` should only be enabled when a reverse proxy really
+terminates TLS in front. [Proxy and
+DoH](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#dns); [encrypted DNS
+docs](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/encryption/). For a pure-LAN
+plaintext-53 service, publishing DoH/DoT/DoQ outward is usually unnecessary.
+
+## On-site review checklist (read-only)
+
+1. Record the version, service method, and the full effective configuration
+   (secrets redacted); run the AGH config check. Officially provided via
+   `--check-config`. [Command-line
+   arguments](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#command-line-arguments).
+2. On `.36`, the gateway, and a wired/wireless client, record `ss` listeners,
+   DHCP option 6, default route, `/etc/config/dhcp`, and OpenClash
+   DNS/firewall-redirect rules.
+3. From a client test: public A/AAAA, ad-rule hits, DHCP hostnames, forward LAN
+   domain, private PTR, DNSSEC bad-signature domain, and the expected failure
+   mode when AGH stops. Then check whether client IPs in AGH query logs are
+   still genuinely identifiable.
+4. From the AGH host, test each upstream and bootstrap over the actual protocol
+   for IPv4 and IPv6 reachability; compare with transparent proxy on/off to rule
+   out loops and leaks.
+5. Verify the web UI/DNS ports have no WAN exposure; confirm allowed clients and
+   firewall match actual LAN/VLAN, guest network, and VPN subnets.
+
+Before changing anything, export the current configuration and DHCP/firewall
+state; adjust one layer at a time (DHCP handout, AGH listening, upstreams, or
+DNS hijack) and keep a known-good management and DNS fallback path.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Domain Docs
+
+How the engineering skills should consume this repo's domain documentation when exploring the codebase.
+
+## Before exploring, read these
+
+- **`CONTEXT.md`** at the repo root, or
+- **`CONTEXT-MAP.md`** at the repo root if it exists — it points at one `CONTEXT.md` per context. Read each one relevant to the topic.
+- **`docs/adr/`** — read ADRs that touch the area you're about to work in. In multi-context repos, also check `src/<context>/docs/adr/` for context-scoped decisions.
+
+If any of these files don't exist, **proceed silently**. Don't flag their absence; don't suggest creating them upfront. The `/domain-modeling` skill (reached via `/grill-with-docs` and `/improve-codebase-architecture`) creates them lazily when terms or decisions actually get resolved.
+
+## File structure
+
+Single-context repo (most repos):
+
+```
+/
+├── CONTEXT.md
+├── docs/adr/
+│   ├── 0001-event-sourced-orders.md
+│   └── 0002-postgres-for-write-model.md
+└── src/
+```
+
+Multi-context repo (presence of `CONTEXT-MAP.md` at the root):
+
+```
+/
+├── CONTEXT-MAP.md
+├── docs/adr/                          ← system-wide decisions
+└── src/
+    ├── ordering/
+    │   ├── CONTEXT.md
+    │   └── docs/adr/                  ← context-specific decisions
+    └── billing/
+        ├── CONTEXT.md
+        └── docs/adr/
+```
+
+## Use the glossary's vocabulary
+
+When your output names a domain concept (in an issue title, a refactor proposal, a hypothesis, a test name), use the term as defined in `CONTEXT.md`. Don't drift to synonyms the glossary explicitly avoids.
+
+If the concept you need isn't in the glossary yet, that's a signal — either you're inventing language the project doesn't use (reconsider) or there's a real gap (note it for `/domain-modeling`).
+
+## Flag ADR conflicts
+
+If your output contradicts an existing ADR, surface it explicitly rather than silently overriding:
+
+> _Contradicts ADR-0007 (event-sourced orders) — but worth reopening because…_
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Issue tracker: Linear
+
+Issues and PRDs for this repo are tracked in Linear, driven entirely through the
+Linear MCP configured in the current runtime. VPS operation records use the
+Linear **`vps`** project (team `W1ndy`).
+
+## Conventions
+
+- **Create**: `linear_save_issue` (requires `title` + `team`); description as
+  real-newline Markdown.
+- **Read**: `linear_get_issue <identifier>` (e.g. LIN-123), optionally with
+  `includeRelations`.
+- **List**: `linear_list_issues`, filtered by `query` / `state` / `assignee` /
+  `team` / `project`.
+- **Comment**: `linear_save_comment` (pass `issueId` + `body`).
+- **Labels**: `linear_save_issue` `labels` field (replaces the whole label set).
+- **Status**: `linear_save_issue` `state` field (type / name / ID).
+
+Resolve team, project, and cycle names through the Linear MCP rather than
+hard-coding them.
+
+## Cross-issue constraint baseline
+
+The `plans/` directory is retired (removed 2026-08-06). Plans and baselines now
+live in the vps project document "VPS 运维重构：已确认决策与验收标准". Open work
+items are tracked as individual issues with dependencies expressed via
+`blockedBy` / `blocks`. Read that document before adding new tasks.
+
+## When a skill says "publish to the issue tracker"
+
+Create a Linear issue with `linear_save_issue` (`project: vps`).
+
+## When a skill says "fetch the relevant ticket"
+
+Use `linear_get_issue <identifier>`.
+
+## Wayfinding operations
+
+- **Map**: one issue as the map; child tickets link via `parentId`.
+- **Child ticket**: `linear_save_issue` with `parentId` set to the map; labels
+  `wayfinder:<type>` (research / prototype / grilling / task).
+- **Blocking**: `linear_save_issue` `blockedBy` / `blocks` (append-only).
+- **Frontier query**: list the map's open children, excluding those blocked or
+  already assigned; take the first in map order.
+- **Claim**: `linear_save_issue` `assignee: me`.
+- **Resolve**: `linear_save_comment` the answer → update `state` → append a
+  pointer under the map's decisions-so-far.
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Triage Labels
+
+The skills speak in terms of five canonical triage roles. This file maps those roles to the actual label strings used in this repo's issue tracker.
+
+| Label in mattpocock/skills | Label in our tracker | Meaning                                  |
+| -------------------------- | -------------------- | ---------------------------------------- |
+| `needs-triage`             | `needs-triage`       | Maintainer needs to evaluate this issue  |
+| `needs-info`               | `needs-info`         | Waiting on reporter for more information |
+| `ready-for-agent`          | `ready-for-agent`    | Fully specified, ready for an AFK agent  |
+| `ready-for-human`          | `ready-for-human`    | Requires human implementation            |
+| `wontfix`                  | `wontfix`            | Will not be actioned                     |
+
+When a skill mentions a role (e.g. "apply the AFK-ready triage label"), use the corresponding label string from this table.
+
+Edit the right-hand column to match whatever vocabulary you actually use.
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# docs/archive — 归档文档
+
+归档 = 单次调研、已过期，或与当前运维无行动指向的内容。恢复使用前先确认
+内容仍与线上状态一致（本仓库原则：先证据后变更，live state 优先）。
+
+## 归档清单
+
+| 文件 | 归档日期 | 原位置 | 说明 |
+|------|---------|--------|------|
+| `lan-dns-alternatives.md` | 2026-08-17 | `docs/` | DNS 技术选型调研，零引用，无在途决策 |
+| `agent-runbook-guide.md` | 2026-08-22 | `docs/` | 上游参考存档；仓库落地规范为 `RUNBOOKS.md` |
+| `lan-core-switch-upgrade-plan.md` | 2026-08-22 | `docs/` | SE5420 历史规划参考；执行以 `docs/lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md` 为准 |
+| `lan-rb5009-upgrade.md` | 2026-08-22 | `docs/` | 未采购的 ER-X→RB5009 休眠备选方案；其中 PVE 透传与 VLAN10 调研仍可参考 |
+| `se5420-review-claim-verification-2026-08.md` | 2026-08-22 | `docs/` | 一次性评审复核调研（现场只读复核结论） |
+
+> 购物类文档（打印机购买指南、交换机选型调研）已按整改计划移入 Obsidian
+> vault（`~/Documents/vault/my-vault/02_Areas/House/`），不在本目录。
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+# Agent Runbook 实用指南（v1）
+
+> **定位**：本指南用于把团队的重复性运维、交付与故障处理经验写成可由 Agent 安全执行的流程。它适用于以 Git 仓库为中心的工程协作模式，优先采用 **Markdown + Git 版本控制 + 明确的 Agent 路由规则**，而不是一开始引入复杂的自动化平台。
+
+> 本文件为上游参考存档。仓库内落地规范见 [`RUNBOOKS.md`](../../RUNBOOKS.md)，标准模板见 [`runbooks/_template.md`](../../runbooks/_template.md)，索引见 [`runbooks/README.md`](../../runbooks/README.md)。
+
+## 1. 什么是 Agent Runbook
+
+Runbook 是预先设计的、可重复执行的操作流程，用于处理部署、告警、故障、配置变更、CI 修复等标准化工作。传统 Runbook 的主要读者是人；**Agent Runbook 则必须把人的隐性判断显式化**，使 Agent 能知道做什么、看到什么才算正常、下一步去哪里、何时停止以及如何撤销。
+
+Google SRE 强调在事故发生前设计响应流程、系统化排障，并逐步将重复性运维工作自动化。[1] [2] AWS Systems Manager Automation 则把可执行 Runbook 建模为顺序步骤：每个步骤调用一个动作，前一步输出可以传递给后续步骤。[3] 这两种思路共同构成了 Agent Runbook 的实用基础。
+
+| 层次 | 核心问题 | 应承担的职责 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `AGENTS.md` | **何时使用哪份流程？** | 工作路由、通用操作约束、无匹配流程时的默认行为 |
+| `runbooks/*.md` | **这件事按什么流程做？** | 前置条件、分步操作、决策分支、验证、停止条件与回滚 |
+| Skill / MCP / Tool | **有哪些可调用能力？** | 具体能力、参数、权限边界和使用说明 |
+| Shell / GitHub / Linear / SSH 等 | **实际如何执行？** | 对系统、代码库或外部服务执行操作 |
+
+## 2. 设计目标与适用边界
+
+Agent Runbook 的目标不是让 Agent 在所有异常下“想办法修好”，而是在一个**已知、受控、可验证、可回退**的边界中提高执行一致性。它应当优先覆盖高频、后果明确、流程稳定的操作，例如 CI 失败定位、Issue 到合并请求、发布前检查、标准部署、回滚及网络变更。
+
+| 适合纳入 Runbook | 暂不适合直接自动执行 |
+|---|---|
+| 明确输入、固定步骤、可观察结果的操作 | 目标或验收标准尚不清楚的探索性任务 |
+| 可在每次修改后验证状态的变更 | 缺失关键参数、权限或上下文的任务 |
+| 具有安全回滚路径的发布与配置调整 | 高破坏性、不可逆或影响面未知的操作 |
+| 可由权限与审批规则约束的运维流程 | 与既有流程事实冲突、无法判断根因的异常场景 |
+
+> **基本原则**：当实际状态与 Runbook 的假设冲突，Agent 应停止并呈报，而不是补全未知信息、绕过检查或继续试错。
+
+## 3. Agent Runbook 的最小字段
+
+与普通人工 Runbook 相比，Agent Runbook 必须显式包含以下六类控制信息。缺少其中任一项，都会增加盲目执行或错误恢复的风险。
+
+| 字段 | 作用 | 写作要求 |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Action** | 定义当前要执行的动作 | 使用可观察、可执行的动词；避免“检查一下”“适当调整”等模糊表述 |
+| **Expected** | 描述正常状态或预期输出 | 给出具体信号、阈值、状态码、测试结果或页面表现 |
+| **Decision** | 定义分支与下一跳 | 用“条件 → 下一步”的形式；无法判断时指向 `STOP` |
+| **Verification** | 确认变更真正生效 | 在每个有副作用的步骤后执行，不能被跳过 |
+| **Stop condition** | 规定何时不得继续 | 明确列出信息缺失、状态冲突、权限不足、验证失败等条件 |
+| **Rollback** | 描述如何恢复到变更前状态 | 标明触发条件、前提、撤销步骤及回滚后的验证方式 |
+
+## 4. 推荐目录与路由机制
+
+建议把流程与代码一起保存在 Git 仓库中。这样 Runbook 可以评审、版本化、随系统演进更新，也能与相关 Issue、PR 和配置建立可追溯关系。
+
+```text
+repo/
+├── AGENTS.md
+├── RUNBOOKS.md
+├── runbooks/
+│   ├── README.md
+│   ├── issue-to-merge.md
+│   ├── fix-ci.md
+│   ├── release.md
+│   ├── rollback.md
+│   ├── network-change.md
+│   └── network-recovery.md
+└── ...
+```
+
+### `AGENTS.md`：只做路由与通用约束
+
+`AGENTS.md` 不应重复流程细节。它只需要规定 Agent 在进行操作类工作前，先查找最具体且适用的 Runbook，并严格遵守其中的步骤、验证、停止和审批要求。
+
+```markdown
+# Operational Rules
+
+Before performing operational work:
+
+1. Inspect `runbooks/`.
+2. Select the most specific applicable runbook.
+3. Follow its steps in order.
+4. Do not skip verification steps.
+5. Respect STOP and approval conditions.
+6. If no runbook applies, diagnose only; do not mutate production state.
+
+## Routing
+
+- CI failure → `runbooks/fix-ci.md`
+- GitHub issue implementation → `runbooks/issue-to-merge.md`
+- Deployment → `runbooks/release.md`
+- Rollback → `runbooks/rollback.md`
+- Network configuration → `runbooks/network-change.md`
+- Network outage → `runbooks/network-recovery.md`
+```
+
+### `RUNBOOKS.md`：仓库级规范
+
+`RUNBOOKS.md` 用于统一所有 Runbook 的字段、命名、评审要求和变更规则。每份 Runbook 只描述一种可识别的操作意图；如果流程已有明显分叉，应拆分为独立文件，而不是堆叠成长篇“万能流程”。
+
+## 5. 规范模板
+
+以下模板可直接保存为 `runbooks/_template.md` 使用。
+
+```markdown
+# Runbook: <名称>
+
+## Purpose
+说明本 Runbook 要解决的问题及成功结果。
+
+## Scope
+- 适用环境：<如 development / staging / production>
+- 适用对象：<服务、仓库、组件或告警类型>
+- 不适用情形：<需要改用其他 Runbook 或转人工的场景>
+
+## Ownership
+- Owner：<团队或角色>
+- Last reviewed：<YYYY-MM-DD>
+- Related systems：<系统名称>
+
+## Preconditions
+- <执行前必须满足的权限、备份、窗口、健康状态或已知信息>
+
+## Inputs
+| 输入 | 来源 | 是否必需 | 校验方法 |
+|---|---|---:|---|
+| <参数> | <来源> | 是/否 | <如何确认有效> |
+
+## Safety
+### Non-negotiable rules
+- 先只读诊断，后执行变更。
+- 不得把删除现有配置作为首次恢复动作。
+- 不得猜测或编造缺失参数。
+- 不得绕过失败的测试、检查或审批。
+- 每次变更后必须完成对应验证。
+- 破坏性操作必须获得明确批准。
+
+### Stop conditions
+- 实际状态与本文档的前提或预期结果冲突。
+- 缺少必要输入、权限、审批或回滚能力。
+- 验证失败且本文档没有明确的下一步。
+- 影响范围超出 Scope。
+
+### Approval gates
+| 动作 | 风险级别 | 是否需要明确批准 | 批准记录位置 |
+|---|---|---:|---|
+| <动作> | 低/中/高 | 是/否 | <Issue / PR / 变更单> |
+
+## Procedure
+
+### Step 1 — Diagnose
+
+**Action**
+
+<执行只读诊断动作。>
+
+**Expected**
+
+<列出预期输出、状态或证据。>
+
+**Decision**
+
+- 若 <条件 A>，进入 Step 2。
+- 若 <条件 B>，进入 Troubleshooting A。
+- 若无法判断或状态冲突，`STOP` 并记录证据。
+
+### Step 2 — Change
+
+**Action**
+
+<描述单一、可审计的变更动作。>
+
+**Expected**
+
+<变更后应出现的状态。>
+
+**Verification**
+
+<给出可重复执行的验证命令、测试、监控指标或检查清单。>
+
+**Rollback**
+
+- 触发条件：<什么情况需要回滚>
+- 回滚动作：<如何撤销>
+- 回滚验证：<如何确认恢复成功>
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+### Troubleshooting A — <异常名称>
+
+- 证据收集：<日志、指标、命令输出、链接>
+- 允许动作：<仅限已验证且低风险的动作>
+- 下一步：<回到某步 / 转入另一 Runbook / STOP 并升级>
+
+## Final Verification
+
+只有同时满足以下标准，流程才算成功：
+
+- <功能或服务状态>
+- <自动化测试或健康检查>
+- <监控指标或告警状态>
+- <变更记录、PR 或 Issue 已更新>
+
+## Failure Handling
+
+若未能完成：
+
+1. 停止进一步变更。
+2. 收集 <命令输出、时间范围、请求 ID、日志链接、截图或复现步骤>。
+3. 记录已完成步骤、实际结果、未满足的预期和是否执行过回滚。
+4. 按 <升级渠道> 交接，不继续猜测。
+
+## References
+
+- <关联 Issue、PR、架构文档、仪表盘、配置仓库或外部文档>
+```
+
+## 6. 编写步骤的标准写法
+
+每个步骤应只承担一个清晰目的，并使用“动作—预期—决策”的闭环表达。如下表所示，前者会导致 Agent 自主扩大操作范围，后者则为其提供安全边界。
+
+| 不推荐写法 | 推荐写法 |
+|---|---|
+| “检查部署是否正常，不正常就修复。” | “读取部署状态与最近一次发布记录。若所有副本 `Ready` 且版本等于目标版本，进入 Final Verification；若副本未就绪，收集事件与日志并进入 Troubleshooting A；若版本不匹配且原因未知，`STOP`。” |
+| “必要时修改配置。” | “仅当配置差异与变更单 `CHG-123` 完全一致且审批已记录时，应用指定键的值；应用后运行健康检查；失败则按 Rollback 回退。” |
+| “测试失败时可先跳过。” | “任何必需测试失败均不得继续部署。记录失败测试、日志和提交版本；仅按 Troubleshooting B 处理。” |
+
+## 7. 通用安全规则
+
+以下规则适合在每份 Runbook 的 `Safety` 章节中复用。若某流程存在更严格要求，应以更严格要求为准。
+
+```markdown
+## Safety Rules
+
+- Never delete an existing configuration as the first recovery action.
+- Prefer read-only diagnosis before mutation.
+- After every mutation, verify the expected state.
+- If actual state conflicts with this runbook, STOP.
+- Do not invent missing parameters.
+- Do not bypass failed tests.
+- Destructive actions require explicit approval.
+```
+
+这些约束体现了一个关键顺序：**先证据，后变更；先小范围，后扩大；先验证，后结束；不确定则停止。** 特别是停止条件必须可操作，例如“权限不足”“缺少变更单”“生产状态与前提不一致”“错误率超过 1%”等，而不应写成“情况复杂时停止”。
+
+## 8. 运行与审计流程
+
+Agent 执行 Runbook 时，应按照固定运行模型工作。每一步的输入、动作、输出和下一跳都应可追踪，这与 AWS 自动化 Runbook 的顺序步骤和输出传递思想一致。[3]
+
+```text
+输入与前置条件
+        ↓
+只读诊断
+        ↓
+确认预期状态或决策分支
+        ↓
+获取审批（如需要）
+        ↓
+执行最小变更
+        ↓
+立即验证
+        ↓
+成功收尾 / 回滚 / 停止并升级
+```
+
+| 阶段 | Agent 必须产出的证据 | 禁止行为 |
+|---|---|---|
+| 输入确认 | 参数来源、环境、目标资源、权限与审批状态 | 用猜测值补全必需参数 |
+| 诊断 | 命令输出、日志、指标或页面状态 | 在未诊断前直接修改生产状态 |
+| 变更 | 实际执行内容、变更范围、时间 | 将多个无关变更混在一起执行 |
+| 验证 | 测试、健康检查、监控状态与预期对比 | 以“命令执行成功”代替业务验证 |
+| 失败处理 | 已做步骤、异常证据、回滚状态和升级对象 | 无限制重试或绕过失败检查 |
+
+## 9. 从人工操作到自动化的成熟路径
+
+不建议在流程尚未稳定时先构建复杂 DSL 或全自动编排。应先积累真实案例，把可重复部分固化为 Markdown Runbook，再把已稳定、低歧义、可验证的操作迁移到脚本、CI、Skill 或自动化系统。Google SRE 将能够由机器替代的重复性人工工作视为应逐步消除的 toil。[4]
+
+| 阶段 | 主要形式 | 人的角色 | 自动化边界 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1. 人工处理 | 现场处置与复盘 | 执行、判断、记录 | 不自动化 |
+| 2. Markdown Runbook | 固化步骤与证据要求 | 审核流程与异常判断 | Agent 可辅助诊断 |
+| 3. Agent + Runbook | 严格按流程执行 | 审批高风险动作、处理例外 | 受停止条件约束的执行 |
+| 4. Script / Skill / CI / Automation | 把稳定步骤程序化 | 处理异常和维护自动化 | 自动完成重复性操作 |
+| 5. 人工审批 + 自动执行 | 常规流程端到端运行 | 决策、审计与治理 | 审批门控下的自动变更 |
+
+## 10. 上线前检查清单
+
+在将一份新 Runbook 交给 Agent 使用前，建议由流程所有者按以下清单审核。
+
+| 检查项 | 合格标准 |
+|---|---|
+| 问题边界 | Purpose 与 Scope 清楚描述适用和不适用情形 |
+| 输入 | 所有必需输入都有来源、格式和校验方法 |
+| 步骤 | 每一步均有 Action、Expected 与明确的下一跳 |
+| 变更控制 | 所有修改动作都有 Verification；关键动作有 Rollback |
+| 安全控制 | Stop conditions、审批门槛和禁止行为已列明 |
+| 异常处理 | 失败时知道收集什么证据、交给谁，而非继续猜测 |
+| 可维护性 | 有 Owner、最近复审日期与关联文档；已在版本控制中评审 |
+| 可演练性 | 已在安全环境或历史案例上走通至少一次 |
+
+## 11. 建议的首批 Runbook
+
+首次落地时，应优先选择频率较高、输入相对明确、变更可回退的场景。以下集合通常能覆盖大部分工程协作的基础需求。
+
+| Runbook | 目的 | 关键安全控制 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `issue-to-merge.md` | 从已明确 Issue 到可评审变更 | Scope 锁定、测试门槛、PR 证据 |
+| `fix-ci.md` | 诊断并修复 CI 失败 | 不跳过测试、不修改无关代码 |
+| `release.md` | 执行标准发布 | 发布窗口、审批、健康检查、回滚点 |
+| `rollback.md` | 恢复到已知稳定版本 | 明确触发条件、版本选择、回滚后验证 |
+| `network-change.md` | 实施受控网络配置变更 | 影响评估、变更单、回退配置 |
+| `network-recovery.md` | 处理网络异常与服务恢复 | 只读诊断优先、状态冲突即停止 |
+
+## 12. 结论
+
+Agent Runbook 的价值不在于把每一项运维工作立即自动化，而在于将团队的工程判断编码为**可路由、可验证、可停止、可回滚**的操作系统。对于多数团队，从仓库中的 `AGENTS.md`、`RUNBOOKS.md` 和一组 Markdown Runbook 起步，已经足够实用。
+
+当某个流程经过多次执行、输入稳定、异常分支收敛且验证可靠后，再将其下沉为脚本、CI 或其他自动化能力。这样既能逐步降低重复性 toil，也能始终保留人类对高风险和例外情形的决策权。[4]
+
+## References
+
+[1]: https://sre.google/sre-book/managing-incidents/ "Google SRE Book — Managing Incidents"
+[2]: https://sre.google/sre-book/effective-troubleshooting/ "Google SRE Book — Effective Troubleshooting"
+[3]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/automation-documents.html "AWS Systems Manager — Creating your own runbooks"
+[4]: https://sre.google/sre-book/eliminating-toil/ "Google SRE Book — Eliminating Toil"
+[5]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/systems-manager-automation.html "AWS Systems Manager Automation"
+[6]: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager-automation-runbooks/latest/userguide/automation-runbook-reference.html "AWS Systems Manager Automation Runbook Reference"
+[7]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/automation/manage-runbooks "Microsoft Learn — Manage runbooks in Azure Automation"
+
+---
+
+**来源**：Manus AI《Agent Runbook 实用指南（v1.0）》，本仓库存档为规范参考。
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# LAN 核心交换机升级计划（保留 ER-X）
+
+**状态：** SE5420 **已采购**（2026-08-09）。**实施与验证以 [lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md](../lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md) 为准**；
+本文为历史规划参考，**不得作为现场执行步骤**；所有实际操作均以部署指南为准。
+**锁定硬件：** TP-Link **`TL-SE5420`**（16 × 2.5GbE RJ45 + 4 × 10GbE SFP+）。  
+**目标：** SE5420 承接全部 LAN 物理接入与二层转发；ER-X 继续承担公网、NAT、防火墙、
+LAN66/LAN55 网关与 DHCP。
+
+**拓扑与流量的详细说明**（职责、逻辑网、流量路径、Wi-Fi 分工、验收边界）见：
+[lan-erx-se5420-network.md](../lan-erx-se5420-network.md)。
+
+SE5420 官方资料：静态功耗 8 W、最大功耗 32 W；VLAN、LACP、STP/RSTP/MSTP、ACL、
+CLI/SNMP、配置导入导出与固件下载。无 PoE——AP 使用本地取电 + 普通网线。
+
+## 已确认边界（摘要）
+
+| 项 | 结论 |
+|---|---|
+| 硬目标 | 同 VLAN 2.5G；SFP+ 先空槽 |
+| 核心角色 | 纯 L2；不开 L3 / DHCP Server/Relay / NAT |
+| 网关 | 默认一律 ER-X `.254`；升级专用 SSID（后续）才走 `gfw` `.1` |
+| 本次 Done | 阶段 0–3；VLAN10 / 客人 SSID / 升级 SSID 另立项目 |
+| 切换 | 30–60 分钟维护窗；旧交换迁完后闲置 |
+| 首批 2.5G | NAS + 主力 PC（或 PVE） |
+| 管理 | 先本地 HTTPS/SSH；云以后再说 |
+
+### 保留的 ER-X 职责
+
+| 项目 | 迁移后职责 |
+|---|---|
+| PPPoE / WAN、NAT、端口转发、WAN 防火墙 | ER-X，不变 |
+| LAN66 (`192.168.66.0/24`) 默认网关与 DHCP | ER-X `eth0`，不变 |
+| LAN55 (`192.168.55.0/24`) 默认网关与 DHCP | ER-X `switch0`，不变 |
+| LAN66 ↔ LAN55 三层转发 | ER-X，不变 |
+| 升级专用 Wi-Fi 网关（后续） | `gfw` VM，不是 ER-X 或核心交换机 |
+
+ER-X 与核心之间使用两条**独立无标签 access**（LAN66 + LAN55），不向 ER-X 送
+VLAN tag。
+
+### 核心交换机职责
+
+- 所有有线设备、AP 与 PVE 的物理接入；
+- VLAN66、VLAN55 的二层转发；
+- 为日后 U6 Lite 与 PVE 预留 VLAN10 trunk（本次不启用业务）；
+- 同 VLAN 的 1G/2.5G 转发；
+- SFP+ 预留未来 10G（DAC/AOC/光；不用 10GBASE-T 作默认）。
+
+## 目标拓扑（简图）
+
+```text
+                         Internet
+                            |
+                        ER-X / PPPoE
+                    +-------+--------+
+                    |                |
+            eth0, LAN66        switch0 port, LAN55
+                 access              access
+                    |                |
+                    +-------+--------+
+                            |
+                    TL-SE5420 核心（纯 L2）
+              |          |           |
+     PVE / gfw         U6 Lite      LAN66/LAN55 access
+     （日后 trunk）    （日后 trunk）  NAS, PC, dns, ubnt, AC-Lite …
+```
+
+完整端口表、流量路径与 Wi-Fi 分工见
+[lan-erx-se5420-network.md](../lan-erx-se5420-network.md)。
+
+## VLAN 与端口设计
+
+| VLAN / 逻辑网络 | 核心配置 | 网关 / DHCP | 用途 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 66 | access；PVE/U6 日后 trunk 的 native | ER-X `eth0` / `.254` | 主 LAN、管理 |
+| 55 | access | ER-X `switch0` / `.254` | LAN55、AC-Lite |
+| 10（后续） | 仅 PVE 与 U6 trunk 上 tagged | `gfw` | 升级专用 SSID |
+| 管理 | LAN66 管理地址；不新建 VLAN | reservation / 静态 | SE5420 管理面 |
+
+管理地址分配前先查 ER-X DHCP/reservation；禁用不需要的 HTTP/Telnet；云管延后；
+保留 HTTPS/SSH 与离线配置备份（备份不进本仓库）。
+
+### 初始端口分配
+
+| 预留 | 对端 | 模式 |
+|---|---|---|
+| 铜口 1 | ER-X `eth0` | access VLAN66 |
+| 铜口 2 | ER-X `switch0` 成员口 | access VLAN55 |
+| 铜口 3 | PVE（`gfw`） | 现 access 66；日后 trunk native66+tag10 |
+| 铜口 4 | U6 Lite | 同上；本地取电 |
+| 铜口 5 | UAP-AC-Lite | access VLAN55；本地取电 |
+| 其余铜口 | NAS、PC、`dns`、`ubnt`… | 默认 access VLAN66 |
+| SFP+ 1–4 | 未来 | 空槽 |
+
+## 分阶段实施与验收
+
+### 阶段 0：采购前核验
+
+1. 确认 SE5420 revision、保修、手册、固件页。
+2. 确认 VLAN trunk、RSTP/MSTP、LACP、镜像、配置导出、错误计数。
+3. SFP+ 模块本次不买；有对端后再选 DAC/AOC/光。
+4. 盘点线缆与对端（LAN66/55、PVE、两台 AP）；确认关键 2.5G 链路可协商。
+
+### 阶段 1：离线初始化核心
+
+1. 仅电源 + 隔离管理本：管理 IP、强密码、时区、NTP、HTTPS/SSH；**关闭 L3/DHCP**。
+2. 导出初始配置（离线保存，不进仓库）。
+3. 建立 VLAN66/55/10 与端口模板；VLAN10 不接生产。
+4. 开启 RSTP/MSTP；不制造物理环路。
+
+### 阶段 2：维护窗迁移 LAN66
+
+1. 使用约定维护窗（约 30–60 分钟）；保留原接线作回滚。
+2. 先接铜口 1 ↔ ER-X `eth0`；验证管理地址、`.254`、DNS `.36`、互联网。
+3. 逐台迁到 VLAN66 access；每台确认地址/DNS/路由/业务。
+4. 最后迁 `ubnt`、`dns`、NAS/PC；禁止无意双上行。
+
+### 阶段 3：迁移 LAN55
+
+1. 接铜口 2 ↔ ER-X `switch0` 成员口。
+2. 测试设备获 `192.168.55.x`、网关 `.254`、可达 DNS。
+3. AC-Lite → 铜口 5；确认 `.55.5` 与 Inform Connected。
+4. 旧交换下电闲置。
+
+### 阶段 4：VLAN10 升级专用 Wi-Fi（独立项目）
+
+不与本次 Done 捆绑。仅 U6；网关 `gfw`；详见
+[lan-erx-se5420-network.md](../lan-erx-se5420-network.md) 第 6.5 / 8 节与
+[unifi-network.md](../unifi-network.md)。
+
+## 性能预期与不变瓶颈
+
+- 同 VLAN、两端在核心上的 2.5G：可测 2.5G 级二层。
+- 上网与 LAN66↔LAN55：仍经 ER-X 1G 路径。
+- 空 SFP+ 不使网络「变成 10G」。
+
+## 验收清单
+
+- 管理面、口令、离线备份；
+- 端口速率与错误计数；
+- LAN66/55 的 DHCP、网关、DNS、互联网与关键本地服务；
+- 两台 AP Connected；Inform 仍为 `http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform`；
+- 无无意环路；旧交换已闲置；
+- （建议）两台 2.5G 终端同 VLAN `iperf3`。
+
+## 回滚
+
+验证失败则停迁、恢复原接线；不改 ER-X WAN/DHCP/SSH。VLAN10 失败只撤新 SSID。
+
+## 参考
+
+- [ER-X + SE5420 网络与拓扑说明](../lan-erx-se5420-network.md)
+- [LAN 概览](../lan-overview.md)
+- [ER-X 配置记录](../edgerouter-x-configuration.md)
+- [UniFi 网络](../unifi-network.md)
+- [`gfw`](../../hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md)
+- [TL-SE5420 官方规格](https://www.tp-link.com.cn/product_2899.html?v=specification)
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+# Home-LAN DNS alternatives for the windy LAN (research, 2026-08)
+
+**Status: research only. No configuration was changed.** This page evaluates
+resolvers/splitters that are genuinely better than — or meaningfully different
+from — the current "AdGuard Home (AGH) + mosdns" setup on
+[`dns.windy.lan`](../../hosts/dns.windy.lan.md) (`.36`), for a GFW-constrained
+China home LAN. Claims are cited to primary sources (official repos, official
+docs, upstream READMEs); anything not verified is flagged as such.
+
+> 2026-08-12: facts in this page's scope recap were refreshed by W1N-56 live
+> verification — mosdns on `.1` is **not idle**, it is clash's
+> `nameserver`/`default-nameserver` (DIRECT-rule real-IP resolution); the
+> canonical decision record is
+> [`lan-dns-architecture.md`](../lan-dns-architecture.md) (final verdict aligned,
+> Phase 0 kill-test evidence incl. a measured upstream-blackhole degradation
+> gap).
+
+Scope recap (from [`lan-overview.md`](../lan-overview.md), verified 2026-08-06):
+
+- Clients get DNS via EdgeRouter DHCP option 6 → AGH `192.168.66.36:53`.
+- AGH upstreams: `dns.alidns.com` + `doh.pub` DoH (load-balanced), fallback
+  `https://adg.chans.xyz/dns-query`. **DNSSEC disabled** (known-bad-signature
+  check failed on the selected path). Rewrites: `hass.local` / `hass.windy.lan`.
+- `gfw` OpenWrt (`.1`) runs OpenClash fake-ip + TPROXY; dnsmasq → clash DNS
+  `127.0.0.1#7874`. `mosdns` on `127.0.0.1:6052` is clash's
+  `nameserver`/`default-nameserver` (DIRECT-rule real-IP resolution: domestic →
+  AGH `.36:53`, foreign → `223.5.5.5`/`119.29.29.29`); it is **not** in the LAN
+  client query path.
+- No local authoritative PTR source yet; private reverse DNS is a known gap.
+
+---
+
+## 1. TL;DR / recommendation
+
+**The current stack is already 80% of the answer.** AGH is a strong LAN DNS
+front-end (filtering, rewrites, per-client upstreams, query log, web UI) and its
+upstream layer — **per-domain upstreams** plus a **per-domain list loaded from a
+file** (`upstream_dns_file`) — is exactly the mechanism the official docs
+recommend for accelerating China CDN domains while keeping everything else on a
+trusted path. [AGH configuration: upstreams](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/).
+
+The genuinely worthwhile changes, in order of value:
+
+1. **Add geo-split inside AGH** via `upstream_dns_file` fed by a converted
+   `accelerated-domains.china.conf` ([felixonmars/dnsmasq-china-list](https://github.com/felixonmars/dnsmasq-china-list)):
+   domestic CDN domains → `dns.alidns.com` / `doh.pub`; everything else →
+   the trusted foreign path (currently `adg.chans.xyz`). This is a documented
+   AGH use case, requires **no new daemon**, and removes the need for mosdns.
+   This is the top recommendation.
+2. **Re-enable real DNSSEC** by putting validation behind AGH: AGH's
+   `enable_dnssec` only sets the DO bit — it does not validate
+   ([AGH config: DNSSEC](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/)).
+   The two realistic ways are (a) point the foreign/trusted default upstream at
+   a validating resolver ([unbound](https://unbound.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/latest/),
+   [blocky](https://0xerr0r.github.io/blocky/latest/configuration/#dnssec-validation))
+   and re-test a known-bad-signature domain; or (b) insert a validating
+   resolver (blocky is the lightest) between AGH and the upstreams.
+3. **mosdns on `.1` is resolved, not idle** — it is clash's
+   `nameserver`/`default-nameserver` (DIRECT-rule real-IP resolution, verified
+   2026-08-12), so "delete it" is off the table; its role is documented in
+   [`lan-dns-architecture.md`](../lan-dns-architecture.md) §1. If a future change
+   moves this role to an AGH-side companion, keep in mind mosdns's cache strips
+   EDNS0 and it performs no DNSSEC validation
+   ([mosdns v5 executable plugins](https://irine-sistiana.gitbook.io/mosdns-wiki/mosdns-v5/ru-he-pei-zhi-mosdns/ke-zhi-xing-cha-jian.md)).
+
+Top-3 alternatives worth pursuing (see §3 for detail):
+
+| Rank | Option | Why |
+|------|--------|-----|
+| 1 | **AGH with China-list geo-split (`upstream_dns_file`)** | Documented AGH pattern; single box; no new service; keeps filtering/rewrites/UI. |
+| 2 | **Blocky as validating backend behind AGH** | The only "new software" option that adds real in-process DNSSEC validation + conditional per-domain upstreams + ECS in one static binary ([blocky README](https://github.com/0xERR0R/blocky), [config](https://0xerr0r.github.io/blocky/latest/configuration/)). |
+| 3 | **Unbound as validating recursive resolver** (replaces forwarders for the foreign path, or whole path) | True validation, full recursion (fail-open by nature), private `local-zone`s; heavier ops than AGH's file-driven split. |
+
+Explicitly **not** recommended as replacements here: smartdns and chinadns-ng
+(both excellent *splitters*, but neither validates DNSSEC and both lack AGH's
+filtering/UI/query-log layer, so they add a daemon without closing the DNSSEC
+gap); mihomo/sing-box DNS as the primary path (couples DNS to the proxy and is
+fail-closed; keep for proxy-side concerns only); knot-resolver/dnsdist (overkill
+for a single-operator home LAN).
+
+---
+
+## 2. Requirement matrix
+
+Legend: **●** native/built-in · **◐** possible with config/lists · **○** absent/
+not applicable. "Geo-split" = route domestic vs foreign names to different
+upstreams. "Anti-pollution" = a mechanism to avoid/adjudicate poisoned answers
+(IP-verdict or trusted-upstream routing). "DNSSEC" = performs validation
+in-process (not just forwards DO).
+
+| Candidate | Geo-split | Anti-pollution | DNSSEC (validate) | Cache | Private names / rewrites | Ops simplicity | License |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| AGH (current) | ◐ per-domain upstreams + list file | ◐ via trusted foreign upstream | ○ (DO bit only) | ● | ● rewrites, per-client, private-PTR | ● Docker + UI | GPL-3.0 |
+| mosdns v5 | ● domain/ip list matchers | ◐ forward foreign→trusted | ○ | ● (strips EDNS0) | ● hosts/redirect/reverse_lookup | ◐ single binary, YAML, no UI | GPL-3.0 |
+| smartdns | ● nameserver groups + domain lists | ● bogus-nxdomain / blacklist-ip / trusted groups | ○ (no option in config ref) | ● serve-expired | ● address / local-domain / lease file | ◐ single binary, optional WebUI plugin | GPL-3.0 |
+| chinadns-ng | ● chnlist/gfwlist + tag:none IP-test | ● IP verdict via chnroute ipset/nftset | ○ | ● cache/stale/verdict | ◐ hosts / dns-rr-ip | ◐ single static binary, config file | AGPL-3.0 |
+| dnsmasq-china-list | ◐ (data only) | ◐ (via host resolver) | ◐ via host | ◐ via host | ◐ via host | ◐ feed lists | WTFPL |
+| unbound | ◐ forward-zones / RPZ / views | ◐ forward-zones + bogus-nxdomain | ● | ● serve-expired | ● local-zone / local-data | ◐ config daemon, no UI | BSD-style (NLnet) |
+| blocky | ◐ conditional per-domain + client groups | ◐ blocking lists + conditional routing | ● | ● prefetch | ● customDNS / rewrite / hosts | ◐ single binary, YAML, REST (no full web UI) | Apache-2.0 |
+| Technitium | ◐ conditional-forwarder zones / apps | ◐ blocked lists + forwarding | ● | ● persistent | ● zones, stub, split-horizon | ● .NET + web console | GPL-3.0 |
+| sing-box | ● DNS rules (geoip/geosite) | ● rule-based servers + (proxy) sniffing | ○ | ● LRU + optimistic | ● hosts / local server | ◐ single binary, JSON | GPLv3-family (metadata "other") |
+| mihomo | ● nameserver-policy + fallback-filter | ● geoip verdict + geosite | ○ | ● (cache-algorithm) | ● hosts; fake-ip-filter for `.lan` | ◐ single binary, YAML | not cleanly verifiable (repo obfuscated) |
+| knot-resolver | ◐ policy modules | ◐ policy + RPZ | ● | ● persistent | ◐ hints / local data | ◐ systemd, Lua config | open source (CZ-NIC) |
+| dnsdist | ◐ Lua rules (custom) | ◐ custom policies | ○ (balancer, not validator) | ○ (no cache of its own) | ○ | ○ power tool | GPL (PowerDNS) |
+
+Notes:
+
+- "Geo-split" for AGH/blocky/unbound/Technitium is real but requires feeding a
+  China domain list; chinadns-ng/mihomo additionally offer the **IP-verdict**
+  path for domains not in any list (query both, adopt CN result only if the
+  answer IP is mainland).
+- mosdns v5's `cache` plugin ignores request EDNS0 and strips response EDNS0
+  ([cache plugin](https://irine-sistiana.gitbook.io/mosdns-wiki/mosdns-v5/ru-he-pei-zhi-mosdns/ke-zhi-xing-cha-jian.md)) —
+  relevant because AGH in front of it relies on the DO bit for DNSSEC-capable
+  upstreams.
+- License for mihomo/sing-box/knot-resolver marked conservative: GitHub
+  metadata is "other"/custom or deliberately obfuscated; see §3 caveats.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Per-candidate evaluation
+
+### 3.1 AdGuard Home — advanced upstream routing / built-ins
+
+What it is: Go DNS proxy + adblock + DHCP, LAN DNS front-end
+([official](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/overview/)).
+
+Capabilities relevant here (all from the official configuration page):
+
+- **Per-domain upstreams** dnsmasq-style: `[/domain/]upstream`, wildcards,
+  `#` = "default upstreams", empty `//` = unqualified names
+  ([upstreams for domains](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#upstreams-for-domains)).
+- **List from file** `upstream_dns_file` — the docs *explicitly* call out China
+  CDN acceleration via dnsmasq lists, with the `server=/0-100.com/114.114.114.114`
+  → `[/0-100.com/]114.114.114.114` conversion
+  ([loading upstreams from file](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#upstreams-from-file)).
+- Upstream modes: `load_balance`, `parallel`, `fastest_addr`; plus `fallback_dns`
+  used only when primary upstreams fail
+  ([config file: dns](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/)).
+- Per-client upstreams (`clients.persistent[].upstreams`), rewrites
+  (`filtering.rewrites`, incl. wildcard), `local_ptr_upstreams` for private PTR,
+  ECS (`edns_client_subnet` with `use_custom` coarse prefix), optimistic cache
+  ([same page](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/)).
+- **DNSSEC is DO-bit only**: `enable_dnssec` "defines whether the proxy should
+  set the DO flag in the upstream requests" — validation must happen upstream
+  ([same page](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/)).
+- DoH/DoT/DoQ/DoH3 serving, `bind_hosts`/ACL guidance
+  ([running securely](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/running-securely/)).
+
+Verdict: **Already installed and capable of the geo-split itself.** The current
+setup under-uses it: only a load-balanced CN pair + fallback, no per-domain
+routing and no validating upstream. This is the cheapest "better" state — see §5.
+
+### 3.2 mosdns v5 — installed, active as clash nameserver (gateway-side)
+
+What it is: "一个 DNS 转发器" (a DNS forwarder) — plugin-based, sequence-driven
+([README](https://github.com/IrineSistiana/mosdns), GPL-3.0, ~3.7k★).
+
+What it does (verified from the v5 wiki and source tree):
+
+- Servers: `udp_server`, `tcp_server` (TLS→DoT), `quic_server`, `http_server`
+  (DoH); upstreams in `forward` support `udp`, `tcp`, `tls`, `https`, `quic`,
+  HTTP/3, concurrent racing (`concurrent: n` picks the fastest) and socks5
+  ([server plugins](https://irine-sistiana.gitbook.io/mosdns-wiki/mosdns-v5/ru-he-pei-zhi-mosdns/fu-wu-qi-cha-jian.md),
+  [executable plugins](https://irine-sistiana.gitbook.io/mosdns-wiki/mosdns-v5/ru-he-pei-zhi-mosdns/ke-zhi-xing-cha-jian.md)).
+- Geo-split: v5 data providers are **`domain_set` / `ip_set` (text list files)**
+  plus `qname`/`resp_ip` matchers — verified from the current source tree
+  ([plugin/data_provider](https://github.com/IrineSistiana/mosdns/tree/main/plugin/data_provider))
+  — and an `ipset`/`nftset` exec plugin to push answer IPs to kernel sets. The
+  old v4-style `geosite`/`geoip` `.dat` plugins are **not present** in the v5
+  tree; the v5 wiki's own matcher page currently states there are no matcher
+  plugins to document
+  ([matcher page](https://irine-sistiana.gitbook.io/mosdns-wiki/mosdns-v5/ru-he-pei-zhi-mosdns/pi-pei-qi-cha-jian.md)).
+  Plan on chnlist/gfwlist-style text lists, not `geosite.dat`.
+- Cache: yes, incl. optional lazy cache and disk dump; **request EDNS0 is
+  ignored and response EDNS0 stripped** by the cache plugin
+  ([cache](https://irine-sistiana.gitbook.io/mosdns-wiki/mosdns-v5/ru-he-pei-zhi-mosdns/ke-zhi-xing-cha-jian.md)).
+- Private names: `hosts` (domain-rules style, not OS /etc/hosts syntax),
+  `redirect`, `arbitrary` (zone records), `reverse_lookup` (PTR/HTTP lookup).
+- Ops: single binary + YAML; `mosdns service install` ships a systemd/launchd
+  helper ([v5 overview](https://irine-sistiana.gitbook.io/mosdns-wiki/mosdns-v5.md));
+  Docker image exists. No web UI of its own.
+
+Verdict: capable splitter/forwarder, but **adds no DNSSEC and no filtering
+layer**, and its cache interferes with EDNS0/DO handling. As a *back-end* splitter
+behind AGH it is a legitimate choice only if DNSSEC stays off. Given AGH can do
+the same per-domain split natively (3.1), mosdns's marginal value here is
+concurrent upstream racing and ipset/nftset integration — neither is needed at
+this LAN's scale. Either wire it up properly or remove it.
+
+### 3.3 smartdns
+
+What it is: local DNS server that queries multiple upstreams, **speed-tests the
+answer IPs and returns the fastest**; DoH/DoT/DoQ/DoH3; GPL-3.0, ~11.2k★
+([README](https://github.com/pymumu/smartdns)).
+
+Capabilities (from the official config reference and FAQ):
+
+- Multi upstream + "returns the fastest IP", unlike dnsmasq all-servers
+  ([README](https://github.com/pymumu/smartdns)).
+- Domain groups: `server ... -group <name>` + `nameserver /domain/group` routing,
+  per-`bind` port flags (`-group`, `-no-speed-check`…), client rules/MAC/IP
+  ([config options](https://pymumu.github.io/smartdns/configuration/)).
+- Anti-pollution tooling: `bogus-nxdomain` (return NXDOMAIN for poisoned IPs),
+  `blacklist-ip`, `whitelist-ip`, `ignore-ip`, `ipset`/`nftset` export
+  ([same page](https://pymumu.github.io/smartdns/configuration/)).
+- ECS: global `edns-client-subnet` and per-server `-subnet`
+  ([same page](https://pymumu.github.io/smartdns/configuration/)).
+- Cache: `cache-size`, `serve-expired` (RFC-like stale), `prefetch-domain`,
+  persistent cache file ([same page](https://pymumu.github.io/smartdns/configuration/)).
+- Private names: `address`, `cname`, `local-domain`, `dnsmasq-lease-file`
+  ([same page](https://pymumu.github.io/smartdns/configuration/)).
+- **DNSSEC: no validation option appears anywhere in the official config
+  reference or FAQ** — its pollution model is blacklist/whitelist + trusted
+  groups + speed selection, not DNSSEC ([config options](https://pymumu.github.io/smartdns/configuration/),
+  [FAQ](https://pymumu.github.io/smartdns/faq/)). Flagged: verify on the version
+  you deploy before relying on it.
+
+Verdict: the classic China-home "best-IP" resolver; good splitter, no DNSSEC,
+speed-test model optimizes for latency rather than anti-pollution correctness.
+Not better than AGH+China-list for this LAN; at most a back-end splitter behind
+AGH, with the same DNSSEC caveat as mosdns.
+
+### 3.4 chinadns-ng / chinadns2 / dnsmasq-china-list
+
+**chinadns-ng** (the requested "china-dns-ng"; actual repo `zfl9/chinadns-ng`,
+AGPL-3.0, Zig, ~1.4k★) is the maintained rewrite of shadowsocks/ChinaDNS:
+
+- Two upstream groups (china / trust) + `chnlist.txt` / `gfwlist.txt` domain
+  lists; domains are tagged `chn`/`gfw`/`none`
+  ([README](https://github.com/zfl9/chinadns-ng)).
+- `tag:none` names are queried on **both** upstreams and the china answer is
+  adopted only if its A/AAAA is a mainland IP (tested against a `chnroute`
+  ipset/nftset loaded into the kernel); verdict caching avoids re-testing and
+  leaks ([README: 原理/verdict-cache](https://github.com/zfl9/chinadns-ng)).
+- Cache with stale + pre-refresh + optional persistence; DoT upstream
+  (wolfssl build); `hosts` + `dns-rr-ip` local records; `nftset` add for
+  chn/gfw IPs; **no DoH by design** and **no DNSSEC** — the author's stated
+  philosophy is "one job, done well"
+  ([README](https://github.com/zfl9/chinadns-ng)).
+- Resource footprint is tiny: ~140 KB baseline, ~2.4 MB with 73k+ chnlist +
+  5.7k gfwlist entries ([README](https://github.com/zfl9/chinadns-ng)).
+
+**chinadns2** (`zfl9/chinadns2`) is the older C predecessor; effectively
+superseded by chinadns-ng for new deployments (README not directly fetched —
+treat as legacy line).
+
+**dnsmasq-china-list** (felixonmars, ~6.1k★) is data, not a daemon:
+`accelerated-domains.china.conf`, `bogus-nxdomain.china.conf`,
+`apple.china.conf`, `google.china.conf`, with generators for **dnsmasq,
+unbound, bind, dnscrypt-proxy**
+([README](https://github.com/felixonmars/dnsmasq-china-list), WTFPL per repo).
+
+Verdict: chinadns-ng is the strongest *pure splitter* for GFW networks (IP
+verdict beats pure list-based routing for unknown domains), but it cannot
+validate DNSSEC and brings no filtering UI. As AGH's backend it duplicates what
+AGH's per-domain upstreams already do; its IP-test mode requires shipping
+`chnroute` ipset/nftset into the host. dnsmasq-china-list is best used as the
+**data feed** for the AGH `upstream_dns_file` recommendation in §5.
+
+### 3.5 unbound
+
+What it is: validating, recursive, caching resolver from NLnet Labs
+([docs](https://unbound.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/latest/)).
+
+- **Real DNSSEC validation by default** (trust anchor, chain of trust); the
+  official home-network guide turns it on explicitly
+  ([home resolver guide](https://unbound.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/latest/use-cases/home-resolver.html)).
+- Full recursion → does not hard-depend on any upstream or proxy; serve-expired
+  (RFC 8767), aggressive NSEC, DoH/DoT/DoQ serving and TLS upstreams,
+  forward-zone/stub-zone/authority-zone, RPZ filtering, views, ECS module
+  ([docs index](https://unbound.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/latest/)).
+- Private names: `local-zone`/`local-data` for `*.windy.lan`-style names
+  ([unbound.conf(5)](https://unbound.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/latest/manpages/unbound.conf.html)).
+- No built-in China split: you assemble it with forward-zones fed by
+  dnsmasq-china-list (`make unbound` generator) + `bogus-nxdomain`; no UI, no
+  per-client grouping comparable to AGH.
+
+Verdict: the gold standard for the **validation** half. Best used as (a) the
+validating upstream behind AGH for the foreign/trusted path, or (b) a full
+recursive resolver replacing the forwarders if you accept losing AGH-style
+filtering/UI on top — keep AGH in front for that. System-package based, heavier
+to operate than blocky but battle-tested.
+
+### 3.6 blocky
+
+What it is: Go DNS proxy + ad-blocker, "fast and lightweight", single static
+binary, stateless, Apache-2.0, ~6.9k★
+([README](https://github.com/0xERR0R/blocky)).
+
+- **In-process DNSSEC validation**: `dnssec.validate` with DO bit, RRSIG
+  verification, chain-of-trust, NSEC/NSEC3, custom trust anchors, SERVFAIL on
+  bogus ([DNSSEC validation docs](https://0xerr0r.github.io/blocky/latest/configuration/#dnssec-validation)).
+- Upstreams: `parallel_best` (2 random resolvers, fastest answer), `strict`,
+  `random`; per-client/per-subnet upstream **groups**; UDP/TCP/DoT/DoH/DoQ/DoH3;
+  DNS stamps; bootstrap DNS
+  ([upstreams](https://0xerr0r.github.io/blocky/latest/configuration/#upstreams-configuration)).
+- Conditional forwarding + `customDNS` mapping/rewrite (the AGH-rewrite
+  equivalent), hosts files, per-domain upstream routing
+  ([custom DNS / conditional](https://0xerr0r.github.io/blocky/latest/configuration/#custom-dns)).
+- ECS: `ecs.useAsClient` / `ecs.forward`
+  ([ECS](https://0xerr0r.github.io/blocky/latest/configuration/#edns-client-subnet-options)).
+- Cache with min/max TTL + **prefetching**; optional **Redis** cache/state sync
+  between instances; query log to SQLite/Postgres/CSV; Prometheus metrics; REST
+  API ([README](https://github.com/0xERR0R/blocky),
+  [config](https://0xerr0r.github.io/blocky/latest/configuration/)).
+- No full web admin UI (metrics/REST/logs only) — an ops trade-off vs AGH's UI.
+
+Verdict: the most attractive *new software* option for this LAN **as a backend
+behind AGH**: it adds real DNSSEC validation + conditional upstream routing +
+ECS with a single binary and YAML. It has no China-IP-verdict split built in —
+feed it the China domain list via `conditional.mapping`/upstream groups, which
+is fine at this scale. One caveat: no GUI means AGH stays the human-facing
+front, so AGH→blocky is strictly additive.
+
+### 3.7 Technitium DNS Server
+
+What it is: self-hosted authoritative **and** recursive DNS server, .NET,
+web console, GPL-3.0, ~9.5k★
+([README](https://github.com/TechnitiumSoftware/DnsServer)).
+
+- **DNSSEC validation** for recursive resolution, forwarders, and conditional
+  forwarders (RSA/ECDSA/EdDSA, NSEC/NSEC3); can also *serve* signed zones
+  ([README](https://github.com/TechnitiumSoftware/DnsServer)).
+- Conditional forwarder zones + bulk conditional forwarding app; blocked-domain
+  lists with regex support and per-client variants; split-horizon/geolocation
+  via DNS Apps; ECS; QNAME minimization
+  ([README](https://github.com/TechnitiumSoftware/DnsServer)).
+- Serving side: DoH/DoT/DoQ/DoH3 server, built-in DHCP, persistent cache,
+  caching with serve-stale/prefetch, clustering, HTTP/SOCKS5 proxy for DNS
+  (e.g. over Tor) ([README](https://github.com/TechnitiumSoftware/DnsServer)).
+- Heavier footprint (needs .NET; Docker image available) and a full web console
+  with many features this LAN won't use.
+
+Verdict: capable and genuinely feature-rich (a real AGH alternative in the
+"everything in one box" sense — filtering, private zones, validation, DHCP), but
+it's more moving parts than this LAN needs, and its geo-split still requires
+manual conditional-forwarder lists. Not chosen over the lighter AGH+backend
+approach.
+
+### 3.8 sing-box / mihomo built-in DNS as the split resolver (fake-ip)
+
+The "third option": let the proxy engine's DNS own resolution, AGH on top.
+
+**sing-box** DNS object: multiple server types (local, udp, tcp, tls, https,
+http3, quic, fakeip, hosts, dhcp, mdns…), rule-based server selection by
+geoip/geosite, LRU cache + optimistic serving, per-query timeout, `client_subnet`
+(ECS), `reverse_mapping`
+([sing-box DNS docs](https://sing-box.sagernet.org/configuration/dns/)).
+
+**mihomo** (Clash.Meta lineage; docs at
+[wiki.metacubex.one](https://wiki.metacubex.one/en/config/dns/)):
+`nameserver-policy` (geosite/rule-set/domain keys) routes specific domains to
+specific resolvers; `fallback` + `fallback-filter` (geoip=CN, geosite=gfw,
+ipcidr, domain) adjudicate pollution — a CN resolver's answer is adopted only if
+the IP is mainland, otherwise the overseas fallback's answer is used;
+`fake-ip`/`redir-host` enhanced mode, `fake-ip-filter` with e.g. `'*.lan'` to
+keep local names on real-IP; per-DNS-server ECS; cache-algorithm
+([mihomo DNS config](https://wiki.metacubex.one/en/config/dns/)).
+
+Assessment for THIS LAN:
+
+- The **pollution adjudication is strong** (geoip-verdict fallback, geosite
+  lists), and mihomo already runs on the gateway — so "clash DNS as splitter" is
+  tempting.
+- But the DNS service is **coupled to the proxy**: foreign resolution rides the
+  proxy path, so when OpenClash/subscription is down, fake-ip mapping and
+  foreign lookups break (partial fail-open only if `direct-nameserver`/fallback
+  are carefully set). The LAN requirement says **must not hard-depend on the
+  proxy (fail-open)**.
+- fake-ip adds an indirection layer for anything in front of it (AGH on top
+  resolves client IPs against fake-ip ranges; leaks/loops need careful rules).
+- Neither engine **validates DNSSEC** (no RRSIG verification).
+- sing-box repo license shows "other" in GitHub metadata (not cleanly
+  verifiable); mihomo's repo currently carries **deliberately obfuscated content**
+  ("Void Terminal" parody) — treat `wiki.metacubex.one` as the authoritative
+  docs and expect the GitHub surface to change.
+
+Verdict: keep clash/mihomo DNS exactly where it is (proxy-side, TPROXY/fake-ip),
+do **not** make it the LAN resolver of record. If you ever want its IP-verdict
+quality outside the proxy, chinadns-ng gives the same idea with zero proxy
+dependency.
+
+### 3.9 knot-resolver / dnsdist — power-resolver options
+
+**knot-resolver** (CZ-NIC): minimal caching validating resolver, modular/Lua,
+full DNSSEC validation, forwarding over TLS, query policies, RPZ, views/ACLs,
+DNS64, persistent cache, serve-stale, even XDP fast-path
+([docs](https://knot-resolver.readthedocs.io/en/stable/)). As powerful as
+unbound but with more configuration surface (Lua); overkill for a one-operator
+home LAN, though it would do the validating-resolver role well.
+
+**dnsdist** (PowerDNS): "highly DNS-, DoS- and abuse-aware loadbalancer" —
+routes traffic to backend servers, Lua/YAML config, runtime console, metrics
+([overview](https://dnsdist.org/)). It is a **balancer, not a validator/cache**
+— it fronts other resolvers. Overkill; only relevant if you wanted a
+multi-backend DNS LB, which this LAN does not.
+
+### 3.10 Emerging / also-considered options
+
+- **AdGuard Home + dnsmasq-china-list** — covered in §3.1/§5; this is the
+  "emerging best practice" for China CDN splits on AGH and is officially
+  documented.
+- **pi-hole** — adblock/dashboard equivalent of AGH but no per-domain upstream
+  routing worth choosing it over AGH here (not deeply verified for this write-up;
+  AGH already satisfies the role).
+- **dnscrypt-proxy** — encrypted forwarder with stamp support; a transport
+  option, not a splitter/validator (not deeply verified for this write-up).
+- **coredns** — plugin-based; geo-split is DIY via plugins; no DNSSEC
+  validation by default (not deeply verified for this write-up).
+
+### 3.11 Other popular options (survey supplement, 2026-08-12)
+
+Follow-up survey of additional popular solutions not covered above, evaluated
+against this LAN's constraints (fail-open, keep DNS on `.36`, DNSSEC goal).
+None of these change the §4/§5 recommendation.
+
+**Encrypted-forwarder micro-tools (AGH downstream options, not replacements):**
+
+- **dnscrypt-proxy** — the classic OpenWrt encrypted forwarder with
+  China-list support and DNS-stamp routing. No in-process DNSSEC validation and
+  no filtering UI; overlaps with AGH's own DoH upstream layer, so its marginal
+  value here is low.
+- **dnsproxy** (AdGuardTeam) — lightweight DoH/DoT/DoQ forwarder/server.
+  Functionally a subset of AGH's upstream layer; only useful if forwarding logic
+  is deliberately split out of AGH.
+- **Stubby** — dnsmasq→stubby→DoT (privacy-community pattern). Pure
+  forwarding, no split/filter/validation; adopting it alone would be a
+  downgrade from AGH.
+
+**Managed / cloud DNS (zero-ops, not self-hosted):**
+
+- **NextDNS / ControlD / AdGuard DNS / Cloudflare** — hosted filtering, logs,
+  per-device policies. This LAN already self-hosts AGH + a private
+  `adg.chans.xyz` fallback, so a cloud service would be a downgrade in control
+  (data leaves the LAN). Only realistic use: add one as an extra foreign-path
+  upstream inside AGH's `upstream_dns_file`.
+
+**Heavier all-in-one resolvers:**
+
+- **PowerDNS Recursor** — real DNSSEC validation + Lua policy, authoritative
+  and recursive in one. Capable but overlaps unbound; over-provisioned here.
+- **BIND9** — classic authoritative/recursive; can validate DNSSEC and, more
+  interestingly, serve as a local **authoritative zone** that would close the
+  private-PTR gap. As a LAN resolver it lacks AGH's filtering/UI and is heavier
+  to operate; a small dnsmasq authoritative zone is a lighter way to achieve the
+  PTR goal (still deferred until a local authoritative source exists).
+- **hickory-dns / trust-dns** (Rust) — emerging recursive resolver, DNSSEC
+  friendly, smaller ecosystem/ops track record than unbound/blocky; not yet
+  worth switching for this LAN.
+
+**Popular stack patterns (structure, not new software):**
+
+- **Pi-hole + unbound** — the most common global self-hosted combo
+  (filtering front-end + validating backend). AGH already occupies the
+  Pi-hole role here (and does more), so the equivalent is **AGH + unbound/
+  blocky** — exactly the report's recommendation #2.
+- **dnsmasq + china-list + smartdns** (classic OpenWrt trio) — routes the
+  China list on the gateway itself. Equivalent to co-locating DNS with the
+  proxy host (`.1`), which violates the fail-open requirement; not recommended
+  for this LAN.
+
+Verdict: the survey adds no better candidate. dnsproxy/dnscrypt-proxy duplicate
+AGH's upstream layer, cloud DNS is a control downgrade, and the only genuinely
+new capability (a local authoritative source for PTR) is better served by a
+small dnsmasq authoritative zone than by replacing the resolver.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Architecture recommendation for this LAN
+
+### 4.1 Preferred architecture (change is config-only)
+
+```
+clients (DHCP option 6 = .36)
+   │  UDP/TCP :53
+   ▼
+AGH .36  (filtering, rewrites, query log, per-client upstreams)
+   │  upstream_dns_file:
+   │    [/cn-domain-list/] dns.alidns.com doh.pub      ← CN CDN domains (China list)
+   │    default: https://adg.chans.xyz/dns-query …      ← trusted/foreign path
+   └→ validating resolver (unbound OR blocky) for the foreign path (optional phase 2)
+```
+
+- Front = AGH stays the single LAN DNS box (filtering/rewrites/UI/query log
+  are its strong suit and are already operating).
+- Split = AGH per-domain upstreams fed by a converted dnsmasq-china-list; no
+  new daemon. This is the documented AGH pattern
+  ([upstreams from file](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#upstreams-from-file)).
+- Validation = add a validating resolver behind AGH for the trusted path
+  (blocky simplest; unbound most battle-tested) and re-run the known-bad-signature
+  check that failed before; then flip `enable_dnssec`.
+
+### 4.2 Why not the alternatives as front-ends
+
+- **smartdns / chinadns-ng as the LAN resolver**: they are pure splitters —
+  no adblock layer, no query log/UI, no DNSSEC. Replacing AGH with either is a
+  capability downgrade; behind AGH they duplicate AGH's built-in split while
+  adding a daemon and losing validation. Only chinadns-ng's IP-verdict mode is
+  genuinely beyond AGH, and it needs kernel ipset/nftset plumbing.
+- **mosdns as the AGH backend**: viable splitter, but no validation and its
+  cache strips EDNS0/DO ([cache plugin](https://irine-sistiana.gitbook.io/mosdns-wiki/mosdns-v5/ru-he-pei-zhi-mosdns/ke-zhi-xing-cha-jian.md)),
+  which fights the DNSSEC goal. It is already idle on the box — configure it
+  deliberately or remove it.
+- **mihomo/sing-box DNS as the resolver of record**: fail-closed + proxy-coupled
+  + no validation. Keep as proxy-side concern (§3.8).
+- **knot-resolver / dnsdist / Technitium**: capable but over-provisioned;
+  Technitium is the only one that would *replace* AGH wholesale, and there's no
+  benefit worth the migration here.
+
+### 4.3 Deployment location
+
+- **Keep DNS on `dns.windy.lan` (.36)**. It is already the DHCP-advertised
+  resolver; it is a separate VM from the proxy host; DNS therefore stays
+  independent of OpenClash state (fail-open), which is an explicit requirement.
+- **Do not move it to `gfw` (.1)**: the gateway is where OpenClash injects
+  TPROXY/fake-ip/DNS-hijack rules; co-locating LAN DNS there couples DNS to the
+  proxy and its restart/update lifecycle.
+- A standalone resolver VM adds nothing: both current VMs already sit on the
+  same PVE hypervisor ([lan-overview.md](../lan-overview.md) §Positioning facts),
+  so a hypervisor outage takes out either placement equally; a second physical
+  host for HA is out of scope for a home LAN.
+- If you ever run a validating resolver + AGH on `.36`, verify outbound from
+  `.36` to the foreign upstreams is not re-hijacked by OpenClash (loop check
+  already mandated in the [AGH review](../adguard-home-official-review-2026-08.md)).
+
+### 4.4 Fail-open, DNSSEC, private names — by candidate
+
+| Concern | How the recommended stack behaves |
+|---|---|
+| Fail-open when proxy/subscription down | AGH forwards directly to DoH upstreams; `.36`'s outbound is not forced through the proxy in normal ops (no TUN policy routing on `.36` — [dns host facts](../../hosts/dns.windy.lan.md)). With unbound/blocky behind, foreign resolution recurses/validates directly, independent of OpenClash. Avoid mihomo-DNS-as-resolver, which is proxy-coupled. |
+| DNSSEC validation | Only unbound, blocky, knot-resolver, Technitium validate in-process. AGH sets DO only; mosdns/smartdns/chinadns-ng/mihomo/sing-box do not. Plan: validate behind AGH, or accept "validating public upstream" (confirm with `dig +dnssec`/known-bad test). |
+| Private names / rewrites | AGH `rewrites` (already in use for `hass.windy.lan`) + `local_ptr_upstreams` once a local PTR source exists. blocky: `customDNS` mapping/rewrite + hosts. unbound: `local-zone`. All adequate. |
+| Query log / visibility | AGH is the best at this of everything evaluated (14-day anonymized log already configured). |
+
+---
+
+## 5. What would make the current AGH + mosdns setup genuinely better
+
+Concrete, in increasing effort:
+
+1. **Implement the China-list geo-split in AGH itself**
+   (`upstream_dns_file` + converted `accelerated-domains.china.conf`, default
+   upstreams = trusted foreign path, `fallback_dns` kept). Official AGH docs
+   describe exactly this pattern
+   ([loading upstreams from file](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/#upstreams-from-file));
+   list source: [dnsmasq-china-list](https://github.com/felixonmars/dnsmasq-china-list).
+   Wire a refresh path (cron/ansible) so the list stays current. Re-test CDN
+   resolution and the DNSSEC known-bad domain after.
+2. **Put a validating resolver on the trusted path** (unbound or blocky), re-run
+   the known-bad-signature check, then enable AGH DNSSEC. Without this, AGH's
+   `enable_dnssec` is only a DO-flag — the exact reason it is currently off
+   ([AGH DNSSEC semantics](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/),
+   [host facts](../../hosts/dns.windy.lan.md)).
+3. **Either fully configure mosdns (systemd service, sequence, lists) or remove
+   it.** Leaving an idle `127.0.0.1:6052` listener documented as "not the active
+   path" is drift. If kept, plan around no-EDNS0 cache + no validation; if
+   removed, drop the listener and its config to reduce surface.
+4. **Close the private-PTR gap**: once a local authoritative source exists (e.g.
+   dnsmasq on `gw`, or a tiny authoritative zone), point AGH
+   `local_ptr_upstreams` at it as the AGH review recommends
+   ([AGH review](../adguard-home-official-review-2026-08.md));
+   don't set it before that source exists
+   ([dns host facts](../../hosts/dns.windy.lan.md)).
+5. **Optional: ECS** for CDN geo-accuracy — AGH `edns_client_subnet.use_custom`
+   with a coarse fixed prefix (or blocky `ecs.forward`) if measurements show a
+   benefit; note many CN resolvers ignore ECS
+   ([AGH ECS](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/adguard-home/configuration/)).
+
+If the DNS engineering budget is one afternoon, do #1 + #3. If the goal is
+"real DNSSEC or nothing", do #1 + #2 + #3. Replacing the stack is only
+justified if you want to abandon AGH's UI/filtering entirely — nothing evaluated
+here beats it on that axis for this LAN.
+
+---
+
+## Caveats / not verified
+
+- **Live behavior not tested**: all capability claims are from primary docs
+  reviewed 2026-08-12; DNSSEC behavior of `dns.alidns.com`/`doh.pub`/the
+  `adg.chans.xyz` path and mosdns's actual version on `.36` need on-box
+  `dig +dnssec` verification (per [adguard-home-health](../../runbooks/adguard-home-health.md)).
+- **smartdns DNSSEC**: the official config reference lists no DNSSEC option;
+  if a newer version added one, it is not reflected here
+  ([config options](https://pymumu.github.io/smartdns/configuration/)).
+- **mosdns geosite/geoip**: v5 source tree (fetched 2026-08-12) contains only
+  `domain_set`/`ip_set` data providers; if a `geosite.dat` plugin exists in a
+  release branch, it is not in `main`
+  ([plugin/data_provider](https://github.com/IrineSistiana/mosdns/tree/main/plugin/data_provider)).
+- **mihomo**: the GitHub repo currently shows deliberately obfuscated metadata
+  (see §3.8); capabilities cited from
+  [wiki.metacubex.one](https://wiki.metacubex.one/en/config/dns/).
+  sing-box/knot-resolver/dnsdist license identifiers via GitHub metadata are
+  "other"/custom — treat the specific SPDX ids with caution.
+- **chinadns2** README was not retrieved (404 on the raw URL); treated as the
+  legacy predecessor of chinadns-ng and not evaluated in depth.
+- Obsidian/personal notes were not consulted; this is upstream-docs-only.
+
+## Related docs
+
+- [lan-overview.md](../lan-overview.md) — full topology (verified 2026-08-06)
+- [hosts/dns.windy.lan.md](../../hosts/dns.windy.lan.md) — AGH host facts
+- [hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md](../../hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md) — OpenClash facts
+- [adguard-home-official-review-2026-08.md](../adguard-home-official-review-2026-08.md) — prior AGH config review
+- [runbooks/adguard-home-health.md](../../runbooks/adguard-home-health.md)
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+# ER-X → RB5009 网关升级：网络形态与实施计划
+
+**状态：** 规划文档（未采购、未接线、未改生产配置）。
+**重要变更（2026-08-09）：** **SE5420 已采购**，网络升级改为「保留 ER-X + SE5420 核心」路径——
+实施与验证以 [lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md](../lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md) 为准。
+本文保留为「ER-X 网关未来替换为 RB5009」的备选方案；其中 PVE 透传调研与 VLAN10 实现方法仍适用。
+
+---
+
+## 1. 一句话架构
+
+```text
+公网 ← RB5009（主网关：PPPoE / NAT / 防火墙 / DHCP / IPv6 / VLAN 66+55 三层）
+          ↑ 全部终端 / AP / PVE 直连其 8×1G 端口
+    （SFP+ 空槽，为未来 10G 核心预留）
+```
+
+- **RB5009** 兼任路由与 LAN 二层交换：所有接入设备直插 RB5009 端口。
+- 客户端默认网关仍是 **`.254`**（RB5009 沿用 ER-X 地址，客户端零感知）。
+- **`gfw`** 仍为旁路由（默认网关 `.254`）；OpenClash 行为不变。
+- **ER-X 升级后下电闲置，作为已配置的备件保存**（回滚路径）。
+- 2.5G/10G 同 VLAN 交换目标**放弃**（无 SE5420）；LAN 二层为 1G。
+
+---
+
+## 2. 已确认的设计决策
+
+| 决策 | 结论 |
+|---|---|
+| 角色 | RB5009 单机：路由 + LAN 交换 + 双 VLAN 三层 |
+| WAN | **PPPoE**，走 **`ether1`（2.5G 铜口接 ONT/光猫）**，MTU 1492 |
+| LAN 模型 | **单 bridge + VLAN 过滤**：VLAN 66（多数端口）+ VLAN 55；VLAN 10 预留 |
+| 网关地址 | **沿用 `192.168.66.254` / `192.168.55.254`**；重编址另立项目 |
+| IPv6 | **保留对等**：PPPoE 上 DHCPv6-PD `/60` + 双 LAN SLAAC `/64` + IPv6 防火墙 |
+| 端口转发 | 4 条 **原样迁入**（hass / transmission / ssh / openvpn）+ hairpin NAT |
+| LAN55 成员 | **保持现状**（AC-Lite、Aqara 及原 LAN55 设备）不迁到 VLAN66 |
+| 管理面 | SSH **仅密钥**（`zhiqiang`）；禁用默认 `admin`；**禁 Winbox/API/WebFig** 或仅限 LAN |
+| 迁移方式 | 台面预配置（临时 `.253`）→ 维护窗（30–60 分钟）→ 验证 → ER-X 留作备件 |
+| 固件/备份 | 当前稳定 RouterOS 7.x；上线前 `.backup` + 文本导出存离线 |
+| 时区/NTP | `Asia/Shanghai` + 现有 NTP 服务器 |
+| 安全 | PPPoE 口令、SSH 私钥、`zhiqiang` 口令**只存设备上**，不落本仓库 |
+
+---
+
+## 3. 升级后的网络形态（拓扑图）
+
+### 3.1 目标物理拓扑（升级完成后）
+
+```text
+                        Internet
+                           │  PPPoE (ether1 2.5G, MTU 1492, IPv6 PD /60)
+                           ▼
+        ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+        │        RB5009  (gw)   RouterOS 7.x           │
+        │  ether1 = WAN (PPPoE)                         │
+        │  bridge + vlan-filtering=yes                  │
+        │    vlan66 = 192.168.66.254/24  (pvid 66)      │
+        │    vlan55 = 192.168.55.254/24  (pvid 55)      │
+        │  SFP+ = 空槽（未来 10G）                       │
+        │  SSH-only 管理（仅 LAN）                       │
+        └─────┬─────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────┘
+              │ pvid66  │ pvid66   │ pvid66   │ pvid55
+              │         │          │          │
+         gfw  (.1)   dns  (.36)  ubnt (.46)  UAP-AC-Lite (.55.5)
+         PVE  (.26)    NAS/PC…      U6 Lite    Aqara (.55.248)
+                                 (.66.6)
+```
+
+端口角色以面板为准；下表是建议预留：
+
+| RB5009 端口 | 对端 | 模式 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `ether1` | ONT/光猫 | WAN，PPPoE |
+| `ether2`–`ether8` | PVE/gfw、dns、ubnt、U6 Lite、NAS、PC、杂项 | access，pvid 66 |
+| `ether9` | 原 LAN55 成员（AC-Lite、Aqara…） | access，pvid 55 |
+| SFP+ `sfp-sfpplus1` | 未来 10G 核心 | 空槽 |
+
+> **禁止双上行：** 任一设备不得同时接旧 ER-X 与 RB5009（环路 / 双默认网关）。
+
+### 3.2 逻辑网络
+
+| VLAN | 子网 | 网关 / DHCP | 形态 | 成员 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **66** | `192.168.66.0/24` | RB5009 `vlan66` `.254` | 多数端口 access | gfw、dns、ubnt、U6、PVE、NAS、PC… |
+| **55** | `192.168.55.0/24` | RB5009 `vlan55` `.254` | `ether9` access | AC-Lite、Aqara…（原 LAN55 全量） |
+| 10（预留） | `192.168.10.0/24` | 未来（`gfw`） | 暂不配业务 | 升级专用 SSID（后续项目） |
+
+- 客户端 DNS：DHCP 仍下发 **`192.168.66.36`**（AdGuard Home）。
+- UniFi Inform 仍为 `http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform`。
+- LAN66 ↔ LAN55 互通由 RB5009 三层转发（沿用现网默认可达语义，防火墙不设隔离边界）。
+
+### 3.3 流量怎么走
+
+```text
+同 VLAN（NAS ↔ PC）：  客户端 → RB5009 端口 → bridge（二层交换，1G）
+跨 VLAN（66 ↔ 55）：   客户端 → RB5009 路由（vlan66 ↔ vlan55，1G）
+上网：                 客户端 → RB5009 → PPPoE → Internet（限速 = 线路；RB5009 fasttrack 去掉 ER-X ~900M 天花板）
+旁路由：               默认网关仍 `.254`；显式代理走 gfw（不变）
+未来 VLAN10：          U6 trunk → RB5009 →（转发 VLAN10）→ gfw（后续项目）
+```
+
+### 3.4 性能预期（诚实边界）
+
+| 场景 | 预期 |
+|---|---|
+| WAN / PPPoE | 线路速率以内；若线路 >1G，RB5009 fasttrack 可跑满（ER-X 受 900M 限制） |
+| 同 VLAN 交换 | **1G**（无 SE5420；RB5009 8×1G） |
+| 跨 VLAN | 1G 级三层 |
+| SFP+ 空槽 | 不等于已是 10G |
+
+---
+
+## 4. 分阶段实施计划
+
+### 阶段 0：采购前核验
+
+1. 确认 RB5009 revision、保修、零售渠道、RouterOS 当前稳定版本号（建议 7.x 最新 stable）。
+2. 确认硬件：1× 2.5G PoE-in（ether1）、8× 1G、1× SFP+、1GB RAM。SFP+ 模块本次不买。
+3. 盘点线缆与对端：ONT ↔ ether1；原 LAN55 设备清单（AC-Lite、Aqara…）及原 ER-X `switch0` 接线。
+
+### 阶段 1：离线初始化（台面）
+
+1. 仅电源 + 隔离管理本。设置身份、时区 `Asia/Shanghai`、NTP。
+2. 建 `zhiqiang` 管理用户（**密钥登录，禁密码**）；**删除/禁用默认 `admin`**。
+3. 建 bridge + VLAN 66/55 + 端口模板（`ether2–8` pvid66，`ether9` pvid55）；**临时地址 `.253`**（不与 ER-X `.254` 冲突）。
+4. 配 WAN PPPoE（ether1）、默认路由、NAT masquerade、4 条端口转发 + hairpin、防火墙（input/forward）、MSS clamp、IPv6 PD + SLAAC + IPv6 防火墙。
+5. 配 DHCP 池 `.38–.243`、24h 租约、DNS `.36`、UniFi Inform 选项、**静态映射全量照搬**。
+6. 管理面收口：**禁 Winbox（8291）/ API（8728）/ WebFig（80/443）**；SSH 仅限 LAN66/55。
+7. `system backup save` + `/export`，导出到离线存储（**不落仓库**）。
+
+**参考 RouterOS 配置骨架**（口令/密钥用占位符；落地前逐一核对）：
+
+```text
+# 身份 / 时区 / NTP
+/system identity set name=gw
+/system clock set time-zone-name=Asia/Shanghai
+
+# WAN
+/interface ethernet set ether1 name=wan
+/interface pppoe-client add name=pppoe0 interface=wan user=<PPPoE_USER> \
+    password=<PPPoE_PASS> add-default-route=yes use-peer-dns=no \
+    mtu=1492 mru=1492
+
+# bridge + VLAN
+/interface bridge add name=bridge66 vlan-filtering=yes
+/interface bridge port add bridge=bridge66 interface=ether2 pvid=66
+...  # ether3..ether8 同 pvid 66
+/interface bridge port add bridge=bridge66 interface=ether9 pvid=55
+/interface bridge vlan add bridge=bridge66 vlan-ids=66 tagged=bridge66
+/interface bridge vlan add bridge=bridge66 vlan-ids=55 tagged=bridge66
+/interface vlan add name=vlan66 interface=bridge66 vlan-id=66
+/interface vlan add name=vlan55 interface=bridge66 vlan-id=55
+
+# 地址（台面先用 .253，维护窗切 .254）
+/ip address add address=192.168.66.254/24 interface=vlan66
+/ip address add address=192.168.55.254/24 interface=vlan55
+
+# NAT masquerade + 端口转发 + hairpin
+/ip firewall nat add chain=srcnat out-interface=pppoe0 action=masquerade
+/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat in-interface=pppoe0 protocol=tcp dst-port=8123 \
+    action=dst-nat to-addresses=192.168.55.11 to-ports=8123
+/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat in-interface=pppoe0 protocol=tcp dst-port=51413 \
+    action=dst-nat to-addresses=192.168.66.51 to-ports=51413
+/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat in-interface=pppoe0 protocol=udp dst-port=51413 \
+    action=dst-nat to-addresses=192.168.66.51 to-ports=51413
+/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat in-interface=pppoe0 protocol=tcp dst-port=5822 \
+    action=dst-nat to-addresses=192.168.66.36 to-ports=22
+/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat in-interface=pppoe0 protocol=udp dst-port=5822 \
+    action=dst-nat to-addresses=192.168.66.36 to-ports=22
+/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat in-interface=pppoe0 protocol=tcp dst-port=1194 \
+    action=dst-nat to-addresses=192.168.66.32 to-ports=1194
+/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat in-interface=pppoe0 protocol=udp dst-port=1194 \
+    action=dst-nat to-addresses=192.168.66.32 to-ports=1194
+/ip firewall nat add chain=srcnat connection-nat-state=dstnat action=masquerade  # hairpin
+
+# 防火墙（input / forward），顺序很重要：SSH 放行必须早于默认 drop
+/ip firewall filter add chain=input connection-state=established,related action=accept
+/ip firewall filter add chain=input connection-state=invalid action=drop
+/ip firewall filter add chain=input protocol=icmp action=accept
+/ip firewall filter add chain=input in-interface=pppoe0 action=drop comment="drop WAN in"
+/ip firewall filter add chain=input protocol=tcp dst-port=22 \
+    src-address=192.168.66.0/24,192.168.55.0/24 action=accept comment="mgmt SSH"
+/ip firewall filter add chain=input action=drop comment="drop other input"
+/ip firewall filter add chain=forward connection-state=established,related action=fasttrack-connection \
+    hw-offload=yes
+/ip firewall filter add chain=forward connection-state=established,related action=accept
+/ip firewall filter add chain=forward connection-state=invalid action=drop
+/ip firewall filter add chain=forward in-interface=pppoe0 action=drop comment="drop WAN fwd"
+/ip firewall filter add chain=forward action=accept comment="accept LAN fwd"
+
+# MSS clamp（PPPoE MTU 1492 → 1452；ER-X 旧值 1412 偏小，验证后按标准值收敛）
+/ip firewall mangle add chain=forward protocol=tcp tcp-flags=syn \
+    tcp-mss=1400-65535 action=change-mss new-mss=1452 passthrough=yes
+
+# IPv6（PD /60 + SLAAC /64）
+/ipv6 dhcp-client add interface=pppoe0 request=prefix pool-name=pd6 \
+    pool-prefix-length=60 add-default-route=yes
+/ipv6 address add from-pool=pd6 interface=vlan66 address=::1 adverts=yes
+/ipv6 address add from-pool=pd6 interface=vlan55 address=::1 adverts=yes
+# /ipv6 firewall filter 参照 IPv4：established/related accept、invalid drop、
+# icmpv6 accept、pppoe0 in drop、默认 drop，forward 同构
+
+# DHCP（池 / DNS / Inform / 静态映射全量照搬 ER-X）
+/ip pool add name=pool66 ranges=192.168.66.38-192.168.66.243
+/ip pool add name=pool55 ranges=192.168.55.38-192.168.55.243
+/ip dhcp-server add name=dhcp66 interface=vlan66 address-pool=pool66 lease-time=1d
+/ip dhcp-server add name=dhcp55 interface=vlan55 address-pool=pool55 lease-time=1d
+/ip dhcp-server network add address=192.168.66.0/24 gateway=192.168.66.254 \
+    dns-server=192.168.66.36
+/ip dhcp-server network add address=192.168.55.0/24 gateway=192.168.55.254 \
+    dns-server=192.168.66.36
+# 静态映射：从 ER-X 导出后逐条 /ip dhcp-server lease add ...
+# UniFi Inform：DHCP option 43（hex 编码为 http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform），
+#   或依赖已 adopt AP 的 set-inform；与现网 ER-X 行为保持一致。
+```
+
+### 阶段 2：上台预验证（ER-X 仍在线）
+
+1. 将 RB5009 `ether2` 接入现有 LAN66 网段（管理本同网段），SSH 登录 `.253`。
+2. 全配置复查：VLAN 表、防火墙规则顺序（SSH 在 drop 前）、NAT、路由、IPv6。
+3. **暂不启用 RA/DHCP**（避免与 ER-X 冲突）。预验证 `.253` 可达、SSH 密钥生效、`zhiqiang` 无密码。
+4. 确认 ER-X 当前配置**已备份并保存**（作为回滚依据；`show configuration commands` 过滤敏感行）。
+
+### 阶段 3：维护窗切换（约 30–60 分钟）
+
+1. 变更 RB5009 `vlan66`/`vlan55` 地址 `.253 → .254`。
+2. **下电 ER-X**（保留原接线与配置，不作任何改动）。
+3. ONT 线从 ER-X `eth4` 移到 RB5009 `ether1`。
+4. 观察 PPPoE 拨号：`/interface pppoe-client monitor pppoe0` 直至 `status=established`；确认 WAN IP 与默认路由。
+5. 验证清单（见第 5 节），全绿才算完成。
+
+### 阶段 4：上线收口
+
+1. 再确认管理面：禁 Winbox/API/WebFig、SSH 仅密钥、默认 `admin` 已除。
+2. 更新固件/补丁至已核定的稳定版；重新导出备份（`.backup` + 文本）存离线。
+3. ER-X 下电收纳为**已配置备件**，把其接线与角色记录到 `hosts/gw.md` 备份节。
+
+### 阶段 5（后续，另立项目）
+
+**时序确认：** VLAN10 升级专用 Wi-Fi 是 RB5009 上线**稳定之后**的独立项目，不并入本次维护窗。
+
+- 4 条端口转发是否仍需的审计。
+- 网关重编址（`.254 → 其它`）决策。
+- **VLAN10 升级专用 SSID → `gfw`（可行性审查，2026-08-09）**。
+- 迁移后同步本仓库事实文档：`hosts/gw.md`、`docs/lan-overview.md`、`inventory/hosts.md`、`AGENTS.md` 快速地图。
+
+### 阶段 5 附：VLAN10 可行性审查
+
+**结论：** 换 RB5009 后**物理上可行**，但 RB5009 只解决「交换机侧」路径；PVE 宿主机到 `gfw` 虚拟机这一段（此前判定为不可行的关键缺口）仍必须单独打通。
+
+**为什么当前不能在 AP 上启用 VLAN10：**
+
+U6 接的是 ER-X `eth0` 的普通 untagged LAN66 路径，尚无已验证的 VLAN10 端到端二层通道。给 SSID 选择 VLAN10 后，客户端不会获得可由 gfw 服务的预期 VLAN10 网络；帧究竟被丢弃、被设备错误处理，还是 SSID 实际没有打 tag，必须以 AP/交换机/gfw 抓包和配置核验判断。**不得**将“tagged 帧必然自动去标签并泄漏到 LAN66”作为实施前提。
+
+**RB5009 下实现需要 3 个前提：**
+
+1. **RB5009 bridge 增加 VLAN10 转发：**
+   `/interface bridge vlan add bridge=bridge66 vlan-ids=10 tagged=<U6口>,<PVE口>`
+   只在这两个口 tagged。**不要**在 RB5009 上给 VLAN10 配 IP / DHCP（gfw 才是网关与唯一 DHCP）。
+2. **PVE 宿主机路径（必须做，RB5009 解决不了这一段）：**
+   PVE 物理上联口透传 tagged VLAN10；`gfw` 虚拟机有一块 VLAN10 可达的网卡
+   （如 vmbr0 开 `vlan_filtering` + 给 gfw 加第二块 pvid 10 的 NIC，或 VM 内 `eth0.10`）。
+   这是此前「无法实现」的同一处缺口，需在 PVE/vSwitch 层单独验证。
+3. **`gfw` 侧：** VLAN10 网卡 `192.168.10.1/24` + DHCP（`192.168.10.0/24`）+ 出 66 口
+   masquerade。RB5009 无需到 `192.168.10.0/24` 的路由（gfw SNAT 后源地址即 66 网段）。
+
+**两个注意点：**
+
+- **单 DHCP 原则：** VLAN10 上唯一 DHCP 是 gfw；RB5009 不得在 VLAN10 提供 DHCP。
+- **设计确认：** 升级 SSID 客户端走 gfw 网关后，DNS 为 gfw 的 dnsmasq→clash（7874），
+  **不是** AdGuard `.36`——这是「被代理网络」的预期行为，需接受。
+
+### 阶段 5 附：PVE 上 VLAN10 透传实现（调研 2026-08-09）
+
+官方 wiki + 多个社区案例支持两种模型，核心原则是 **「一层只拥有一个 tag」**——要么 PVE 拥有
+access VLAN，要么 OpenWrt 拥有 trunk，**不能在同一张 NIC 上两层都做**。
+
+**方案 A（推荐）：PVE 拥有 access VLAN，gfw 加第二块 virtio 网卡**
+
+1. `vmbr0` 开 vlan-aware（`/etc/network/interfaces`）：
+
+   ```text
+   auto vmbr0
+   iface vmbr0 inet static
+           address 192.168.66.26/24
+           gateway 192.168.66.254
+           bridge-ports eno1
+           bridge-stp off
+           bridge-fd 0
+           bridge-vlan-aware yes
+           bridge-vids 10        # 至少含 10；常见默认 2-4094
+   ```
+
+2. gfw VM 添加 `net1: virtio,bridge=vmbr0,tag=10`。VM 内该网卡是**无标记**接口
+   （已落在 VLAN10 广播域），**不要再建同名 8021q 子接口**。
+3. 现有 `eth0`（native/untagged = VLAN66）不动，gfw 原有角色不变。
+4. PVE 物理上联口（PVE→RB5009）改为 **trunk：native 66 + tagged 10**。
+5. OpenWrt 内：新网卡 `192.168.10.1/24` + DHCP（`192.168.10.0/24`）+ 独立 firewall zone→wan masq。
+
+**方案 B：OpenWrt 拥有 trunk（单 NIC 多 VLAN）**
+
+- `vmbr0` vlan-aware；VM NIC **不加 tag**；trunk 原样进 VM；OpenWrt 内建 `8021q` 设备
+  （`eth0.10`，x86/virtio 用 `option type '8021q'`，不要套用 DSA 教程）。物理上联 trunk。
+- 更灵活（一块网卡多 VLAN），是 router VM 的常见做法，但需要 OpenWrt 8021q 配置，
+  且方案 A 对现有单网卡 gfw 改动更小。
+
+**RB5009 侧配套（U6 口 + PVE 口都做成 trunk）：**
+
+```text
+/interface bridge port add bridge=bridge66 interface=<U6口>  pvid=66
+/interface bridge port add bridge=bridge66 interface=<PVE口> pvid=66
+/interface bridge vlan add bridge=bridge66 vlan-ids=66 tagged=bridge66 untagged=<U6口>,<PVE口>,<其余66口>
+/interface bridge vlan add bridge=bridge66 vlan-ids=55 tagged=bridge66 untagged=<ether9>
+/interface bridge vlan add bridge=bridge66 vlan-ids=10 tagged=<U6口>,<PVE口>
+```
+
+VLAN10 在 RB5009 上**纯二层桥接**（U6 ↔ PVE），三层由 gfw 承担；RB5009 无 VLAN10 IP/DHCP。
+
+**常见坑（社区高复发）：**
+
+- **双标签：** PVE 设了 `tag=10` 又在 OpenWrt 里建 `eth1.10` → 一帧被两层改两次。
+- **native VLAN 不一致：** trunk 上无标记帧被两端当成不同 VLAN → DHCP 消失 / 拿到错网段
+  （正是你之前在 AP 上打 VLAN10 坏 66 网的同类故障）。
+- **bridge 未 vlan-aware：** tagged 帧进 host 后在 bridge 过滤层消失。
+
+**诊断命令：**
+
+```bash
+# PVE host
+bridge vlan show
+ip -br link
+tcpdump -eni <上联口>          # 帧是否到物理口
+tcpdump -eni vmtapXXXXXX       # 帧是否到 VM tap
+# OpenWrt guest
+ip -d link show
+logread -e netifd
+```
+
+**参考案例：**
+
+- PVE 官方 wiki — Network Configuration / VLAN 802.1Q（三种模式 + vlan-aware bridge）：
+  <https://pve.proxmox.com/wiki/Network_Configuration>
+- 「OpenWrt VM on Proxmox」设计（trunk vs access 谁拥有 tag、双标签坑）：
+  <https://phb-crystal-ball.org/run-openwrt-in-proxmox/>
+- PVE 论坛「Tagged and Untagged VLAN」（`bridge-vlan-aware yes` + `bridge-vids` 解法）：
+  <https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/tagged-and-untagged-vlan-configuration.144421/>
+- OpenWrt 论坛 guest WiFi tagged VLAN 案例（`vmbr0.3`→VM 第三网卡；guest 拿到错误网段的
+  同型故障，最终归因在 PVE/host 侧）：<https://forum.openwrt.org/t/continued-x86-openwrt-proxmox-vlan-issues/182623>
+
+> **PVE host 改动风险：** 给 `vmbr0` 开 vlan-aware 是对宿主机网络栈的修改，有管理面断连风险；
+> 需在维护窗内用控制台/独立带外通道进行，先 `ifreload -a`（PVE7+ 的 ifupdown2 支持热应用），
+> 保留原配置作回滚。
+
+---
+
+## 5. 验收清单（「网络算正常」的样子）
+
+1. 管理面：`zhiqiang` 密钥 SSH 可从 LAN66/55 登录；默认 `admin` 禁用；Winbox/API 不可达；`.254` 管理可达。
+2. VLAN：客户端取得正确网段（`.66.x` / `.55.x`），默认网关 `.254`，DNS `.36` 可用。
+3. 互联网：PPPoE 已建立；IPv4 外网通；端口转发逐条从公网验证（hass 8123、transmission 51413、ssh 5822→.36:22、openvpn 1194）。
+4. IPv6：两 VLAN 拿到 SLAAC `/64`，默认路由存在，外部 IPv6 可达；IPv6 防火墙未阻断必要 ICMPv6/DHCPv6。
+5. 本地服务：跨 VLAN（`.55.x` ↔ `.66.x`）互通；AdGuard Home、UniFi 控制器、`gfw` 旁路由行为与升级前一致。
+6. UniFi：U6 Lite（`.66.6`）与 UAP-AC-Lite（`.55.5`）在控制器显示 **Connected**；Inform 未变 `:9080`。
+7. 无环路、无双默认网关；端口协商与错误计数正常。
+8. 备份（`.backup` + 文本导出）已离线保存；ER-X 已下电收纳。
+
+---
+
+## 6. 回滚语义
+
+任一阶段失败：**停手**。
+
+- **维护窗内失败（PPPoE 未起 / 客户端不通 / 防火墙锁死）：**
+  1. 下电 RB5009。
+  2. ONT 线插回 ER-X `eth4`。
+  3. 给 ER-X 上电 → 服务在数分钟内恢复。
+  4. 不要在故障中改 ER-X 的 WAN、DHCP、网关地址或 SSH 策略。
+- **维护窗成功后** ER-X 只是备件；后续 VLAN10 失败只撤 SSID/VLAN 绑定，主 SSID 与 `.254` 路径不动。
+
+---
+
+## 7. 安全与记录
+
+- **本仓库永不记录**：PPPoE 口令、`zhiqiang` 口令、SSH 私钥、RouterOS 备份（含口令/密钥）。
+- 每次实质性变更（切换、回滚、加固）完成后，在 Linear **`vps` 项目**记录 scope / action / verification / 遗留 follow-up（本次先不建 issue，待执行时补）。
+- SSH 与访问策略变更遵循仓库「SSH access safety」流程：ER-X 会话保持为回滚路径，新密钥登录验证成功前不关闭旧通道。
+
+---
+
+## 8. 参考
+
+- 现网地图：[lan-overview.md](../lan-overview.md)
+- ER-X 现状：[edgerouter-x-configuration.md](../edgerouter-x-configuration.md)、[hosts/gw.md](../../hosts/gw.md)
+- UniFi：[unifi-network.md](../unifi-network.md)、[hosts/ubnt.md](../../hosts/ubnt.md)
+- `gfw`：[hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md](../../hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md)
+- 作废方案（**不再实施**）：[lan-erx-se5420-network.md](../lan-erx-se5420-network.md)、[lan-core-switch-upgrade-plan.md](lan-core-switch-upgrade-plan.md)
+- MikroTik RB5009 官方：<https://mikrotik.com/product/rb5009ug_s_in>、RouterOS v7 手册
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# SE5420 实施评审主张核实（2026-08-10）
+
+> **核对基准（历史快照）：** 本文于 2026-08-10 针对 [lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md](../lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md) 的**评审前版本**（`35577d0`）撰写。该指南自 `ffb37a9`（"finalize SE5420 deployment guide per review"）起已按本评审修订，当前 `origin/main` 章节已重组：旧 §3.3 → §4.3、旧 §6（gfw）→ §11、旧 §7（SSID）→ §12、旧 §9（验收/IPv6）→ §13 + §11.4。文末「当前指南处理情况」列出各主张的现行状态；实施以部署指南现行为准。
+
+**范围。** 本文核对对 `lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md` 的评审意见。结论分为
+“已证实”（规范/一手资料直接支持）、“基本证实”（架构推论成立但仍须读取现场配置）和
+“需现场核实”（不能仅由文档或产品手册断言）。这不是实施变更，也不替代维护窗前的
+`uci show firewall`、交换机当前 VLAN 表和 PVE bridge 配置检查。
+
+## 核实结论
+
+| 评审主张 | 结论 | 依据与限定 |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `firewall.ubunt_upg.masq=1` 是错误方向，应在实际出站的 `wan` zone 做 IPv4 NAT | **已证实** | OpenWrt 明确规定 masquerade 是**按出站 zone/interface**控制；`masq` 通常在 `wan`。因此，对 `ubunt_upg → wan` 流量把 `masq` 放在源 zone 不是该需求的正确 zone 语义。若 `wan` 已 masq，不应重复开启；也可用 `masq_src` 只限 `192.168.10.0/24`。见 [OpenWrt firewall configuration](https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/firewall/firewall_configuration) 和 [fw4 masq 测试](https://lxr.openwrt.org/source/firewall4/tests/02_zones/02_masq)。 |
+| `ubunt_upg → wan` 允许所有经 gfw `wan` 可路由的目的地，不等于只上互联网 | **已证实** | `forwarding` 的 `src`/`dest` 是 zone-to-zone 单向许可，未按“Internet”语义区分目标 IP；规则可用 `dest_ip` 限制。故若 gfw 的 `wan` 接在 LAN66 且 ER-X 可路由 LAN55，评审所列 LAN66/LAN55 风险成立。最终可达网段仍须以 gfw 路由表、ER-X 路由/防火墙现场检查为准。见 [OpenWrt forwarding/rule 参考](https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/firewall/firewall_configuration)。 |
+| 不应把 `ubunt_upg.forward` 改为 `ACCEPT`；`forward_policy` 不是必要的标准 zone 选项；匿名 `uci add` 不可重复执行 | **基本证实** | OpenWrt zone 的标准项是 `forward`，forwarding 是独立 section，参考页未定义 `forward_policy`。单独的具名 forwarding 足以允许跨 zone 路径，因此保持 zone 内 `forward=REJECT` 是较小权限配置。匿名 section 每执行一次都会新增一节，这是 UCI 的操作语义；实施应先读现场配置并使用具名 section。 |
+| VLAN10 必须有显式 IPv6 策略，否则可能绕过仅 IPv4 的 NAT/隔离 | **已证实** | fw4 将 `masq`（IPv4）和 `masq6`（IPv6）分开；forwarding 默认 family 是 `any`。仅写 IPv4 DHCP/NAT/地址规则不能表达 VLAN10 的 IPv6 RA、DHCPv6、路由和过滤策略。是否已经存在可用 IPv6 前缀、以及 OpenClash 是否接管 IPv6，必须现场验证。见 [OpenWrt firewall configuration](https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/firewall/firewall_configuration)。 |
+| 管理 SVI + 默认路由与“不开 SVI/静态路由/一切 L3”矛盾 | **已证实** | 指南（历史版）§3.3 同时要求 VLAN66 `192.168.66.253/24` 与默认路由，又要求不开 SVI/静态路由。TL-SE5420 官方称其为三层交换机，支持静态路由、RIP、DHCP server/relay。准确目标应是：仅保留 VLAN66 管理 L3 interface/默认网关，不给 VLAN55/10 建 L3 interface，且禁用不需要的 L3 服务和跨 VLAN routing。见 [TL-SE5420 官方页](https://www.tp-link.com.cn/product_2899.html?v=specification) 与 [官方安装手册](https://service.tp-link.com.cn/download/202310/TL-SE5420%20V1.0%E5%AE%89%E8%A3%85%E6%89%8B%E5%86%8C%201.0.2.pdf)。 |
+| 必须明确移除 VLAN1 成员，PVID 变更本身不等于 access-port VLAN membership | **已证实** | PVID/native VLAN 只处理进入端口的未标记帧；access/trunk 的允许 VLAN 列表是独立概念。指南（历史版）§3.3 只列 VLAN66/55 member 和 PVID，未写移除 VLAN1 或 ingress filtering。验收应检查 VLAN1 member、VLAN1 管理 IP、端口允许 VLAN 和 tagged-frame ingress policy。见 [Ubiquiti 对 native/tagged/access/trunk 的定义](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/26136855808919-Switch-Port-VLAN-Assignment-Trunk-Access-Ports)（术语与 802.1Q 语义）以及 [Linux bridge VLAN 配置示例](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.19/networking/dsa/b53.html)（显式 `bridge vlan del ... vid 1`）。TL-SE5420 具体 GUI/CLI 行为仍以其固件手册核验。 |
+| NAS 不应在未先完成双端 LACP 时同时接两口；LACP 不使单 TCP 流自动达到 5G | **基本证实** | 这是标准二层环路/聚合变更控制结论：没有已协商的 LAG 时，两条同 VLAN 并行链路会构成潜在环路；STP 只能作为保护而非实施方法。官方产品页列出 LACP 相关资料，但本次未取得 TL-SE5420/TrueNAS 对端的精确配置与当前 NAS 连接状态，故“必然环路/双 IP”不能在桌面审阅中断言。单连接吞吐受链路散列限制是 802.3ad 的常见实现特性，应以 NAS 与交换机的 hash policy 和 `iperf3` 实测验收。 |
+| 非 VLAN-aware 的 PVE `vmbr0` 不提供 VLAN10 的端口级隔离 | **已证实** | PVE 将 bridge 描述为虚拟交换机；VLAN-aware mode 才能给 guest NIC 赋 VLAN tag，或显式 trunk。Linux 内核说明：`vlan_filtering=0` 时 bridge 不考虑 VLAN tag，且默认关闭；开启后才按 MAC **和 VLAN tag**转发及进行严格 VID 检查。因此“共享非 VLAN-aware bridge 可让可控 guest 主动消费 VLAN10，不能作为严格隔离边界”成立。不能仅凭该结论断言每个 guest 必定收到每个单播帧：未知单播/广播会泛洪，已学习的单播会按 FDB 转发。见 [PVE 网络配置](https://pve.proxmox.com/wiki/Network_Configuration) 和 [Linux bridge 文档](https://docs.kernel.org/networking/switchdev.html)。 |
+| AP VLAN10 tagged frame 在一个普通 untagged LAN66 access path 上会“自动去 tag 并泄漏到 LAN66” | **不成立／需改写** | 802.1Q 的 native VLAN 是对**未标记**流量的 VLAN；tagged VLAN 需被显式允许于 trunk。因此通常的正确表述是：若上游不允许 VLAN10 tag，AP 到 VLAN10 网关/DHCP 的路径不存在，SSID 会成为不可用入口。实际设备的端口模式（包括是否错误地配置为 all/trunk、是否接受 tagged ingress）须现场查看，不能泛称必然去标签。见 [Ubiquiti VLAN 端口定义](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/26136855808919-Switch-Port-VLAN-Assignment-Trunk-Access-Ports) 和 [Ubiquiti VLAN troubleshooting](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/9592924981911-Virtual-Network-VLAN-Troubleshooting)。 |
+| 仅保留 SSH 会话不是移动 PVE/ER-X 物理上联时的真正带外回滚路径；应全程保持 SE5420 Console | **已证实** | 这是直接的操作依赖判断：TCP SSH 的承载链路被拔除时会断，不能证明回滚可达。TL-SE5420 官方安装手册确认该机有 Type-C Console，且本仓库指南本身也把恢复出厂流程建立在 Console 上。故应在迁移前接通 Console、标注旧/新端口、逐根迁移并用 MAC 表与链路/错误计数验证。见 [官方安装手册](https://service.tp-link.com.cn/download/202310/TL-SE5420%20V1.0%E5%AE%89%E8%A3%85%E6%89%8B%E5%86%8C%201.0.2.pdf)。 |
+| “所有设备均不得直连 ER-X”不是避免环路的必要条件 | **已证实** | 环路取决于同一 L2 广播域存在多条并行二层路径，不取决于是否还有一个独立终端直接接 ER-X。应禁止的是一个下级交换机/桥接主机同时形成平行路径。此项仍需以 ER-X switch0 VLAN/bridge 现场配置和实际接线图确认。 |
+| 性能不应承诺全面 2.5G；同 VLAN 才可能在 SE5420 本地交换超 1G，跨 55/66 与 Internet 受 ER-X/宽带限制 | **已证实** | TL-SE5420 的 2.5G 端口仅提高经其本地二层转发的链路上限；跨子网必须由网关路由，Internet 另受 WAN/PPPoE 约束。产品页确认 16×2.5G + 4×10G SFP+，但 ER-X、NAS、PC、AP 的实际协商速率和 NIC/布线能力必须由 `ethtool`/端口状态及 `iperf3` 验证。见 [TL-SE5420 官方规格](https://www.tp-link.com.cn/product_2899.html?v=specification)。 |
+
+## 已核对的文档内事实
+
+现行指南的**历史版本**（`35577d0`）确实包含评审指出的关键文字：旧 §3.3 的管理 IP/默认路由与“不开 SVI/静态路由”；旧 §6 的 `ubunt_upg.masq`、`forward=ACCEPT`、`forward_policy`、匿名 forwarding；旧 §7 只验“不可达 LAN66”；旧 §9 对新增 VLAN10 写“IPv6 行为与升级前一致”。因此上述评审不是对未出现内容的假设。
+
+但这些内容在 `ffb37a9` 起的修订中已被修正或重组：`ubunt_upg.masq` 与 `forward_policy` 已删除，gfw 防火墙改为 §11（§11.3 第 2 步明确“不要给 `ubunt_upg` zone 加 masq”）；VLAN10 IPv6 在 §11.4 显式写为“本阶段不提供”；SVI/L3 边界在 §4.3 第 16 步单列“L3 明确边界检查”。本文按历史快照保留评审结论，读者应以现行部署指南为准。
+
+本仓库的 `hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md` 还记录 gfw 的 `eth0` 在 LAN66、`eth1` 在 LAN55，故 `ubunt_upg → wan` 的隔离结论应在执行前以当前 `ip route`、`uci show firewall`、`nft list ruleset` 复核，而不能从方案文字直接把规则写死。
+
+## gfw 现场只读复核（2026-08-10）
+
+已通过 `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1` 仅读取配置和运行规则，未修改设备。该结果会改变
+评审中两项“当前状态”的表述：
+
+| 现场事实 | 对评审的影响 |
+| --- | --- |
+| `wan` zone 已有 `masq='1'`；现有配置另有具名 `ubunt_upg_nat`，运行时渲染为 `oifname "eth0"` 且只匹配 `ip saddr 192.168.10.0/24 masquerade`。 | “必须在 wan 开 masq”的**方向原则**正确，但“当前无 masq”不正确。现有显式 SNAT 已在实际出 `eth0` 时执行；计划中再将 `masq` 加到 `ubunt_upg` 仍是多余且方向错误。 |
+| 当前放行是具名 `ubunt_upg_to_lan`，不是 `ubunt_upg→wan`；其运行链先拒绝 `192.168.66.0/24`，再允许到 `lan`。gfw 的 IPv4 default route 是 `192.168.66.254`。 | 计划新增 `ubunt_upg→wan` 会是与当前设计不同、过宽的改动。现有 LAN66 阻断规则在该链中先匹配；但对经 ER-X 可达的 LAN55/其他内网仍没有显式拒绝，故隔离评审的**剩余风险成立**。应以明确内网前缀 deny + 所需外网 allow 重写，而不是加 WAN forwarding。 |
+| `ubunt_upg` DHCPv6 和 RA 都是 `disabled`；运行路由表仅有各接口的 IPv6 link-local route，没有 IPv6 default route；全局 IPv6 forwarding 是 `1`。 | 评审“VLAN10 未明确 IPv6 策略”的表述对计划文本仍成立，但“IPv6 可能立即绕过”的事实判断在当前状态**未获证实**：现有 RA/DHCPv6 已关闭且无 IPv6 默认路由。实施文档仍应把这项显式写为“IPv6 不提供”，并在启用前复查。 |
+| 系统是 ImmortalWrt **25.12.0**，`/usr/bin/apk` 存在（apk-tools 3.0.5）。 | 评审中“ImmortalWrt 21.02.5 应使用 opkg”的版本判断错误/过时；在本机上 `apk add tcpdump` 是可用包管理器。仍应先检查软件包可用性，避免在维护文档中把两种命令并列为未经验证的替代方案。 |
+
+这些命令输出未含凭据、令牌或私钥，故仅记录了安全相关的摘要；不将完整防火墙快照提交至仓库。
+
+## 当前指南处理情况（2026-08-13 核对）
+
+对 `origin/main`（`2fd354c`）逐项核对评审主张：
+
+| 评审主张 | 现行状态 | 现行位置 |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `ubunt_upg.masq=1` 方向错误 | ✅ 已修复 | §11.3 第 2 步「不要给 `ubunt_upg` zone 加 masq」 |
+| `ubunt_upg→wan` 不等于只上互联网 | ⚠️ 原则成立，指南已禁止新增宽泛 forwarding；LAN55/RFC1918 显式 deny 仍为待办 | §11.1b「待补缺口」、§11.3 |
+| 勿改 `forward=ACCEPT`；无 `forward_policy`；匿名 uci 不可重复 | ✅ 已修复 | §11.3 第 1 步保持 REJECT；指南已无 `forward_policy` |
+| VLAN10 须显式 IPv6 策略 | ✅ 已修复 | §11.4「本阶段不提供 VLAN10 IPv6」 |
+| 管理 SVI + 默认路由 vs「不开一切 L3」矛盾 | ✅ 已消解 | §4.3 第 16 步「L3 明确边界检查」 |
+| 须移除 VLAN1 成员；PVID≠membership | ✅ 指南已加强；现网仍偏离（W1N-54） | §4.3 第 9–12 步；VLAN1 不可删说明 |
+| NAS 双口未 LACP 前勿并行 | ✅ 已体现 | §7 第 7 步「仅口 8，口 12 断开」 |
+| 非 VLAN-aware PVE bridge 不能作隔离边界 | ✅ 已体现 | §9.2 要求 VLAN-aware + `bridge-vids` |
+| AP tagged 帧在 access 口自动去 tag | ✅ 本文已纠正（不成立） | — |
+| SSH 非真正带外；须 Console | ✅ 已体现 | 开头第 2 条、§4.1、§16 |
+| 「所有设备不得直连 ER-X」非必要 | ✅ 已体现 | 全程三条第 1 条、§7 |
+| 不应承诺全面 2.5G | ✅ 已体现 | §8 第 7 条、§14 |
+
+## 实施前的最低限度现场证据
+
+1. gfw：保存并审阅 `uci show firewall`、`ip route`、`ip -6 route`、`nft list ruleset`；确认 wan 的 masq 与所有 WAN→内网、VLAN10→内网匹配次序。
+2. SE5420 Console：导出/截图 VLAN1、55、66 member 和 PVID/ingress-filter 状态；确认唯一管理 L3 interface 和路由/relay/DHCP 状态。
+3. PVE：记录 `/etc/network/interfaces`、VM NIC VLAN tags 和 `bridge vlan show`，再决定是否把 VLAN-aware 改造另开窗口。
+4. AP：从实际设备 `info` 或控制器记录确认 Inform URL（本仓库目前记录 `http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform`），并验证 VLAN10 tag 只经 U6/PVE trunk。
+5. NAS：单网口稳定后，另窗配置并验证两端 LACP，第二根线最后插入；用多流及单流 `iperf3` 分开验收。
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# EdgeRouter X configuration record
+
+This is a read-only, sanitized configuration record for
+[gw](../hosts/gw.md), taken on 2026-08-05. It intentionally excludes PPPoE
+credentials, user/password configuration, key material, and full DHCP client
+or reservation inventories.
+
+## Platform and topology
+
+| Item | Current configuration |
+|---|---|
+| Appliance / OS | EdgeRouter X 5-Port; EdgeOS `v3.0.1` build `5862409` |
+| WAN physical interface | `eth4`, described as `Internet (PPPoE)` |
+| WAN routed interface | `pppoe0`; dynamic IPv4 default route; MTU `1492` |
+| LAN66 | `eth0`, `192.168.66.254/24` |
+| LAN55 | `switch0`, `192.168.55.254/24`; member ports `eth1`–`eth3` |
+| IPv4 routing | Both LAN prefixes are directly connected; default route is through `pppoe0` |
+
+Despite its name, LAN55 is not currently an 802.1Q VLAN configuration:
+`switch0` has `vlan-aware` disabled. It is a separate Layer-3 subnet carried
+by the built-in switch ports, while LAN66 is connected through `eth0`.
+
+## IPv6
+
+The PPPoE uplink requests a delegated `/60`, enables rapid commit and assigns
+SLAAC-capable `/64` networks to the LANs:
+
+| Interface | Delegated prefix slot | Router address suffix |
+|---|---|---|
+| `eth0` (LAN66) | `:1` | `::1` |
+| `switch0` (LAN55) | `:2` | `::1` |
+
+IPv6 has a default route through `pppoe0`. The currently delegated prefixes
+are dynamic and are deliberately not treated as persistent configuration
+facts.
+
+## Effective firewall policy
+
+| Ruleset | Direction / attachment | Effective policy |
+|---|---|---|
+| `WAN_IN` | `pppoe0`, IPv4 `in` | Active; default drop; permits established/related, drops invalid |
+| `WAN_LOCAL` | `pppoe0`, IPv4 `local` | Active; default drop; permits established/related, drops invalid |
+| `WANv6_IN` | `pppoe0`, IPv6 `in` | Active; default drop; permits established/related and ICMPv6; drops invalid |
+| `WANv6_LOCAL` | `pppoe0`, IPv6 `local` | Active; default drop; permits established/related, ICMPv6, and DHCPv6 replies; drops invalid |
+| `LAN_IN` | None | Inactive; configured default drop with explicit LAN55 ↔ LAN66 allows |
+| `LAN_OUT` | None | Inactive; configured default drop with an Internet allow |
+
+Therefore, LAN55 and LAN66 currently have ordinary bidirectional routed
+access. The configured `LAN_IN`/`LAN_OUT` rules do **not** enforce an access
+boundary because neither is bound to an interface. From source
+`192.168.55.254`, the controller at `192.168.66.46` replied to 3/3 ICMP probes
+on 2026-08-05. The online LAN55 AP also confirms the operational Inform path
+to `192.168.66.46:9080`.
+
+Global firewall settings enable normal ICMP echo replies, disable broadcast
+ping and IPv4/IPv6 source routing, enable SYN cookies and martian logging, set
+an MSS clamp of `1412`, and leave source validation disabled. Receive redirects
+are disabled; IPv4 send redirects remain enabled.
+
+The [official EdgeOS User Guide](https://dl.ubnt.com/guides/edgemax/EdgeOS_UG.pdf)
+describes the distinction: a firewall policy is a ruleset that must be applied
+to its target interface and direction before it affects traffic.
+
+## NAT and inbound exposure
+
+IPv4 traffic leaving `pppoe0` is covered by NAT masquerade rule `5010`.
+Port-forward auto-firewall and hairpin NAT are enabled. The configured WAN
+forwards are below; their external reachability was not tested in this review.
+
+| WAN protocol / port | Internal destination | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| TCP/UDP `8123` | `192.168.55.11:8123` | Home Assistant |
+| TCP/UDP `51413` | `192.168.66.51:51413` | Transmission |
+| TCP/UDP `5822` | `192.168.66.36:22` | SSH forward |
+| TCP/UDP `1194` | `192.168.66.32:1194` | OpenVPN |
+
+Treat every forward as an intentional public attack surface. Changes require
+the normal firewall/change review and external verification from a trusted
+network.
+
+## LAN services
+
+| Service | LAN66 | LAN55 |
+|---|---|---|
+| DHCP pool | `.38`–`.243` | `.38`–`.243` |
+| Default gateway | `.254` | `.254` |
+| DNS server handed out | `192.168.66.36` | `192.168.66.36` |
+| Lease duration | 24 hours | 24 hours |
+| UniFi Controller DHCP option | `192.168.66.46` | `192.168.66.46` |
+
+DNS forwarding listens on `eth0` and `switch0` with a cache size of `512`.
+Management services are SSH/TCP `22`, HTTP/TCP `80`, and HTTPS/TCP `443`.
+Since no active LAN-local firewall is documented, treat access to this gateway
+management plane from either LAN as permitted unless verified otherwise.
+
+Infrastructure devices, including the two APs and the UniFi controller, have
+DHCP static mappings. Keep the authoritative full mapping list only in the
+gateway configuration; do not copy unrelated household device inventories into
+this operations repository.
+
+## Acceleration and maintenance implications
+
+At verification time, `show ubnt offload` reported that both IPSec and HWNAT
+offload modules were not loaded. No `system offload` enablement was present in
+the inspected configuration. This may constrain routing/NAT throughput under
+load; it is an observation, not authorization to alter the router.
+
+Use these safe effective-state checks after any planned change:
+
+```bash
+show interfaces
+show ip route
+show ipv6 route
+show firewall
+show nat rules
+show ubnt offload
+```
+
+Avoid recording raw `show configuration commands` output: it includes PPPoE
+credentials and may include other secrets.
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+# Home Assistant × Matrix integration
+
+Reference for wiring the Home Assistant [Matrix integration](https://www.home-assistant.io/integrations/matrix)
+to the self-hosted Matrix homeserver at [`synapse.chans.xyz`](../hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md).
+Deliberately contains no Matrix passwords, access tokens, or room encryption material.
+
+> **Status (2026-08-15, W1N-139):** the built-in `matrix` integration has been
+> **retired** on `hass.windy.lan` and replaced by the custom **`matrix_e2ee`**
+> integration. The sections below on the built-in integration are kept for
+> reference only. See [matrix_e2ee](#matrix-e2ee-custom-e2e-integration) for the
+> active setup and [Device verification (SAS) model](#device-verification-sas-model)
+> for how device trust works.
+
+## Purpose
+
+The integration lets Home Assistant send messages to Matrix rooms and react to
+messages/reactions in Matrix rooms. "Reacting" is done by firing a
+`matrix_command` event when one of the configured commands matches; automations
+then trigger on that event. Sending is done through the `notify.matrix` platform
+and the `matrix.send_message` / `matrix.react` actions.
+
+## Environment mapping
+
+| Integration setting | This deployment |
+|---|---|
+| `homeserver` | `https://synapse.chans.xyz` (client-server base URL) |
+| `username` | full Matrix ID, e.g. `@ha_bot:chans.xyz` |
+| `password` | MAS local-password account password (see below) |
+| Room IDs / aliases | full forms with the identity domain, e.g. `!cUrbafjkfsMDVwdRDQ:chans.xyz` or `#room:chans.xyz` |
+
+- Identity domain is `chans.xyz` (not `synapse.chans.xyz`); user IDs and room
+  aliases carry the `:chans.xyz` suffix.
+- Authentication on this homeserver is MAS (Matrix Authentication Service) with
+  local-password accounts. The integration logs in with `m.login.password`
+  (username + password), so the bot account must be a local-password account —
+  same as the Hermes account documented in [`hermes-matrix.md`](hermes-matrix.md).
+  If MAS is later switched to OAuth2/OIDC-only (no legacy password login), the
+  integration's password login will stop working; keep that in mind before such
+  a change.
+- Public registration is disabled. Create/reset the dedicated bot account via
+  MAS / Element Admin.
+
+## Use a separate bot account (mandatory)
+
+The docs are explicit: to prevent infinite loops when reacting to commands,
+the integration **must** use a separate account from any account whose messages
+it reacts to. Use a dedicated account such as `@ha_bot:chans.xyz`, not a human
+account.
+
+## configuration.yaml (example)
+
+```yaml
+# The Matrix integration
+matrix:
+  homeserver: https://synapse.chans.xyz
+  username: "@ha_bot:chans.xyz"
+  password: supersecurepassword
+  rooms:
+    - "#hasstest:chans.xyz"
+  commands:
+    - word: my_command
+      name: my_command
+```
+
+After changing `configuration.yaml`, restart Home Assistant to apply the
+changes. The integration then shows under **Settings → Devices & services**;
+its entities are on the integration card and the Entities tab.
+
+### Configuration variables
+
+| Variable | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `username` | Full Matrix ID the bot logs in as, e.g. `@ha_bot:chans.xyz`. The `@` has a special YAML meaning, so always quote it. |
+| `password` | The bot account's password (MAS local password). |
+| `homeserver` | Full client-server URL of the homeserver. |
+| `rooms` | Rooms the bot should join and listen in. List **all** rooms commands are to be received in, even if a command scopes itself to fewer rooms. Accepts internal room ID (`!…:chans.xyz`) or alias (`#room:chans.xyz`). |
+| `commands` | Commands to listen for. Each fires a `matrix_command` event when triggered. |
+
+### Command types
+
+| Key | Triggers when |
+|---|---|
+| `word` | A message starts with `!<word>`. Arguments after the word are captured as a list in the event's `data`. |
+| `expression` | A message matches the Python regexp. The regexp group dictionary is captured in the event's `data`. |
+| `reaction` | A message is reacted to with the given emoji. |
+| `name` | The command name, exposed as an attribute of the fired event. |
+
+A command can be scoped to specific rooms with a per-command `rooms` list (the
+room must still be listed under the top-level `rooms`).
+
+## Event data
+
+When a command triggers, a `matrix_command` event fires with:
+
+- `name` — the command name.
+- `data` — for `word` commands, a list of arguments (everything after the word,
+  split on spaces); for `expression` commands, the group dictionary of the
+  matching regexp.
+- `event_id` — the received message's identifier.
+- `thread_parent` — the root message ID of the thread; equals `event_id` when
+  the message is not inside a thread.
+
+## Notifications (notify.matrix)
+
+Deliver notifications from Home Assistant to a Matrix room (direct or group):
+
+```yaml
+notify:
+  - name: matrix_notify
+    platform: matrix
+    default_room: "#hasstest:chans.xyz"
+```
+
+- The target room must already exist; get its canonical ID from the room
+  settings dialog (`!<randomid>:chans.xyz`) or an alias (`#roomname:chans.xyz`).
+  Quote the room ID/alias in YAML to escape the `!` / `#` characters.
+- The notifying account may need to be invited to the room, depending on room
+  policy.
+
+Message formats (`data.format`): `text` (default) and `html`. Images can be
+attached via `data.images` (list of file paths); files from outside allowed
+folders require `homeassistant.allowlist_external_dirs` to list the source
+folder.
+
+Reply inside a thread by passing the root message ID into `data.thread_id`:
+
+```yaml
+action: notify.matrix_notify
+data:
+  message: "Reply message goes here"
+  data:
+    thread_id: "{{ trigger.event.data.thread_parent }}"
+```
+
+## Actions
+
+- `matrix.react` — send a reaction to a message in a Matrix room
+  (`reaction`, `room`, `message_id`).
+- `matrix.send_message` — send a message to one or more Matrix rooms.
+
+## Comprehensive example (adapted)
+
+```yaml
+matrix:
+  homeserver: https://synapse.chans.xyz
+  username: "@ha_bot:chans.xyz"
+  password: supersecurepassword
+  rooms:
+    - "#hasstest:chans.xyz"
+    - "#someothertest:chans.xyz"
+  commands:
+    - word: testword
+      name: testword
+      rooms:
+        - "#someothertest:chans.xyz"
+    - expression: "My name is (?P<name>.*)"
+      name: introduction
+    - reaction: 👍
+      name: thumbsup
+
+notify:
+  - name: matrix_notify
+    platform: matrix
+    default_room: "#hasstest:chans.xyz"
+
+automation:
+  - alias: "Respond to !testword"
+    triggers:
+      - trigger: event
+        event_type: matrix_command
+        event_data:
+          command: testword
+    actions:
+      - action: notify.matrix_notify
+        data:
+          message: "It looks like you wrote !testword"
+```
+
+## matrix_e2ee (custom E2E integration)
+
+Custom integration [`windyboy/ha-matrix-e2ee`](https://github.com/windyboy/ha-matrix-e2ee),
+release **v0.3.12** (Matrix activity events + push diagnostics), deployed on
+`hass.windy.lan` 2026-08-20 (upgraded from v0.3.2, W1N-182/#34 emoji-wait
+wizard fix; v0.3.9 brought the Connection health binary sensor, SAS/command
+allowlist split, URL normalization and single-entry enforcement, W1N-156/W1N-190).
+Runs a dedicated bot with a **persistent E2EE device identity**.
+
+- Domain `matrix_e2ee`; Config Flow (UI) with YAML import migration, not in HACS. Does **not**
+  override the built-in `matrix` integration.
+- Dependencies are declared **explicitly** in `manifest.json` to work around Home
+  Assistant's `is_installed` dropping the `[e2e]` extra (W1N-140):
+  `matrix-nio[e2e]==0.26.0` + `vodozemac` + `peewee` + `cachetools` + `atomicwrites`.
+- **v0.2.0 migration:** YAML `matrix_e2ee:` block was auto-imported into a Config Entry
+  (`source: import`) on first startup, then removed. All settings now managed via
+  **Settings → Devices & Services → Matrix E2EE → Configure**.
+  See [hosts/hass.windy.lan.md](../hosts/hass.windy.lan.md) for the deployed state.
+
+### Services & events
+
+- Services (all admin-only since v0.1.4):
+  - `send_message` (`message`, `room_id`)
+  - `start_verification` (`user_id`, `device_id`)
+  - `confirm_verification` (`transaction_id`)
+  - `cancel_verification` (`transaction_id`)
+  - `reauthenticate` (`password`) — soft-logout only
+  - `get_fingerprint` (no fields; returns bot's own `ed25519`/`curve25519` keys; added v0.1.3)
+  - `verify_device_by_fingerprint` (`user_id`, `device_id`, `ed25519`; added v0.1.3,
+    renamed from `verify_device` in v0.1.4; requires exact `ed25519` match)
+- Events:
+  - `matrix_e2ee_command` (`room_id`, `sender`, `command`, `args` only —
+    never the raw body)
+  - `matrix_e2ee_error` (codes, no secrets)
+  - `matrix_e2ee_verification` (`stage`, `transaction_id`, `user_id`, `device_id`,
+    optional `emojis`, optional `expires_at`; `expires_at` added v0.1.3)
+  - `matrix_e2ee_fingerprint` (`user_id`, `device_id`, `ed25519`, `curve25519` —
+    public keys only; added v0.1.3)
+  - `matrix_e2ee_message_received` (`room_id`, `sender`, `event_id`; added v0.3.12
+    activity events)
+  - `matrix_e2ee_verification_done` (`transaction_id`, `user_id`, `device_id`;
+    added v0.3.12)
+- v0.3.12 also adds an `event.` platform entity (`Bot activity`,
+  `event_types: ["message", "command", "verification_done"]`) and a diagnostic
+  Connection binary sensor (`binary_sensor.*_connection`, CONNECTIVITY class).
+- `notify.matrix_e2ee` is **not implemented** (upstream deferred) — notifications
+  must call `matrix_e2ee.send_message` (message + room_id).
+- Commands fire Home Assistant events only; the integration never calls
+  `domain.service` itself. Map commands in automations.
+- Encrypted rooms fail-closed on unverified devices.
+- Since v0.1.4: `start_verification`, `confirm_verification`, `cancel_verification`,
+  `verify_device_by_fingerprint`, and `reauthenticate` are enforced as HA admin-only
+  via `async_register_admin_service`; non-admin users cannot call them.
+
+### Storage & recovery
+
+- `.storage/matrix_e2ee_session.json` (`user_id`, `device_id`, `access_token`,
+  `pickle_key`) and `.storage/matrix_e2ee_store/` (Olm/Megolm, device trust,
+  sync token). Both stay on the HA persistent volume and are in HA backups.
+- Soft logout → `matrix_e2ee.reauthenticate` (keeps `device_id` + crypto store;
+  rejected outside soft-logout state since v0.1.3).
+- Hard logout / store loss → delete session + store, restart with password, re-SAS
+  (a **new device**; old history not decryptable).
+
+## Device verification (SAS + fingerprint) model
+
+Researched 2026-08-15 (W1N-139 stage-6 pre-study), updated for v0.1.3/v0.1.4.
+Sources: matrix.org
+[cross-signing guide](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/implementing-more-advanced-e-2-ee-features-such-as-cross-signing/),
+matrix-nio [examples](https://matrix-nio.readthedocs.io/en/latest/examples.html),
+[element-android#6832](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/issues/6832),
+Element [device-verification](https://element.io/features/device-verification).
+
+`matrix_e2ee` supports three verification paths (the wizard — v0.3.0
+bot-initiated, reworked in v0.3.1/v0.3.2 to wait for a peer-initiated inbound
+SAS from the user's Matrix client with emoji comparison — automates the SAS
+flow):
+
+### 1. SAS (mutual, manual confirmation since v0.1.4)
+
+- SAS is device-to-device: exchange ephemeral keys → derive emojis → **a human on
+  each side compares and confirms** (`m.key.verification.mac`).
+- Matrix distinguishes two cases (spec uses *should*, not *must*):
+  - **same user, two devices** → to-device messages (SAS);
+  - **two different users** → **in-room (DM) messages**, verifying the *user*
+    (cross-signing master key), not a specific device.
+- Cross-signing: each user has master / self-signing / user-signing keys. A device
+  looks "verified" to another user via the chain
+  `my master → my user-signing → their master → their self-signing → their device`.
+- Element's "Verify" button only starts **in-DM user verification**; it has no
+  "verify a specific device of another user via to-device" flow (matrix.org
+  recommends hiding per-device verification for other users).
+- `matrix_e2ee` implements **raw to-device device SAS** (`start_verification`/
+  `confirm_verification`), **no cross-signing / in-room**. This is a non-standard
+  cross-user path: works with matrix-nio + Element Web/Desktop (reported in
+  element-android#6832), **not** on Element Android/X.
+- **v0.1.3**: inbound SAS auto-complete was added; SAS events include `expires_at`.
+- **v0.1.4 (breaking)**: auto-confirm was removed. **Every** device — including
+  another device of the bot's own account — requires explicit `confirm_verification`
+  after emoji comparison. Only the bot's own account or users in `allowed_users`
+  may initiate SAS (`verification_peer_denied` otherwise).
+- **v0.2.1**: storage I/O moved off the event loop (`asyncio.to_thread`,
+  W1N-167); own-keys query on startup so inbound SAS can build a session (W1N-166).
+- **v0.2.2** (not deployed): intermediate version.
+- **v0.2.3**: sync loop runs as a background task (fixes bootstrap setup timeout,
+  W1N-168); SAS double-send of key and MAC fixed (W1N-169).
+- **v0.2.6**: `_log_verification_state()` tracks SAS state transitions with
+  `async_write_ha_state` for diagnosis (W1N-174);
+  `_bridge_verification_request()` handles inbound
+  `m.key.verification.request` → `m.key.verification.ready` since nio lacks a
+  `request` framework (W1N-173).
+- **v0.2.5**: bridge `m.key.verification.request` → `ready` (nio lacks
+  request framework, W1N-173).
+- **v0.2.4**: `_patch_nio_sas_timeout()` works around nio 0.26.0
+  `_last_event_time` bug (SAS timed out at 60s regardless of activity — now uses
+  `_max_age` 5 min); `_repair_dropped_start()` recovers SAS `start` events nio
+  dropped when the peer device was unknown (W1N-170/W1N-172);
+  `VERIFICATION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` 600→240 (fires before nio's `_max_age`).
+- **v0.2.11**: `receive_mac_event` no longer overrides canceled state (W1N-179/#31).
+- **v0.3.12**: Matrix activity events (`matrix_e2ee_message_received`,
+  `matrix_e2ee_verification_done`) + `event.` Bot activity entity + Connection
+  diagnostic binary sensor.
+- **v0.3.9**: SAS driver gate split from the command allowlist — new
+  `verification_peer_users` option (W1N-156/#41); SAS/sync logs demoted
+  warning→info/debug (W1N-188/#38); Connection health binary sensor
+  (W1N-185/#40); URL normalization + single-entry enforcement (W1N-190/#42).
+- **v0.3.8**: `m.key.verification.done` handshake completion for
+  request-based SAS (W1N-183/#35).
+- **v0.3.2**: wizard waits for the inbound SAS to show emojis before moving
+  to the compare step (`_wait_for_inbound` requires `latest_sas_snapshot()` to
+  return `emojis`) — W1N-182/#34.
+- **v0.3.1**: verification wizard now waits for a peer-initiated inbound SAS
+  (options flow no longer starts verification from the bot; `latest_sas_snapshot()`
+  skips verified/canceled transactions) — GitHub #33.
+- **v0.3.0**: bot-initiated device verification wizard (W1N-180/#32).
+- Inbound SAS is gated to `allowed_users` (v0.1.3); **since v0.3.9 (W1N-156)
+  the gate is the separate `verification_peer_users` allowlist**, which is
+  unset on hass.windy.lan — only the bot's own account may drive SAS until
+  `@zhiqiang:chans.xyz` is added there.
+
+### 2. One-sided fingerprint (added v0.1.3, hardened v0.1.4)
+
+- Call `matrix_e2ee.get_fingerprint` to get the bot's own `ed25519` device key
+  (read it from the `matrix_e2ee_fingerprint` event).
+- In Element, open the bot user's sessions and use "Manually verify by text".
+  Compare the session key with the fingerprint.
+- To trust another device from the bot's side, call
+  `matrix_e2ee.verify_device_by_fingerprint` with the peer's `user_id`, `device_id`,
+  and `ed25519` key. The match is exact (since v0.1.4's rename from `verify_device`).
+  Feed the **peer** key, not the bot's own key.
+- This trusts from one side only; the peer still trusts the bot independently.
+- Both `get_fingerprint` and `verify_device_by_fingerprint` are HA admin-only.
+
+### Consequence
+
+Whether `@zhiqiang`'s device can be verified depends on which Element client
+they use. Open options recorded in W1N-139 (A: Web SAS test; B: upstream
+in-room/cross-signing; C: unencrypted-room downgrade).
+
+## References
+
+- Home Assistant Matrix integration: <https://www.home-assistant.io/integrations/matrix>
+- Matrix host facts: [`hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md`](../hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md)
+- Matrix deployment and upstream index: [`matrix-upstream.md`](matrix-upstream.md)
+- Hermes Agent Matrix channel (MAS local-password + access-token pattern): [`hermes-matrix.md`](hermes-matrix.md)
+- HA host facts: [`hosts/hass.windy.lan.md`](../hosts/hass.windy.lan.md)
+- HA maintenance runbook: [`runbooks/home-assistant-maintenance.md`](../runbooks/home-assistant-maintenance.md)
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+# 内网 DNS 架构调研与优化建议
+
+> 状态:2026-08-12 调研定稿,Linear **W1N-56**。**Phase 0 验证(2026-08-12)全部完成,最终裁决(用户定稿)已对齐**;本期未改动任何生产 DNS 路径。
+> 2026-08-12 现场核查修正:gfw 上 mosdns **不是闲置**——它是 OpenClash clash 的
+> `nameserver`/`default-nameserver`(DIRECT 规则真实 IP 解析),处于活动链路,裁决第 5 条
+> 的"删除闲置 mosdns"前提不成立,处置改为"正式纳管并文档化"。
+> 相关:`docs/lan-overview.md`、`hosts/dns.windy.lan.md`、`hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md`、W1N-40。
+> 2026-08-13 (W1N-62):gfw mosdns 国外分支已从"明文国内公网 DNS"改为**加密 DoH**
+> (自建 `https://adg.chans.xyz/dns-query`,hk2),新增 `foreign_upstream`/`foreign_fallback`
+> (primary=DoH, secondary=明文国内 DNS, threshold 1000ms),`bootstrap` 用现有国内公网 IP
+> (防自举循环)。实测:mosdns 平面国外域名 A/AAAA 恢复(google AAAA `2607:f8b0…`)、
+> `dup.baidustatic.com`→`0.0.0.0`(AGH 拦截保留)、clash 7874 fake-ip 平面不变。
+> **重要修正(定稿)**:DoH 流量实测为 **gfw→hk2 直连,未经 clash 代理**——nft output 链
+> (mangle mark/tcp redirect)计数为 0、`/proc/net/tcp` 存在到 hk2:443 的 established
+> 连接,路由自身 TCP 输出当前并未被 OpenClash 重定向,故"经代理访问加密 DNS"的假设不成立。
+> **最终决策:接受直连,不强行走代理**——`foreign_upstream` 以自建解析器
+> `adg.chans.xyz`(hk2)为主力,自有 VPS 直连即可达、无被墙/污染问题、DoH/TLS 已加密、应答干净,
+> 走代理毫无增益反而把 DNS 平面耦合进 clash;实测 kill clash 期间国外查询 0.01s 正常应答,
+> watchdog 自动拉起,直连使 DNS 平面独立于代理(优于过代理)。
+> **多上游冗余(同日)**:`concurrent: 3`,新增 `https://dns.quad9.net/dns-query` 与
+> `https://dns.cloudflare.com/dns-query`(2026-08-13 本网络实测可达;`dns.quad101.net`
+> TLS 握手失败已排除)——hk2 故障时仍由干净的国外 DoH 应答,最后才退化明文国内兜底。
+> 验证:google AAAA 由 hk2 的 `2607:f8b0…` 变为新上游的 `2404:6800…`,国内外/拦截/代理平面无回归。
+> 备份:`config.yaml.bak-foreign-doh-20260813-103746` / `config.yaml.bak-foreign-doh-20260813-103813` /
+> `config.yaml.bak-multi-doh-20260813-105421`。
+
+## 1. 现状(实测 2026-08-12)
+
+| 角色 | 部署 | 职责 | 是否在活动路径 |
+|------|------|------|----------------|
+| **AdGuard Home** | `192.168.66.36`(PVE VM 120,Docker host 网络) | EdgeRouter DHCP 通告给 LAN55/66 客户端的唯一 DNS;广告/过滤、查询统计、Web 面板 | ✅ **是(LAN 客户端唯一入口)** |
+| **mosdns** | `192.168.66.1`(gfw OpenWrt)监听 `127.0.0.1:6052`(仅本机) | clash 的 `nameserver`/`default-nameserver`:DIRECT 规则真实 IP 分流(国内 → AGH `.36:53`,国外 → `223.5.5.5`/`119.29.29.29`) | ✅ 网关侧(clash 消费,不面向客户端) |
+| **OpenClash / clash(meta)** | `192.168.66.1`(gfw) | gateway 自身/被劫持流量的 fake-ip + 代理;DNS 走 dnsmasq→clash `#7874` | 仅网关侧与 VLAN10 |
+
+**关键事实(全部实测):**
+- LAN 客户端 DNS 直连 `66.36`,**不经过** gfw(EdgeRouter `service dns forwarding` cache 512,通告 `.36`)。
+- AGH 上游:DoH `dns.alidns.com`(→`223.5.5.5`/`223.6.6.6`)+ `doh.pub`(→`120.53.53.53`/`1.12.12.12`),
+  `upstream_mode: load_balance`、`fastest_timeout: 1s`、`upstream_timeout: 10s`;bootstrap
+  `223.5.5.5`/`223.6.6.6`(公网 IP,无自举循环);兜底 DoH `adg.chans.xyz`(→`hk2.chans.xyz`→`154.36.174.161`)。
+  DNS 监听 UDP/TCP **v4 only(`0.0.0.0:53`)**,无 v6 监听;`enable_dnssec: false`;cache 4 MB;ratelimit 20。
+- AGH 宿主出网:默认路由 `via 192.168.66.254`(EdgeRouter),**直连,不经 gfw**;DoH 实测可达
+  (223.5.5.5:443 → HTTP 400/0.05s,120.53.53.53 → 502/0.06s,adg.chans.xyz 冷连接 ~3.5s)。
+- gfw 自身出网:OpenClash `openclash_mangle_output` 对非本地区域/国内 IP 流量统一
+  `mark 0x162 → tproxy 127.0.0.1:7895`(**gfw 自身流量默认走代理**,含 clash 的
+  nameserver-policy DoH);mosdns 的上游(AGH `.36` 本地区域、`223.5.5.5` 国内 IP)均被 bypass,保持直连。
+- gfw DNS 链:`server=127.0.0.1#7874`(dnsmasq)→ clash:`nameserver: [127.0.0.1:6052]`(mosdns)、
+  `default-nameserver: [127.0.0.1:6052]`、`nameserver-policy` 国外域名 → DoH `https://1.1.1.1/dns-query`、
+  `enhanced-mode: fake-ip`(198.18.0.1/16)、`ipv6: false`;nft 有 UDP/53 hijack → dnsmasq。
+- **mosdns 配置缺陷(2026-08-12 发现并修复)**:`main` sequence 的国内分支
+  (`matches: qname $domestic_domains → exec: $domestic_upstream`)之后**缺少
+  `matches: has_resp → accept` 守卫**。mosdns v5 的 `sequence` 在 `forward` 成功后不会停止,
+  只有 `accept`/`reject`/`return` 或错误会终止——因此命中 `geosite_cn` 的查询会被转发**两次**
+  (AGH 与 223.5.5.5/119.29.29.29),最终应答来自最后一个 forward(国内公网 DNS),**AGH 的
+  拦截/rewrite 对 DIRECT 国内域名静默失效**。实测证据:`dup.baidustatic.com`(在 `geosite_cn`
+  且在 AGH 拦截表)经 mosdns 返回真实 IP `183.60.227.49` 而非 `0.0.0.0`。已修复(备份
+  `/etc/mosdns/config.yaml.bak-20260812`),修复后同一域名返回 `0.0.0.0`,taobao/google 解析
+  与 clash 链均无回归。**§6 的二期示例同款缺陷已一并修正。**
+  同日追加加固:`domestic_fallback`(fallback 插件:`primary: domestic_upstream`(AGH)、
+  `secondary: default_upstream`(223.5.5.5/119.29.29.29)、`threshold: 500ms`)使 AGH 宕机时
+  DIRECT 国内真实 IP 查询回退国内公网 DNS,不再直接报错;实测:AGH 停止时缓存未命中查询由
+  fallback 应答(NXDOMAIN/真实 IP),AGH 恢复后主路径即时应答且拦截(`0.0.0.0`)恢复。
+  备份:`/etc/mosdns/config.yaml.bak-fallback-20260812`。
+- AGH rewrites(实测):`hass.windy.lan`/`hass.local` → `192.168.55.11`;`dns.windy.lan` → `.36`;
+  `ubnt.windy.lan` → `.46`;`gfw.windy.lan` → `.1`;`nas.windy.local` → `.32`。
+- 拦截:仅启用 **AdGuard DNS filter**(filter_1);实测 `doubleclick.net`/`googleadservices.com` → `0.0.0.0`。
+
+**现状缺口(实测确认):**
+1. AGH 上游是固定 DoH,**无"国内/国外分流"能力**;国外域名解析质量依赖唯一兜底路径。
+2. **兜底失效**(kill-test 证实):主上游黑洞时,兜底 `adg.chans.xyz` 在客户端 15s 窗口内不生效
+   (`upstream_timeout: 10s` + TCP 重试行为),缓存未命中查询无有界降级——见 §8。
+3. 国外域名 AAAA 经国内路径全部置空(见 §8),v6 解析缺位。
+
+## 2. 最终裁决对齐(用户定稿 2026-08-12)
+
+| # | 裁决 | 本issue处理 |
+|---|------|------------|
+| 1 | **保留 AGH `.36` 为唯一 LAN DNS 入口**(现有方案增强版),不改 EdgeRouter DHCP 通告 | ✅ 现状保持;本期零改动 |
+| 2 | **否决"AGH 全局转发到 Clash fake-IP"**——DNS 平面必须与流量转发平面一致 | ✅ 分层方案(§4)明确 AGH 上游为**真实 IP** 解析路径,不与 fake-ip 混用 |
+| 3 | **AGH → mosdns 仅为二期可选项**(经实测确有需求后启用) | ✅ §4 为二期方案;§8 kill-test 已给出"实测需求"证据(降级缺口) |
+| 4 | 代理 VLAN10 将来用独立 OpenClash DNS 平面(fake-ip + TPROXY),不污染普通 LAN | ✅ 现状即此(dnsmasq→clash,非面向 LAN 客户端);文档记录 |
+| 5 | **删除或明确禁用** `.1` 上未使用的 mosdns | ⚠️ 前提修正:mosdns 是 clash 的 nameserver,处于活动链路(§1)。处置改为**正式纳管并文档化**(本文件 + `hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md`),不删除 |
+| 6 | 先完成验证再改动生产路径 | ✅ 本期完成全部 Phase 0 验证(§8),**未改任何生产 DNS 路径** |
+| 7 | 建立 `home.arpa` 内部域(替代 `.local`) | ⏳ 后续任务:当前命名空间为 `.lan`(AGH rewrites + EdgeRouter DHCP domain),`hass.local` 兼容保留至迁移完成;home.arpa 需联动 AGH rewrites、DHCP domain、客户端,另行排期 |
+| 8 | 高可用时增加第二个等价 AGH(独立物理故障域) | ⏳ 备用方案,记录不实施 |
+
+## 3. 两个候选方案评估
+
+### 方案 A:AGH 单独作为统一入口(现状演进)
+- 优点:单解析点、面板/拦截/日志集中、维护简单。
+- 缺点:AGH 对 geo 分流 + 防污染支持弱(官方定位是"过滤/家长控制")。固定 DoH 上游无法按域名
+  region 选路;且 §8 kill-test 显示主上游全挂时缓存未命中查询无有界降级。→ **不足以解决防污染/分流/降级问题。**
+
+### 方案 B:mosdns 作为智能上游分流器
+mosdns(v5)用 `sequence` 编排:`geosite/geoip` 匹配器 → 国内域名转发国内 DoH、国外域名转发加密 DoH(防污染),可加 `cache`、`reject`。
+- 优点:真正解决"国内快 / 国外不被污染"的分流;性能高。
+- 缺点:纯转发器,无 Web 面板、无每客户端统计、拦截靠域名表。→ 单独当入口会退回原始体验。
+
+**结论:两个方案互补,不是二选一。** 单用 A 无法分流防污染且降级无界;单用 B 失去 AGH 管理体验。
+
+## 4. 二期可选项:分层架构(AGH 前端 + mosdns 后端,经实测需求后启用)
+
+```
+局域网客户端(DHCP DNS = 192.168.66.36)
+        │
+        ▼
+AdGuard Home (66.36)      ── 前端:广告/过滤、拦截表、每客户端统计、Web 面板
+   │  上游 = mosdns
+   ▼
+mosdns(66.36 伴生容器)      ── 后端:智能分流 + 防污染
+   │  - geosite:cn        → 国内 DoH/UDP(aliDNS / 腾讯 DNSPod)
+   │  - 其他              → 加密 DoH(自建 adg.chans.xyz 等)
+   ▼
+   上游 DoH
+```
+
+职责分离:
+- **AGH = 策略/拦截/可观测**(拦截表、每客户端日志、面板)。
+- **mosdns = 智能转发**(geo 分流 + 加密防污染 + 内置 cache,可显著缩短降级窗口)。
+- **OpenClash(gfw)= 代理选路**(fake-ip + 规则)。与 DNS 解析选上游是两个独立决策,分开放最干净。
+
+**部署位置:mosdns 与 AGH 同机(66.36 伴生容器),而非 gfw(.1)**:单点即 AGH 所在;不受网关重启/
+OpenClash churn 影响;可纳入现有 compose/ansible 管理;不占用 OpenWrt 资源。放 gfw 会与 clash 的
+DNS 处理互相干扰、耦合,且网关重启即断全 LAN DNS。**不推荐放 .1。**
+
+> 启用条件(kill-test 实测需求,§8):主上游全挂时,当前 AGH 单入口对缓存未命中查询无有界降级。
+> 分层方案(或下调 `upstream_timeout` + 改 failover 模式)可修;启用与否由用户在二期决定。
+
+## 5. 更优替代方案(一并考虑)
+
+1. **分层(推荐二期,见 §4)**:AGH(66.36)→ mosdns(66.36 伴生)→ 上游。体验最好、职责最清。
+2. **纯 mosdns + 前端面板**:损失拦截/统计管理体验。**不推荐**用于替换。
+3. **AGH 只挂一个带分流的上游(第三方 DoH 聚合)**:失去可控性且不可信。不推荐做主路径。
+4. **全部交给 OpenClash fake-ip,关闭 AGH**:让"代理网关"成为全 LAN DNS 单点;且 AGH 拦截/日志也没了。**不推荐。**
+
+## 6. mosdns 配置要点(mosdns v5,二期实施预留)
+
+核心是 `sequence` + 上游拆分 + 缓存 + 屏蔽:
+
+```yaml
+plugins:
+  - tag: main
+    type: sequence
+    args:
+      - exec: cache 1024            # 缓存加速
+      - matches: has_resp
+        exec: accept
+      # 国内分流:命中 geosite:cn → 国内 DoH
+      - matches: [ qname &geosite:cn ]
+        exec: forward https://dns.alidns.com/dns-query
+      # 广告域名屏蔽交 AGH 前置,不重复维护
+      # 其余(国外)→ 加密 DoH 防污染
+      - exec: forward https://adg.chans.xyz/dns-query
+  - type: udp_server
+    args: { entry: main, listen: "127.0.0.1:5353" }
+  - type: tcp_server
+    args: { entry: main, listen: "127.0.0.1:5353" }
+```
+
+> **注意**:`sequence` 中每个 `forward` 分支之后必须跟 `matches: has_resp → accept`
+> (或改用 `goto`/`jump` + `return` 结构),否则查询会继续执行后续规则被二次转发,
+> 最终应答来自最后一个 forward——gfw 上 mosdns 的同类缺陷(2026-08-12)已实测并修复(见 §1)。
+
+要点:
+- 上游可加 `upstream` 的 `concurrent > 1` 与多地址故障切换;mosdns 自带 cache,能保证上游故障时
+  缓存命中仍即时应答(对应 §8 认定的降级缺口)。
+- `geosite:cn` / `geoip:cn` 数据自动更新;国内 aliDNS/腾讯,国外可用自建 `adg.chans.xyz`(实测
+  唯一能返回国外 AAAA 的路径,§8)。
+- 屏蔽交 AGH 前置,AGH 与 mosdns 不各自维护拦截表。
+
+## 7. 迁移 / 实施顺序(二期,待用户确认启用)
+
+1. 在 66.36 起 mosdns 伴生容器(`/opt/mosdns` + compose,**按 digest 固定镜像**,纳入 ansible)。
+2. AGH「上游 DNS 服务器」改为指向 mosdns(`127.0.0.1:5353`,bootstrap 仍用公网 IP,避免
+   AGH → mosdns → AGH 死循环);只保留**一条语义一致的上游路径**,保持可回滚(备份 yaml + `--check-config`)。
+3. 验证:国内域名、国外域名、被拦截域名、每客户端日志、AAA A 解析(§8 基线)。
+4. 回归:EdgeRouter 通告不变(仍 `.36`),LAN 客户端无感;重启 AGH/mosdns 单点验证(§8 kill-test 模板)。
+5. 上线后重跑 §8 kill-test,确认降级窗口有界。
+
+## 8. Phase 0 验证证据(2026-08-12 全部实测)
+
+### 8.1 基线与功能
+
+| 项 | 结果 |
+|----|------|
+| rewrites:`hass.windy.lan` / `hass.local` | → `192.168.55.11` ✅(兼容保留) |
+| rewrites:`dns.windy.lan` / `gfw.windy.lan` / `ubnt.windy.lan` / `nas.windy.local` | → `.36` / `.1` / `.46` / `.32` ✅ |
+| 国内解析 `taobao.com`(经 AGH) | 真实 CN IP(59.82.x 等)✅ |
+| 国外解析 `google.com` / `github.com`(经 AGH) | 真实 IP(142.250.x / 20.205.x),**无 fake-IP 泄漏** ✅ |
+| 广告拦截 `doubleclick.net` / `googleadservices.com` | → `0.0.0.0` ✅ |
+| clash 7874 `google.com` | `198.18.1.101`(fake-ip,仅网关/VLAN10 平面)✅ |
+| clash 7874 `taobao.com` | 真实 IP(经 mosdns→AGH)✅ |
+| dnsmasq :53(.1)`google.com` / `taobao.com` | fake-ip / 真实 IP ✅ |
+| mosdns 6052 直连 `taobao.com` / `google.com` | 真实 IP(59.82.x / 142.250.73.78)✅ |
+| DNSSEC:`dnssec-failed.org`(经 AGH) | 返回正常应答 `96.99.227.255`(非 SERVFAIL)→ 当前路径不校验,W1N-40 结论复现,**维持关闭** |
+
+### 8.2 出口路径与 fake-IP 泄漏
+
+- AGH 宿主默认路由 `via 192.168.66.254`(EdgeRouter),**直连出网,不经 gfw**;DoH 端点实测可达
+  (见 §1)。LAN 客户端经 AGH 的解析结果全部为真实 IP,无 `198.18/16` 泄漏。
+- gfw 自身流量默认进代理(`openclash_mangle_output` mark 0x162 → tproxy :7895),
+  clash nameserver-policy 的 `1.1.1.1` DoH 实测 35ms 可达(走代理链路,不依赖直连)。
+- mosdns 上游(AGH `.36`、`223.5.5.5`)命中本地/国内 bypass 规则,保持直连——设计意图达成。
+
+### 8.3 IPv6 / RDNSS / AAAA
+
+- LAN 有 IPv6 SLAAC(EdgeRouter dhcpv6-pd /60 → eth0 host-address + switch0,**仅 `service slaac`**,
+  **无 RDNSS/dns-server 通告**);`.36` 有全局 v6 地址 + RA 默认路由。
+- **RDNSS 未通告** → v6 客户端无 v6 DNS,回退 v4 DNS(`.36`);AGH 仅监听 `0.0.0.0:53`(v4 only),无 v6 DNS 服务。
+- **AAAA 解析实测**:`baidu.com` 公网本就无 AAAA(dns.google NOERROR/0,权威 NS 而已);
+  `taobao.com` AAAA 经国内路径正常(`2408:4001:f10::6f` 等);**国外域名(`google.com`)经
+  `223.5.5.5` UDP、alidns DoH、`8.8.8.8` UDP 全部返回空**,而 dns.google 与 `adg.chans.xyz`
+  DoH 均能返回 `2404:6800:4005:81a::200e` → **国内路径对国外域 AAAA 置空;`adg.chans.xyz`
+  兜底是当前唯一能返回国外 AAAA 的路径**。clash `ipv6: false` 亦不返回 AAAA。
+
+### 8.4 自举(bootstrap)循环
+
+- AGH `bootstrap_dns: [223.5.5.5, 223.6.6.6]`(公网 IP,非 AGH 自身)→ 无自举循环;AGH 解析
+  DoH 主机名不经过自身。二期方案要求 AGH→mosdns 时 bootstrap 仍用公网 IP(§7)。
+
+### 8.5 Kill-test 矩阵(2026-08-12,全部实测)
+
+| # | 场景 | 结果 |
+|---|------|------|
+| 1 | 重启 `.1` mosdns(init.d) | ✅ 直连 6052 与 clash 链恢复 |
+| 2 | 重启 `.1` dnsmasq | ✅ 真实 IP 与 fake-ip 双路径恢复 |
+| 3 | kill `.1` clash 核心 | ✅ LAN DNS(AGH)不受影响;gfw dnsmasq→clash **有界 3s 失败**(无卡死);OpenClash watchdog ~15s 自动拉起 |
+| 4 | stop/start `.1` OpenClash | ✅ DNS 平面独立于代理;clash 与 tproxy 规则恢复 |
+| 5 | 重启 `.36` AGH 容器 | ✅ 全量恢复:rewrites/拦截/国内外解析/DNSSEC 行为不变 |
+| 6 | 黑洞 alidns DoH(223.5.5.5/223.6.6.6:443) | ✅ ~0.5s 内经 `doh.pub` 应答(load_balance 生效) |
+| 7 | 黑洞全部主上游,兜底存活(adg.chans.xyz) | ⚠️ **客户端 15s 内无应答**——兜底未在窗口内生效 |
+| 8 | 黑洞全部上游(含兜底),缓存未命中 | ⚠️ **25s 内无应答、无 SERVFAIL**——解析器对缓存未命中查询"卡死" |
+| 9 | 黑洞全部上游,缓存命中 | ✅ 瞬时 NOERROR(cache 兜底) |
+
+**结论(Phase 0 门禁):** 国内解析在代理停止/上游单点故障/组件重启下均维持可用;
+但**"主上游全挂"时缓存未命中查询无有界降级**——`upstream_timeout: 10s` 与 TCP 重试行为使
+兜底 `adg.chans.xyz` 在实践中无法在客户端期望窗口内生效。这是 §4 二期分层方案(或下调
+`upstream_timeout` + failover 模式)的**实测需求依据**;按最终裁决,本期不改生产路径。
+
+## 9. 风险与备注
+
+- mosdns 仅监听 `127.0.0.1`(不对外),由 clash 消费;二期若启用,保持同样的边界,避免 LAN 出现两套入口。
+- AGH 上游指向本机 mosdns 时务必配公网 bootstrap,否则自举死循环。
+- 本方案不改 EdgeRouter DHCP/通告、不改 gfw OpenClash 代理规则,只动 66.36 上的 DNS 链路,风险可控。
+- 已知降级缺口(§8.5 #7/#8):主上游全挂时缓存未命中查询无有界降级;启用二期前,LAN 客户端会感知
+  超时(约 10s+)。缓解:AGH cache 已覆盖高频域;根治需二期。
+- 与 W1N-40「审查并修正 AdGuard Home」联动:该 issue 侧重 AGH 本身,本 issue 侧重整体 DNS 分层。
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+# ER-X + TL-SE5420 网络与拓扑说明
+
+**状态：** SE5420 **已采购**（2026-08-09）。**实施与验证以 [lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md](lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md) 为准**；
+本文保留为拓扑/流量路径/职责边界的设计说明。
+**锁定硬件：** EdgeRouter X（保留）+ TP-Link `TL-SE5420`（新建核心）。  
+**本文目的：** 说明升级后物理拓扑、逻辑网络、流量路径与职责边界；唯一实施步骤见
+[lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md](lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md)。
+
+---
+
+## 1. 一句话架构
+
+```text
+公网 ← ER-X（网关 / NAT / DHCP / 防火墙）
+           ↑ 两条独立 access 上联（LAN66 + LAN55，无 VLAN tag）
+      TL-SE5420（纯 L2 核心：所有接入、同 VLAN 转发、未来 trunk）
+           ↑
+   有线终端 / PVE(gfw) / 两台 UniFi AP
+```
+
+- **ER-X** 继续当唯一主网关：PPPoE、NAT、端口转发、LAN66/LAN55 的 `.254` 与 DHCP。
+- **SE5420** 只做二层：接线、VLAN 隔离转发、端口统计；**不开** L3、静态路由、DHCP
+  Server/Relay、NAT。
+- **`gfw`（PVE 上的 OpenWrt）** 仍是旁路由；默认客户端网关仍是 `.254`。以后若启用
+  「设备升级」专用 SSID，该 SSID 的客户端才把网关指向 `.1`。
+
+---
+
+## 2. 已确认的设计决策
+
+| 决策 | 结论 |
+|---|---|
+| 硬目标 | 同 VLAN **2.5G** 二层转发；10G 仅 SFP+ 预留 |
+| 核心型号 | **`TL-SE5420`**（16×2.5G RJ45 + 4×10G SFP+） |
+| 终局形态 | ER-X 边缘网关 + 核心纯 L2；可分阶段实施 |
+| 本次升级 Done | 迁完 LAN66/LAN55 接入与验收（计划阶段 0–3）；不含 VLAN10 |
+| 默认网关 | **`192.168.66.254` / `192.168.55.254`（ER-X）** |
+| 专用升级 SSID | 仅 **U6 Lite**；客户端网关 **`gfw` `.1`**（后续项目） |
+| 客人网 | 仅 **UAP-AC-Lite**；UniFi Guest 隔离，仍在 **LAN55**（后续） |
+| 切换方式 | **30–60 分钟维护窗** 集中切；旧交换迁完后闲置 |
+| 首批 2.5G | NAS + 主力 PC（或 PVE）；其余可先 1G |
+| SFP+ | 先空槽；有明确 10G 对端再买 DAC/光模块 |
+| AP 供电 | **本地取电 + 普通网线**（SE5420 **无 PoE**） |
+| 管理面 | 先本地 HTTPS/SSH；云以后再说；L3/DHCP 严格关闭 |
+
+---
+
+## 3. 设备职责
+
+### 3.1 EdgeRouter X（`gw`，`192.168.66.254`）
+
+| 职责 | 说明 |
+|---|---|
+| WAN | `eth4` → PPPoE（`pppoe0`），NAT、WAN 防火墙、端口转发 |
+| LAN66 网关/DHCP | `eth0` = `192.168.66.254/24`；DHCP 池与静态映射不变 |
+| LAN55 网关/DHCP | `switch0`（`eth1`–`eth3`）= `192.168.55.254/24` |
+| 跨网段路由 | LAN66 ↔ LAN55 仍由 ER-X 三层转发 |
+| 与核心的连接 | **两条无标签 access**，不是 802.1Q trunk |
+
+ER-X 当前不是 trunk 设计：不要向它发送 VLAN66/55 的 tag。核心上 VLAN66 的
+untagged 帧进 `eth0`；VLAN55 的 untagged 帧进 `switch0` 的某个成员口。
+
+### 3.2 TL-SE5420（新建核心）
+
+| 职责 | 说明 |
+|---|---|
+| 物理接入汇聚 | 有线设备、PVE、两台 AP 都接到 SE5420 |
+| VLAN66 / VLAN55 | 二层转发（access 或 trunk 的 native/allowed） |
+| 同 VLAN 高速交换 | 两端都是 2.5G 时可跑满协商速率（受 NIC/线材限制） |
+| 未来 trunk | PVE、U6：native 66 + tagged 10（仅后续阶段启用） |
+| 不做 | 不当默认网关；不开 DHCP；不做 NAT；第一阶段不开 SVI/路由 |
+
+管理地址：落在 **LAN66** 的一个未占用地址（先查 ER-X DHCP reservation，再分配）；
+不新建管理 VLAN。
+
+### 3.3 旁路由 `gfw`（`192.168.66.1`）
+
+| 现状 | 升级后（阶段 0–3） | 更后续 |
+|---|---|---|
+| PVE 上的 ImmortalWrt VM | 仍挂在 **untagged LAN66** | 可增 VLAN10 接口 |
+| OpenClash 旁路/透明代理 | 路径不变：客户端默认仍走 `.254` | 升级专用 SSID → 网关 `.1` |
+| 不能单独「做出」VLAN10 | 需 PVE vSwitch + 核心 trunk + U6 trunk | 见部署指南第二步 |
+
+### 3.4 其它现网角色（地址与角色不变）
+
+| 主机 | 地址 | 角色 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `dns.windy.lan` | `192.168.66.36` | AdGuard Home + Mihomo |
+| `ubnt` | `192.168.66.46` | UniFi Controller；Inform `http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform` |
+| U6 Lite | `192.168.66.6` | LAN66 AP；后续承载升级专用 SSID |
+| UAP-AC-Lite | `192.168.55.5` | LAN55 AP；后续承载客人 SSID |
+| PVE | `192.168.66.26`（DHCP 静态） | 宿主机；上挂 `gfw` |
+| NAS / 主力 PC 等 | 既有 reservation | 首批 2.5G 候选 |
+
+---
+
+## 4. 物理拓扑
+
+### 4.1 目标连线（阶段 3 完成后）
+
+```text
+                            Internet
+                               │
+                          PPPoE / WAN
+                               │
+                    ┌──────────┴──────────┐
+                    │   EdgeRouter X      │
+                    │   (gw / 网关)       │
+                    │                     │
+                    │  eth0          switch0 成员口
+                    │  LAN66          LAN55
+                    │  untagged       untagged
+                    └───┬───────────────┬─┘
+                        │               │
+                   铜口1│               │铜口2
+                        │               │
+              ┌─────────┴───────────────┴─────────┐
+              │         TL-SE5420 核心              │
+              │   16×2.5G RJ45 + 4×SFP+（先空）    │
+              │   纯 L2 · VLAN66 / VLAN55          │
+              └───┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬───────┘
+                  │     │     │     │     │
+               铜口3  铜口4  铜口5  其余铜口   SFP+
+                  │     │     │     │        （预留）
+                  │     │     │     │
+                 PVE   U6   AC-Lite  NAS/PC/
+               (gfw)  Lite  (LAN55)  dns/ubnt…
+              LAN66  LAN66          默认 LAN66
+             （日后可  （日后可
+               trunk)   trunk)
+```
+
+要点：
+
+1. **星型**：终端与 AP 只上联到 SE5420；旧交换机迁完后**闲置**，避免双上行环路。
+2. **ER-X 双上联**：LAN66、LAN55 各一条独立铜缆；两条都是 access，**不打 tag**。
+3. **AP 供电**：SE5420 无 PoE；U6 / AC-Lite 在安装点**本地取电**，网线只传数据。
+4. **SFP+**：四个槽位先空着；有 10G NIC/对端与兼容模块后再上 DAC/AOC/光纤。
+
+### 4.2 与「现在」的差异（概念上）
+
+```text
+现在（简化）                         目标
+─────────────                       ────
+终端/AP ──► ER-X 内置交换/旧交换     终端/AP ──► SE5420 ──► ER-X（仅网关）
+同网段 1G 交换受 ER-X/旧设备限制     同 VLAN 2.5G 在 SE5420 上本地交换
+跨网段 / 上网 仍经 ER-X              跨网段 / 上网 仍经 ER-X（不变）
+```
+
+ER-X **不会被换成**「只接一条 trunk 的路由」；WAN 与双 LAN 接口模型保持不变。
+
+---
+
+## 5. 逻辑网络（VLAN / 子网）
+
+### 5.1 本次升级范围内（阶段 0–3）
+
+| 名称 | 子网 | 核心上的形态 | 网关 | DHCP | 典型成员 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **LAN66** | `192.168.66.0/24` | VLAN 66：access，或 trunk 的 native | ER-X `eth0` `.254` | ER-X | PVE、gfw、dns、ubnt、U6、NAS、PC… |
+| **LAN55** | `192.168.55.0/24` | VLAN 55：access | ER-X `switch0` `.254` | ER-X | UAP-AC-Lite、原 LAN55 设备 |
+
+客户端 DNS 仍按现网：DHCP 下发 `192.168.66.36`（AdGuard）。  
+LAN55 ↔ LAN66 互通仍走 ER-X（现网 `LAN_IN`/`LAN_OUT` 未挂到接口时，两边默认可达；不要把未生效的防火墙当隔离边界）。
+
+### 5.2 后续能力（不进本次 Done）
+
+| 名称 | 打算 | 网关 | 落点 | 依赖 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **升级专用 Wi-Fi** | 独立 SSID → 独立 VLAN（如 VLAN10） | **`gfw` `.1`**（该 VLAN 内） | **仅 U6 Lite** | 核心 trunk + PVE vSwitch + `gfw` DHCP/NAT |
+| **客人网** | 客人 SSID + UniFi Guest 隔离 | 仍 **ER-X `.254`（LAN55）** | **仅 UAP-AC-Lite** | UniFi 策略；**不**新建 VLAN |
+
+客人网与升级 SSID **分工到两台 AP**，避免一上来就做「两台 AP 同一客人 VLAN + ER-X trunk」的改造。
+
+### 5.3 VLAN10 的时序与边界
+
+第一阶段**不**在 SE5420 创建 VLAN10，也**不**把 PVE/U6 改为 trunk。VLAN10 必须在 LAN55/LAN66 稳定后，以独立维护窗完成 PVE VLAN-aware 隔离、SE5420 trunk、gfw IPv4 NAT/内网拒绝策略和 IPv6 策略；仅在这些验收通过后才启用专用 SSID。详见部署指南第二步。
+
+---
+
+## 6. 流量怎么走
+
+### 6.1 同 VLAN、两端都在核心上（例如 NAS ↔ PC，皆 LAN66）
+
+```text
+NAS ──(2.5G)── SE5420 ──(2.5G)── PC
+              （二层交换，不经过 ER-X）
+```
+
+这是本次升级的**主要收益**。吞吐受 NIC、线材、磁盘限制；与 ER-X 的 1G 无关。
+
+### 6.2 访问互联网（任意 LAN66/LAN55 客户端）
+
+```text
+客户端 → SE5420 →（对应 access 上联）→ ER-X → PPPoE → Internet
+默认网关 = .254
+```
+
+上网路径仍受 **ER-X 上联 1G** 与 PPPoE 限制；换核心**不会**把公网变成 2.5G。
+
+### 6.3 LAN66 ↔ LAN55
+
+```text
+LAN66 设备 → SE5420(VLAN66) → ER-X eth0
+                                    ↕ 三层转发
+LAN55 设备 → SE5420(VLAN55) → ER-X switch0
+```
+
+跨网段必须过 ER-X；两条上联各 1G，且 ER-X 是否硬件加速需实测，**不要**按 2.5G 承诺跨 VLAN 吞吐。
+
+### 6.4 旁路由 `gfw`（默认主网行为）
+
+默认：DHCP 仍发网关 `.254`。客户端若把代理/策略指到 `gfw`，或由上游策略引流，则
+`gfw` 以旁路由身份处理；**主网关身份仍是 ER-X**。
+
+### 6.5 未来：升级专用 SSID（仅说明，非本次范围）
+
+```text
+手机 --SSID(升级)--> U6 Lite --tag VLAN10--> SE5420 --tag VLAN10--> PVE --> gfw
+                                                                    网关 .1
+gfw 上游仍回 LAN66 → SE5420 → ER-X → Internet
+```
+
+主 SSID（如现有 `ubnt-windy`）继续 untagged/LAN66，网关仍是 `.254`，互不影响。
+
+---
+
+## 7. 端口预留（SE5420）
+
+端口号以面板为准；下表是角色预留。
+
+| 预留 | 对端 | 模式 | 备注 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 铜口 1 | ER-X `eth0` | access VLAN66 | 主网上联 |
+| 铜口 2 | ER-X `switch0` 成员口 | access VLAN55 | LAN55 上联 |
+| 铜口 3 | PVE（`gfw` 所在宿主机） | 阶段 0–3：access VLAN66；日后 trunk native66+tag10 | 只允许需要的 VLAN |
+| 铜口 4 | U6 Lite | 同上 | 本地取电；日后升级 SSID |
+| 铜口 5 | UAP-AC-Lite | access VLAN55 | 本地取电；日后客人 SSID |
+| 其余铜口 | NAS、PC、`dns`、`ubnt`… | 默认 access VLAN66 | 首批 2.5G：NAS + 主力 PC/PVE |
+| SFP+ 1–4 | 未来 10G | 空槽 | 优先 DAC/AOC/光；不用 10GBASE-T 模块作默认 |
+
+禁止：同一设备同时接旧路径与新核心形成**无意双上行**（环路/环回保护误杀/不稳定）。
+
+---
+
+## 8. Wi-Fi 与 UniFi（目标语义）
+
+| SSID 类型 | AP | 二层落点 | 客户端网关 | 本次升级是否必须完成 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 现有主 SSID（如 `ubnt-windy`） | 按现网 | LAN66 等 | `.254` | 迁线后保持 Connected 即可 |
+| 客人 SSID | **仅 AC-Lite** | LAN55 + UniFi Guest 隔离 | `.254` | **否**（后续） |
+| 升级专用 SSID | **仅 U6** | 未来 VLAN10 | **`.1`（gfw）** | **否**（后续） |
+
+Inform 仍为：`http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform`。  
+AC-Lite 在 LAN55、Controller 在 LAN66：跨网段由 ER-X 转发（现网已验证可达）。
+
+---
+
+## 9. 管理与安全面
+
+| 项 | 做法 |
+|---|---|
+| SE5420 管理 IP | LAN66 未占用地址；DHCP reservation 或静态；先查 ER-X 再写 |
+| 管理协议 | 本地 HTTPS / SSH；禁用不需要的 HTTP/Telnet |
+| 云管 | 先本地管稳；商云/App **以后再说** |
+| L3 功能 | **全部关闭**（无 SVI、无静态路由、无 DHCP Server/Relay） |
+| STP | 开启 RSTP/MSTP；合理根桥优先级；迁完后不留生产环路 |
+| 配置备份 | 离线导出；**不得**把含口令/SNMP 的备份放进本仓库 |
+| AP | 本地电源 + 数据网线；核心不供电 |
+
+---
+
+## 10. 性能预期（诚实边界）
+
+| 场景 | 预期 |
+|---|---|
+| 同 VLAN、两端 2.5G 接在 SE5420 | 可达约 2.5G 级二层（测 `iperf3` 验收） |
+| 上网 / PPPoE | 仍受 ER-X WAN 与 1G 上联限制 |
+| LAN66 ↔ LAN55 | 必过 ER-X；按 1G 级规划，实测为准 |
+| SFP+ 空槽 | **不等于**网络已是 10G |
+| 未来 VLAN10 + `gfw` | 受 PVE NIC/vSwitch 与 `gfw` 处理能力限制，勿预先承诺 2.5G 路由 |
+
+---
+
+## 11. 验收时「网络算正常」的样子
+
+阶段 3 完成后，应同时满足：
+
+1. 有线设备从 SE5420 获取正确网段地址；默认路由为对应 `.254`；DNS `.36` 可用。  
+2. 互联网、端口转发、现有本地服务行为与迁线前一致（除同 VLAN 内网吞吐变快）。  
+3. U6（`.6`）与 AC-Lite（`.55.5`）在 UniFi 为 Connected；Inform 未改。  
+4. SE5420 管理面仅可信 LAN66 可达；默认口令已改；配置已离线备份。  
+5. 端口协商速率、CRC/错误计数正常；旧交换已下电闲置。  
+6. （可选强化）两台 2.5G 终端同 VLAN `iperf3` 结果入库/记笔记。
+
+VLAN10 / 升级 SSID / 客人 SSID **失败或未做，不否决**本次核心升级。
+
+---
+
+## 12. 回滚语义
+
+任一阶段失败：停止继续搬家；把刚迁的设备插回原 ER-X/旧交换端口。  
+**不要**在故障中改 ER-X 的 WAN、DHCP 池、网关地址或 SSH 策略。  
+后续 VLAN10 失败：只撤 SSID/VLAN 绑定，主 SSID 与 `.254` 路径保持不动。
+
+---
+
+## 13. 参考
+
+- 实施阶段与清单：[lan-core-switch-upgrade-plan.md](archive/lan-core-switch-upgrade-plan.md)
+- 现网地图：[lan-overview.md](lan-overview.md)
+- ER-X：[edgerouter-x-configuration.md](edgerouter-x-configuration.md)、[hosts/gw.md](../hosts/gw.md)
+- UniFi / VLAN10 前置：[unifi-network.md](unifi-network.md)
+- `gfw`：[hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md](../hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md)
+- SE5420 规格：<https://www.tp-link.com.cn/product_2899.html?v=specification>
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+# LAN network overview
+
+A standalone, live-verified map of the **internal LAN** hosts and the software
+deployed on them. Written for a future self / another agent to get oriented fast.
+Focused per-host facts and runbooks live in [`../hosts/`](../hosts/) and are linked
+from each section below.
+
+> **Scope:** this document covers the real LAN only. It deliberately excludes the public VPS
+> hosts (`mx2`, `us2`, `us4`, `hk2`, `synapse`) and any dormant/stub software. The
+> WireGuard VPN server is external (`us4.wsvc.info`); there is **no WireGuard interface on
+> the LAN side**.
+
+> **Verified live on 2026-08-06** by read-only SSH from the WSL client. No
+> changes were made. `gfw.windy.lan` root SSH was re-verified the same day after
+> the key was installed; its facts below are from the fresh probe.
+>
+> **IPv6 re-verified 2026-08-20** (read-only): UniFi controller `Default`
+> network IPv6 enabled (SLAAC/RA), both APs hold global SLAAC addresses, and
+> `zhiqiangf` key-only AP SSH re-confirmed. See
+> [unifi-network.md](unifi-network.md).
+
+---
+
+## Topology
+
+```
+                        Internet
+                           │  PPPoE (pppoe0, MTU 1492, IPv6 PD /60)
+                           ▼
+        ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+        │  gw  — EdgeRouter X  (192.168.66.254)         │
+        │  eth0 = LAN66  ·  switch0(eth1-3) = LAN55     │
+        │  WAN_IN active on pppoe0 (default-drop)         │
+        │  port-forwards: hass/transmission/ssh/openvpn │
+  LAN66  └───────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
+  (192.168.66.0/24)      │
+
+        │  gfw.windy.lan  — OpenWrt / OpenClash (192.168.66.1)
+        │  dns.windy.lan  — AdGuard Home + Mihomo (192.168.66.36)
+        │  ubnt           — UniFi Network Controller (192.168.66.46)
+```
+
+> **SE5420 live (2026-08-22):** TP-Link `TL-SE5420` (purchased 2026-08-09) is
+> online — management `192.168.66.253` reachable, web UI on :80/:443; LAN55
+> 上联为 ER-X `switch0` **单口**（`eth1` up、`eth2`/`eth3` down，2026-08-22
+> 只读核实）→ `switch0` 不再是 LAN55 全量抓包点（同段有线单播在 SE5420 本地
+> 交换），全量点只能靠 SE5420 port mirroring。迁移状态见部署计划
+> [lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md](lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md). Design/planning refs:
+> [lan-erx-se5420-network.md](lan-erx-se5420-network.md),
+> [lan-core-switch-upgrade-plan.md](archive/lan-core-switch-upgrade-plan.md).
+
+---
+
+## Hosts
+
+| Host | Role | SSH | IPv4 | Facts |
+|------|------|-----|------|-------|
+| **gw** | EdgeRouter X primary LAN gateway | `ssh -4 zhiqiang@192.168.66.254` | `192.168.66.254` | [hosts/gw.md](../hosts/gw.md) |
+| **PVE** | Proxmox host (`.66.26`/vmbr0 · `.55.26`/vmbr1) — hosts gfw/dns/ubnt VMs | `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.26` | `192.168.66.26` | — |
+| **gfw.windy.lan** | OpenWrt LAN gateway / OpenClash — **PVE VM 140** | `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1` | `192.168.66.1` | [hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md](../hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md) |
+| **dns.windy.lan** | AdGuard Home LAN DNS + Mihomo explicit proxy — **PVE VM 120** (`pihole`) | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.36` | `192.168.66.36` | [hosts/dns.windy.lan.md](../hosts/dns.windy.lan.md) |
+| **ubnt** | UniFi Network Controller — **PVE VM 160** | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.46` | `192.168.66.46` | [hosts/ubnt.md](../hosts/ubnt.md) |
+| **hass.windy.lan** | Home Assistant (HAOS) — **x88 Pro physical box** (LAN55) | `ssh hassio@hass.windy.lan` | `192.168.55.11` | [hosts/hass.windy.lan.md](../hosts/hass.windy.lan.md) |
+| **pgdb** | TimescaleDB PG18 (Docker) — HA recorder 后端 — **PVE VM** (LAN55) | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.55.15` | `192.168.55.15` | [hosts/pgdb.md](../hosts/pgdb.md) |
+| **NAS/FreeNAS** | NAS; `transmission` jail runs here (`.51`) | — | — | — |
+| **U6 Lite** | UniFi AP (LAN66) | `ssh -4 zhiqiangf@192.168.66.6` | `192.168.66.6` | [docs/unifi-network.md](../docs/unifi-network.md) |
+| **UAP-AC-Lite** | UniFi AP (LAN55) | `ssh -4 zhiqiangf@192.168.55.5` | `192.168.55.5` | [docs/unifi-network.md](../docs/unifi-network.md) |
+
+> **Positioning facts:** `dns`/`ubnt`/`gfw`/`pgdb` are VMs on PVE; `haos` is a **physical x88 Pro
+> box** (HAOS bare-metal, `machine: green`), not a PVE VM (corrected 2026-08-15).
+> `transmission` is a FreeNAS/NAS jail. Physical SE5420 ports: gw, PVE, haos, NAS,
+> U6, UAP-AC-Lite, and wired PCs. See [lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md](lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md) §1.
+
+---
+
+## gw — EdgeRouter X (LAN gateway)
+
+| Item | Value |
+|------|-------|
+| Platform | EdgeOS v3.0.1 (Build 5862409), kernel 4.14.54-UBNT |
+| Interfaces | `eth0`=192.168.66.254/24 (LAN66) · `switch0`=192.168.55.254/24 (LAN55) · `eth4`=WAN PPPoE · `pppoe0`=WAN default route (MTU 1492, IPv6 PD /60) |
+| WAN | `pppoe0`=113.68.54.159 (PPPoE) · IPv6 SLAAC /64 on both LANs |
+| Firewall | `WAN_IN` **active** on pppoe0 (established/related accept, invalid drop, default drop) · `LAN_IN`/ `LAN_OUT` defined but **inactive** (not attached) |
+| DHCP | LAN1 (66) + LAN2 (55), 24h leases, client DNS = `192.168.66.36`, pools .38–.243, static mappings for infra hosts |
+| DNS | `service dns forwarding` cache 512, listen on eth0 + switch0; DHCP advertises `192.168.66.36` as client DNS |
+| Port-forwards | `hass`→192.168.55.11:8123 · `transmission`→192.168.66.51:51413 · `ssh`→192.168.66.36:22 (orig 5822) · `openvpn`→192.168.66.32:1194 · WAN iface pppoe0 |
+| Management | SSH TCP 22 · EdgeOS GUI HTTP 80 / HTTPS 443 |
+
+**Static DHCP mappings (LAN66):** `OnePlus-12`=.37, `gfw`=.1, `hp-nas`=.32, `pihole`=.36, `pve`=.26, `transmission`=.51, `ubnt-6`=.6, `ubnt-app`=.46, `windy-pc`=.99. LAN55: `Aqara-Hub-M3-10CB`=.248, `SmartThings-Station`=.48, `espressif`=.47,
+`hass`=.11, `hass-wifi`=.250, `ihost`=.12, `midea_ac_0418`=.10,
+`midea_e3_0198`=.42, `roborock-wm-a141`=.43, `samsung-hub`=.251,
+`matter`=.41 (added 2026-08-20).
+
+> **Note:** `LAN_IN`/`LAN_OUT` are defined but not applied to an interface, so LAN55
+> and LAN66 are bidirectionally reachable by default. Do not rely on those rules as
+> an access boundary. See [hosts/gw.md](../hosts/gw.md).
+
+---
+
+## gfw.windy.lan — OpenWrt / OpenClash gateway
+
+| Item | Value |
+|------|-------|
+| IPv4 | `192.168.66.1` |
+| OS | **ImmortalWrt 25.12.0** (r37854), Linux 6.12.87, x86/64 |
+| SSH | `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1` (key-only, verified 2026-08-06) |
+| OpenClash | `/etc/openclash/clash` (clash_meta core) + config `/etc/openclash/pass-cat.yaml` |
+| Mode | **fake-ip + TPROXY transparent proxy** (`operation_mode=fake-ip`, `en_mode=fake-ip`, `proxy_mode=rule`) |
+| DNS | dnsmasq → clash DNS `127.0.0.1#7874`; clash `nameserver` = mosdns `127.0.0.1:6052` (DIRECT 规则真实 IP 解析,非客户端路径) |
+| nft | `table inet fw4` with OpenClash TPROXY/redirect + DNS-hijack rules; residual `table inet passwall` (0 packets, unused) |
+
+**OpenClash listeners:** HTTP `7890` · SOCKS `7891` · Redirect `7892` · Mixed `7893` · TPROXY `7895` · DNS `7874` · dashboard `9090`. `8443` is **not** an OpenClash listener (only in its TLS-sniffing port list).
+
+> **Operational note:** a LAN client request logged as `<client> --> localhost:8443` + refusal is normally an explicit-proxy client sending its own loopback to the gateway. Fix the
+> originating host's `NO_PROXY`/`no_proxy` config; do not create a listener on this router to mask it. See [docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md](../docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md).
+
+---
+
+## dns.windy.lan — AdGuard Home + Mihomo (DNS & proxy host)
+
+| Item | Value |
+|------|-------|
+| IPv4 | `192.168.66.36` |
+| OS | Debian 12 (kernel 6.1.0-43) |
+| SSH | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.36` |
+| AdGuard Home | Docker container `adguardhome` (host network, pinned digest), `/opt/adguardhome` |
+| DNS | TCP/UDP `53` (no source ACL — serves both LAN55 and LAN66) |
+| UI | `192.168.66.36:80` (LAN66 only via nft `agh_ui_access`) |
+| Upstreams | `https://dns.alidns.com/dns-query` + `https://doh.pub/dns-query` (load-balanced) · bootstrap `223.5.5.5`/`223.6.6.6` · fallback `https://adg.chans.xyz/dns-query` |
+| DNSSEC | **disabled** (upstream path failed known-bad-signature check) |
+| Rewrites | `hass.local` + `hass.windy.lan` → same Home Assistant address |
+| Query log | 14 days, anonymized client IPs |
+| Mihomo | **systemd service** (NOT Docker) — `/usr/local/bin/mihomo -d /etc/mihomo`, config `/etc/mihomo/config.yaml` |
+| Mihomo listeners | HTTP `7890` · SOCKS `7891` · Mixed `7892` · DNS `1053` · external-controller `9090` · `allow-lan: true` · mode `rule` |
+| nft | `table inet agh_ui_access` permits only `192.168.66.0/24` to TCP/80, drops other TCP/80 input |
+
+**Routing boundary:** read-only checks found no host TUN policy routing or nftables/iptables transparent-redirection on this host. A Mihomo listener alone does not mean it intercepts AdGuard traffic; the default gateway (`gfw.windy.lan`) can still affect outbound, so inspect its OpenClash rules separately before changing upstream routing.
+
+---
+
+## ubnt — UniFi controller host
+
+| Item | Value |
+|------|-------|
+| IPv4 | `192.168.66.46` |
+| Compose | `/home/windy/unifi-9/compose.yml` · service `unifi` · container `unifi-controller` |
+| Image | `jacobalberty/unifi:v9.5.21` (host network) |
+| HTTPS UI | `https://192.168.66.46:8443` |
+| Inform | `http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform` (not 8080) |
+| Health | `docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' unifi-controller` → `healthy` (2026-08-06) |
+| Also running | **dockge** (`louislam/dockge:1`, healthy) — compose UI, `/opt/stacks` |
+| Dormant | `semaphoreui` (semaphore + postgres, exited 9 months) · `homarr` dir (no container) |
+
+**Proxy contract:** the container keeps `NO_PROXY`/`no_proxy` enabled with
+`localhost,127.0.0.1,::1,192.168.0.0/16,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12` so a controller
+request to `localhost:8443` stays local instead of going to the OpenClash gateway.
+See [docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md](../docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md).
+
+---
+
+## hass.windy.lan — Home Assistant (HAOS)
+
+| Item | Value |
+|------|-------|
+| IPv4 | `192.168.55.11` (LAN55) |
+| DNS | `hass.windy.lan` (AdGuard rewrite; legacy `hass.local` alias) |
+| SSH | `ssh hassio@hass.windy.lan` (key-only, verified 2026-08-13) |
+| Web UI | `http://hass.windy.lan:8123` |
+| WAN | gw port-forward `hass` → `192.168.55.11:8123` |
+| Platform | HAOS on physical x88 Pro box; kernel `6.1.115-haos` (aarch64), `machine: green` |
+
+---
+
+## Managed access points
+
+| Name | Model | Mgmt IP | Firmware | Network | Inform |
+|------|-------|---------|----------|---------|--------|
+| U6 Lite | U6 Lite (UAL6) | `192.168.66.6` | 6.7.54.15663 | LAN66 | `:9080` |
+| UAP-AC-Lite | U7LT | `192.168.55.5` | 6.8.2.15592 | LAN55 | `:9080` |
+
+Both reported **Connected** to `http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform` on 2026-08-06.
+AP SSH account is `zhiqiangf` (key-only, verified). See [docs/unifi-network.md](../docs/unifi-network.md).
+
+**IPv6 (verified 2026-08-20):** both APs hold global SLAAC IPv6 addresses on
+`br0` — U6 Lite `240e:3bd:235:1fb1::/64` (LAN66), UAP-AC-Lite
+`240e:3bd:235:1fb2::/64` (LAN55) — with RA default routes via `gw`; the
+controller's `Default` network has IPv6 enabled (SLAAC). Prefixes are dynamic
+(PPPoE PD), so they rotate on redial. Details:
+[docs/unifi-network.md](../docs/unifi-network.md).
+
+**SSID cleanup (2026-08-21, W1N-207):** the SmartThings Element/vWire provisioning
+SSIDs (`element-8a0d5133c9438f12`, `vwire-8b2d67469e455785`, `vport-F09FC22004E9`)
+were removed/disabled in the controller (`element_adopt` setting off, element wlanconf
+deleted, connectivity `x_mesh_essid`/`x_mesh_psk` cleared, device `x_vwirekey` removed,
+`vwire_enabled`/`mesh_sta_vap_enabled=false`) and cleared from both APs; all
+vwire/vport/element flags on the remaining SSIDs are now `disabled`.
+
+**Stable ULA on gw: not feasible (2026-08-21, W1N-207):** EdgeOS v3.0.1
+`interfaces switch switch0` rejects a static `ipv6 address`, and an explicit
+`router-advert` node *replaces* the DHCPv6-PD-slaac RA (drops the delegated GUA
+prefix from radvd → LAN55 loses IPv6 egress after RA expiry). Attempted and rolled
+back cleanly (no `save`; gw config unchanged). Consequence: after a PD rotation,
+restart HA's matter-server (see [hosts/hass.windy.lan.md](../hosts/hass.windy.lan.md))
+to clear stale IPv6 mDNS caches.
+
+**LAN55 RA environment (observed 2026-08-21):** besides `gw`, the SmartThings
+Station (.48) and Aqara M3 (.248) act as Thread border routers and advertise ULA
+prefixes (`fd00:5a7:6415:1::/64`, `fd97:d580:16fe:1::/64`); several LAN55 hosts
+(HA, PVE, UAP-AC-Lite) have IPv6 forwarding enabled and mark themselves as
+routers in NDP. This is normal Thread-BDR behaviour and was not the Matter
+failure cause.
+
+**Matter 灯泡（2026-08-21 实测，W1N-207）：** 两盏 ESP32-C2 Matter 灯泡
+（VP `0x4891/0x4100`，OUI `34:98:7a`）——工作盏 MAC `34:98:7a:25:a1:f0`；故障盏
+MAC `34:98:7a:27:7f:08`（hostname `matter`，动态 .145）。故障盏已在 Aqara fabric
+`4DF2B1455D19402D` 内、宣告 `CM=0`（不在配对模式）且缺 GUA → 找回需**恢复出厂**
+后扫它自己的二维码。DHCP 保留 `matter`（.45 → MAC `34:98:7a:27:10:bc`）与故障盏
+MAC 不符，保留从未租出（待修，见 [hosts/gw.md](../hosts/gw.md)）。完整排障知识：
+[docs/matter-pairing-troubleshoot.md](matter-pairing-troubleshoot.md)。
+
+---
+
+## Quick orientation (who runs what)
+
+| Service | Host | How to reach |
+|---------|------|--------------|
+| LAN gateway / routing / DHCP | gw | `ssh -4 zhiqiang@192.168.66.254` |
+| Transparent/explicit proxy (OpenClash) | gfw.windy.lan | `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1` |
+| LAN DNS (AdGuard Home) + Mihomo proxy | dns.windy.lan | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.36` |
+| UniFi controller + dockge | ubnt | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.46` |
+| Home Assistant | hass.windy.lan | `ssh hassio@hass.windy.lan` · UI `:8123` |
+| Wi-Fi APs | U6 Lite / UAP-AC-Lite | via controller |
+
+---
+
+## Related docs
+
+- [hosts/gw.md](../hosts/gw.md) — EdgeRouter X detail, firewall, verification record
+- [hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md](../hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md) — OpenClash listeners
+- [hosts/dns.windy.lan.md](../hosts/dns.windy.lan.md) — AdGuard Home + Mihomo detail
+- [hosts/ubnt.md](../hosts/ubnt.md) — UniFi controller + proxy contract
+- [hosts/hass.windy.lan.md](../hosts/hass.windy.lan.md) — Home Assistant (HAOS) SSH + LAN access
+- [docs/unifi-network.md](../docs/unifi-network.md) — APs, inform endpoint, recovery
+- [docs/unifi-third-party-vlan10-dhcp.md](unifi-third-party-vlan10-dhcp.md) — VLAN Wi-Fi feasibility and DHCP boundary
+- [docs/unifi-openwrt-vlan10-implementation-examples.md](unifi-openwrt-vlan10-implementation-examples.md) — supported topology and examples
+- [docs/edgerouter-x-configuration.md](../docs/edgerouter-x-configuration.md) — effective gw config
+- [docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md](../docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md) — proxy bypass
+- [runbooks/adguard-home-health.md](../runbooks/adguard-home-health.md) — AGH health
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+# SE5420 核心交换机升级操作指导（细粒度版）
+
+**目标：** 把 LAN66/LAN55 有线接入从 ER-X 内置交换迁到 TL-SE5420；稳定后再启用 VLAN10 升级专用 SSID。
+
+**全程三条（不再重复）：**
+1. 先断旧、后接新，一次一根线；同一设备不得同时接旧路径与新核心。
+2. 全程保持 SE5420 Type-C Console（38400 8N1）连接——SSH 会话移动其承载链路即断，不是回滚保障。
+3. 任一步「预期」不符 → 停止，执行 §16 对应回滚；故障中不动 ER-X 的 WAN/DHCP/SSH。
+
+**关于命令的真实性：** SE5420 的 GUI 菜单路径来自官方 Omada VLAN/管理指南；CLI 语法仅采用官方手册出现过的（`enable`、`telnet disable`、`copy running-config startup-config`、`show vlan`）。PVE/gfw 的每步先有只读快照命令，改动均以你实际看到的输出为准，不套用写死的模板。
+
+---
+
+# 第一阶段：主网 55/66 迁移
+
+## 1. 开工前准备
+
+### 1.1 备份（4 个动作，全部留档到 `/tmp/opencode/baseline-YYYYMMDD/`，不进仓库）
+
+1. ER-X 配置快照（滤敏感行）：
+   ```bash
+   mkdir -p /tmp/opencode/baseline-$(date +%Y%m%d)
+   ssh -4 zhiqiang@192.168.66.254 'show configuration commands' \
+     | grep -Ev 'pppoe|password|secret|key|pre-shared' \
+     > /tmp/opencode/baseline-$(date +%Y%m%d)/gw-sanitized.txt
+   ```
+   - 预期：文件非空，`grep -i 'password\|pppoe' gw-sanitized.txt` 无输出。
+2. PVE 配置：
+   ```bash
+   ssh -4 root@192.168.66.26 'cat /etc/network/interfaces; echo ---; qm config 140' \
+     > /tmp/opencode/baseline-$(date +%Y%m%d)/pve-interfaces.txt
+   ```
+   - 预期：能看到 `vmbr0`/`vmbr1` 定义与 VM140 的 `net0`/`net1`。
+3. gfw 配置：
+   ```bash
+   ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1 'cat /etc/config/network /etc/config/dhcp /etc/config/firewall' \
+     > /tmp/opencode/baseline-$(date +%Y%m%d)/gfw-uci.txt
+   ```
+   - 预期：三个文件内容都在，且能看到 `ubunt_upg` zone、`ubunt_upg_nat`、`ubunt_upg_to_lan`。
+4. 检查备份文件存在且可读：`ls -la /tmp/opencode/baseline-$(date +%Y%m%d)/`。
+
+### 1.2 记录现网状态（迁移后比对用）
+
+1. ER-X 状态：
+   ```bash
+   ssh -4 zhiqiang@192.168.66.254 'show interfaces; show ip route; show dhcp server leases'
+   ```
+   - 预期：eth0/switch0 up；两条直连路由 + pppoe0 默认路由；DHCP lease 正常。
+2. PVE 地址：
+   ```bash
+   ssh -4 root@192.168.66.26 'ip -br addr'
+   ```
+   - 预期：`vmbr0`=192.168.66.26、`vmbr1`=192.168.55.26。
+3. gfw 关键状态：
+   ```bash
+   ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1 'uci show firewall | grep -E "ubunt_upg|wan.*masq"; ip -4 route'
+   ```
+   - 预期：`wan.masq=1`、`ubunt_upg_nat`、`ubunt_upg_to_lan` 在位；默认路由 `default via 192.168.66.254`。
+4. 两台 AP：打开 UniFi 控制台 → Devices，记录 U6 Lite 与 UAP-AC-Lite 的 IP、Connected 状态、Inform URL。
+
+### 1.3 SSID 与标签
+
+1. 禁用不可用 SSID：UniFi → WiFi → 找到 `ubnt-upg` → 关闭 Enabled 开关。
+   - 预期：开关变灰/显示 Disabled。
+   - 记录原设置（第二步回滚要用）。
+2. 给现网每根线缆贴标签：`旧设备端接口名` + `目标 SE5420 口`，如 `NAS→SE5420口4`、`ERX-eth0→SE5420口1`。
+3. 打印 §2 端口表放在操作位。
+
+### 1.4 物料与带外
+
+1. 确认有：SE5420（核对 V1.0 型号）、原装电源线、Type-C 串口线、Cat5e 以上网线数根、标签贴。
+2. 管理本装「TP-LINK USB 串口驱动」（官网下载或随机光盘）。
+3. 终端仿真软件准备（PuTTY/串口助手/Windows Terminal），预填参数 **38400 / 8 / 无校验 / 1 / 无流控**。
+
+## 2. 端口表（SE5420）
+
+> 面板端口为**上下交错**排列：下排 = 1、3、5、7、9、11、13、15；上排 = 2、4、6、8、10、12、14、16（口 1 最左下，口 2 在其正上方）。
+> **分组原则：上排全 = LAN66，下排全 = LAN55**（55 在 66 下一排）；ER-X 两条上联在最左相邻（口 2=66、口 1=55）。
+
+### 上排 = VLAN66（口 2、4、6、8、10、12、14、16）
+
+| SE5420 口 | 对端 | 模式 | PVID | 成员 VLAN |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **2** | ER-X `eth0`（66 上联） | access | 66 | untagged 66 |
+| **4** | PVE `enp1s0` | access | 66 | untagged 66 |
+| **6** | U6 Lite | access | 66 | untagged 66 |
+| **8** | NAS/FreeNAS 第 1 口 | access | 66 | untagged 66 |
+| **10** | windy-pc（`.99`）或 hp-nas（`.32`）二选一 | access | 66 | untagged 66 |
+| **12** | NAS 第 2 口（后续 LACP 窗用） | 物理断开 | — | — |
+| **14** | LAN66 预留 | admin down | — | — |
+| **16** | LAN66 预留 | admin down | — | — |
+
+### 下排 = VLAN55（口 1、3、5、7、9、11、13、15）
+
+| SE5420 口 | 对端 | 模式 | PVID | 成员 VLAN |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **1** | ER-X `switch0` 成员口（55 上联） | access | 55 | untagged 55 |
+| **3** | PVE `enp2s0` | access | 55 | untagged 55 |
+| **5** | UAP-AC-Lite | access | 55 | untagged 55 |
+| **7** | 隔壁房间上联（IoT） | access | 55 | untagged 55 |
+| **9** | 打印机（未来） | admin down | — | — |
+| **11** | LAN55 预留 | admin down | — | — |
+| **13** | LAN55 预留 | admin down | — | — |
+| **15** | LAN55 预留 | admin down | — | — |
+| SFP+ 1–4 | 最右侧 4 个 | 空槽 | — | — |
+
+- 第一步不建 VLAN10、不向 ER-X 送任何 tag、口 4/6（PVE、U6）不做 trunk。
+- NAS 只接口 8，口 12 断开（LACP 是独立维护窗）。
+- 不占口的 VM：dns(.36=VM120)、ubnt(.46=VM160)、gfw(.1=VM140)；haos(.55.11) 是物理 x88 Pro 盒子（非 VM）；transmission(.51) 是 NAS jail。
+
+## 3. 开箱与固件升级
+
+1. 核对包装型号 `TL-SE5420`；看设备底部标签硬件版本 `V1.0`。
+2. 浏览器打开 `https://www.tp-link.com.cn/product_2899.html?v=download`。
+3. 页面「升级软件」分类下下载最新固件（已知 `20230908_1.0.0`，以页面为准）；解压得到 `.bin` 文件。
+4. 管理本网线接 SE5420 任意 RJ45 口；管理本设静态 IP `10.18.18.10/24`（网关留空）。
+5. 浏览器 `http://10.18.18.251`，首次登录创建用户名 + 强密码。
+6. WEB 里 `系统管理 → 系统工具 → 软件升级 → 选择文件` 选固件 → 升级 → 等待重启，**期间勿断电**。
+7. **验证：** 升级后 `系统管理 → 系统配置 → 系统信息` 版本号正确；面板 SYS 灯绿色闪烁、Link/Act 闪一下后熄灭。
+
+## 4. 台面初始化 SE5420（不接生产）
+
+### 4.1 登录通道确认
+
+1. Console 线接 SE5420 Type-C Console 口 → 管理本 USB。
+2. 打开串口终端（38400/8/无/1/无流控），连按回车。
+3. **预期：** 出现 `TL-SE5420>` 提示符。
+4. 输入 `enable` 回车，进特权模式（提示符变 `#` 或类似）。
+5. 若 WEB 也通（第 3 步已创建账号），记录：WEB + Console 双通道可用。
+
+### 4.2 基础安全
+
+1. WEB 登录 → 改强口令：`系统管理 → 用户管理 → 用户配置` → 修改用户名/密码 → 保存。
+2. 设时区与 NTP：`系统管理 → 系统配置 → 系统时间` → 时区 `Asia/Shanghai` → NTP 服务器填 `ntp.aliyun.com`（或 `pool.ntp.org`）→ 保存。
+3. 关 Telnet：`系统管理 → 安全管理 → Telnet配置` → 关闭 Enable。
+   - CLI 替代：`telnet disable`。
+4. 关 HTTP：`系统管理 → 安全管理 → HTTP配置` → 关闭 HTTP 服务（保留 HTTPS）。
+5. 开 SSH：`系统管理 → 安全管理 → SSH配置` → 启用 SSH（端口 22）。
+6. 关云管理：`系统管理 → 云管理 → 全局配置` → 全局开关保持关闭（不绑定 `smbcloud.tp-link.com.cn`）。
+7. **保存：** 顶部/右上角保存按钮，或 `配置保存 → 保存配置`。
+8. **验证：** CLI `show running-config` 中 Telnet/HTTP 为 disable；管理本 `https://10.18.18.251` 能开、SSH 22 能连（此时管理 IP 仍是默认 10.18.18.251，66.253 的 HTTPS 验证在 §4.3 第 7 步做）。
+
+### 4.3 VLAN 与管理地址（本步只建 66/55）
+
+**步骤顺序依据：先建二层 VLAN（勾选端口成员）→ 再建 SVI → 验证管理路径 → 才清理 VLAN1。**
+> **端口成员在 VLAN 配置界面的 Untagged/Tagged 选择器里直接勾选**，无独立端口配置页。Untagged = 该 VLAN 的 access 口；PVID 随之对应（以界面为准）。
+
+1. 建 VLAN66：`VLAN → 802.1Q VLAN → VLAN配置` → 新建 → VLAN ID 填 `66` → **Untagged 勾选：口 2、4、6、8、10**（Tagged 不选）→ 保存。
+2. 建 VLAN55：新建 → VLAN ID 填 `55` → **Untagged 勾选：口 1、3、5、7**（Tagged 不选）→ 保存。
+3. **验证：** VLAN 列表出现 66、55；VLAN1 仍在（暂不动）。
+4. 建管理 SVI：`路由功能 → 接口 → 接口设置` → 创建接口 → 接口 ID `VLAN 66` → IP 地址模式 `Static` → IP `192.168.66.253`、掩码 `255.255.255.0` → 管理状态开启 → 保存。默认网关：`路由功能 → 静态路由 → IPv4静态路由条目` → 新建：目的 `0.0.0.0`、掩码 `0.0.0.0`、下一跳 `192.168.66.254`、管理距离 `1`。
+5. 管理本改静态 IP `192.168.66.10/24`，网线接 SE5420 **口 6**（口 6 已在 VLAN66）。
+6. **验证管理路径：**
+   - `ping 192.168.66.253` → 通；
+   - 浏览器 `https://192.168.66.253` → 登录成功；
+   - （可选）SSH：`ssh -o KexAlgorithms=+diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -o HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-rsa admin@192.168.66.253` → 成功。
+   - 全通后再进行下一步；否则停手排查（查 Untagged 勾选/PVID/接线），保持 Console 兜底。
+7. **保存配置**（右上角保存或 `配置保存 → 保存配置`）。
+8. **验证：** `show vlan`：口 2/4/6/8/10 属 VLAN66，口 1/3/5/7 属 VLAN55，口 9/11/12/13/14/15/16 无成员；VLAN1 暂时还有全口成员（下一步清理）。
+9. 清理 VLAN1：`VLAN → 802.1Q VLAN → VLAN配置` → 编辑 VLAN1 → 把口 1–16 从 **Untagged 勾选**中移除（保留 66 或 55 的勾选不变）→ 保存。**改 PVID 不等于移除成员。**
+   > **VLAN1 不可删除属正常**（TP-Link 默认 VLAN），且 **access 口必须属于某 untagged VLAN，GUI 会拒绝把口从 VLAN1 剔除**——不必强求。做法改为：**先把未用口 Disabled（第 13 步）再清 VLAN1 IP（第 10 步）**；disabled 口不转发流量，VLAN1 剩下无管理 IP + 全 disabled 成员 = 无管理面、无转发路径，目标达成。
+10. 删 VLAN1 管理 IP：`路由功能 → 接口 → 接口设置` → VLAN1 → 清空 IPv4。
+11. **保存配置**。
+12. **验证：** `show vlan` VLAN1 无任何成员、无管理 IP；VLAN66 管理路径仍通（SSH/HTTPS 不断）。
+13. 关未用端口：`二层交换 → 端口管理 → 端口配置` → 口 9、11、12、13、14、15、16 **及 SFP+ 17–20** → 端口状态 `Disabled`；并确认这些口不在任何 VLAN 的 Untagged/Tagged 勾选中。**口 12 是 NAS LACP 预留口，未来 LACP 维护窗需在此重新启用。**
+14. 配管理面源限制：`系统管理 → 安全管理 → 安全配置`（管理主机/管理访问，以界面为准）→ 只允许源 `192.168.66.0/24` 访问 HTTPS/SSH（启用 SNMP 则一并限制）→ 其余拒绝 → 保存。
+    > ⚠️ **不要**在 `访问控制` 菜单配——那是数据面 ACL（MAC/IP ACL），管不到管理面；管理面限制在 `安全管理 → 安全配置`。
+15. 配生成树：
+    - 全局配置（`生成树 → 基本配置`）：功能`启用`、模式`RSTP`、**CIST优先级 `4096`**（让本机当根桥）；联络时间 2 / 老化 20 / 时延 15 / 流量限制 5 / 最大跳数 20 保持默认。
+    - 端口配置（`生成树 → 端口配置`）：**终端口 5、6、8、10 的「边缘端口」设`启用`**（= PortFast）；上联口 1、2、3、4、7 保持`禁用`。状态列显示`禁用`是链路未接/未启用，属正常。
+    - 端口保护（`生成树 → 安全配置 → 端口保护`）：**终端口 5、6、8、10 的「BPDU保护」设`启用`**；上联口 1、2、3、4、7 保持`禁用`。环路保护/根桥保护/TC保护/BPDU过滤全部保持`禁用`。
+    - 保存。
+16. **L3 明确边界检查：** `路由功能` 确认只有 VLAN66 有接口（`路由功能 → 接口 → 接口设置` 仅 VLAN66 有 IPv4）；`路由功能 → 静态路由 → IPv4静态路由条目` 只有默认路由一条（0.0.0.0→.254）；`路由功能 → DHCP服务器` 与 `DHCP中继` 未启用；`路由功能 → RIP` 未启用。
+17. **保存 + 导出备份：** `配置保存 → 保存配置`；`系统管理 → 系统工具 → 配置导出` → 导出配置文件到管理本（离线保存，不进仓库）。
+18. **断电重启验证：** 拔电源 10 秒 → 插回 → 重启完成后 `ping 192.168.66.253` 通、HTTPS/SSH 可登录 → 证明保存生效。
+
+### 4.4 台面完成判定
+
+- `show vlan` 结果与 §2 端口表一致；VLAN1 空；管理仅 LAN66 可达；配置已导出。
+
+## 5. 建立上联（维护窗开始）
+
+1. 找到 ER-X `eth0` 当前所连的旧设备/旧交换线，**先拔掉旧线**（避免 eth0 同时连两条路径形成环路）。
+2. 新线一端插 SE5420 **口 2**，另一端插 ER-X `eth0`。
+3. **验证：**
+   - 管理本 `ping 192.168.66.253` → 通（SE5420）；
+   - `ping 192.168.66.254` → 通（ER-X）；
+   - `ping 223.5.5.5` → 通（外网）；
+   - SE5420 `show interface` 口 2：Link up、速率协商正常、错误计数 0。
+4. 找到 ER-X `switch0` 某成员口（eth1–eth3 任一口）的旧接线，先拔。
+5. 新线一端插 SE5420 **口 1**，另一端插该 switch0 成员口。
+6. **验证：**
+   - 从 55 网段设备（或临时给管理本加 `.55.x` 地址）`ping 192.168.55.254` → 通；
+   - `ping 192.168.66.46`（控制器，跨网段）→ 通；
+   - SE5420 `show interface` 口 1：Link up、错误计数 0。
+
+## 6. 迁移 PVE
+
+1. 拔 PVE `enp1s0` 旧线 → 插 SE5420 **口 4**。
+2. **验证：**
+   ```bash
+   ssh -4 root@192.168.66.26 'ip -br addr'
+   ```
+   - 预期：`enp1s0`/`vmbr0` = `192.168.66.26/24`；
+   - `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.26 'ping -c3 192.168.66.254'` → 通。
+3. 拔 PVE `enp2s0` 旧线 → 插 SE5420 **口 3**。
+4. **验证：**
+   - `ip -br addr`：`vmbr1` = `192.168.55.26/24`；
+   - `ping -c3 192.168.55.254` → 通。
+5. 逐台验证（顺序：gfw → dns → ubnt → haos；前三个是 VM，haos 是物理盒子）：
+   ```bash
+   ssh -4 root@192.168.66.26 'qm list'
+   ```
+   - gfw：`ping -c3 192.168.66.1` → 通；
+   - dns：`ping -c3 192.168.66.36` → 通；
+   - ubnt：`ping -c3 192.168.66.46` → 通；
+   - haos：`ping -c3 192.168.55.11` → 通（注意是 55 网段）。
+6. 每台再验业务：gfw 的 OpenClash 面板/DNS 正常、dns 的 AdGuard UI 能开、ubnt 控制器 Connected、haos 界面能开。不以"宿主开机"代替。
+
+## 7. 迁移 AP 与接入设备
+
+1. U6 Lite：先拔旧线 → 插 SE5420 **口 6**（本地 PoE 注入器不动，网线只走数据）。
+2. **验证：** U6 重连后拿回 `192.168.66.6`；UniFi 控制台显示 U6 Connected；Inform 与 §1.2 记录一致。
+3. UAP-AC-Lite：拔旧线 → 插 SE5420 **口 5**。
+4. **验证：** `192.168.55.5`；UniFi 显示 Connected。
+5. 隔壁房间上联：拔旧线 → 插 SE5420 **口 7**。
+   - 插之前确认对端：若对端是小交换机，须满足——只有一条上联、只承载 untagged LAN55、无 VLAN trunk、无第二条路径回 ER-X/SE5420。任一项不满足则不迁移。
+6. **验证：** 该网段设备拿到 `.55.x`、网关 `192.168.55.254`、DNS `192.168.66.36` 可达。
+7. NAS：拔旧线 → 插 SE5420 **仅口 8**（口 12 保持断开）。
+8. **验证：** NAS 拿到 `.66.x`（应为原静态 `.51` 或 reservation），`ping 192.168.66.36` 通，transmission jail 可访问。
+9. 口 10 只接一台明确设备（windy-pc `.99` 或 hp-nas `.32`）：拔旧线 → 插口 10。
+10. **验证：** 该设备拿 `.66.x`、上网正常。
+11. 确认没有并行二层路径后，旧交换/旧接线下电、收线。
+
+## 8. 第一阶段验收（全绿才进第二阶段）
+
+1. SE5420：`ping 192.168.66.253` 通，且从 55 网段**不通**（依赖 §4.3 第 14 步管理面源限制已配；若 ACL 未生效，从 55 网段经 ER-X 路由仍可达 .253——此条不通过则回查 ACL）；默认口令已改；配置已离线备份。
+2. LAN66 客户端：`ip addr` 是 `.66.x`、路由 `default via 192.168.66.254`、DNS `192.168.66.36`；`ping 223.5.5.5` 通。
+3. LAN55 客户端：`.55.x`、`default via 192.168.55.254`；LAN55↔LAN66 互通（如 `ping 192.168.66.46`）。
+4. 端口转发：从公网（手机流量）逐条验——hass `:8123`、transmission `:51413`、ssh `:5822→.36:22`、openvpn `:1194`。
+5. UniFi：U6、AC-Lite 均 Connected，Inform 与基线一致。
+6. SE5420 `show interface`：所有在用口无 CRC/FCS/错误计数增长；ER-X 无广播风暴/ MAC 漂移日志；旧交换已断电。
+7. gfw：主网默认网关仍 `.254`（`ip route` 里没有默认走 `.1`），OpenClash 行为与升级前一致。
+
+> 可选：两台 2.5G 终端同 VLAN 跑 `iperf3 -s` / `iperf3 -c <对端>`，记结果。同 VLAN 才可能超 1G；跨 55/66 与 Internet 受 ER-X/宽带限制。
+
+---
+
+# 第二阶段：VLAN10 升级专用 SSID（第一步稳定 ≥1 天后再做）
+
+> 放行门槛：§8 全绿、稳定 ≥1 天、每步先只读核实现状。SSID 最后才启用。任一步失败只回滚该步。
+
+## 9. PVE VLAN10 边界
+
+### 9.1 快照与备份（在 PVE 上执行：SSH `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.26` 进入或本地终端）
+
+1. 取只读快照（逐条执行并保存输出）：
+   ```sh
+   cat /etc/network/interfaces
+   qm config 140
+   bridge vlan show
+   bridge link
+   ip -d link show vmbr0
+   pveversion -v
+   ```
+2. 备份（同 §1.1 目录）：PVE `/etc/network/interfaces`、`/etc/pve/qemu-server/140.conf`；gfw `/etc/config/{network,dhcp,firewall}`。
+3. 确认本地 Console/带外路径可用；**无完整备份和回滚能力则停止。**
+
+### 9.2 改造 vmbr0 为 VLAN-aware（以 §9.1 快照为准）
+
+1. 编辑 `/etc/network/interfaces`（PVE 本机 `nano /etc/network/interfaces`）。
+2. 在 **vmbr0 定义段**加两行：
+   ```text
+   bridge-vlan-aware yes
+   bridge-vids 10 66
+   ```
+   > `bridge-vids` 只放行需要的 tagged VLAN：`10`（gfw VLAN10 帧）+ `66`（显式声明 native）。不要写 `2-4094` 全放行；将来加 VLAN 再扩展此列表。
+   > ⚠️ **`bridge-vids` 必须加在 vmbr0 段**，不是 `enp1s0` 段——enp1s0 只是 `bridge-ports` 成员；加错位置 VLAN10 无法上 bridge。
+3. **不要**改动 `bridge-ports enp1s0`、现有 tap 口或 `vmbr1`；现有 VM 的无标签语义（untagged/PVID）保持不变。
+4. 应用：**优先 `ifreload -a`**（PVE 用 ifupdown2，只应用变更）；不要用 `systemctl restart networking`（会重载全部接口）。
+   > ⚠️ `ifreload` 会断当前 SSH 连接（管理本重连即可），`ip -br addr` 重新验证。
+5. **验证（关键）：** `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.26 'ip -br addr'` 显示 `.66.26` 仍在；`ping 192.168.66.254` 通；dns(.36)/ubnt(.46)/gfw(.1) 仍通。任一断 → 立即恢复备份的 interfaces 文件并 `ifreload -a`。
+6. `bridge vlan show` 确认现有 tap 口、物理口的 PVID/untagged 与迁移前一致，只是多出 tag 10 的允许。
+
+### 9.3 为 gfw 加 tag=10 专用 vNIC
+
+1. PVE 上给 VM140 加网卡（从管理本执行，bus 用下一个空闲值，记下 MAC）：
+   ```sh
+   ssh -4 root@192.168.66.26 'qm set 140 -net2 virtio,bridge=vmbr0,tag=10'
+   ```
+2. **验证：** `qm config 140` 出现 `net2 ... tag=10`。
+3. gfw 内确认新接口名：
+   ```sh
+   ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1 'ip -br link'
+   ```
+   - 预期出现新接口（如 `eth2`），状态 DOWN 正常。
+
+### 9.4 迁移 gfw 的 ubunt_upg 到新接口
+
+1. gfw 先只读确认当前绑定与 DHCP 段名：
+   ```sh
+   ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1 'uci show network; uci show dhcp'
+   ```
+   预期：`network.ubunt_upg.device='eth0.10'`、`dhcp.ubunt_upg.interface='ubunt_upg'`（按接口名绑定）。
+2. **最小迁移——只改 device 一行**（gfw 上执行）：
+   ```sh
+   ifdown ubunt_upg
+   uci set network.ubunt_upg.device='eth2'
+   uci commit network
+   ifup ubunt_upg
+   ```
+   > `eth0.10` 不再被引用会自动消失，**无需手动删段**；DHCP 池 `dhcp.ubunt_upg.interface='ubunt_upg'` 按接口名绑定，自动跟着走。
+3. **验证：** gfw 内 `ip -br addr` → `eth2` 拿 `192.168.10.1/24` UP、`eth0.10` 消失、`eth0` 仍 `.66.1`。
+4. 确认 firewall `ubunt_upg` zone 按 `network='ubunt_upg'` 绑定（改 device 后 zone/DHCP/NAT/规则自动跟随）。
+5. **验证：**
+   - PVE 管理 IP 仍在 LAN66；
+   - `bridge vlan show` 确认其他 VM 无 VLAN10 可达性（`tap140i2` 显示 `10 PVID Egress Untagged`；dns/ubnt 等 tap 仍只有 PVID 1）。
+6. 未通过 → 按 §16 回滚顺序停止 VLAN10 项目。
+
+## 10. SE5420 增加 VLAN10
+
+> **关键：口 4/6 是 access 口时，VLAN10 的 Tagged 选择器里会显示不可选**——必须先在本步第 1 步把口 4/6 改成 trunk，才能勾 Tagged。改 trunk 后口 4/6 会从 VLAN66 untagged 成员中被移除，需在第 3 步恢复。
+
+1. 改口 4/6 为 trunk：`VLAN → 802.1Q VLAN → 端口配置` → 口 4、口 6 → 端口类型 `ACCESS`→`TRUNK` → **PVID 改 `66`**（改 TRUNK 后默认 PVID 变 1，必须改回 66）→ 保存。
+2. **验证：** 端口配置页口 4/6 显示 `TRUNK` + PVID `66`。
+3. **恢复 VLAN66 成员：** 改 trunk 后口 4/6 从 VLAN66 untagged 被移除 → `VLAN → 802.1Q VLAN → VLAN配置` → 编辑 VLAN66 → **Untagged 重新勾选口 4、口 6** → 保存。确认 VLAN66 = 口 2、4、6、8、10。
+4. 建 VLAN10：`VLAN → 802.1Q VLAN → VLAN配置` → 新建 VLAN ID `10` → **Tagged 勾选：口 4、口 6**（Untagged 不勾）→ 保存。口 4/6 即 trunk：untagged 66 + tagged 10。
+5. 确认其余口不允许 VLAN10（口 4/6 之外不勾选）。
+6. 确认 VLAN10 不建 SVI/DHCP/路由：`路由功能 → 接口 → 接口设置` 无 VLAN10 接口；`路由功能 → DHCP服务器/DHCP中继` 无 10 段。
+7. **保存配置：** `配置保存 → 保存配置`。
+8. **验证（静态链路）：**
+   - SE5420 `show vlan`：VLAN10 仅在口 4/6；VLAN66 仍是口 2、4、6、8、10。
+   - PVE `bridge vlan show`：`enp1s0` 允许 10 + 66；`tap140i2` 显示 `10 PVID Egress Untagged`。
+   - `ping 192.168.66.253`、`ssh` 均通（VLAN66 管理流量不受影响）。
+   - > 注：此时抓不到 VLAN10 帧是正常的——还没有客户端（SSID 未启用）；真正流量验证在 §12 启用 SSID 后。
+
+## 11. gfw 防火墙、NAT 与 IPv6
+
+### 11.1 先只读确认现场
+
+```sh
+ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1 'uci show network; uci show firewall; uci show dhcp; ip -4 route; ip -6 addr; ip -6 route; fw4 print; nft list ruleset'
+```
+- 记录 `wan` zone 的 masq、`ubunt_upg` zone 段名、`ubunt_upg_nat`、`ubunt_upg_to_lan`、DHCP 段名。以下命令全部用具名段，段名以本次输出为准。
+
+### 11.1b 现场已核实规则（2026-08 实施时确认存在，无需重建）
+
+| 段名 | 类型 | 作用 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `firewall.ubunt_upg` | zone | `network='ubunt_upg'`，input/forward=`REJECT`、output=`ACCEPT` |
+| `ubunt_upg_dhcp` | rule | VLAN10 → UDP 67 允许（DHCP） |
+| `ubunt_upg_dns` | rule | VLAN10 → TCP/UDP 53 允许（DNS） |
+| `ubunt_upg_block_lan66` | rule | VLAN10 → `192.168.66.0/24` REJECT |
+| `ubunt_upg_to_lan` | forwarding | `src=ubunt_upg → dest=lan` |
+| `ubunt_upg_nat` | nat | `src=lan`、`src_ip=192.168.10.0/24`、target `MASQUERADE`（出口走 lan 即 eth0/LAN66） |
+
+> **待补缺口：** 只有 `192.168.66.0/24` 被拒，**LAN55 和其余 RFC1918 无显式拒绝**——VLAN10 经 ER-X 仍可达 `192.168.55.0/24`（haos/IoT/AP）等内网，必须在 §11.3 补齐。
+
+### 11.2 IPv4 策略（目标）
+
+| 流量 | 动作 |
+|---|---|
+| VLAN10 → gfw DHCP、DNS | 允许 |
+| VLAN10 → gfw SSH/LuCI/SNMP/其他管理服务 | 拒绝 |
+| VLAN10 → LAN66、LAN55、其他 RFC1918 内网 | 拒绝 |
+| VLAN10 → Internet | 允许 |
+| established/related 回包 | 允许 |
+
+### 11.3 执行（段名替换为实际值）
+
+1. 确认 `ubunt_upg` zone 的 `forward` 保持 `REJECT`（不改 ACCEPT）。
+2. **NAT 已存在，勿动：** 现场已有 `wan` zone `masq=1` + `ubunt_upg_nat`（`src=lan`、`src_ip=192.168.10.0/24` masquerade）。**不要**给 `ubunt_upg` zone 加 masq，也不要新增 NAT 规则。核对 `nft list ruleset` 该规则在列。
+3. 不新增宽泛的 `ubunt_upg→wan` zone forwarding（会经 ER-X 放行 LAN55/其它内网）。
+4. **补内网前缀拒绝**（LAN55、10/8、172.16/12；`192.168.0.0/16` 已被 66/55/10 三段覆盖，无需再加）。⚠️ **每条必须写 `dest='lan'`**——否则 fw4 会把规则放进 `input_ubunt_upg`（进 gfw 本机方向）而非 `forward_ubunt_upg`（VLAN10→其他网段转发），`dest_ip` 永远不命中、等于没配：
+   ```sh
+   # LAN55
+   uci add firewall rule
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].name='v10_deny_lan55'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].src='ubunt_upg'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].dest='lan'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].dest_ip='192.168.55.0/24'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].target='REJECT'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].proto='all'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].family='ipv4'
+   # 10/8
+   uci add firewall rule
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].name='v10_deny_10net'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].src='ubunt_upg'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].dest='lan'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].dest_ip='10.0.0.0/8'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].target='REJECT'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].proto='all'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].family='ipv4'
+   # 172.16/12
+   uci add firewall rule
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].name='v10_deny_172net'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].src='ubunt_upg'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].dest='lan'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].dest_ip='172.16.0.0/12'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].target='REJECT'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].proto='all'
+   uci set firewall.@rule[-1].family='ipv4'
+   uci commit firewall
+   fw4 reload
+   ```
+5. **验证（看 nft 而非 UCI）：** `nft list ruleset | grep -A6 "chain forward_ubunt_upg"` 应显示拒绝规则**全部在 `forward_ubunt_upg` 链**且先于 `accept_to_lan`；`wan` masq 仍在。若拒绝规则出现在 `input_ubunt_upg` 链 → 说明漏了 `dest='lan'`，回去补。
+6. **IPv6 核验：** `ip -6 addr show eth2` 只有 `fe80::`；`dhcp.ubunt_upg` 的 `ra='disabled'`、`dhcpv6='disabled'` → VLAN10 无 GUA/ULA、无 IPv6 DNS/路由/出口。
+
+### 11.4 IPv6：本阶段不提供 VLAN10 IPv6
+
+1. 显式关闭并核验（不能靠"没配"）：RA、DHCPv6、NDP relay/delegation、IPv6 forwarding 对 `ubunt_upg` 相关接口、前缀委派。
+2. 现场已知：DHCPv6/RA disabled、无 IPv6 默认路由，但全局 `IPv6 forwarding=1`——启用 VLAN10 前复查 `ip -6 addr`、`sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding`。
+3. 客户端可留 link-local；不得获得 GUA/ULA、IPv6 DNS 或 IPv6 默认路由。
+
+### 11.5 部署后验证
+
+1. **链归属（已实测）：** `nft list ruleset | grep -A6 "chain forward_ubunt_upg"` 确认 66/55/10/172 四条拒绝在 forward 链、先于 `accept_to_lan`；`192.168.10.0/24 masquerade` 仍在（§11.3 第 5 步已验）。
+2. **IPv6（已实测）：** `ip -6 addr show eth2` 仅 `fe80::`；`dhcp.ubunt_upg.ra='disabled'` + `dhcpv6='disabled'`；odhcpd 不服务 eth2（§11.4 已验）。
+3. **DHCP 租约（已实测）：** `cat /tmp/dhcp.leases` 出现 VLAN10 客户端（实测 OnePlus-12 → `192.168.10.168`）。
+4. **数据面（已实测）：** `nft list ruleset` 中 `192.168.10.0/24 masquerade` counter 增长（实测 215 pkts / 42KB）、`accept_to_ubunt_upg` 回包增长、四条 deny 保持 0 → VLAN10 上网走 gfw NAT、隔离生效。
+5. **拒绝规则命中（SSID 启用后验）：** 从测试客户端 `ping 192.168.66.1/.26/.36/.46/.254`、`192.168.55.254`、LAN55 主机 → 全不通；访问 gfw 的 22/80/443 管理口 → 拒绝。
+6. **客户端上网（SSID 启用后验）：** 拿 `192.168.10.x`、网关 `.10.1`、DNS 正常；`curl -4` 国内/海外均通、`curl -6` 失败。
+7. 抓包工具：`apk add tcpdump`（ImmortalWrt 25.12.0；勿用 opkg）。
+
+## 12. UniFi 改网络 + 启用 SSID（最后做）
+
+1. 在 AP 上核实 Inform：SSH 进 U6（`ssh -4 zhiqiangf@192.168.66.6`）→ `info` → 记录 `inform_url`。不凭文档假定。
+2. UniFi → Networks → 编辑 `ubnt-upg`：
+   - Router/网关设置 → 选 **Third-party Gateway**；
+   - VLAN ID：`10`；
+   - 子网：`192.168.10.0/24`；网关：`192.168.10.1`；
+   - DHCP：关闭（dhcp 由 gfw 提供）。
+3. **验证：** 保存后网络列表 `ubnt-upg` 显示 Third-party Gateway、VLAN 10。
+4. UniFi → WiFi → `ubnt-upg` SSID → 分配设备只勾 **U6 Lite**（确保 UAP-AC-Lite 不被勾选）→ 保存。
+5. 启用 `ubnt-upg` SSID（最后一步才开）。
+6. 单台测试客户端连上后逐项验证：
+   - `ip addr`：`192.168.10.100~250`；`ip route` 默认网关 `192.168.10.1`；DNS 为预期 gfw 地址；
+   - `nslookup` 普通/国内/海外域名均按预期解析（DNS 走 gfw/OpenClash 路径，不能直连 LAN66 `.36` DNS，除非书面允许）；
+   - gfw 出现该客户端 DHCP 租约与 VLAN10 帧；
+   - `curl -4 https://www.baidu.com` 与 `curl -4 https://www.google.com` 均成功；`curl -6` 失败；
+   - `ping 192.168.66.1/.26/.36/.46/.254`、`192.168.55.254`、LAN55 主机 → 全不通；gfw 管理口不通；
+   - 代理路径：在 gfw/OpenClash 日志或按客户端源地址/五元组确认流量走代理，**不以全局 `7892` 计数增长为证明**。
+7. 任一验证失败 → 先关 `ubnt-upg` SSID；主 SSID、`.254` 路径、LAN55/LAN66 不受影响。
+
+> **实测记录（2026-08-11）：** OnePlus-12 连 `ubnt-upg` 拿到 `192.168.10.168`（DHCP 由 gfw 下发，租约见 `/tmp/dhcp.leases`）；gfw `192.168.10.0/24 masquerade` counter 增长（215 pkts / 42KB）、`accept_to_ubunt_upg` 回包 5 pkts、四条内网 deny 保持 0 → 上网走 gfw NAT、VLAN10→内网隔离生效。手机 Wi-Fi 详情不显示网关，以 DHCP 租约 + NAT counter 为证。
+
+## 13. 第二阶段验收
+
+1. `ubnt-upg` 客户端满足 §12 第 6 步全部项。
+2. gfw 侧 DHCP、拒绝规则、NAT、DNS、代理路径均关联到该测试客户端。
+3. LAN55/LAN66 的 IPv6 行为与迁移前基线一致；VLAN10 无 GUA/ULA、IPv6 DNS、默认路由或 IPv6 出口（除 link-local）。
+
+> **状态（2026-08-11）：** 第 2 条 DHCP+NAT+隔离已实测通过（见 §12 实测记录）；第 1、3 条待补（浏览器 curl 国内/海外、拒绝规则从客户端实测命中、IPv6 `curl -6` 失败）。
+
+## 14. 性能实测（可选但建议）
+
+1. 两台 2.5G 终端（如 NAS 与 windy-pc，均接 SE5420）：一端 `iperf3 -s`，另一端 `iperf3 -c <对端IP>`。
+2. 记录：单流、4 流结果；预期单流约 2.3–2.5Gbps（受 NIC/线材限制）。
+3. 跨网段（66↔55）与 Internet 结果如实记录——预期被 ER-X 上联/宽带限制，不要按 2.5G 承诺。
+
+## 15. 记录
+
+- 每次实质变更后在 Linear `vps` 项目记录 scope / action / verification / 遗留 follow-up。
+- 本仓库不记录 SE5420 口令、ER-X 配置快照（含 PPPoE/口令）、gfw 凭据。
+- 实施前先读 `archive/se5420-review-claim-verification-2026-08.md` 的现场只读复核结论。
+
+## 16. 回滚
+
+| 失败位置 | 回滚动作 |
+|---|---|
+| §4 台面 | 还原台面配置或恢复出厂（见下） |
+| §5–7 上联/迁移 | 停手 → 刚迁的线逐根插回 ER-X 原口 → 逐根验证（IP/服务恢复、AP Connected、MAC 表回旧拓扑） |
+| §9 PVE 边界 | 关 `ubnt-upg` SSID → gfw `ubunt_upg` 恢复绑 `eth0.10` → 恢复 gfw network/DHCP/firewall → 移除 VM140 新增 vNIC（`qm set 140 -delete net2`）→ 恢复 VM140 配置 → **最后**恢复 PVE `/etc/network/interfaces` 并 `ifreload -a` → 分别验证 PVE/dns/ubnt/gfw 的 LAN66 |
+| §10 SE5420 VLAN10 | 删 VLAN10（`VLAN → 802.1Q VLAN → VLAN配置` 删除 VLAN10），口 4/6 恢复 Untagged 仅 VLAN66、Tagged 清空 |
+| §11 gfw | 恢复已备份命名规则/NAT；不触碰 LAN55/LAN66 主网规则 |
+| §12 SSID | 只关 `ubnt-upg` SSID；主 SSID、`.254`、gfw 66 路径不受影响 |
+
+**SE5420 恢复出厂（忘口令/重配）：**
+- **WEB 方式：** `系统管理 → 系统工具 → 软件复位`（若还能登录 GUI）。
+- **Console 方式（WEB 不可用/忘口令）：**
+  1. 管理本连 Type-C Console（38400 8N1）。
+  2. 交换机断电重启；串口出现 **`Press CTRL-B to enter the bootUtil`** 时按 `Ctrl+B`。
+  3. 输入 **`2`**（软件复位）→ 恢复出厂；此后首次 WEB 登录创建新用户名密码（初始管理 IP 恢复 `10.18.18.251`）。
+  4. 恢复后按 §4 重配并保存。
+
+## 参考
+
+- 设计说明：[lan-erx-se5420-network.md](lan-erx-se5420-network.md)
+- 评审核实：[se5420-review-claim-verification-2026-08.md](archive/se5420-review-claim-verification-2026-08.md)
+- 现网地图：[lan-overview.md](lan-overview.md)
+- 官方安装手册（Markdown 版）：[se5420-official-manuals/tl-se5420-install-manual.md](se5420-official-manuals/tl-se5420-install-manual.md)
+- 官方 PDF：<https://service.tp-link.com.cn/download/202310/TL-SE5420%20V1.0安装手册%201.0.2.pdf>
+- 规格 / 固件：<https://www.tp-link.com.cn/product_2899.html?v=specification> · <https://www.tp-link.com.cn/product_2899.html?v=download>
+- Omada VLAN 指南：<https://support.omadanetworks.com/en/document/12981/> · <https://support.omadanetworks.com/en/document/13135/>
+- ER-X：[edgerouter-x-configuration.md](edgerouter-x-configuration.md)；gfw：[hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md](../hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md)；PVE VLAN10：[lan-rb5009-upgrade.md#阶段-5-附pve-上-vlan10-透传实现-调研-2026-08-09](archive/lan-rb5009-upgrade.md#阶段-5-附pve-上-vlan10-透传实现-调研-2026-08-09)
@@ -108,3 +108,4 @@ Steps:
 - Matrix Authentication Service: <https://github.com/element-hq/matrix-authentication-service>
 - Matrix spec: <https://spec.matrix.org/>
 - Federation tester: <https://federationtester.matrix.org/>
+- Home Assistant Matrix integration: [home-assistant-matrix.md](home-assistant-matrix.md)
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+# Matter 配网排障手册
+
+> 基于 Matter 1.5.1 Core Spec §4.3.1 与本环境（EdgeRouter X + UniFi AP + Aqara M3 +
+> Home Assistant）2026-08-21 实测整理。配套 Linear W1N-207。
+
+## 1. Matter 配网协议要点（发现即一切）
+
+- **发现走 mDNS（DNS-SD）**，UDP **5353**，组播 `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`。
+  **不经过单播 DNS（如 AdGuard .36）、不需要反向 DNS、不需要 DHCPv6**（SLAAC 即满足 Matter
+  的 IPv6 要求）。
+- 服务类型：
+  - `_matterc._udp` — 可配网设备（Commissionable），**配对模式才有效**
+  - `_matter._tcp` — 已配设备（Operational），TXT 里含 fabric 信息
+- 子类型（配对方按此过滤）：
+  - `_L<全12位 discriminator>`（如 `_L3266`）— 按二维码里的完整 discriminator 精确匹配
+  - `_S<高4位>`（如 `_S12`）
+  - `_V<vendorId>`、`_T<deviceType>`（可选）
+  - `_CM`（仅真正处于配对模式时发布）
+- TXT 关键键：`D=`（discriminator，规范 **SHALL** 必填）、`VP=`（vendor+product）、
+  **`CM=`**、`RI=`（rotating id）、`PH=`/`PI=`（配对提示）。
+- 配对端口：**TCP 5540**（PASE/CASE）。部分生态（Aqara M3）为 Thread 中继节点用 **5552**。
+- 实例名：64 位随机 hex；**进入配对模式时更换**（可用作"是否重新进过配对"的信号）。
+- 规范参考：[Matter 1.5.1 Core Spec §4.3.1](https://csa-iot.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/23-27349-010_Matter-1.5.1-Core-Specification.pdf)、
+  [Google Home: Commissionable and Operational Discovery](https://developers.home.google.com/matter/primer/commissionable-and-operational-discovery)、
+  [Matter Handbook: Discovery](https://handbook.buildwithmatter.com/how-it-works/discovery/)、
+  [connectedhomeip: IP commissioning](https://pigweed.googlesource.com/third_party/github/project-chip/connectedhomeip/+show/59edd2ff8506b1e3dabb7040d716f0e75a2312d1/docs/guides/ip_commissioning.md)。
+
+## 2. 关键判据：CM=0 = 不在配对模式
+
+规范 §4.3.1.2 / §4.3.1.7：
+
+- 设备可以长期宣告 `_matterc`（**Extended Discovery**），但 **`CM=0` 表示"当前不接受配网"**。
+- **已在 fabric 里的设备**（宣告里同时有 `_matter._tcp` + `_I<fabric>._sub` 运营记录）重配时
+  通常报 `CM=0` —— 它已配好，不是新设备。
+- **配对方不能把已配设备当新设备加** → 重加/找回必须先**恢复出厂**（清 fabric，重启后以
+  `CM=1` 全新配对模式宣告），再用**它自己的二维码**添加。
+- 常见误判：抓包看到 `_matterc` 宣告就以为"在配对模式"——**必须看 `CM=`**。
+
+## 3. 本环境实测事实（2026-08-21，W1N-207）
+
+| 事实 | 状态 |
+|---|---|
+| LAN55 IPv6/mDNS 链路 | ✅ 全正常（RA→交换机→AP→客户端；mDNS 双向通；igmp snooping off、mdns on、无客户端隔离、无组播增强、PMF off、WPA2、仅 2.4G） |
+| Matter 不依赖单播 DNS/.36、反向 DNS、DHCPv6 | ✅ 已排除（.36 健康且不在路径上） |
+| HA matter-server 曾宣告两代前的旧 GUA | ✅ 已修复（重启 `core_matter_server`；宣告恢复当前前缀） |
+| ISP PD /60 随重拨轮换 → Matter IPv6 缓存反复失效 | ⚠️ 环境性根因；对策 = 重拨后重启 matter-server + 重启 M3 |
+| EdgeOS 上静态 ULA 不可行 | ✅ 已尝试并回滚（switch0 不支持静态 `ipv6 address`；显式 router-advert 会替换 PD-slaac RA） |
+| 在用的两盏 ESP32-C2 Matter 灯泡（VP `0x4891/0x4100`；2026-08-23 复核） | 工作盏 MAC 已变为 `fc:e8:c0:25:a1:f0`（`.146`，hostname `espressif`；原 `34:98:7a:25:a1:f0` 全网消失，疑固件更新后换 MAC——末 3 字节相同）；新盏 `34:98:7a:27:10:bc`（`.148`，hostname `matter`）。两盏各宣告 **3 个 fabric** 运营实例：Aqara `4DF2B1455D19402D`、`2F6E56020E1996E7`、HA `DCE86145C137AF0E`（见 §8） |
+| 故障盏 `34:98:7a:27:7f:08`（曾 .145，Aqara fabric，`CM=0` 缺 GUA） | 2026-08-23 复核：无租约、ARP incomplete、AP 无日志 = **已离网**（退役/退换） |
+| **失败模式 C（2026-08-23 实测，两盏同时）**：mDNS 活、5540 死 | 灯泡 ping 通（v4/v6）、DHCP 正常续租、mDNS 应答并宣告 `_matter._tcp`（SRV :5540、TXT `T=1`、当前前缀 GUA），但 **TCP 5540 在 IPv4 与 IPv6（fe80+GUA）均 RST 拒绝** → 配对方无法建立 CASE，App 显示离线；hass matter-server 侧无任何 established :5540 会话（详见 §8） |
+| ISP PD 前缀再次轮换（2026-08-23 → `240e:3bd:238:4812::/64`；08-22 为 `235:1fb2`） | hass 与 `.148` 均持当前前缀 GUA；hass 残留 `.146` 旧前缀 GUA 的 **FAILED** 邻居项（旧地址缓存仍被某端尝试） |
+| DHCP 保留 `matter`（.45 → MAC `…10:bc`） | ⚠️ 保留仍未生效：新灯泡（`…10:bc`）实际拿到动态 `.148` 而非保留的 `.45`（待修，见 hosts/gw.md） |
+| **新灯泡（2026-08-22 添加成功）**：MAC `34:98:7a:27:10:bc`（=DHCP 保留目标 MAC），hostname `matter`，IP `.148`，VP `4891/4100`，D=`3377` | ✅ 已入 **Aqara fabric `4DF2B1455D19402D`**；**经 BLE 配网**（Aqara Home App）——线上**无 TCP 5540** 属正常（BLE 会话对 AP/hass 抓包不可见） |
+| ESP32-C2 灯泡 firmware 挂死模式（2026-08-22 实测） | 入网后宣告 `_matterc`（CM=1、D=3377）约 **3 秒后网络栈完全静默**：STA 收发计数冻结、不掉线不重启、配对方（手机/M3 `_L3377` 查询）无应答 → 加不上。**对策=断电 10 秒重启**重新进配网模式（实例名更换：`3F4E2C66F2DA85CD`→`E5BA8E28E4DE23A0`），随即 App 添加即成功 |
+| 遗留 SSID（element/vwire/vport） | ✅ 已清理 |
+
+## 4. 抓包方法（BusyBox 兼容）
+
+> 完整指令集（实时 / 落盘轮转 / 定向抓取 / Wireshark 解密）见
+> [runbooks/matter-packet-capture.md](../runbooks/matter-packet-capture.md)。
+> 下面是最常用的两条。
+
+**视角必须在 LAN55**。**HA matter-server 作配对方时推荐直接在 hass `end0` 抓**——配对方
+必然参与配对流程的每一条通讯（mDNS 本段组播 + 自己的 TCP 5540 全程），覆盖最全；AP `br0`
+能看到全部 mDNS 组播 + 无线客户端单播，但**看不到有线↔有线单播**（如 Thread 设备经有线 M3
+配对时 HA↔M3 的 5540 在 AP 侧不可见）。66 网段电脑看不到 55 的组播。BusyBox 注意点仅适用
+AP（**不要用 `--line-buffered`**；引号外层双引号、内层单引号）；hass 是 HAOS 全量 tcpdump。
+
+完整抓取（跑配对时保持窗口开着，`Ctrl+C` 结束）：
+
+```bash
+ssh zhiqiangf@192.168.55.5 "tcpdump -ni br0 -s 0 -vvv -tt 'udp port 5353 or tcp port 5540 or tcp port 5552'"
+```
+
+hass 侧（HA matter-server 作配对方，推荐；非交互 ssh 需显式 `sudo -n -i`）：
+
+```bash
+ssh hassio@hass.windy.lan "sudo -n -i tcpdump -ni end0 -s 0 -vvv -tt 'udp port 5353 or tcp port 5540 or tcp port 5552'"
+```
+
+精简过滤（只看 Matter 信号）：
+
+```bash
+ssh zhiqiangf@192.168.55.5 "tcpdump -ni br0 -s 0 -vvv -tt 'udp port 5353 or tcp port 5540 or tcp port 5552' | grep -E '_matterc|_matter|_L[0-9]+|_S[0-9]+|_CM|_V[0-9]+|_T[0-9]+|\.5540|\.5552'"
+```
+
+存 pcap 供 Wireshark：把上面 `-w /tmp/matter.pcap` 追加到 tcpdump 参数（去掉 `-vvv`），
+`scp zhiqiangf@192.168.55.5:/tmp/matter.pcap .` 拉回本地分析。
+
+> **落盘务必轮转**：AP `/tmp` 只有约 60MB。用
+> `-C 5 -W 12 -w /tmp/matter.pcap`（每 5MB 轮转、最多 12 个文件）防止写满，
+> 详见 runbook Step 3（落盘轮转）。
+> **Matter 载荷是加密的**：mDNS（5353）明文可读；5540 上的 Matter 报文要看明文
+> 需要 Wireshark matter-dissector + 会话密钥，详见 runbook Step 5（解密）。
+
+### 阶段对照表
+
+| 阶段 | 应该看到 | 对应问题 |
+|---|---|---|
+| 发现（设备侧） | `_matterc._udp` + `_L3266._sub` + `_S12._sub` + TXT `D=3266 CM=1` + SRV `:5540` + AAAA | **无宣告**=设备没入网/没进配对模式；**`CM=0`**=不在配对模式（已配设备）；**无 `_L3266`**=固件子类型缺失 |
+| 发现（配对方侧） | M3/手机查询 `_L3266._sub._matterc._udp` | 查询有、无应答 = 码/discriminator 不匹配或设备不在线 |
+| 配对握手 | 到设备 IP **TCP 5540 SYN/SYN-ACK** 双向 | **SYN 无 ACK**=设备不可达/防火墙；**完全无 5540**=发现阶段没完成 |
+| 配完后 | 设备宣告 `_matter._tcp` + `_I<fabric>._sub` | 出现 = 已入网成功 |
+| BLE 配网（手机 App 直连设备 BLE，如 Aqara Home） | 线上**无 TCP 5540**（BLE 会话对 AP/hass 抓包不可见）；设备入网后仍先 mDNS 宣告 `_matterc` | 成功判据=最终宣告 `_matter._tcp` + `_I<fabric>._sub`；无 5540 **不代表**失败 |
+
+## 5. 排障决策树（按顺序）
+
+1. 抓包看**有没有 `_matterc` 宣告**：没有 → 设备不通电 / 没连上 Wi-Fi / 没进配对模式
+   （先解决"设备在线"，网络侧已反复验证正常）。
+2. 有宣告但 **`CM=0`** → 设备已配 / 不在配对模式 → **恢复出厂**后重试（用它自己的二维码）。
+3. 有宣告 `CM=1` 但**无 `_L<disc>` 子类型** → 固件 mDNS 缺陷 → 升固件或换通用发现配对方。
+4. `CM=1` + 子类型齐全但**无 TCP 5540** → 配对方没匹配上（查码/discriminator）或设备不可达。
+5. 有 5540 但配对中断 → 查 `CM` 源（码是否正确）、设备电源、fabric 状态（是否需先清）。
+
+## 6. 相关文档
+
+- [runbooks/matter-packet-capture.md](../runbooks/matter-packet-capture.md) — Matter 抓包指令集（实时/落盘轮转/定向/解密）
+- [docs/lan-overview.md](lan-overview.md) — LAN 拓扑、SSID 清理、ULA 不可行
+- [hosts/hass.windy.lan.md](../hosts/hass.windy.lan.md) — matter-server 重拨运维规范
+- [docs/unifi-network.md](unifi-network.md) — UniFi 网络/IPv6/SSID 记录
+- [hosts/gw.md](../hosts/gw.md) — DHCP 保留 `matter` MAC 错位（待修）
+
+## 7. 2026-08-22 实测记录：添加新 ESP32-C2 Matter 灯泡（成功 + 失败路径全记录）
+
+> 场景：手机 App（Aqara Home）添加一盏**新的** ESP32-C2 Matter 灯泡
+> `34:98:7a:27:10:bc`（hostname `matter`，最终 IP `.148`）。中途换了灯泡并断电重启，
+> 共经历 **2 种失败模式** 和 **1 条成功路径**，全部抓包实证。
+>
+> 抓包点：UAP-AC-Lite `192.168.55.5` `br0`（轮转 `udp 5353 or tcp 5540 or tcp 5552`
+> + 定向全量 `ether host 34:98:7a:27:10:bc`）+ hostapd/stahtd 日志 + gw DHCP/ARP 交叉验证。
+> 本地用 tshark 4.7.2 分析。
+
+### 时间线（CST，2026-08-22）
+
+| 时间 | 事件 | 判据 / 说明 |
+|---|---|---|
+| 10:50:28 | 启动轮转抓包 | — |
+| 10:51:12–19 | 手机 `.143`（OnePlus，连 wifi0ap0=`ubnt-windy-2`）重新关联；查询 `_matter._tcp` | 运营查询（浏览已配设备），**不是**配网（配网应查 `_matterc._udp`） |
+| ~10:56 | 用户报「配置 wifi 后挂起，不能加入 wifi」 | 首次失败 |
+| 11:00:15 | M3 `.248` 查询 `_L3266._sub._matterc` | 无应答（是另一台设备的 discriminator，无关） |
+| 11:01:24–42 | **失败模式 A**：故障盏 `…7f:08` 尝试关联 `wifi0ap1`(`ubnt-haas`)：发 1 次 open-auth 帧（algorithm 0）→ AP 回 `status_code=0` → **客户端不再发 assoc 请求** → 18s 后 `auth_failures=1` + disassociated | auth 阶段卡死（client 侧）；非密码错——密码错会先 assoc 再 4-way 失败 |
+| 11:04:01–05 | **新灯泡 `…10:bc` 关联 `wifi0ap1` 成功**，WPA2 4-way 完成，DHCP 拿 `.148`（tracker `soft failure`: ip_delta 3.76s，avg_rssi -68）；随即宣告 `_matterc`：实例 `3F4E2C66F2DA85CD`，TXT `VP=4891+4100 D=3377 CM=1`，SRV :5540，**有 GUA** | 发现阶段判据全过 |
+| 11:04:05 之后 | **失败模式 B**：灯泡网络栈完全静默——STA 收发计数冻结（rx=89/tx=5 持续 12s+ 不变）、**不掉线不重启** | firmware 挂死 |
+| 11:04:59–11:07:27 | 手机查 `_matterc` ×4、`.60` 解析实例、M3 查 `_L3377._sub._matterc` ×5（discriminator 3377 正是新盏）——**全部无应答**；TCP 5540/5552 全程 0 | 配对方找不到设备 → App 报「加不上」 |
+| 11:09:35–48 | **断电 10 秒重启**：灯泡重新关联 `wifi0ap1` ×2 | 对策生效 |
+| 11:10:26 | DHCP 重新拿 `.148`；STA 计数恢复持续增长（活跃） | — |
+| 11:10–11:15 | 重新宣告 `_matterc`（**新实例 `E5BA8E28E4DE23A0`**——入配对模式实例名更换，符合规范）；App 走 **BLE 配网** | 线上无 TCP 5540（BLE 对 AP 不可见，属正常） |
+| 11:15:23 | 灯泡宣告 **`_matter._tcp`**：`4DF2B1455D19402D-02EF2FF12DFAF10E`（Aqara fabric）+ SRV :5540 + GUA + A | ✅ **添加成功**（已入 Aqara fabric `4DF2B1455D19402D`） |
+
+### 结论与经验
+
+1. **同族灯泡（VP 4891/4100，OUI 34:98:7a）存在两种不同失败模式**：
+   - 故障盏 `…7f:08`：auth 阶段卡死（auth 帧后不发 assoc）；此前（08-21 21:27）成功关联后伴随
+     `ip_failures=1`（拿不到 IP）+ 缺 GUA —— 属更深层故障，需恢复出厂，本次未处理，仍离线。
+   - 新盏 `…10:bc`：入网 + 宣告 `_matterc`（CM=1）成功后约 3 秒固件挂死（全静默）。
+     **断电 10 秒重启即恢复**，是最简单有效的对策。
+2. **AP 抓包看不到 BLE 配网**：Aqara Home App 对 WiFi Matter 设备走 BLE 配网时，线上只有
+   mDNS/DHCP，**无 TCP 5540 不代表失败**；成功判据 = 设备最终宣告 `_matter._tcp` + `_I<fabric>._sub`。
+3. **发现判据回顾**：`_matterc` + TXT（`CM=1`、`D=`、`VP=`）+ SRV :5540 + AAAA(GUA) + A 全齐才算
+   设备真的在配对模式；配对方按 `_L<disc>._sub._matterc` 精确匹配 discriminator（本例 D=3377）。
+4. 新盏 RSSI -68、DHCP 3.76s，射频偏弱，可能加剧 firmware 不稳定（待观察）。
+5. DHCP 保留 `matter`（.45→`…10:bc`）**仍未生效**：新盏实际拿动态 `.148`（待修，见 hosts/gw.md）。
+6. 识别「配对方在找但设备不答」的快速方法：抓包里配对方持续查 `_matterc`/`_L<disc>` 而目标 MAC
+   零应答 + STA 收发计数冻结 = 设备侧挂死；此时**先断电重启设备**，不要怀疑网络/AP。
+
+### 后续：新盏 11:24 起离线循环（同一盏 `…10:bc`，2026-08-22）
+
+配网成功后约 10 分钟（11:15–11:24 可控制），灯泡进入**持续性故障循环**：
+
+| 时间 | 事件 | 模式 |
+|---|---|---|
+| 11:24:57 | `EVENT_STA_LEAVE`（真掉线） | 掉线 |
+| 11:25:12 | 重连 `auth_failures=2` | **auth 卡死**（同故障盏 `…7f:08` 11:01 的模式） |
+| 11:25:23–25 | 重连成功，WPA2 完成，重新拿 `.148` | — |
+| 11:25:38 | `soft failure`，ip_delta 2.65s，**avg_rssi -73**（-68→-73 持续变差） | 射频偏弱 |
+| 11:25 之后 | STA 计数冻结（rx=119/tx=64 不动）；M3 持续查询其运营实例 `4DF2B1455D19402D-02EF2FF12DFAF10E._matter._tcp` **无应答** → App 显示「离线」 | 静默挂死 |
+
+**结论**：三盏 ESP32-C2 灯泡中两盏（`…7f:08`、`…10:bc`）故障，表现覆盖 auth 卡死 / 静默挂死 /
+随机掉线三种形态；工作盏 `…25:a1:f0` 正常。网络侧（AP、M3、DHCP、mDNS）均验证正常。
+**疑似根因（按可能性）**：① ESP32-C2 Matter 灯泡 firmware 缺陷（同批次）② 射频偏弱
+（RSSI -73，天线/距离/遮挡）加剧不稳定 ③ 供电不稳（brownout 造成 Wi-Fi 栈崩溃重启）。
+**待办**：移近 AP 或改善供电后观察；App 内查固件更新；仍复发则考虑退换。
+
+## 8. 2026-08-23 状态核查：两盏「半在线」——mDNS 宣告正常但 TCP 5540 无监听（失败模式 C）
+
+> 全程**只读**核查（gw DHCP/ARP、AP hostapd 日志、hass matter-server 状态 + mDNS 抓包、
+> 对灯泡 v4/v6 的 TCP 5540 探测，09:0x CST）。结论：**网络侧全部健康；两盏灯泡网络栈活着、
+> mDNS 运营宣告正常，但 Matter 会话端点（TCP 5540）无监听**——配对方无法建立 CASE，
+> App 内应显示离线/不可达。
+
+| 对象 | 状态（2026-08-23） |
+|---|---|
+| 新盏 `34:98:7a:27:10:bc`（`.148`，hostname `matter`） | DHCP 04:40 续租；gw ARP 完整；ping 通（93–122ms，ESP32 省电时延）；08-22 16:40 起稳定关联 `wifi0ap1`，关联时 `avg_rssi -70`。mDNS 宣告 3 实例：`4DF2B1455D19402D-02EF079EEB480D07`（**新 node ID——08-22 之后被重新配网过**）、`2F6E56020E1996E7-137147AF27BE4EB6`、`DCE86145C137AF0E-0000000000000011`（HA fabric）；host 记录 A `.148` + fe80 + **当前前缀** GUA `240e:3bd:238:4812:*`。支持单播 legacy mDNS 查询（`dig -p 5353 @.148 _matter._tcp.local PTR` 可用） |
+| 工作盏（MAC 已变）`fc:e8:c0:25:a1:f0`（`.146`，hostname `espressif`） | DHCP 07:17 续租；ping 通 v4/v6（v6 fe80 38–61ms）。mDNS 宣告 3 实例：`4DF2B1455D19402D-02EF4CA3F856B615`、`2F6E56020E1996E7-EE8F2E4F1A77BF05`、`DCE86145C137AF0E-000000000000000B`。原 MAC `34:98:7a:25:a1:f0` 全网消失（无租约/ARP/AP 日志）而新 MAC 末 3 字节相同 → 疑固件更新后改 MAC。**拒绝单播 5353**（ICMP port unreachable），只应答组播查询——同族固件行为差异。hass 残留其旧前缀 GUA `240e:3bd:235:1fb2:fee8:c0ff:fe25:a1f0` 的 **FAILED** 邻居项 |
+| 故障盏 `34:98:7a:27:7f:08`（曾 `.145`） | 无租约、ARP incomplete、AP 日志零事件 = 已离网 |
+| **TCP 5540 探测（两盏）** | IPv4（LAN66 与 hass 本段）、IPv6（fe80%end0 + 当前 GUA）全部 **RST（Connection refused）** —— SRV 宣告 :5540 且 TXT `T=1`，但实际无监听 |
+| hass matter-server | `started`，v9.0.4，无更新；宣告自身运营实例 `DCE86145C137AF0E-…1B669`（v4+v6，当前 GUA）；**无任何 established :5540 会话**；core/add-on 日志无 matter 错误 |
+| 其他 Matter 控制器 | Aqara M3 `.248` 在线（有线 0.8ms），宣告含自身 fabric 节点 `4DF2B1455D19402D-11E158E46D24A000`；SmartThings `.48` 在线并周期查询 `_matter._tcp.local`；手机（当前前缀 GUA）也在浏览。LAN55 共见 **5 个 fabric**：`4DF2B1455D19402D`（M3）、`DCE86145C137AF0E`（HA）、`2F6E56020E1996E7`、`03BCFAEDD6153944`、`6A6FF80C2DB84DEE` |
+
+**判定**：失败模式 C = TCP/IP 栈与 mDNS 守护进程活着（主动 RST、DHCP 续租、ping 通），
+但 Matter 应用层监听不存在。与模式 A（auth 卡死）、模式 B（全静默挂死）同族不同形态；
+**两盏同时处于同一状态**更指向共同诱因（固件缺陷，或 PD 轮换等共同事件后未恢复）。
+**对策（推荐，未执行）**：逐盏断电 10 秒重启（模式 B 的已验证对策），重启后复测
+TCP 5540 恢复监听即可确认。
+
+**核查方法备忘**（只读，可复用）：
+
+- gw：`show dhcp leases` / `show arp`（经 `/opt/vyatta/bin/vyatta-op-cmd-wrapper`）。
+- AP：`grep -i <mac> /var/log/messages`（hostapd 关联事件 + stahtd RSSI/soft failure）。
+- hass：`sudo -n -i ha apps info core_matter_server`；`ip -6 neigh show dev end0`
+  （看灯泡 fe80/旧新前缀 GUA 与 FAILED 项）；被动抓包
+  `sudo -n -i timeout 65 tcpdump -ni end0 -s 0 -tt 'udp port 5353'`——配对方周期查询
+  会自然引出灯泡宣告，无需主动发包。
+- 5540 探测：hass 上 python3 对 v4 / fe80%end0 / GUA 各 connect 一次；RST=无监听，
+  超时=不可达（两者含义不同）。
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# Plane CE 加固草稿（docs/plane-hardening/）
+
+> **状态：草稿，未应用、未提交。** 对应追踪：Plane vps 项目条目（2026-09-03，**记录源**；Linear W1N-277 已取消，Linear 自 2026-09-03 起不再作为记录源）。
+> 线上实例：`plane.chans.xyz`（synapse K3s，ns `plane`，release `plane-app` = chart `plane-ce-1.8.0` / app `v1.4.1`）。
+> 依据：2026-09-03 只读核查（13 条审查意见中 11 条属实、#3 基本属实、#9 指标归属错误）+ 上游 chart 模板逐条核对。
+
+## 文件
+
+| 文件 | 内容 |
+|------|------|
+| `values.hardened.yaml` | 可选硬化 values（external secrets 引用、requireExplicitSecrets、minio pin、上传限额对齐）；含 HTTP→HTTPS `extraObjects` 示例 |
+| `secrets.yaml.example` | 6 组外部 Secret 结构占位（只含 key 名，真实值仅存宿主机） |
+| `backup/plane-backup.yaml` | **PostgreSQL 备份 CronJob**（pg_dump `-Fc`，hostPath `/var/backups/plane`；MinIO 已按实际用量剔除） |
+| `backup/README.md` | 备份方案说明（排程/容量/保留/还原/阻塞） |
+
+## 应用顺序（每步先 diff 后执行，全部需用户逐项确认）
+
+### 现在就值得做：DB 备份（P0，见 backup/）
+`plane-backup.yaml` 部署 + 手动触发验证一次即可；88 MB 库每日快照几乎零成本。
+
+### 可选（顺手做一次，不是必须）
+- **Phase A 密钥外部化**（零行为变化、无停机，约 15 分钟）：按 `secrets.yaml.example`
+  在宿主机建 6 个 Secret（值先复制当前集群），用 `values.hardened.yaml` 跑
+  `helm diff upgrade` → `helm upgrade`；验证后删除 chart 生成的旧 Secret。
+  价值：默认密钥不再落在 chart 公开常量上，作为保险。
+- **MCP API Key 轮换**：若审查对话出过你的环境，Plane 后台重生成 + 更新
+  `/home/windy/plane-k3s/mcp/mcp.env`（0600）+ 重启 Cursor MCP。
+- **/god-mode IP 白名单**：若在意管理后台被公网爆破。chart 1.8.0 的 IngressRoute
+  不支持给单条路由追加 middleware → 需 post-renderer 或 upgrade 后 `kubectl patch`
+  （升级会覆盖，需固化）；源 IP 清单待提供。
+
+### 明确暂缓/跳过（个人单节点，等出现症状再处理）
+- SECRET_KEY 等轮换（Phase B）：等真要配 SMTP/OAuth 前再做（避免旧密文不可解）。
+- NetworkPolicy、有状态组件 resources limits（chart 无 values 开关，需 post-render/patch）、
+  HTTP→HTTPS（草稿已给 `extraObjects` 示例）、metrics-server/Sentry。
+
+## 关键限制（chart 1.8.0 模板已核对）
+- `external_secrets.*_existingSecret` 设置后，对应 Secret **必须**包含模板所需全部 key
+  （缺失不自动补），见 `secrets.yaml.example` 注释。
+- `app_keys_existingSecret` 的 envFrom 在所有 workload 上**最后注入**（后置生效），
+  保证 app/live 共享密钥一致——不要在其后再放同名 key 的 Secret。
+- `DATABASE_URL`/`AMQP_URL`/`REDIS_URL` 是 chart 生成的派生 URL，内嵌明文密码；
+  外部化后轮换 DB/队列密码时必须同步更新 `plane-app-env`。
+- minio 的 `MINIO_ROOT_*` 与 `AWS_*` 同源于一个 Secret；升级时 bucket Job 会重跑
+  （需 admin 权限凭据）——换 svcacct 前先确认权限覆盖该 Job。
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Plane CE 备份方案（DB-only）— DRAFT (2026-09-03), 未应用
+
+> 关联：`plane-backup.yaml`（CronJob）；追踪：Plane vps 项目条目（记录源，2026-09-03 起不用 Linear）。
+> 现状（实测）：pg 全库 **88 MB**（310 issues / 1 user）；MinIO uploads **264 KB**（几乎空）。
+
+## 范围决策（2026-09-03，实际角度）
+
+- **做：PostgreSQL 逻辑备份** —— 覆盖现实故障（误删、升级失败、磁盘坏、重装），成本≈0。
+- **不做：MinIO/附件备份** —— 桶仅 264 KB，个人实例附件可接受丢失；不为它付日常维护。
+  日后附件明显变多再按原完整版思路加 `mc mirror`（历史版本见本目录 git 历史/Plane 条目评论）。
+- 异机同步暂不启用（见下"局限/阻塞"）。
+
+## 方案
+
+集群内 CronJob（ns `plane`，每天 **01:30 UTC = 03:30 本地**，控制器按 UTC 跑）：
+
+1. 单容器 `postgres:15.7-alpine`：`pg_dump -Fc`（自定义压缩格式）打 `plane` 库
+   → `/var/backups/plane/pg/plane-<UTC时间戳>.dump`（hostPath `DirectoryOrCreate`）
+2. 保留 7 天（`find -mtime +7 -delete`），成功/失败历史各留 3/2
+3. 凭据：现 chart Secret `plane-app-pgdb-secrets`（Phase A 外部化后改 `plane-pgdb-credentials`）
+
+## 容量
+
+- 库 88 MB → `-Fc` 快照约 10–40 MB/天 × 7 天 ≈ **<300 MB**，对 83 G 可用盘可忽略。
+
+## 还原（未演练；应用前先做一次隔离测试）
+
+```bash
+# 目标 PG15 实例（临时起一个 postgres:15.7-alpine 容器或另一台机）:
+#   先建空库: createdb plane (user=plane)
+pg_restore -h <target> -U plane -d plane --clean --if-exists /var/backups/plane/pg/plane-<TS>.dump
+# 还原后确认 310 issues 量级一致；附件为空属预期（未备份 MinIO）
+```
+
+## 验收（应用前逐项过）
+
+- [ ] CronJob 建立后手动触发一次：`kubectl -n plane create job --from=cronjob/plane-backup plane-backup-manual-1`，Job `Completed`
+- [ ] `/var/backups/plane/pg/plane-*.dump` 可被 `pg_restore -l` 列出
+- [ ] 备份 Job 只依赖 pgdb 服务，不依赖 Plane 应用 Pod（应用故障期间也能出备份）
+- [ ] 保留清理 dry-run（`find ... -print`）正确；`df -h /` 前后对比记录
+
+## 局限 / 阻塞
+
+- **本地方案不是离机备份**：单节点磁盘/整机故障即丢。如日后要离机，纳入
+  [Restic 异机 repository 决策与存取隔离](https://plane.chans.xyz/space/projects/56874283-7e1d-43a8-afa4-631cf1c4ad5b/issues/7825d564-ae15-446b-bced-be26b648346b/)
+  （与 Matrix 备份同一决策）；恢复演练纪律见
+  [服务级 restore runbook 与隔离复元演练](https://plane.chans.xyz/space/projects/56874283-7e1d-43a8-afa4-631cf1c4ad5b/issues/a9bea3ba-c958-4a74-b2f1-6bbb653f21d3/)。
+- 提醒：同一节点 **Matrix 数据价值远高于 Plane 且同样无备份** —— 若投入备份精力，顺序上 Matrix 优先。
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# Plane CE PostgreSQL backup CronJob — DRAFT (2026-09-03), NOT applied.
+# ns: plane (synapse K3s single node). Output: hostPath /var/backups/plane (root disk, auto-created).
+#
+# Scope decision (2026-09-03, practical): DB-only. MinIO dropped — uploads bucket
+# measured at 264 KB / 444 KB total; attachments are acceptable loss for this
+# personal 1-user instance (310 issues / 88 MB DB). Revisit only if usage grows.
+#
+# Credentials: read from the CURRENT chart-generated Secret (works today). After the
+# optional external-secrets migration (docs/plane-hardening/README.md Phase A) switch
+# the secretKeyRef name to plane-pgdb-credentials.
+#
+# Apply:
+#   ssh windy@synapse.chans.xyz 'sudo k3s kubectl apply -n plane -f -' < plane-backup.yaml
+# Manual run + verify:
+#   sudo k3s kubectl -n plane create job --from=cronjob/plane-backup plane-backup-manual-1
+#   sudo k3s kubectl -n plane get cronjob,job,pods | grep plane-backup
+#   sudo ls -lh /var/backups/plane/pg
+# Restore steps + tuning: see backup/README.md
+
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: CronJob
+metadata:
+  name: plane-backup
+  namespace: plane
+spec:
+  # 01:30 UTC daily = 03:30 local (CEST). CronJob controller runs in UTC.
+  schedule: "30 1 * * *"
+  concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
+  successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 3
+  failedJobsHistoryLimit: 2
+  jobTemplate:
+    spec:
+      backoffLimit: 2
+      template:
+        spec:
+          restartPolicy: OnFailure
+          volumes:
+            - name: backup
+              hostPath:
+                path: /var/backups/plane
+                type: DirectoryOrCreate
+          containers:
+            - name: pg-dump
+              image: postgres:15.7-alpine
+              env:
+                - name: PGPASSWORD
+                  valueFrom:
+                    secretKeyRef:
+                      name: plane-app-pgdb-secrets      # -> plane-pgdb-credentials after Phase A
+                      key: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
+              command: ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+              args:
+                - |
+                  set -euo pipefail
+                  TS=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)
+                  mkdir -p /backup/pg
+                  pg_dump -h plane-app-pgdb.plane.svc.cluster.local -U plane -d plane \
+                    -Fc -f "/backup/pg/plane-${TS}.dump"
+                  find /backup/pg -type f -name 'plane-*.dump' -mtime +7 -delete
+                  echo "pg_dump done: /backup/pg/plane-${TS}.dump ($(du -h /backup/pg/plane-${TS}.dump | cut -f1))"
+              volumeMounts:
+                - name: backup
+                  mountPath: /backup
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# External Secret structure for Plane CE hardening — EXAMPLE ONLY.
+# No real values here; this file is safe to commit. Real values live only on the
+# host (/home/windy/plane-k3s, 0600/0700) and in the cluster.
+#
+# Phase A — create each Secret with the CURRENT cluster values first (zero change):
+#   # current source Secrets (chart-generated):
+#   kubectl -n plane get secret plane-app-app-secrets     -o jsonpath='{.data.SECRET_KEY}'            | base64 -d
+#   kubectl -n plane get secret plane-app-live-secrets   -o jsonpath='{.data.REDIS_URL}'             | base64 -d
+#   kubectl -n plane get secret plane-app-pgdb-secrets   -o jsonpath='{.data.POSTGRES_PASSWORD}'     | base64 -d
+#   kubectl -n plane get secret plane-app-rabbitmq-secrets -o jsonpath='{.data.RABBITMQ_DEFAULT_PASS}' | base64 -d
+#   kubectl -n plane get secret plane-app-doc-store-secrets -o jsonpath='{.data}'                    | base64 -d
+#
+# e.g. kubectl -n plane create secret generic plane-app-keys \
+#        --from-literal=SECRET_KEY="$(<copy from above>)" \
+#        --from-literal=LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY="$(<copy from above>)"
+#
+# All keys below are REQUIRED by chart templates/plane-ce-1.8.0 (verified 2026-09-03):
+# missing keys are NOT auto-filled once an existingSecret is referenced.
+
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: plane-app-keys          # external_secrets.app_keys_existingSecret
+  namespace: plane
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  SECRET_KEY: ""                # current: copy from plane-app-app-secrets; rotate only in Phase B
+  LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY: ""    # current: same value as above / plane-app-live-secrets
+
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: plane-app-env           # external_secrets.app_env_existingSecret
+  namespace: plane
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  REDIS_URL: ""                 # redis://plane-app-redis.plane.svc.cluster.local:6379/
+  DATABASE_URL: ""              # postgresql://plane:plane@plane-app-pgdb.plane.svc.cluster.local/plane
+  AMQP_URL: ""                  # amqp://plane:plane@plane-app-rabbitmq.plane.svc.cluster.local/
+
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: plane-live-env          # external_secrets.live_env_existingSecret
+  namespace: plane
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  REDIS_URL: ""                 # redis://plane-app-redis.plane.svc.cluster.local:6379/
+
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: plane-pgdb-credentials  # external_secrets.pgdb_existingSecret
+  namespace: plane
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ""         # Phase A: keep current ('plane'); Phase B: ALTER USER first, then sync
+  POSTGRES_DB: "plane"
+  POSTGRES_USER: "plane"
+
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: plane-rabbitmq-credentials  # external_secrets.rabbitmq_existingSecret
+  namespace: plane
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  RABBITMQ_DEFAULT_USER: "plane"
+  RABBITMQ_DEFAULT_PASS: ""     # Phase A: keep current; Phase B: rabbitmqctl change_password first
+
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: plane-minio-credentials # external_secrets.doc_store_existingSecret
+  namespace: plane
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  FILE_SIZE_LIMIT: "20971520"          # must match env.doc_upload_size_limit
+  AWS_S3_BUCKET_NAME: "uploads"
+  USE_MINIO: "1"
+  MINIO_ROOT_USER: "admin"
+  MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ""              # root creds take effect on first init only
+  AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: "admin"
+  AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ""            # == MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD while minio.local_setup
+  AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL: "http://plane-app-minio:9000"
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# Plane CE hardened values — DRAFT (2026-09-03), NOT applied.
+# Target file on host: /home/windy/plane-k3s/values.yaml (synapse.chans.xyz)
+# Reference release: plane-app, chart plane-ce-1.8.0 (values.yaml L1-362 + templates verified 2026-09-03).
+# No secrets in this file. Secret *values* live only in k8s Secrets (see secrets.yaml.example).
+#
+# Two phases:
+#   Phase A: externalize secrets (reference names below) with CURRENT values copied -> zero change.
+#   Phase B: rotate credentials one by one (see README.md). SECRET_KEY rotation is cheap only while
+#            SMTP/OAuth are unconfigured (no encrypted config rows yet).
+
+planeVersion: v1.4.1
+
+ingress:
+  enabled: true
+  appHost: plane.chans.xyz
+  ingressClass: traefik
+  traefik:
+    # 20 MiB (chart default). Keep aligned with env.doc_upload_size_limit below.
+    maxRequestBodyBytes: 20971520
+
+ssl:
+  createIssuer: true
+  issuer: http          # HTTP-01; ssl_token_existingSecret not needed
+  email: admin@chans.xyz
+  generateCerts: true
+
+postgres:
+  storageClass: local-path
+  volumeSize: 5Gi
+  # NOTE: chart 1.8.0 exposes NO resources knob for the bundled datastores
+  # (stateful templates render no resources block). Add limits via
+  # --post-renderer/kustomize or `kubectl -n plane patch sts ...` re-applied on
+  # every upgrade (P2 task; see README.md).
+
+redis:
+  storageClass: local-path
+  # image: valkey/valkey:7.2.11-alpine   # already pinned by chart default; uncomment to make explicit
+
+minio:
+  # P2: pin. Digest of the currently running :latest (2026-09-03, pod plane-app-minio-wl-0).
+  image: minio/minio@sha256:14cea493d9a34af32f524e538b8346cf79f3321eff8e708c1e2960462bd8936e
+  # image_mc: minio/mc@sha256:...   # optional: pin one-shot bucket-init client the same way
+  storageClass: local-path
+  volumeSize: 5Gi
+
+rabbitmq:
+  storageClass: local-path
+
+env:
+  # Fail the render instead of ever falling back to the chart's PUBLIC constants
+  # (values.yaml L340-341 in chart 1.8.0). Requires external_secrets below.
+  requireExplicitSecrets: true
+
+  # SECRET_KEY / LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY are deliberately OMITTED here.
+  # They live in k8s Secret `plane-app-keys` (referenced below). With
+  # requireExplicitSecrets=true and app_keys_existingSecret set, the chart renders
+  # neither key itself and app+live workloads both envFrom `plane-app-keys` LAST
+  # (later envFrom wins), which keeps the shared signing key consistent.
+
+  pgdb_name: plane
+  docstore_bucket: uploads
+  # Align app-side upload cap with the Traefik body limit (was 5242880/5MiB).
+  # Keep both at 20MiB, or lower both together.
+  doc_upload_size_limit: "20971520"
+
+external_secrets:
+  # Shared signing keys (used by app + live). REQUIRED keys: SECRET_KEY, LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY.
+  app_keys_existingSecret: plane-app-keys
+  # REQUIRED keys: REDIS_URL, DATABASE_URL, AMQP_URL (chart-derived URLs; update on DB/queue rotation).
+  app_env_existingSecret: plane-app-env
+  # REQUIRED keys: REDIS_URL.
+  live_env_existingSecret: plane-live-env
+  # REQUIRED keys: POSTGRES_PASSWORD, POSTGRES_DB, POSTGRES_USER.
+  pgdb_existingSecret: plane-pgdb-credentials
+  # REQUIRED keys: RABBITMQ_DEFAULT_USER, RABBITMQ_DEFAULT_PASS.
+  rabbitmq_existingSecret: plane-rabbitmq-credentials
+  # REQUIRED keys: FILE_SIZE_LIMIT, AWS_S3_BUCKET_NAME, USE_MINIO, MINIO_ROOT_USER,
+  # MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL.
+  doc_store_existingSecret: plane-minio-credentials
+  # ssl_token_existingSecret: ''   # DNS-01 only (cloudflare/digitalocean); unused with HTTP-01
+
+# Optional, P2: HTTP -> HTTPS 301. The chart's own IngressRoute binds only
+# 'websecure' (http:// currently 404s). extraObjects is rendered verbatim (toYaml).
+# Uncomment and `helm upgrade` once reviewed:
+# extraObjects:
+#   - apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+#     kind: Middleware
+#     metadata:
+#       name: plane-https-redirect
+#       namespace: plane
+#     spec:
+#       redirectScheme:
+#         scheme: https
+#         permanent: true
+#   - apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+#     kind: IngressRoute
+#     metadata:
+#       name: plane-http-to-https
+#       namespace: plane
+#     spec:
+#       entryPoints: [web]
+#       routes:
+#         - match: Host(`plane.chans.xyz`)
+#           kind: Rule
+#           middlewares:
+#             - name: plane-https-redirect
+#           services:
+#             - name: plane-app-web
+#               port: 3000
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+# TL-SE5420 官方安装手册（整理版）
+
+> **来源：** TP-LINK《TL-SE5420 V1.0 安装手册 1.0.2》（PDF），已整理为 Markdown。
+> 官方 PDF：<https://service.tp-link.com.cn/download/202310/TL-SE5420%20V1.0安装手册%201.0.2.pdf>
+> 配套实施文档：[../lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md](../lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md)
+> 说明：PDF 中示意图已省略（仅保留文字）；正文以官方 PDF 为准。
+
+---
+
+## 声明
+
+- Copyright © 2023 普联技术有限公司，版权所有，保留所有权利。
+- 产品规格和资讯仅供参考，如有内容更新，恕不另行通知。本手册仅作为使用指导，所作陈述均不构成任何形式的担保。
+
+## 相关文档
+
+| 文档名称 | 用途 |
+|---|---|
+| 《安装手册》 | 交换机的安装过程、启动以及常见故障处理 |
+| 《用户手册》 | 交换机的各个功能应用以及常见功能使用问题处理 |
+| 《命令行手册》 | 交换机 CLI（Command Line Interface，命令行界面）参考信息 |
+| 《防雷安装手册》 | 安装中如何做好防雷措施以避免设备雷击损坏 |
+
+技术支持：服务热线 `400-8863-400` · 邮箱 `fae@tp-link.com.cn` · 微信公众号「TP-LINK商用网络」/「TP-LINK商云APP」
+
+## 阅读对象与约定
+
+- 适合阅读对象：网络工程师、网络管理员。
+- 本手册如无特别说明，均以 **TL-SE5420** 机型为例介绍，所指交换机为 2.5G 三层网管交换机。
+- 产品规格标贴位于设备底部，扫描二维码可查看安规符号释义。
+
+---
+
+## 第 1 章 产品介绍
+
+### 1.1 产品简介
+
+2.5G 三层网管交换机，支持静态路由和动态路由 RIP 协议，提供完备的安全防护机制、完善的 QoS 策略和丰富实用的 VLAN 功能。适用于中小型企业网、校园网络、酒店、网吧等使用场景。
+
+### 1.2 产品外观
+
+**前面板组成：** 1 模式切换按键 · 2 指示灯 · 3 1 个 Type-C Console 端口 · 4 16 个 2.5Gbps RJ45 端口 · 5 4 个 SFP+ 端口 · 6 1 个 USB 端口
+
+**模式切换按键：** 用于切换指示灯的指示状态，支持「端口模式」和「堆叠模式」切换。任意模式下超过 45s 不按动按钮，自动恢复为端口模式。（模式切换功能软件后续升级支持，以实际软件功能为准。）
+
+**指示灯状态：**
+
+| 指示灯 | 名称 | 工作状态 | 工作说明 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| PWR | 电源指示灯 | 常亮 / 熄灭 / 闪烁 | 供电正常 / 未通电或供电异常 / 供电异常 |
+| SYS | 系统指示灯 | 绿色闪烁 / 红色闪烁 | 系统正常 / 系统异常 |
+| Master | 堆叠指示灯 | 绿色常亮 / 黄色常亮 / 熄灭 | 堆叠主设备 / 堆叠错误 / 非主设备 |
+| Stack | 模式指示灯 | 绿色常亮 / 熄灭 | 端口指示灯工作在堆叠模式 / 其它模式 |
+| 1-16（端口模式） | 端口指示灯 | 绿色常亮 / 黄色常亮 / 闪烁 / 熄灭 | 2.5Gbps / 10/100/1000Mbps / 传输中 / 未连接 |
+| 17-20（端口模式） | 端口指示灯 | 绿色常亮 / 黄色常亮 / 闪烁 / 熄灭 | 10Gbps / 2.5Gbps 或 1000Mbps / 传输中 / 未连接 |
+| USB | 端口指示灯 | 绿色常亮 / 熄灭 | USB 连接正常 / 未连接或异常 |
+
+**Console 端口：** 用于和计算机或其他终端的串口相连以管理或配置交换机。TL-SE5420 提供 **1 个 Type-C Console 端口**。
+
+**2.5Gbps RJ45 端口：** 16 个，支持 10M/100M/1000M/2.5Gbps 速率，每个端口对应一个端口指示灯。
+
+**10Gbps SFP+ 端口：** 支持接入 1Gbps/2.5Gbps SFP 光/电模块或 10Gbps SFP+ 光/电模块，每个端口对应 1 个 Link/Act 指示灯。
+
+**USB 端口：** 标准 USB2.0，480Mbps。可和交换机 Flash 文件系统交互（上传/下载应用程序、配置文件）。支持**交换机 U 盘开局**（详见《用户手册》）。
+
+> 注意：不同厂商 USB 设备的兼容性和驱动存在差异，TP-LINK 不保证所有 USB 设备都能正常使用；如不能使用不属于交换机故障。
+
+**后面板组成：** 1 防雷接线柱 · 2 电源插座（三相，220V~50Hz 交流电源）。
+
+> 注意：请使用原装电源线；请通过电源线插头连接到有接地连接的输出插座；请远离水、火、潮湿或炎热环境；不要自行拆卸、修理、修改设备或更换电池（有爆炸危险）。
+
+---
+
+## 第 2 章 产品安装
+
+### 2.1 物品清单
+
+- 交换机 ×1 · 电源线 ×1 · 机架 L 型支架 ×2 · 安装手册 ×1 · 接地线 ×1 · 其他配件
+
+### 2.2 安装注意事项
+
+**安装安全：**
+- 安装过程中电源保持关闭，佩戴防静电手环并保证接地良好；
+- 确认供电电压与交换机标示电压相符；
+- 通电前确认不会引起电源电路超负荷；
+- 工作时不要打开外壳；
+- 清洁前先拔电源插头，勿用湿润面料擦拭或液体清洗；
+- 保持交换机底部朝下水平放置。
+
+**环境要求：**
+
+| 环境描述 | 温度 | 相对湿度 |
+|---|---|---|
+| 工作环境 | 0℃ ~ 40℃ | 10% ~ 90%RH 无凝结 |
+| 存储环境 | -40℃ ~ 70℃ | 5% ~ 90%RH 无凝结 |
+
+- 海拔：仅适用于 2000m 以下地区。
+- 室内防尘、防电磁干扰、防雷：确认设备与大地接地良好；远离高频大功率设备；室外布线建议使用信号防雷器。
+- 安装台：机架或工作台需承重至少 **5.5Kg**；供电插座与交换机距离不超过 1.5 米。
+
+### 2.3 安装工具准备
+
+十字螺丝刀 · 防静电手环 · 网线、光纤
+
+### 2.4 产品安装
+
+**桌面安装：** 底部朝上放置于稳定桌面 → 粘贴 4 个脚垫到机壳底部四角凹槽 → 翻转放平。机壳周围预留 5~10cm 空隙确保散热。
+
+**19 英寸机架安装：** 检查机架接地与稳定性 → 两侧安装 L 型角铁并固定 → 安放到机架内由托架支撑 → 螺钉固定 L 型角铁到机架导槽。机架内一般由下至上安装。
+
+---
+
+## 第 3 章 硬件连接
+
+### 3.1 连接 RJ45 端口
+通过 RJ45 端口连接交换机和对端设备。
+
+### 3.2 连接 SFP+ 端口
+连接 SFP/SFP+ 光/电模块或 SFP+ 电缆。**SFP+ 端口默认支持 10Gbps；若使用千兆 SFP 光模块，需先将 SFP+ 端口速率设置为 1000Mbps。** 使用 SFP+ 电缆时确保最小弯曲半径符合要求。
+
+### 3.3 连接 Console 端口
+Type-C Console 端口，连接后可通过命令行管理交换机（登录方法见 4.2）。
+
+### 3.4 连接电源线
+接入 220V~50Hz 交流电源；确认供电电源与大地良好接触，确认电源开关位置以便及时断电。
+
+### 3.5 设备初始化
+接通电源后自动初始化：
+- PWR 指示灯亮 = 电源连接正确，灭 = 供电异常；
+- SYS 指示灯闪烁 = 系统初始化成功，灭或常亮 = 初始化失败；
+- Link/Act 指示灯会闪烁一下后熄灭，指示系统已复位。
+
+### 3.6 安装后检查
+- 周围散热空间与空气流通；
+- 电源插座供电符合规格；
+- 电源、交换机、机架正确接地；
+- 与其它网络设备连接正常。
+
+---
+
+## 第 4 章 配置指南
+
+### 4.1 WEB 登录
+
+> **TL-SE5420 业务口固定 IP 为 `10.18.18.251`**；电脑连接业务口时需设 IP `10.18.18.x`（x 为 2-250 任意值），子网掩码 `255.255.255.0`。
+
+1. 普通 PC 用网线连接交换机任意一个 RJ45 业务端口；
+2. 浏览器输入 `http://10.18.18.251` 回车；
+3. **设置用户名和密码**，点击<确认>登录 WEB 管理界面；
+4. 首页左上角商标可访问 TP-LINK 官网；左侧主菜单进行功能配置。
+
+### 4.2 本地登录（Console）
+
+1. 连接 Type-C Console 口到计算机；
+2. 安装「**TP-LINK USB 串口驱动程序**」（官网下载或随机光盘）；
+3. 终端仿真程序参数：
+   - 波特率 **38400bps** · 数据位 **8** · 奇偶校验 **无** · 停止位 **1** · 数据流控制 **无**
+4. 输入回车，出现 **`TL-SE5420>`** 提示符即登录成功。
+
+### 4.3 远程登录（Telnet）
+
+1. cmd 输入 `telnet 10.18.18.251`；
+2. 输入登录用户名和密码；
+3. 输入 `enable` 回车进入特权模式。
+
+### 4.4 云管理
+
+1. Web 界面 →<云管理> → 开启<全局开关>；
+2. 访问 `https://smbcloud.tp-link.com.cn/login.html`，登录 TP-LINK ID；
+3. 项目集中管理 → 设备列表 → 添加设备（输入 MAC、名称、用户名、密码、分组；MAC 可扫设备底部二维码获取）；
+4. 设备信息页找到对应条目 →<远程配置> → 云平台远程管理。
+
+---
+
+## 附录 A 常见故障处理
+
+**问题1：忘记用户名和密码（恢复出厂设置）**
+1. 串口连 Console 口，打开终端；
+2. 交换机断电重启，终端出现 **`Press CTRL-B to enter the bootUtil`** 时按 `Ctrl+B` 进入 bootUtil 菜单；
+3. 输入 **`2`** 进行软件复位，恢复到出厂默认设置，登录用户名和密码均为 **admin**。
+
+**问题2：电源指示灯显示不正常**
+- 电源线连接是否正确；供电电源是否匹配（100-240V~ 50/60Hz）。
+
+**问题3：无法登录 WEB 管理界面**
+- 是否达到 HTTP 管理人数上限；
+- 端口线缆连接与端口状态；
+- 电脑 IP 与交换机 IP 是否同网段；
+- `ping 127.0.0.1`（本机 TCP/IP）与 `ping 10.18.18.251`（交换机）。
+
+**问题4：断电后配置消失**
+- 配置实时生效，但**断电前必须点保存配置**。
+
+---
+
+## 附录 B 技术参数规格
+
+| 项 | 值 |
+|---|---|
+| 产品型号 | TL-SE5420 |
+| 技术标准 | IEEE 802.3 / 802.3i / 802.3u / 802.3ab / 802.3z / 802.3bz(2.5G/5G) / 802.3ae(10G) / 802.3ad(链路聚合) / 802.3x(流控) / 802.1p(QoS) / 802.1q(VLAN) / 802.1x / 802.1d(STP) / 802.1s(MSTP) / 802.1w(RSTP) / 802.1ab(LLDP) |
+| 端口 | 16× 10/100/1000/2.5G RJ45 + 4× 10G SFP+ |
+| 传输方式 | 存储转发 |
+| 数据传输速率 | 10M半双工/20M全双工 · 100M半/200M全 · 千兆2000M全 · 2.5G 5000M全 · 10G 20000M全 |
+| 包转发速率 | 10BASE-T:14881pps · 100BASE-TX:148810pps · 1000BASE:1488095pps · 2.5GBASE-T:3720238pps · 10GBASE:14880952pps（每端口） |
+| 电源输入 | 220V~50Hz |
+| 工作温度 | 0℃~40℃ |
+| 存储温度 | -40℃~70℃ |
+| 工作湿度 | 10%~90%RH 无凝结 |
+| 存储湿度 | 5%~90%RH 无凝结 |
+
+网络介质（部分）：10BASE-T 3类线≤100m · 100BASE-TX 5类线≤100m · 1000BASE-T 超5类≤100m · 2.5GBASE-T 超5类≤100m · 10GBASE-SR OM1/OM2/OM3 MMF 2m~300m · 10GBASE-LR SMF 2m~10000m。
+
+---
+
+## 附录 C 连接 SFP+ 端口补充说明
+
+- **光纤**：单模（芯径 9/10μm，模间色散小，适合远程）；多模（芯径 50/62.5μm，传输距离较近，一般几公里）。
+- **光模块**：按性质分单模/多模；按速率分百兆/千兆/万兆。SFP/SFP+ 端口兼容单模、多模光模块，推荐使用 TP-LINK 光模块。
+
+**TP-LINK 光模块参考表：**
+
+| 模块类型 | 产品型号 | 速率 | 距离 | 传输介质 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 光模块 | TL-SM512LS-10KM | 10Gbps | 10km | SMF 双纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM512LM-300m | 10Gbps | 300m | OM3 MMF 双纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM411LSA/B-5KM | 2.5Gbps | 5km | SMF 单纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM411LSA/B-500m | 2.5Gbps | 500m | SMF 单纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM411SSA/B-500m | 2.5Gbps | 500m | SMF 单纤 SC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM412LS-5KM | 2.5Gbps | 5km | SMF 双纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM311LSA/B-20KM | 1Gbps | 20km | SMF 单纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM311LSA/B-2KM | 1Gbps | 2km | SMF 单纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM311SSA/B-2KM | 1Gbps | 2km | SMF 单纤 SC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM312LS-40KM | 1Gbps | 40km | SMF 双纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM312LS-20KM | 1Gbps | 20km | SMF 双纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM312LS-20KM工业级 | 1Gbps | 20km | SMF 双纤 LC |
+| 光模块 | TL-SM312LM-550m | 1Gbps | 550m | OM2 MMF 双纤 LC |
+| 电口模块 | TL-SM510U | 10Gbps | 30m | 超六类网线 |
+| 电口模块 | TL-SM410U | 2.5Gbps | 100m | 超五类网线 |
+| 电口模块 | TL-SM310U | 1Gbps | 100m | 超五类网线 |
+
+---
+
+## 附录 D 产品保修卡（要点）
+
+- 免费保修范围外的情况：超出保换/保修期限、未按要求安装使用、擅自改动设置或拆机、意外或人为损坏、运输损坏、不可抗力等。
+- 技术支持热线：`400-8863-400` · 邮箱 `fae@tp-link.com.cn` · 官网 `www.tp-link.com.cn`。
+- **售后服务承诺：三年保修。**
+- 外置电源保换 1 年，电池 6 个月，鼠标 3 个月；无线外置天线及光纤头 3 个月。
+- 购机 15 天内出现性能问题且外观无划伤可换新。
+
+---
+
+## 附录 E 有毒有害物质含量声明
+
+（详见官方 PDF 附表。）
+
+---
+
+公司地址：深圳市南山区深南路科技园工业厂房 24 栋南段 1 层、3-5 层、28 栋北段 1-4 层
+公司网址：<http://www.tp-link.com.cn> · 技术支持 E-mail：`smb@tp-link.com.cn` · 技术支持热线：`400-8863-400`
+文档版本：REV1.0.2
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+# UniFi network configuration
+
+## Controller
+
+| Item | Value |
+|---|---|
+| Host | [ubnt](../hosts/ubnt.md) |
+| Address | `192.168.66.46` |
+| Deployment | Docker, `jacobalberty/unifi:v9.5.21`, host networking |
+| Inform endpoint | `http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform` |
+| MongoDB database / port | `ace` / `27117` |
+
+Although `8080` is a common UniFi inform port, this controller uses `9080`.
+All AP adoption and recovery procedures must use the endpoint above.
+
+## Login and MFA
+
+On 2026-08-08, **"Sync Local Admin with Ubiquiti SSO"** was disabled
+(`super_sdn.sso_login_enabled: false`). Previously every login was forced
+through Ubiquiti SSO (sso.ui.com) and required MFA, which blocked programmatic
+access: the `unifi-network-mcp` write operations failed with
+`api.err.Ubic2faTokenRequired`.
+
+Now local accounts (`windy`, `zhiqiangf`) sign in with their local passwords
+and no MFA. The `unifi-network-mcp` tool uses the `zhiqiangf` local account and
+works for both read and write operations (verified 2026-08-08 with a reversible
+client rename).
+
+Impact: unifi.ui.com remote access (Site Manager) no longer works.
+
+Manage the setting idempotently via Ansible:
+
+```bash
+cd ansible
+ansible-playbook playbooks/unifi-sso.yml --limit unifi --check   # read-only
+ansible-playbook playbooks/unifi-sso.yml --limit unifi \
+  -e '{"unifi_sso_confirm": true, "unifi_sso_target_value": false}'  # apply
+```
+
+See [runbooks/ansible-operations.md](../runbooks/ansible-operations.md).
+
+## Inter-VLAN reachability
+
+The AP management networks are routed by [gw](../hosts/gw.md),
+`192.168.66.254`. On 2026-08-05, a probe sourced from the LAN55 gateway
+(`192.168.55.254`) reached the controller (`192.168.66.46`) with 3/3 ICMP
+replies. The UAP-AC-Lite is online through the `:9080/inform` endpoint, which
+also confirms the required application path in practice.
+
+`LAN_IN` contains explicit allow rules for `192.168.55.0/24 ↔
+192.168.66.0/24`, but the firewall set is currently inactive (not attached to
+an interface). Treat the networks as bidirectionally reachable by default;
+do not rely on those inactive rules as an access boundary. Recheck this after
+attaching any LAN firewall policy or changing VLAN routing.
+
+To inspect device records from the controller host:
+
+```bash
+docker exec -it unifi-controller bash
+mongo --port 27117
+```
+
+```javascript
+use ace
+db.device.find(
+  { type: "uap" },
+  { name: 1, ip: 1, model: 1, inform_url: 1 }
+).pretty()
+```
+
+## IPv6 status (verified 2026-08-20)
+
+IPv6 is **enabled and live** on the main Wi-Fi networks. Read-only
+verification, no changes made.
+
+**Controller (`networkconf` in the `ace` DB):** the `Default` LAN network has
+`ipv6_enabled: true`, `ipv6_client_address_assignment: slaac`,
+`ipv6_ra_enabled: true`, `ipv6_ra_priority: high`, and
+`dhcpdv6_allow_slaac: true`. `ipv6_interface_type: "none"` is expected: the
+network's gateway is the third-party EdgeRouter (`gw`), so the controller does
+not manage WAN-side IPv6 — RA/SLAAC is served by the router.
+
+All active SSIDs map to the `Default` network: `ubnt-windy` (5G),
+`ubnt-windy-2` (2.4G), `ubnt-haas` (2.4G) — clients on them receive SLAAC IPv6.
+
+Exception: the dormant `ubnt-upg` VLAN 10 network (and its `ubnt-upg` SSID) has
+no IPv6 configuration (default off). See
+[Dedicated Wi-Fi through a third-party gateway](#dedicated-wi-fi-through-a-third-party-gateway).
+
+**APs (live):** both managed APs hold global SLAAC addresses on `br0` with a
+default route learned via RA from `gw`:
+
+| AP | Global IPv6 on `br0` (at check time) | Default route |
+|---|---|---|
+| U6 Lite (`192.168.66.6`) | `240e:3bd:235:1fb1:...`/64 | `default via fe80::... dev br0 proto ra` |
+| UAP-AC-Lite (`192.168.55.5`) | `240e:3bd:235:1fb2:...`/64 | `default via fe80::... dev br0 proto ra` |
+
+The delegated prefixes are dynamic ISP allocations (PPPoE PD `/60`) and rotate
+on redial; only the structure is stable.
+
+**Gateway (`gw`):** the IPv6 routing table shows connected `/64`s on `eth0`
+(LAN66) and `switch0` (LAN55) plus `::/0` via `pppoe0`.
+
+Re-verify:
+
+```bash
+ssh -4 -o BatchMode=yes zhiqiangf@192.168.66.6 'ip -6 addr show br0; ip -6 route show'
+ssh -4 -o BatchMode=yes zhiqiangf@192.168.55.5 'ip -6 addr show br0; ip -6 route show'
+```
+
+> **2026-08-21 (W1N-207):** SmartThings Element/vWire provisioning SSIDs
+> (`element-8a0d5133c9438f12`, `vwire-8b2d67469e455785`, `vport-F09FC22004E9`) were
+> removed (element_adopt setting disabled + element wlanconf deleted + device vwire
+> fields cleared) and confirmed off on both APs (normal SSIDs unchanged: `ubnt-windy`,
+> `ubnt-windy-2`, `ubnt-haas`, `ubnt-upg`). Root cause of Matter onboarding failure that
+> day: HA's matter-server advertised a stale IPv6 GUA (two prefix generations old) in
+> mDNS; fixed by restarting the add-on — see [hosts/hass.windy.lan.md](../hosts/hass.windy.lan.md).
+>
+> **SSID ↔ subnet split (Matter-relevant):** `ubnt-windy` (5G) is served only by the
+> U6 Lite on LAN66; `ubnt-haas` / `ubnt-windy-2` (2.4G) only by the UAP-AC-Lite on
+> LAN55. mDNS is link-local multicast and does **not** cross the routed 55/66
+> boundary (no mDNS reflector). Matter commissioning therefore requires phone and
+> device on the **same subnet (LAN55)**; a phone on 5G (LAN66) cannot discover a
+> LAN55 Matter device.
+>
+> **Cleanup side-effects (left as-is, harmless):** after the direct-DB cleanup,
+> `db.device.cfgversion` holds placeholder values (`0000000000000000` /
+> `1111111111111111`) and UAP-AC-Lite has `mesh_sta_vap_enabled=false`; the
+> controller has not reverted them and no functional impact was observed.
+
+## Dedicated Wi-Fi through a third-party gateway
+
+### Architecture boundary discovered on 2026-08-08
+
+`gfw` is a virtual machine connected only to the native LAN 66 network; the
+physical Wi-Fi uplink is also an ER-X LAN 66 path. The ER-X provides DHCP for
+that LAN. There is no verified 802.1Q-capable path from the U6 Lite to `gfw`.
+
+Consequently, the proposed `ubnt-upg` design is **not implementable on the
+current topology without an additional VLAN-capable L2 path**. Giving the VM
+an `eth0.10` interface alone does not create VLAN 10 on the physical switch or
+deliver tagged frames to it.
+
+UniFi APs associate clients and bridge an SSID into a selected 802.1Q VLAN;
+they do not allocate DHCP addresses. The controller configures that AP
+behavior, but it is not a DHCP service for a third-party-gateway VLAN. The
+gateway on the corresponding VLAN provides DHCP. In the existing topology, the
+ER-X DHCP service legitimately answers untagged LAN 66 requests.
+
+The observed `192.168.66.91` lease on `ubnt-upg` is therefore expected when
+traffic reaches the existing untagged LAN 66. It is not a failure that can be
+fixed by changing the controller or by adding another DHCP server to the same
+broadcast domain.
+
+### Conditions for a future implementation
+
+The design becomes viable only after adding and proving one of these:
+
+1. A VLAN-capable switch/trunk from the U6 Lite to a VLAN-10 interface on the
+   actual gateway, with native LAN 66 retained for AP management; or
+2. A hypervisor/vSwitch and physical uplink configured to pass VLAN 10 end to
+   end to the `gfw` VM, plus the corresponding tagged port towards the U6.
+
+Then configure one UniFi virtual network with **Router: Third-party Gateway**
+and VLAN ID `10`, map only `ubnt-upg` to it, and have the VLAN 10 gateway be
+the sole DHCP server for `192.168.10.0/24`. A test client must obtain
+`192.168.10.x`, with traffic and its lease visible on that gateway, before the
+SSID is considered working.
+
+### Protecting existing Wi-Fi
+
+`ubnt-windy` is the existing 5 GHz SSID and has been restored on the U6 Lite.
+Keep its network and broadcast/device assignment unchanged. If the dedicated
+SSID is ever retried, use the controller's normal **Specific -> U6 Lite**
+broadcast selection for `ubnt-upg` only; do not reuse, move, or manually edit
+an existing SSID's AP group. An AP configuration push can still briefly
+reassociate clients, so zero-impact work on the same AP cannot be guaranteed.
+
+### References
+
+- [Feasibility and DHCP responsibility](unifi-third-party-vlan10-dhcp.md)
+- [Supported topology and implementation examples](unifi-openwrt-vlan10-implementation-examples.md)
+- Ubiquiti: [Creating Virtual Networks (VLANs)](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/9761080275607-Creating-Virtual-Networks-VLANs),
+  [Creating WiFi SSIDs](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/26136823938583-Creating-UniFi-WiFi-SSIDs), and
+  [Switch Port VLAN Assignment](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/26136855808919-Switch-Port-VLAN-Assignment-Trunk-Access-Ports).
+
+## Managed access points
+
+| Name | Model | Management IP | Firmware | Management network | Inform port |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| U6 Lite | U6 Lite (`UAL6`) | `192.168.66.6` | `6.7.54.15663` | LAN66 (`192.168.66.0/24`, gateway `192.168.66.254`) | `9080` |
+| UAP-AC-Lite | `U7LT` | `192.168.55.5` | `6.8.2.15592` | LAN55 (`192.168.55.0/24`, gateway `192.168.55.254`) | `9080` |
+
+AP MAC addresses are recorded only where operationally needed: U6 Lite
+`78:45:58:4d:cc:30`; UAP-AC-Lite `f0:9f:c2:20:04:e9`.
+
+## SSH administration
+
+Adopted APs use the SSH account configured in the controller, rather than the
+factory `ubnt/ubnt` credential. The password is stored in the password manager
+and must not be added to this repository.
+
+In UniFi Network `9.5.21`, configure it at:
+
+```text
+Devices → Device Updates and Settings → Device SSH Settings
+→ Device SSH Authentication
+```
+
+Use `ssh zhiqiangf@AP_IP` for the adopted-device account. Do not query or copy
+the controller's `mgmt` database setting into logs or documentation: it can
+contain the managed SSH password.
+
+Key-only IPv4 SSH was verified for both managed APs using the `zhiqiangf`
+account on 2026-08-06 and re-verified 2026-08-20 (BatchMode with password and
+keyboard-interactive disabled; both APs still log in key-only). Verify future
+access without permitting password or keyboard-interactive fallback:
+
+```bash
+ssh -4 -o BatchMode=yes -o PasswordAuthentication=no \
+  -o KbdInteractiveAuthentication=no -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes \
+  zhiqiangf@192.168.66.6 'mca-cli-op info'
+ssh -4 -o BatchMode=yes -o PasswordAuthentication=no \
+  -o KbdInteractiveAuthentication=no -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes \
+  zhiqiangf@192.168.55.5 'mca-cli-op info'
+```
+
+Both devices reported `Connected` to
+`http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform` during that verification. The AP shell maps
+this management account to UID 0, so treat it as administrative access.
+
+## Offline AP recovery
+
+An AP can be reachable via ICMP and SSH but offline in the controller when its
+saved inform URL still points to port `8080`. This occurred for UAP-AC-Lite
+after its inform configuration had diverged from the controller endpoint.
+
+From the AP, inspect the active endpoint and test controller reachability:
+
+```bash
+info
+nc 192.168.66.46 9080
+```
+
+The AP's BusyBox `nc` may not support `-zv`; use the plain `nc` invocation
+above when testing the TCP path.
+
+If `info` reports `http://192.168.66.46:8080/inform` (or another obsolete
+endpoint), correct it. UniFi devices commonly require the command twice while
+adoption is completed:
+
+```bash
+set-inform http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform
+set-inform http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform
+```
+
+Verify that the AP changes to connected/online in the controller.
+
+## Controller migration check
+
+After a controller migration or restore, inspect stored device records for a
+stale default-port endpoint before treating an AP as faulty:
+
+```javascript
+use ace
+db.device.find(
+  { inform_url: /8080/ },
+  { name: 1, ip: 1, inform_url: 1 }
+)
+```
+
+Do not include credentials or controller database dumps in incident notes.
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# UniFi AP + OpenWrt VLAN-backed Wi-Fi: implementation evidence
+
+**Research date:** 2026-08-08  
+**Scope:** research only. This file does not assert that the local physical
+path currently carries VLAN 10, and no controller, AP, ERX, or OpenWrt setting
+was changed while preparing it.
+
+## Conclusion
+
+Yes. This is a normal, supported deployment pattern: UniFi APs and Network
+Application manage the SSID-to-VLAN mapping, while a non-UniFi gateway such as
+OpenWrt owns the tagged VLAN interface, its subnet, DHCP, routing, and
+firewall/policy routing. The existing untagged LAN DHCP server remains in
+place; it serves only the native LAN, while OpenWrt serves the tagged VLAN.
+
+Ubiquiti's current third-party-gateway recipe specifically says to configure
+the subnet, VLAN ID, and DHCP **on the third-party gateway first**, then create
+a UniFi virtual network with **Router = Third-party Gateway** and the same VLAN
+ID. [Ubiquiti: Creating Virtual Networks (VLANs)](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/9761080275607-Creating-Virtual-Networks-VLANs)
+
+That supported pattern requires an end-to-end tagged path. It is not feasible
+on the current local topology: `gfw` is a VM connected only to untagged LAN 66
+and there is no verified physical or virtual switch trunk carrying VLAN 10 from
+the U6 Lite to that VM. Creating `eth0.10` inside the VM cannot supply the
+missing L2 transport.
+
+## The reusable topology
+
+```text
+main SSID ── untagged/native LAN66 ── ERX DHCP ── 192.168.66.0/24
+                         │
+U6 Lite ── AP uplink trunk (native LAN66 + tagged VLAN 10) ── gfw/OpenWrt
+   └── ubnt-upg SSID ── VLAN 10 ── gfw.10: 192.168.10.1/24 + DHCP + OpenClash
+```
+
+This is not two DHCP servers answering one broadcast domain. They serve two
+separate L2 broadcast domains. An AP bridges a station's DHCP request into the
+VLAN selected for its SSID; it does not allocate the address itself. Ubiquiti
+states that SSID clients become members of the selected VLAN and that every
+port between AP and gateway must allow that VLAN. [Ubiquiti: Creating UniFi
+WiFi SSIDs](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/26136823938583-Creating-UniFi-WiFi-SSIDs)
+
+OpenWrt's own VLAN documentation shows the same mixed-link model: an untagged
+LAN plus tagged VLAN interfaces on a common link, and explicitly notes that a
+separate DHCP server can serve each segment. [OpenWrt: VLAN / switch
+configuration](https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/network/vlan/switch_configuration)
+
+## Evidence of existing deployments
+
+### Protocol and product documentation (authoritative)
+
+* Ubiquiti's third-party-gateway workflow is an exact product-supported recipe
+  for the UniFi half: gateway first, then matching VLAN in UniFi. It does not
+  require a UniFi gateway or switch. [Creating Virtual Networks
+  (VLANs)](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/9761080275607-Creating-Virtual-Networks-VLANs)
+* Ubiquiti specifies the exact Wi-Fi half: choose the network in the SSID's
+  **Network** dropdown, select the APs that should broadcast it, and permit the
+  VLAN on all intervening ports. [Creating UniFi WiFi
+  SSIDs](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/26136823938583-Creating-UniFi-WiFi-SSIDs)
+* Ubiquiti's troubleshooting topology specifically calls an SSID VLAN made
+  native on the AP port, or absent as a tagged VLAN upstream, a broken setup;
+  it directs operators to trace every AP-to-gateway port. [Virtual Network
+  (VLAN) Troubleshooting](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/9592924981911-Virtual-Network-VLAN-Troubleshooting)
+* OpenWrt documents Linux 802.1Q interfaces and bridge VLAN membership. Its
+  example calls out a trunk carrying untagged traffic and tagged VLANs, which
+  is the link gfw needs. [OpenWrt: VLAN / switch
+  configuration](https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/network/vlan/switch_configuration)
+
+### User-reported working deployments (official Ubiquiti Community; anecdotal)
+
+These are not Ubiquiti support guarantees, but they demonstrate that the exact
+vendor split is in real use:
+
+* A user reports a UniFi site whose upstream router/DHCP server is **OpenWrt**;
+  they create a Third-Party Gateway network, assign its VLAN tag, then bind it
+  to the Wi-Fi SSID. The report says it works without a UniFi gateway or switch.
+  [UniFi Network Application 7.4.156 discussion](https://community.ui.com/releases/UniFi-Network-Application-7-4-156/15ac6260-9cd1-4ac3-a91c-4880c1c87882?page=36)
+* A second user reports two SSID VLANs over an **OpenWrt Linksys WRT32X 802.1Q
+  trunk**, with no USG or UniFi switch; the controller network is selected in
+  the SSID's Network dropdown. [Assigning VLANs to SSIDs on Controller
+  6](https://community.ui.com/questions/Assigning-VLANs-to-SSIDs-on-Controller-6/3e656047-685f-470e-954c-703077e89aaa)
+* A Ubiquiti Community post describes an existing multi-VLAN UniFi deployment
+  with an OpenWrt NanoPi R6S gateway and all UniFi networks configured as
+  Third-party Gateway. [OpenWrt third-party-gateway
+  deployment](https://community.ui.com/questions/Replacing-an-existing-third-party-router-firewall-with-a-UXG-Lite-on-an-existing-UniFi-network/5de2504a-fac2-437a-b893-495a6be2f3c0)
+
+## Exact mapping for this network
+
+| Layer | Required configuration |
+|---|---|
+| `gfw` / OpenWrt | Only after a tagged path reaches the VM: create/retain VLAN-10 interface, address `192.168.10.1/24`, run the **only** DHCP server for that segment, and apply the intended OpenClash/policy routing. |
+| U6-to-gfw path | Native/untagged LAN66 for U6 management; tagged VLAN 10 allowed at every switch/link. Do not replace the native LAN with VLAN 10. |
+| UniFi network | One VLAN 10 virtual network with **Router: Third-party Gateway**. This is controller metadata that makes the AP tag the selected SSID; it is not a DHCP service. |
+| `ubnt-upg` Wi-Fi | Select that VLAN 10 network. Do not enable UniFi Hotspot/guest portal unless deliberately required. |
+| Existing Wi-Fi | Leave `ubnt-windy`, `ubnt-windy-2`, and `ubnt-haas` network/VLAN choices untouched; they remain on their existing LANs and DHCP servers. |
+
+The acceptance test is therefore unambiguous: after reconnecting, a device on
+`ubnt-upg` must receive `192.168.10.x` from the VLAN 10 gateway, while a device
+on existing Wi-Fi continues to receive its established LAN address. A
+`192.168.66.x` lease on the dedicated SSID means VLAN 10 was not selected or
+did not pass the L2 path; it is not evidence that the U6 should run DHCP.
+
+## Protecting the existing Wi-Fi during a retry
+
+The current UniFi UI supports **All**, **Specific**, and **Groups** independently
+for each SSID's Broadcasting APs selection. [UniFi WiFi SSID and AP Settings
+Overview](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/32065480092951-UniFi-WiFi-SSID-and-AP-Settings-Overview)
+
+Given the earlier incident where changing a virtual/AP group removed
+`ubnt-windy` from the U6 Lite, the low-risk control is to leave every existing
+SSID's Broadcasting APs selection unchanged and set **only `ubnt-upg`** to
+**Specific → U6 Lite**. Do not reuse or move the default SSID into a temporary
+group. This does not eliminate the short re-provision/reassociation caused by
+an AP config push, but it prevents the configuration-level loss of the default
+SSID that was observed.
+
+Before enabling the dedicated SSID, inspect the saved settings and AP's
+effective configuration, then test with one client. Only the dedicated SSID
+should be affected by a failure; LAN66 DHCP and the existing SSIDs require no
+change.
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+# UniFi Wi-Fi VLAN 10 with a third-party gateway
+
+**Research date:** 2026-08-08  
+**Scope:** evidence-backed design only; no controller, AP, switch, EdgeRouter,
+or OpenWrt settings were changed by this research.
+
+## Answer: who assigns client addresses?
+
+Neither a UniFi Network controller nor a UniFi AP is the DHCP server for a
+normal third-party-gateway deployment.  The controller configures the AP; the
+AP maps a selected SSID to an 802.1Q VLAN and bridges the client's DHCP
+broadcast into that VLAN.  A UniFi **Gateway** can provide DHCP, but Ubiquiti's
+DHCP documentation expressly describes the DHCP server as a service of UniFi
+Gateways, not APs or the Network Application. [UniFi DHCP Server](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/360012097513-UniFi-DHCP-Server)
+
+Accordingly, an existing DHCP server on the native/untagged LAN (here, the
+EdgeRouter X for `192.168.66.0/24`) is expected to answer an SSID that is not
+actually VLAN-tagged. It must **not** provide the lease for a genuinely
+separate dedicated VLAN. That VLAN's gateway would provide its DHCP service.
+
+## Required architecture
+
+```text
+client → SSID ubnt-upg → U6 Lite
+                         │ VLAN 10 (802.1Q tagged)
+                         ▼
+                every intervening L2 link permits VLAN 10
+                         ▼
+     gateway VLAN-10 interface: 192.168.10.1/24 + DHCP + routing/OpenClash
+```
+
+The AP's management traffic may remain untagged on LAN66.  VLAN 10 is only
+the client traffic emitted by `ubnt-upg`; it must be carried, tagged, from the
+U6 Lite through every intervening switch/link to `gfw`.  Ubiquiti explicitly
+states that selecting a network for an SSID makes connected clients members of
+that VLAN and that all ports between AP and gateway must permit its VLAN ID;
+it recommends AP uplinks be trunked for the relevant VLANs. [Creating UniFi
+WiFi SSIDs](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/26136823938583-Creating-UniFi-WiFi-SSIDs)
+
+On a managed UniFi switch, this means the AP uplink and every upstream port in
+the path have native LAN66 (for AP management) plus tagged VLAN 10.  Ubiquiti
+defines that as a trunk, and warns that an AP uplink must not restrict VLANs
+needed downstream. [Switch Port VLAN Assignment](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/26136855808919-Switch-Port-VLAN-Assignment-Trunk-Access-Ports)
+
+If a non-UniFi switch is in the path, its 802.1Q settings must be configured
+equivalently (or it must be verified to transparently forward VLAN 10); UniFi
+does not manage that switch.  This is a physical/L2 requirement, so merely
+creating a controller network cannot make a VLAN reach `gfw`.
+
+## Local feasibility result
+
+The local `gfw` instance is a VM attached only to untagged LAN 66, and the U6
+Lite's physical path is the same ER-X LAN 66 network. No VLAN-capable physical
+trunk or verified hypervisor/vSwitch VLAN handoff exists between them. The
+diagram above is therefore a valid design pattern but **not a description of
+the current deployable topology**. An `eth0.10` interface inside the VM cannot
+create that missing L2 path.
+
+To make this architecture feasible, add a VLAN-capable switch/trunk from AP to
+gateway, or configure an end-to-end tagged VLAN handoff through the hypervisor
+and its physical uplink. Until then, leave the ER-X LAN 66 DHCP design in place
+and do not expect `gfw` to serve an SSID-only subnet.
+
+## Correct controller model (after the L2 prerequisite exists)
+
+Use one UniFi virtual network for VLAN 10 whose **Router** is **Third-party
+Gateway** and whose VLAN ID is `10`; assign that network to Wi-Fi
+`ubnt-upg`. Configure the subnet, VLAN and DHCP on the VLAN gateway first.
+This follows Ubiquiti's documented third-party-gateway workflow: create the
+VLAN on the gateway, then add a UniFi virtual network with Router =
+Third-party Gateway and the matching VLAN ID. [Creating Virtual Networks
+(VLANs)](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/9761080275607-Creating-Virtual-Networks-VLANs)
+
+Do not enable a second DHCP service in UniFi for this VLAN. The controller
+entry is the AP/switch VLAN definition; the gateway on VLAN 10 remains the
+sole DHCP server and default gateway. The EdgeRouter X's LAN66 DHCP service
+can remain unchanged because it is for untagged LAN66, not VLAN 10.
+
+## Safe verification sequence
+
+1. Read-only confirm on `gfw` that its VLAN-10 interface has
+   `192.168.10.1/24`, DHCP is enabled for `192.168.10.0/24`, and no other
+   DHCP daemon serves that VLAN.
+2. In the controller, verify `ubnt-upg` selects the Third-party Gateway VLAN
+   10 network, not `Default`/LAN66 and not an unassigned VLAN-only placeholder.
+3. Trace the U6 Lite-to-`gfw` L2 path and permit tagged VLAN 10 on every link
+   while retaining LAN66 as the AP's native/management network.
+4. Reconnect a test client (forget/rejoin or renew lease).  The expected lease
+   is `192.168.10.x`, gateway/DNS `192.168.10.1` (or the DNS option configured
+   by `gfw`), never `192.168.66.x`.
+5. Confirm a lease appears on `gfw` and that the VLAN-10 interface's RX/TX
+   counters advance.  Ubiquiti's VLAN troubleshooting guide identifies
+   upstream ports not allowing the VLAN as the common cause when Wi-Fi clients
+   cannot receive a correct IP address. [Virtual Network (VLAN)
+   Troubleshooting](https://help.ui.com/hc/en-us/articles/9592924981911-Virtual-Network-VLAN-Troubleshooting)
+
+## What the observed `192.168.66.91` proves
+
+It is evidence that the client's DHCP discover reached the LAN66 broadcast
+domain and was answered by the EdgeRouter X.  It does not show a DHCP failure
+on `gfw`; it shows that the client was bridged untagged (or VLAN 10 was not
+carried end-to-end) at that attempt.  The corrective work is therefore to make
+the SSID-to-VLAN association and L2 trunk path real, then test the lease—not to
+make the AP/controller compete with the LAN DHCP server.
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# dns.windy.lan — AdGuard Home LAN DNS
+
+## Role and access
+
+| Item | Value |
+|---|---|
+| IPv4 | `192.168.66.36` |
+| SSH | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.36` |
+| OS | Debian 12 |
+| **Host** | **PVE VM 120 (`pihole`)** — not a separate physical host (verified 2026-08-09) |
+| Roles | AdGuard Home LAN DNS; Mihomo explicit-proxy service |
+
+Use `windy` for routine inspection.  Do not store credentials, AdGuard Home
+user hashes, proxy subscriptions, or query-log contents in this repository.
+
+## AdGuard Home
+
+AdGuard Home runs as the root-owned `adguardhome` Docker container in host
+network mode.  The persistent deployment is `/opt/adguardhome`:
+
+| Item | Path / setting |
+|---|---|
+| Compose file | `/opt/adguardhome/docker-compose.yml` |
+| Configuration | `/opt/adguardhome/conf/AdGuardHome.yaml` |
+| Mutable data and query logs | `/opt/adguardhome/work` |
+| DNS | TCP/UDP `53`; intentionally no source ACL so both LAN55 and LAN66 work |
+| HTTP UI | `192.168.66.36:80`; LAN66 only |
+| Image policy | Pin the reviewed image digest; do not use `latest` for a rebuild |
+
+The EdgeRouter DHCP service advertises this host as DNS for LAN55 and LAN66.
+Do not enable AdGuard Home DHCP unless the existing EdgeRouter DHCP service is
+explicitly migrated and disabled first.
+
+`agh-ui-access.service` loads `/etc/nftables-agh-ui-access.nft`.  It permits
+`192.168.66.0/24` (LAN66) and `192.168.55.0/24` (LAN55, for Home Assistant
+integration) to TCP/80 and drops other TCP/80 input.  It deliberately
+does **not** restrict DNS, SSH, Docker, or Mihomo ports.  Keep it isolated from
+Docker-managed nftables tables.
+
+> 2026-08-12: added `192.168.55.0/24` allow so HAOS (`192.168.55.11`) can reach
+the HTTP API on `:80` for the Home Assistant AdGuard Home integration; applied
+via `sudo systemctl restart agh-ui-access.service` (file edited first, then
+reloaded; syntax verified with `nft -c`). Other firewalls (EdgeRouter LAN_IN/
+LAN_OUT inactive, PVE zero rules) were already open for LAN55->LAN66.
+
+Current query-log policy is 14 days with anonymized client IPs.  Check free
+space before increasing retention.  DNSSEC is disabled because the selected
+upstream path did not pass the known-bad-signature validation check; do not
+enable it without re-testing validated upstreams.
+
+`hass.windy.lan` points to Home Assistant via this rewrite.  The legacy
+`hass.local` rewrite was removed on 2026-08-14; `hass.local` now resolves only
+via HAOS mDNS/LLMNR (`hostname: hass`), not via AdGuard Home.  The
+`nas.windy.local` rewrite was likewise removed on 2026-08-14; `.local` names
+are now left to mDNS only.  Remaining rewrites all use `.windy.lan`.
+
+## Mihomo and routing boundary
+
+Mihomo listens for explicit proxy traffic on this host.  Read-only checks found
+no host TUN policy routing or local nftables/iptables transparent-redirection
+rules.  A Mihomo listener alone does not mean it intercepts AdGuard Home
+traffic.  The default gateway (`gfw.windy.lan`) can still affect outbound
+traffic, so inspect its OpenClash rules separately before changing upstream
+routing.
+
+## Safety
+
+- Back up `/opt/adguardhome/conf/AdGuardHome.yaml` and `docker-compose.yml`
+  before changing either, then run the official `--check-config` command.
+- Recreate only the AdGuard Home container and verify DNS A/AAAA, local names,
+  the UI from LAN66, and the UI denial from LAN55 afterwards.
+- Private PTR currently has no local authoritative source: direct EdgeRouter
+  PTR queries return NXDOMAIN.  Do not point `local_ptr_upstreams` at the
+  router until that source exists.
+
+See [the health runbook](../runbooks/adguard-home-health.md) and
+[the official configuration review](../docs/adguard-home-official-review-2026-08.md).
+
+Routine health through Ansible (`--limit adguardhome`), with a daily timer +
+email alerting like the other active hosts:
+
+```bash
+cd ansible
+ansible-playbook playbooks/health-report.yml --limit adguardhome
+```
@@ -6,17 +6,71 @@
 |---|---|
 | Role | LAN gateway and OpenClash transparent/explicit-proxy host |
 | IPv4 | `192.168.66.1` |
-| SSH | `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1` |
-| OS | OpenWrt, Linux `6.12.87` |
+| SSH | `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1` (key-only, verified 2026-08-06) |
+| OS | ImmortalWrt 25.12.0 (r37854), Linux `6.12.87`, x86/64 |
+| **Host** | **PVE VM 140 (`gfw`)** — 3 NICs: `net0`→vmbr0(LAN66/eth0), `net1`→vmbr1(LAN55/eth1, up but unaddressed), `net2`→VLAN10/`ubunt_upg`(eth2, `192.168.10.1/24`) (topology 2026-08-09; eth2/VLAN10 live verified 2026-08-11) |

-Do not store the root password in this repository. Prefer a verified SSH key for
-future management access.
+Do not store the root password in this repository.

 ## OpenClash

-OpenClash runs `/etc/openclash/clash` with configuration
+OpenClash runs `/etc/openclash/clash` (clash_meta core) with configuration
 `/etc/openclash/pass-cat.yaml`.

+- Core: **Mihomo Meta v1.19.29** (linux-amd64, with_gvisor; upgraded from
+  `alpha-g9ae1cc2` on 2026-08-06, backup `clash_meta.bak.alpha-g9ae1cc2`) —
+  tracked in Linear W1N-50
+- OpenClash app: **luci-app-openclash 0.47.133** (GitHub latest)
+
+- Mode: **fake-ip + TPROXY transparent proxy** (`operation_mode=fake-ip`,
+  `en_mode=fake-ip`, `proxy_mode=rule`); fake-ip network `198.18.0.0/16`
+- DNS path: dnsmasq → clash DNS `127.0.0.1#7874` (`server=127.0.0.1#7874` in
+  dnsmasq config); OpenClash custom DNS uses `mosdns` on `127.0.0.1:6052` as its
+  `nameserver`/`default-nameserver` for DIRECT-rule real-IP resolution
+  (`/etc/mosdns/config.yaml`): domestic domains → AGH `.36:53`, foreign →
+  `223.5.5.5`/`119.29.29.29` (Chinese public DNS). mosdns is **not** in the
+  client query path — LAN/VLAN10 clients receive fake-ip from clash :7874.
+  > 2026-08-12: fixed missing `has_resp → accept` guard after the domestic
+  > branch in `/etc/mosdns/config.yaml` (domestic queries were double-forwarded,
+  > final answer came from CN public DNS, bypassing AGH blocking/rewrites;
+  > verified via `dup.baidustatic.com` before/after); added `domestic_fallback`
+  > (fallback plugin: primary=AGH, secondary=CN public DNS, 500ms) so domestic
+  > DIRECT lookups survive an AGH outage. Backups:
+  > `config.yaml.bak-20260812` / `config.yaml.bak-fallback-20260812`. See
+  > [docs/lan-dns-architecture.md](../docs/lan-dns-architecture.md) §1.
+  > 2026-08-13 (W1N-62): foreign branch now uses encrypted DoH
+  > `https://adg.chans.xyz/dns-query` (self-hosted, hk2) via new
+  > `foreign_upstream` / `foreign_fallback` plugins; non-CN queries → DoH,
+  > falls back to CN public DNS after 1000ms. `bootstrap` = existing CN public
+  > DNS IPs (no self-loop). Live-verified: google/youtube real IP + AAAA
+  > restored (2607:f8b0…), `dup.baidustatic.com` → `0.0.0.0` (AGH intercept
+  > kept), clash 7874 fake-ip plane unchanged. **Final decision (2026-08-13):
+  > DoH goes DIRECT to hk2, not via clash proxy** — `foreign_upstream` points
+  > only at the self-hosted resolver `adg.chans.xyz` (hk2), which is directly
+  > reachable and already encrypted (DoH/TLS) with clean answers, so forcing
+  > the proxy adds nothing and would couple the DNS plane to clash (nft output
+  > chains also show OpenClash does not currently redirect router-own TCP).
+  > Kill-test: foreign queries answered during clash outage, watchdog
+  > auto-restarted. Backups: `config.yaml.bak-foreign-doh-20260813-103746` /
+  > `config.yaml.bak-foreign-doh-20260813-103813`.
+  > 2026-08-13 (W1N-62): added redundancy to `foreign_upstream` —
+  > `concurrent: 3`, upstreams = `adg.chans.xyz` (hk2) + `dns.quad9.net` +
+  > `dns.cloudflare.com` (both direct-reachable from CN, live-tested 2026-08-13;
+  > `dns.quad101.net` excluded — TLS handshake fails). Verified: google.com
+  > AAAA now `2404:6800…` (new upstream answering, was `2607:f8b0…` via hk2),
+  > taobao/intercept/clash-fake-ip all unchanged. Backup:
+  > `config.yaml.bak-multi-doh-20260813-105421`.
+  > 2026-09-01: removed `dns.quad9.net` from `foreign_upstream` — recurring
+  > `WARN foreign_upstream … unexpected EOF` bursts (481 log entries) against
+  > Quad9 DoH; endpoint answers on probe but gets intermittently
+  > connection-reset from this network (same failure class as the excluded
+  > `dns.quad101.net`). Remaining upstreams `adg.chans.xyz` (hk2) +
+  > `dns.cloudflare.com` both verified live; google.com A + youtube.com AAAA
+  > resolve through mosdns :6052 after restart. Backup:
+  > `config.yaml.bak-quad9-remove-20260901-201801`.
+- nft: OpenClash injects TPROXY/redirect + DNS-hijack rules into
+  `table inet fw4`; a residual `table inet passwall` exists with 0 packets (unused)
+
 | Listener | Port |
 |---|---:|
 | HTTP | `7890` |
@@ -25,10 +79,28 @@ OpenClash runs `/etc/openclash/clash` with configuration
 | Mixed | `7893` |
 | TPROXY | `7895` |
 | DNS | `7874` |
+| Dashboard | `9090` |

 `8443` is not an OpenClash listener and has no runtime nftables forwarding rule.
 It is included only in OpenClash's common TLS-sniffing port list.

+## VLAN 10 Wi-Fi
+
+`gfw`'s third NIC `eth2` hosts the `ubunt_upg` interface at `192.168.10.1/24`,
+serving the dedicated `ubnt-upg` SSID VLAN 10 (untagged access path from a
+VLAN-capable switch/trunk; AP management stays untagged on LAN66). The
+`ubunt_upg` zone runs the **only** DHCP server for `192.168.10.0/24` (UDP/67),
+allows DNS (53), and applies `192.168.10.0/24 → eth0 masquerade` (NAT) for
+Internet egress. `forward_ubunt_upg` isolates VLAN10 from LAN66/55 and RFC1918
+(deny counters 0, `accept_to_lan` passes).
+
+Live-verified 2026-08-11: an `ubnt-upg` client received `192.168.10.168` (lease
+in `/tmp/dhcp.leases`), the `192.168.10.0/24 masquerade` counter climbed
+(215 pkts/42KB), and the LAN55/LAN66 deny counters stayed 0 → VLAN10→LAN
+isolation holds. See
+[docs/lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md](../docs/lan-se5420-deployment-guide.md),
+[docs/unifi-openwrt-vlan10-implementation-examples.md](../docs/unifi-openwrt-vlan10-implementation-examples.md)
+
 ## Operational note

 When OpenClash logs a LAN client request such as
@@ -37,4 +109,3 @@ an explicit-proxy client sending its own loopback request to the gateway. Fix
 the originating host's `NO_PROXY` / `no_proxy` configuration; do not create a
 listener on this router to mask the problem. See
 [the UniFi localhost proxy note](../docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md).
-
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+# gw — EdgeRouter X primary LAN gateway
+
+## Role and access
+
+| Item | Value |
+|---|---|
+| Role | Primary router for the `192.168.66.0/24` and `192.168.55.0/24` LANs |
+| IPv4 | `192.168.66.254` |
+| Verified hostname | `gw` |
+| SSH | `ssh -4 zhiqiang@192.168.66.254` |
+| Platform | Ubiquiti EdgeRouter X 5-Port, EdgeOS `v3.0.1` (Build `5862409`) |
+| Kernel | `4.14.54-UBNT` |
+| Time zone | `Asia/Shanghai` |
+
+Use `zhiqiang` as the default account for all routine gateway operations. Its
+key-only SSH login and passwordless `sudo` were verified on 2026-08-04; use
+`BatchMode=yes` for unattended read-only checks. `ubnt` remains an existing
+administrative account, but is not the routine operations entry point.
+
+Do not store account passwords, PPPoE credentials, SSH keys, configuration
+password hashes, or UISP/UNMS connection strings in this repository. Both
+administrative accounts have EdgeOS configuration and sudo privileges. Verify a
+new SSH host key out of band before accepting it.
+
+## Network topology
+
+| Interface | Address / role |
+|---|---|
+| `eth0` | `192.168.66.254/24`; LAN 66 |
+| `switch0` (`eth1`–`eth3`) | `192.168.55.254/24`; LAN 55 |
+| `eth4` | WAN physical port; PPPoE uplink |
+| `pppoe0` | WAN default route; MTU `1492`; IPv6 prefix delegation `/60` |
+
+IPv6 prefix delegation assigns SLAAC-capable `/64` networks to both LANs.
+`eth4` applies the WAN IPv4 and IPv6 firewall policies.
+
+**SE5420 single-uplink topology (verified 2026-08-22):** the TP-Link `TL-SE5420`
+core switch is deployed — management `192.168.66.253` (TP-Link OUI `f8:c9:03`,
+web UI on :80/:443). The LAN55 uplink into `switch0` is a **single member
+port**: `eth1` link up, `eth2`/`eth3` down. All LAN55 wired devices (hass
+`.11`, Aqara M3 `.248`, SmartThings `.48`, UAP-AC-Lite `.5`) are reached via
+`switch0` behind that one uplink, so same-segment wired↔wired unicast is
+switched locally on the SE5420 and never reaches the ER-X. The switch FDB is
+hardware-offloaded and not readable from the ER-X (`brctl showmacs switch0` →
+"Operation not supported"; `show mac-address-table` / `show ethernet-switch`
+are not available on this EdgeOS build) — port link state (`show interfaces
+ethernet`) plus ARP are the reliable topology checks.
+
+Detailed effective configuration, including firewall binding and WAN exposure,
+is recorded in [the EdgeRouter X configuration record](../docs/edgerouter-x-configuration.md).
+
+## Services and policy
+
+- DHCP serves both LANs with 24-hour leases. Client DNS is `192.168.66.36`.
+  Pools are `.38`–`.243` on both networks; selected infrastructure and client
+  addresses have static mappings. The UniFi controller is advertised as
+  `192.168.66.46`.
+- DNS forwarding listens on `eth0` and `switch0` with a cache size of 512.
+- WAN NAT masquerades all IPv4 traffic leaving `pppoe0`.
+- `WAN_IN` and `WAN_LOCAL` default to drop, permitting established/related
+  sessions and rejecting invalid state. Equivalent IPv6 policies permit
+  necessary ICMPv6 and DHCPv6 traffic.
+- `LAN_IN` defines a default drop plus explicit `55 → 66` and `66 → 55`
+  allows, but it is **not currently applied to an interface**. The active
+  inter-VLAN posture is therefore ordinary routed access: LAN55 and LAN66 can
+  communicate bidirectionally unless a different active policy intervenes.
+  `LAN_OUT` is likewise defined but inactive; WAN policies are active on
+  `pppoe0`.
+- Management services: SSH on TCP 22; EdgeOS GUI on HTTP 80 and HTTPS 443.
+
+## Safe inspection
+
+Use the EdgeOS operational CLI for routine inspection. `show configuration
+commands` can expose credentials and remote-management tokens, so either avoid
+copying it or filter sensitive lines before recording output.
+
+```bash
+ssh -4 -o BatchMode=yes zhiqiang@192.168.66.254
+show version
+show interfaces
+show ip route
+show system uptime
+show firewall
+```
+
+The [official EdgeOS User Guide](https://dl.ubnt.com/guides/edgemax/EdgeOS_UG.pdf)
+explains that a firewall policy is a ruleset and must be applied to the
+relevant interface/direction to take effect. Use the operational `show
+firewall` output—not merely the configured rule definitions—to determine the
+effective policy.
+
+## PPPoE redial
+
+To force the `pppoe0` session to reconnect (e.g. to obtain a fresh WAN IP), use
+the operational `disconnect` / `connect` commands — **not** `renew dhcp
+interface`, which applies only to DHCP interfaces:
+
+```bash
+ssh -4 zhiqiang@192.168.66.254
+/opt/vyatta/bin/vyatta-op-cmd-wrapper disconnect interface pppoe0
+/opt/vyatta/bin/vyatta-op-cmd-wrapper connect interface pppoe0
+```
+
+`disconnect` tears down the PPP session; `connect` re-dials immediately. A
+short pause between them (a few seconds, or minutes for cautious ISPs) lets the
+old session finish teardown before redialing. This briefly drops the whole WAN
+uplink and may change the public IPv4 and delegated IPv6 `/60`; in-flight
+sessions and port-forwarded services are interrupted until the new session is
+up.
+
+The `zhiqiang` account logs into `vbash`, not the EdgeOS CLI, so operational
+commands must be invoked through `/opt/vyatta/bin/vyatta-op-cmd-wrapper` and
+depend on its passwordless `sudo`. The `ubnt` account lands directly in the
+operational CLI, where the same commands are entered without the wrapper.
+`show`/`configure` are interactive-only aliases (from
+`/etc/bash_completion.d/vyatta-{op,cfg}`, loaded via `~/.bashrc`), so a
+non-interactive `ssh ubnt@… 'show …'` also fails — from a script use the op
+wrapper above, or `_vyatta_op_run` after sourcing `vyatta-op` with
+`vyatta_op_templates=/opt/vyatta/share/vyatta-op/templates`.
+
+## Maintenance notes
+
+- EdgeOS writes persistent changes through its configuration tree: enter
+  `configure`, make the intended change, then run `commit` and `save`.
+- The current SSH service reported a non-post-quantum key-exchange warning.
+  Treat any cryptography or SSH-policy maintenance as a planned, lockout-safe
+  change following the repository SSH safety procedure.
+- This device is distinct from `gfw.windy.lan` (`192.168.66.1`), the OpenWrt
+  OpenClash gateway. Do not apply OpenWrt procedures to this router.
+
+## Verification record
+
+Configuration and reachability were checked by read-only SSH on 2026-08-04.
+No network policy changes were made during that inspection. The `zhiqiang`
+account password was subsequently rotated using the EdgeOS configuration tree
+and verified by a separate SSH login; the password is intentionally not
+recorded here.
+
+Inter-VLAN access was rechecked by read-only SSH on 2026-08-05. A probe sourced
+from `192.168.55.254` reached the UniFi controller at `192.168.66.46` with
+3/3 ICMP replies. This supports the AP Inform path to
+`192.168.66.46:9080`; the controller listener and an online LAN55 AP provide
+the corresponding application-level evidence. No firewall changes were made.
+
+IPv6 was re-verified by read-only SSH on 2026-08-20 during the UniFi AP/AC
+check: the IPv6 routing table shows connected `/64`s on `eth0` (LAN66) and
+`switch0` (LAN55) plus `::/0` via `pppoe0`; both UniFi APs obtained SLAAC
+addresses from the router's RAs. No configuration changes were made.
+
+**DHCP 保留 `matter` 失效（2026-08-21 发现，2026-08-23 复核仍未生效，W1N-207）：**
+静态映射 `matter` → .45 / MAC `34:98:7a:27:10:bc`，但该灯泡一直以**动态租约**拿
+`.148`（hostname `matter`；2026-08-23 09:02 时租约当日 04:40 已续租）。保留 .45 从未
+被租出。2026-08-23 复核补充：另一盏工作灯泡的 MAC 已变为 `fc:e8:c0:25:a1:f0`
+（动态 `.146`，hostname `espressif`），原「把 MAC 改为 `34:98:7a:27:7f:08`」的修正
+建议已过时（该灯泡已离网）。处置：删除该保留，或按现用 MAC（`.148` 的
+`34:98:7a:27:10:bc` / `.146` 的 `fc:e8:c0:25:a1:f0`）重建，**未执行**。
+
+**SE5420 部署 + switch0 单上联（2026-08-22 只读核实）：** `switch0` 成员口
+`eth1` link up、`eth2`/`eth3` down（单上联）；SE5420 管理面 `192.168.66.253`
+在线（TP-Link OUI `f8:c9:03`，:80/:443）；ARP 显示 LAN55 主机（hass `.11`、
+M3 `.248`、SmartThings `.48`、UAP-AC-Lite `.5`）全部经 switch0 可达。含义：
+`switch0` 不再是 LAN55 的全量抓包点（同段有线单播在 SE5420 本地交换），详见
+[runbooks/matter-packet-capture.md](../runbooks/matter-packet-capture.md)。
@@ -0,0 +1,751 @@
+[hosts/hass.windy.lan.md#8DF6]
+# hass.windy.lan — Home Assistant (HAOS)
+
+## Role and access
+
+| Item | Value |
+|---|---|
+| Role | Home Assistant automation hub |
+| IPv4 | `192.168.55.11` (LAN55) |
+| DNS | `hass.windy.lan` (AdGuard rewrite on `dns.windy.lan`; legacy `hass.local` alias) |
+| SSH | `ssh hassio@hass.windy.lan` |
+| **Host** | **x88 Pro physical box** (HAOS bare-metal, `machine: green`; verified 2026-08-18) |
+| Platform | Home Assistant OS; kernel `6.1.115-haos` (aarch64) |
+| Web UI | `http://hass.windy.lan:8123` (LAN); WAN port-forward `hass` on gw → `:8123` |
+
+Use `hassio` for routine SSH inspection. Key-only login was verified on
+2026-08-13 from the WSL client (`BatchMode=yes`).
+
+The `ha` supervisor CLI (`/usr/bin/ha`) authenticates with `SUPERVISOR_TOKEN`.
+Interactive login works because `~hassio/.zprofile` runs `exec sudo -i`, which
+loads a root environment carrying the supervisor API token. Non-interactive
+`ssh hassio 'command'` does not source `.zprofile` and fails with
+`unauthorized: missing or invalid API token`. Run `ha` non-interactively via:
+
+```bash
+ssh -o BatchMode=yes hassio@hass.windy.lan 'sudo -n -i ha core info'
+```
+
+Verified 2026-08-13 that `sudo -n -i ha core info` works from the WSL client.
+Never copy the supervisor token into this repository.
+
+The current SSH ED25519 host-key fingerprint is
+`SHA256:DMcMOgDzFsFTon1fndXowEP7jlyOK3/AX3PVK8BATvk` (verified 2026-08-13).
+Verify a changed key out of band before accepting it.
+
+Do not store Home Assistant long-lived tokens, integration credentials, or
+recovery codes in this repository.
+
+## Network
+
+| Interface | Address / role |
+|---|---|
+| `end0` | IPv4 static `192.168.55.11/24` (gw `.254`, DNS `192.168.66.36`); IPv6 SLAAC `auto` with GUA on the current PD-derived /64 (`240e:3bd:235:1fb2:*` at 2026-08-22; rotates on PPPoE redial); primary LAN55 NIC (interface name verified live 2026-08-22 — `end1` does not exist) |
+| `wlan0` | Supervisor **disabled** (verified 2026-08-14, W1N-104); IPv6 remains off on this RTL8821CS radio |
+| `wg0` | `10.13.13.2/32`; WireGuard (add-on / integration tunnel) |
+| `hassio` / `docker0` | internal HAOS Docker bridges (`172.30.32.0/23`, `172.30.232.0/23`) |
+
+LAN55 clients reach the HTTP API on `dns.windy.lan:80` for the AdGuard Home
+integration; see [hosts/dns.windy.lan.md](dns.windy.lan.md).
+
+## API access
+
+Home Assistant exposes a REST API at `http://hass.windy.lan:8123/api/` (same
+as `http://192.168.55.11:8123/api/`). Authenticate with a **long-lived access
+token** created under **Profile → Security → Long-lived access tokens**.
+
+```bash
+HA_URL="http://hass.windy.lan:8123"
+HA_TOKEN="<long-lived-access-token>"
+
+# Health check — expect {"message":"API running."} and HTTP:200
+curl -sS -w "\nHTTP:%{http_code}\n" \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HA_TOKEN" "$HA_URL/api/"
+
+# Read one entity state
+curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer $HA_TOKEN" \
+  "$HA_URL/api/states/sensor.csg_30d_max"
+
+# List entities / recent errors
+curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer $HA_TOKEN" "$HA_URL/api/states"
+curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer $HA_TOKEN" "$HA_URL/api/error_log"
+```
+
+- `401` → token invalid or expired; create a new one.
+- `404` on `/api/states/<id>` → entity does not exist.
+- The token is a secret: never commit it here; keep it in the shell
+  environment or a secrets file outside the repo.
+
+### HTTP proxy gotcha (verified 2026-08-13)
+
+The WSL client had `http_proxy` set to Mihomo (`192.168.66.99:7890`). LAN
+hostnames sent **through that proxy** returned empty `502`, even though DNS
+resolved and the HA UI was up. Direct `192.168.55.11:8123` worked, and
+`hass.windy.lan:8123` worked only after clearing the HTTP proxy.
+
+Before debugging a "502" on a LAN URL, check `env | grep -i proxy` and bypass
+the proxy:
+
+```bash
+unset http_proxy HTTP_PROXY all_proxy ALL_PROXY
+curl -sS -w "\nHTTP:%{http_code}\n" \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $HA_TOKEN" "$HA_URL/api/"
+```
+
+For a persistent fix, add `.windy.lan` (leading dot) and the LAN ranges to
+`NO_PROXY`, or add `*.windy.lan` to the proxy's own bypass/skip-proxy list.
+See `~/.config/zsh/env/local/environment.env` for the client-side setting.
+
+## Safe verification
+
+```bash
+ssh -o BatchMode=yes hassio@hass.windy.lan 'hostname; ip -4 addr show end0'
+```
+
+From a LAN client, confirm DNS and UI reachability:
+
+```bash
+getent hosts hass.windy.lan
+# expect 192.168.55.11
+```
+
+## Local patches (custom components)
+
+
+### Manual custom-component install (this host)
+
+Home Assistant loads custom integrations from
+`<config>/custom_components/<domain>/` (HAOS: `/config` ≡ `/homeassistant`).
+A folder named after the integration domain, containing at least
+`manifest.json` and `__init__.py`, is enough; Core must be restarted after
+copying files. Official HA lookup order:
+`<config>/custom_components/<domain>` then built-in
+`homeassistant/components/<domain>`.
+See [Integration file structure](https://developers.home-assistant.io/docs/creating_integration_file_structure).
+
+This host **does not git-clone** custom components. The live tree is a file
+copy. Do not `git pull` on HA.
+
+**Official plugin path** (from
+[windyboy/china_southern_power_grid_stat README](https://github.com/windyboy/china_southern_power_grid_stat)):
+HACS **or** [手动下载安装](https://github.com/windyboy/china_southern_power_grid_stat/releases).
+This host uses the latter. Releases here have no uploaded zip assets; use
+GitHub's **Source code (zip)** / zipball of the tag.
+
+**UI (Samba / File editor / Studio Code Server):**
+
+1. Download Source code (zip) from the GitHub Release.
+2. Extract. Copy only the inner
+   `custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat/` tree — not the repo
+   root, not a nested extra folder.
+3. Place it at `/config/custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat/`.
+4. Restart Core (**Settings → System → Restart**).
+5. First install only: **Settings → Devices & services → Add integration**.
+
+**SSH from the workstation** (verified 2026-08-14, W1N-107). Replace `v1.3.1`
+with the tag being installed:
+
+```bash
+TAG=v1.3.1
+STAGE=/tmp/csg-${TAG}-deploy
+mkdir -p "$STAGE"
+gh api "repos/windyboy/china_southern_power_grid_stat/zipball/${TAG}" \
+  > "$STAGE/src.zip"
+unzip -q "$STAGE/src.zip" -d "$STAGE"
+SRC=$(find "$STAGE" -type d -path '*/custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat' | head -1)
+# expect .../custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat
+
+ssh -o BatchMode=yes hassio@hass.windy.lan \
+  'sudo -n -i mkdir -p /homeassistant/.csg-backups &&
+   sudo -n -i cp -a /homeassistant/custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat \
+     /homeassistant/.csg-backups/china_southern_power_grid_stat.bak-$(date +%Y%m%d)-manual'
+
+rsync -a --delete \
+  -e 'ssh -o BatchMode=yes' \
+  "$SRC/" \
+  hassio@hass.windy.lan:/homeassistant/custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat/
+
+# --delete cannot remove Core-owned __pycache__; wipe as root, then restart
+ssh -o BatchMode=yes hassio@hass.windy.lan \
+  'sudo -n -i rm -rf /homeassistant/custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat/__pycache__ \
+     /homeassistant/custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat/*/__pycache__ &&
+   sudo -n -i ha core restart'
+```
+
+Wait until Core is up (`ha core info` returns, typically 1–2 min; this CLI
+build does not print a `state:` field).
+Then:
+
+```bash
+ssh -o BatchMode=yes hassio@hass.windy.lan \
+  'sudo -n -i cat /homeassistant/custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat/manifest.json'
+# version must match the tag
+
+ssh -o BatchMode=yes hassio@hass.windy.lan \
+  'sudo -n -i ha core logs -n 2500' | grep -E 'china_southern_power_grid_stat|cannot pickle' || true
+```
+
+**Host constraints (do not skip):**
+
+- Backups **must** live in `/homeassistant/.csg-backups/`. A `*.bak-*`
+  directory next to the live folder is scanned as the same domain and Core
+  fails with `No module named '...bak-YYYYMMDD-...'`.
+- Do not install this fork via HACS on this host. HACS still tracks
+  `CubicPill/china_southern_power_grid_stat` `v1.2.0`; a HACS update would
+  overwrite the live copy.
+- First poll after restart can time out to CSG over IPv4; if this-month
+  sensors stay `unknown` while last-month filled, reload the config entry
+  (UI: integration → Reload, or supervisor
+  `POST /core/api/config/config_entries/entry/<id>/reload`).
+- `runbooks/scripts/ha-maintenance.sh --restart-core --yes` can print
+  nothing and exit 1 in under a second **without restarting Core**. The
+  wrapper's ssh line discards stderr (`2>/dev/null`); with `pipefail`,
+  an ssh failure yields empty stdout + exit 1 before any remote command
+  runs. Do not treat that as a completed restart. Confirm with elapsed
+  time (~2 min for a real restart) and `ha core info`. Prefer
+  `ssh -o BatchMode=yes hassio@hass.windy.lan 'sudo -n -i ha core restart'`.
+
+Full command family: [runbooks/home-assistant-maintenance.md](../runbooks/home-assistant-maintenance.md).
+
+### `china_southern_power_grid_stat` live tree
+
+**v1.3.2** (`934f58c`, verified 2026-08-15, W1N-118): manual zipball of
+GitHub release
+[v1.3.2](https://github.com/windyboy/china_southern_power_grid_stat/releases/tag/v1.3.2)
+copied to `/config/custom_components/china_southern_power_grid_stat`.
+Earlier trees: v1.3.1/`55a293fc` (W1N-107), v1.3.0/`69f13c90` (W1N-106),
+`a433e8c` (W1N-105), `de01914` (W1N-103), `eb8b174` (W1N-102). Backups:
+`/homeassistant/.csg-backups/` (w1n102/104/105/106/107/118).
+
+v1.3.0 crashed the coordinator on first refresh
+(`TypeError: cannot pickle 'mappingproxy' object` in
+`copy.deepcopy(self._config)` under Python 3.14 / HA 2026.8.1). v1.3.1
+wraps those `deepcopy` calls with `dict(...)`. Post-restart 22:13 CST:
+entry `loaded`, no pickle traceback. Native this-month sensors filled after
+reloading entry `01KGCQDSZCF523A9X6SV3BZ1B9` (`ip_family: ipv4`). Native
+cost/ladder sensors can stay `unknown` because CSG
+`get_month_daily_cost_detail` returns a marketing-system SQL error; the
+dashboard uses template ladder/cost entities instead. Do not change
+`templates/csg_sensors.yaml` or the 电力监控 dashboard for an install.
+
+**`templates/csg_sensors.yaml` hardened 2026-08-29 (W1N-239):** added
+`availability` templates to all 12 `csg_*` sensors (numeric sensors can't
+render `unknown`/`unavailable` in `state`; availability suppresses
+rendering instead — native CSG down ⇒ derived sensors show `unavailable`,
+no more fake zeros / "一档" / `0%`). `csg_yesterday_kwh` now falls back to
+`last_month_by_day`'s last entry when `this_month_by_day` is empty (month
+start); ladder constants (`t1/t2/p1/p2/p3`) deduped into per-block
+`variables:` (Block B + Block D); `csg_mom_change` parses `date`
+defensively. Backup:
+`/homeassistant/.csg-backups/csg_sensors.yaml.bak-20260829-w1n239`.
+**Verified:** `ha core check` OK; Core restart required (trigger-based
+template blocks don't settle on `template.reload` — W1N-114 precedent);
+post-restart all 12 entities numeric & consistent (302.47 kWh→180.28 元,
+324.03 kWh→194.06 元, mom_change -3.6%, yesterday 7.66 kWh/2026-08-28),
+no template errors in Core logs.
+
+**`csg_sensors.yaml` off-by-one fixed 2026-08-29 (W1N-241):** CSG data
+lags 1 day (`sum(this_month_by_day)` == `this_month_total_usage`, data
+stops at yesterday), but templates used `now().day` as "days elapsed" →
+`csg_predicted_usage` underestimated ~1 daily avg (~3%) and
+`csg_mom_change` compared this-month 28 days vs last-month 29 days
+(-3.6% vs true -0.3%). Both now derive the day number from
+`this_month_by_day[-1].date` (fallback `now().day` when empty). Added
+`sensor.csg_this_month_daily_avg` (month-to-date avg, 302.47/28=10.8) and
+`sensor.csg_prediction_progress` (usage/predicted %, 90.3) in Block C
+(trigger adds `csg_predicted_usage`). Backup:
+`/homeassistant/.csg-backups/csg_sensors.yaml.bak-20260829-w1n241`.
+**Verified (8/29):** predicted 324.03→334.81, mom_change -3.6→-0.3,
+daily_avg 10.8, progress 90.3, predicted_cost 194.06→200.94 (334.81 kWh
+ladder), ladder cost 180.28 unchanged, `ha core check` OK after restart,
+no template errors; 14 csg_* entities total.
+
+**电力监控面板（`lovelace.dashboard_unknown` / view `power-monitor`）
+updated 2026-08-29 (W1N-240 + W1N-242):** 「本月累计」gauge 对齐夏季阶梯：
+`max:650`、segments `0/260/600`（绿/橙/红 = 一/二/三档；冬季 11-01 需切
+`max:450`、`0/200/400` — **seasonal switch point**，见下文）。「📊 统计
+数据」卡新增本年/去年 4 行（原生传感器，口径标注「电费(账单)」、本年
+「(至今)」）+ 本月日均/预测进度 2 行（`csg_this_month_daily_avg` /
+`csg_prediction_progress`，W1N-242）；面板共引用 **20** 个实体。改前备份：
+`/homeassistant/.lovelace-backups/dashboard-unknown-power-monitor-20260829-204845.json`
+（W1N-240）、`-20260829-210708.json`（W1N-242）
+（改法：WS `lovelace/config/save`，参数 `url_path: dashboard-unknown` +
+`config`；勿直改 `.storage/`）。验证：WS 读回 18→20 实体 diff ✓、gauge
+配置一致 ✓、URL `http://hass.windy.lan:8123/dashboard-unknown/power-monitor`。
+
+**`csg_sensors.yaml` W1N-242:** `csg_predicted_usage` /
+`csg_mom_change` / `csg_this_month_daily_avg` 三处取 `days[-1]` 前补
+`sort(attribute='date')`（与 `csg_yesterday_kwh` 一致，防上游乱序取错
+数据日）。备份 `csg_sensors.yaml.bak-20260829-w1n242`。验证：Core
+restart 后回归值不变（334.81 / -0.3 / 10.8 / 90.3 / 200.94 / 180.28）。
+
+**CSG 面板重构 2026-09-04（VPS-90，先核对计价后展示层改动）:** 核对
+`power-monitor` 计价与 8 月账单一致（198.65 vs 账单 198.64，差 ≤0.01 元，
+因模板用公众圆整价 0.589/0.639/0.889、账单用 6 位精确价），不改阶梯常量。
+改动：① `csg_sensors.yaml` Block B 新增
+`sensor.csg_this_month_avg_price`（本月阶梯电费÷本月用电，`元/kWh`，
+availability 照 W1N-239 惯例；**csg_* 实体 14→15**）；② 面板改名「环比上月」
+→「环比上月同期」；glance「本月/上月」grid 去重为单卡「上月」（本月用电/电费
+行归 💰核心数据卡）；⚡阶梯电价卡加「本月实际均价」行（当前档位/当前电价/
+本月实际均价/档位剩余；面板唯一实体引用 20→21）；③ `automations.yaml` 加
+2 条提醒：`automation.csg_mian_ban_qie_dong_ji_dang_ti_xing`（10-25 09:00）
+与 `automation.csg_mian_ban_qie_xia_ji_dang_ti_xing`（4-25 09:00）经
+`matrix_e2ee.send_message` 提醒切 gauge。④ 金额单位混排（原生 CNY vs 模板
+元）**维持**：`config/entity_registry/update` 拒绝自定义文本单位
+（`extra keys not allowed … Got '元'`），用户确认接受。备份：
+`.lovelace-backups/dashboard-unknown-power-monitor-20260904-204757-pre-refactor.json`、
+`.csg-backups/csg_sensors.yaml.bak-20260904-204757-pre-refactor`（及
+`-205301-pre-avgprice`）、`.automations-backups/automations.yaml.bak-*`。
+**WS 改法（2026.8，本机实测）**：core/主机 python 无 ws 库、core 容器内经
+supervisor 代理 WS 被拒（loop prevention），用
+`docker run --rm --network host -e SUPERVISOR_TOKEN`（supervisor 镜像
+`aarch64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0`）连 `ws://172.30.32.2/core/websocket`；
+命令名 `lovelace/config`（读）+ `lovelace/config/save`（写），
+`lovelace/config/get` 已不存在（unknown_command）。验证：新实体
+0.589 元/kWh、15 个 csg_* 数值齐全、回归值不变（14.09/198.65/331.22/
+304.99/181.89）、automations on、`ha core check` OK、日志无 template 错误。
+
+**CSG 长期归档（W1N-243, 2026-08-29）:** scribe 库新增 `csg_history`
+表（逐日 usage/cost/ladder/balance + 逐月累计；2026-07-01 起回填，永久），
+由 TimescaleDB 每日任务 **1008** `csg_daily_snapshot()`（22:30
+Asia/Shanghai；**TS job 非 pg_cron**）upsert 维护。日费用在原生
+`latest_day_cost` 缺失时回退 = 昨日用电 × 当前档费率（模板
+`csg_current_ladder_tariff` 0.639）；月费用回退模板
+`csg_this_month_ladder_cost`。**语义**：day 行 usage/cost 为该日值，
+ladder/balance 为 22:30 快照值。详见 [hosts/pgdb.md](../hosts/pgdb.md)。
+
+> **Seasonal gauge switch (W1N-240 已知事项):** 每年 **11-01** 把
+> `power-monitor` 视图「本月累计」gauge 切到冬季 `max:450` /
+> `0/200/400`，**5-01** 切回夏季 `max:650` / `0/260/600`（与模板
+> `now().month` 季节逻辑对齐；模板常量在 Block B/D `variables`）。
+> **提醒 automation（2026-09-04 起，VPS-90）:** 
+> `automation.csg_mian_ban_qie_dong_ji_dang_ti_xing`（10-25）与
+> `automation.csg_mian_ban_qie_xia_ji_dang_ti_xing`（4-25）09:00 经
+> `matrix_e2ee.send_message` 发操作步骤提醒；gauge 的 max/segments 无法
+> 模板化，仍需人工改卡配置。
+
+Home PPPoE IPv4 to CSG is still blackholed (`curl -4` to `218.19.148.218:443`
+times out). `end0` IPv6 is enabled (`ipv6.method: auto`); from HA,
+`curl -6 https://95598.csg.cn` returns HTTP 200 via `240e:f9:8060::1:16`.
+
+**`tianqi` weather recorder patch (verified 2026-08-13, W1N-75):**
+`/config/custom_components/tianqi/weather.py` has a local patch adding
+`_unrecorded_attributes = frozenset({"hourly_temperature", "hourly_skycon",
+"hourly_cloudrate", "hourly_precipitation"})` to the `WeatherEntity` class.
+Without it, weather.guangzhou's state attributes (~19 KB, dominated by the 4
+hourly_* arrays of up to 48 entries) exceed the recorder 16384-byte limit, so
+the recorder drops **all** attributes for the entity and logs
+`Recorder.db_schema: State attributes for weather.guangzhou exceed maximum
+size of 16384 bytes`. The patch excludes only the 4 arrays from recording
+(live state unchanged; other attributes still stored; ~6.3 KB payload). Backup
+at `weather.py.bak-w1n75`. **Re-apply after any `tianqi` component update.**
+The `_unrecorded_attributes` mechanism exists in Core 2026.8.1
+(`Entity.__init_subclass__` → `state_info["unrecorded_attributes"]`, consumed
+by recorder `shared_attrs_bytes_from_event`).
+
+
+### `matrix_e2ee` live tree (E2E Matrix bot, verified 2026-08-20)
+
+**v0.3.12** (tag `v0.3.12`; feat — Matrix activity events
+`matrix_e2ee_message_received` / `matrix_e2ee_verification_done` + push
+diagnostics; v0.3.9 added Connection health binary sensor, SAS/command
+allowlist split, URL normalization, single-entry enforcement):
+source copy from `/home/windy/project/ha-matrix-e2ee` `ea421ed` (tag
+`v0.3.12`) deployed 2026-08-20 via SSH rsync from workstation (upgraded
+from v0.3.2, backup `matrix_e2ee.bak-20260820-v0.3.2`).
+Custom **`matrix_e2ee`** integration — **Config Flow** (UI). See
+[docs/home-assistant-matrix.md](../docs/home-assistant-matrix.md).
+**Update runbook:** [runbooks/matrix-e2ee-update.md](../runbooks/matrix-e2ee-update.md).
+
+Earlier: v0.3.2 (tag `v0.3.2`, W1N-182/#34: wizard waits for inbound SAS
+emojis) deployed 2026-08-18 from `d35c484` (backup
+`matrix_e2ee.bak-20260818-v0.3.1`); v0.3.1 (GitHub #33: peer-initiated
+verification wizard fix) deployed 2026-08-18 from `d22e935` (backup
+`matrix_e2ee.bak-20260818-v0.3.0`); v0.3.0 (W1N-180/#32: bot-initiated
+verification wizard; W1N-179/#31 `receive_mac_event` cancel-state fix)
+deployed 2026-08-18 from `216cc99` (backup
+`matrix_e2ee.bak-20260818-v0.2.10`).
+
+- Bot `@hass:chans.xyz` reused (E2EE device `rO1R915ncu`). Config Entry
+  `01M04D7C1M4T2GX5VPG7NVQ7GV` (`source: import`, `state: loaded`). All
+  settings via **Settings → Devices & Services → Matrix E2EE → Configure**.
+- Config Entry options: `allowed_rooms` `["!gidvAzpDzwtzfEDrqu:chans.xyz", "!boxfylDSzOvrWkcsyY:chans.xyz"]`,
+  `allowed_users` `["@zhiqiang:chans.xyz"]`, `command_prefix` `"!"`.
+  **`verification_peer_users` not set** (v0.3.9+ SAS allowlist split from
+  `allowed_users`, W1N-156): defaults to empty → only the bot's own account
+  may drive SAS; `@zhiqiang` is denied until the option is added via
+  Settings → Devices & Services → Matrix E2EE → Configure.
+- Storage: `/config/.storage/matrix_e2ee_session.json` +
+  `/config/.storage/matrix_e2ee_store/`. Backups:
+  `/homeassistant/.matrix-e2ee-backups/` (incl. `matrix_e2ee.bak-20260820-v0.3.2`,
+  `matrix_e2ee.bak-20260818-v0.3.1`,
+  `matrix_e2ee.bak-20260818-v0.3.0`,
+  `matrix_e2ee.bak-20260818-v0.2.10`,
+  `matrix_e2ee.bak-20260816-v0.2.9`, `matrix_e2ee.bak-20260816-v0.2.8`);
+  full HA backup slugs `3d9d36db` (pre-v0.1.4) + `9f223f35` (pre-v0.2.0).
+- v0.3.12: Matrix activity events + push diagnostics
+  (`matrix_e2ee_message_received` / `matrix_e2ee_verification_done`).
+  v0.3.9: Connection health binary sensor (W1N-185/#40), config-entry
+  diagnostics (W1N-184/#39), SAS/command allowlist split
+  `verification_peer_users` (W1N-156/#41), SAS/sync logs demoted
+  warning→info/debug (W1N-188/#38), URL normalization + single-entry
+  enforcement (W1N-190/#42).
+  v0.3.8: `m.key.verification.done` handshake for request-based SAS
+  (W1N-183/#35).
+  v0.3.2: wizard waits for inbound SAS emojis before the compare step
+  (W1N-182/#34).
+  v0.3.1: verification wizard waits for a peer-initiated inbound SAS instead
+  of the bot starting SAS (GitHub #33).
+  v0.3.0: bot-initiated device verification wizard (W1N-180/#32).
+  v0.2.11: `receive_mac_event` no longer overrides canceled state (W1N-179/#31).
+- v0.2.9: restore SAS emoji rendering after vodozemac migration (W1N-175/#29).
+  v0.2.8: SAS commitment unpadded base64 for Element interop (W1N-174/#28).
+  v0.2.7: SAS cancel code/reason logging. v0.2.6: verification state logging +
+  request→ready bridge. v0.2.4: `_patch_nio_sas_timeout()` +
+  `_repair_dropped_start()`; `VERIFICATION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` 600→240.
+- Automation `1761188403590`「Matrix 聊天关卫生间灯」: trigger
+  `matrix_e2ee_command` (command `关卫生间灯`), actions `light.turn_off` +
+  `matrix_e2ee.send_message` (room `!gidvAzpDzwtzfEDrqu`).
+- **SAS not yet completed:** every device requires explicit `confirm_verification`.
+  Encrypted-room commands stay fail-closed until `@zhiqiang`'s device is verified.
+  Since v0.3.9 the SAS driver gate uses `verification_peer_users` (empty on
+  this host) instead of `allowed_users` — add `@zhiqiang:chans.xyz` there
+  before retrying the wizard. Three paths available: SAS manual confirm,
+  fingerprint, or the device verification wizard (v0.3.0 bot-initiated,
+  reworked in v0.3.1/v0.3.2 to wait for a peer-initiated inbound SAS from
+  Element with emoji comparison), see
+  [docs/home-assistant-matrix.md § Device verification](../docs/home-assistant-matrix.md).
+### Scribe long-term history (3.8.0 setup 2026-08-29; 4.4.0 verified 2026-09-13)
+
+- **Scribe 4.4.0** (`/homeassistant/custom_components/scribe/`, HACS repo
+  `jonathan-gtd/scribe`, = latest stable 2026-09-12; upgraded 2026-09-13 together
+  with Core 2026.9.1 / HAOS 18.2), configured from
+  `/homeassistant/scribe.yaml` — W1N-238 moved the block out of
+  `configuration.yaml` on 2026-08-29 (main config now carries
+  `scribe: !include scribe.yaml`; content moved verbatim; backup
+  `configuration.yaml.bak-20260829-201724-w1n238`). Config entry
+  `01KC2VFJWEQ3XDHY6TQKHPDVRB`, `source: import` — UI "Configure → Advanced"
+  edits are overridden by the YAML on restart; treat YAML as authoritative.
+- TimescaleDB at `192.168.55.15:5432/scribe` (DB user `hass`; host in inventory,
+  see [hosts/pgdb.md](../hosts/pgdb.md)). Database re-initialized 2026-08-29 14:06 CST
+  (user-handled; earlier `relation "entities" does not exist` errors resolved).
+  Health: `binary_sensor.scribe_database_connection`.
+- 2026-08-29 config applied (backup `/homeassistant/configuration.yaml.bak-20260829-scribe`):
+  - `record_events: true` with `include_events` whitelist: `automation_triggered`,
+    `matrix_e2ee_command`, `matrix_e2ee_message_received`,
+    `matrix_e2ee_verification_done`, `script_started`, `tag_scanned`,
+    `mobile_app_notification_action`, `homeassistant_start`, `homeassistant_stop`.
+  - State noise trimmed: `exclude_domains` update/button; glob
+    `sensor.zigbee2mqtt_bridge_*`; 4 hassio cpu/mem-percent entities.
+  - Global `exclude_attributes` drops tianqi `hourly_*` arrays (~19 KB/state —
+    the recorder-side `_unrecorded_attributes` patch does not apply to Scribe).
+  - `enable_stats_io` + `enable_stats_size` on → 14 `sensor.scribe_*` stats
+    entities (`scribe_states_written`, `scribe_events_written`, rates, sizes).
+  - Verified post-restart 14:23 CST: writer started, `scribe_events_written=1`
+    (homeassistant_start), states ~110/min, buffer 3, no scribe log errors.
+- **4.x upgrade核对 2026-09-13（只读 + 一处配置变更）**：live `manifest.json` =
+  4.4.0。两个 4.0 breaking change 在本机都不需要动作——数据库是 3.x 结构
+  （`states_raw` PK `(metadata_id, time)` 在，4.2.0 的启动态去重因此可用），
+  TimescaleDB 2.29.2 已装。4.1.0 修了 `db_url` 优先级，YAML 里的
+  `!secret scribe_url` 现在是权威。`scribe.yaml` 现有键在 4.4.0 全部仍然合法
+  （未知键被忽略，`extra=vol.ALLOW_EXTRA`）。**配置优先级 YAML > entry
+  `options` > entry `data` > 默认值**，而 `_resolve_settings` 读的是
+  `hass.data[DOMAIN]["yaml_config"]`（只有 `async_setup` 会写），所以
+  **YAML 改动必须重启 Core，reload config entry 不重读 YAML。**
+- **`stats_io_interval: 300`（2026-09-13 添加**，备份
+  `/homeassistant/scribe.yaml.bak-20260913-191558`）。4.4.0 不再让 HA 每 30s
+  轮询 I/O 统计传感器，改由集成自己每 60s 发布，间隔成为配置项。scribe 自己的
+  传感器此前是本机自写历史的主要来源（变更前 24h：11 019 / 87 461 行状态 =
+  12.6%），60s → 300s 把这部分降约 5 倍（每个 I/O 传感器约 1440 → 288 行/天）。
+  验证：`ha core check` OK；重启 88s；`ScribeWriter started successfully`；
+  无 scribe error/warning；scribe Repairs 问题 0 条；传感器发布间隔实测正好
+  300s（11:19:26 → 11:24:26 UTC）。
+- **Retention 现在可用但刻意不设**：`retention_states` / `retention_events`
+  （4.0.0）按间隔丢 chunk，留空 = 永久保留，符合本机定位（Scribe 是永久归档，
+  recorder 保留 365 天）。注意 retention 是**绕过** entry `data` 副本读取的
+  （`from_entry_data=False`），所以删掉 YAML 行即撤销策略。`db_schema`、
+  `enable_rollups`、`scribe.purge` 同样未用：图表走 `sensor_minute` +
+  `timescale_database_reader`（见 [hosts/pgdb.md](pgdb.md)），不吃 scribe 自己的
+  视图，配置里也没有任何 `scribe.query` 调用。`flush_interval` 仍是 entry
+  `data` 钉住的 5s——上游下一个版本把默认改成 30s，但 entry 值优先，要采用只能
+  在 YAML 显式写 `flush_interval: 30`。
+- Recorder stays external-Postgres with `purge_keep_days: 365` (W1N-243,
+  2026-08-29, raised from 30 — ~300 MB/yr, 1% of the 30G pgdb disk) for
+  native UI per-change history; Scribe is the permanent archive. Long-term
+  statistics stay permanent (not purged by `purge_keep_days`). Note:
+  extending retention does **not** recover pre-2026-08-29 raw history
+  (already purged); only `csg_history` day/month values cover that period.
+
+### Config layout: scribe.yaml + templates/ merge (W1N-238, verified 2026-08-29)
+
+- `configuration.yaml` line 29: `scribe: !include scribe.yaml`; line 9:
+  `template: !include_dir_merge_list templates`. No `packages/`.
+- `scribe.yaml` (config root): the Scribe block, content identical to the
+  former inline one; import semantics unchanged.
+- `templates/`: `csg_sensors.yaml` (12 template sensors, top-level **list**)
+  + `quick_sensors.yaml` (scaffold for Quick-derived `quick_*` sensors, empty
+  list with convention header). **`!include_dir_merge_list` merges per-file
+  lists; non-list files are silently skipped** — every file in `templates/`
+  must be a top-level list (`- sensor:` blocks). Directory include only picks
+  up `*.yaml`, so the `.bak` / `.pre-*` backups in the dir are ignored. After
+  adding sensors, verify template-platform entity count = 12 + N (entity
+  registry `platform: template`).
+- Convention (per review + W1N-233): pure sums/averages stay min_max helpers
+  (e.g. `sensor.dang_qian_zong_gong_lu`); only template-logic derivations
+  (ladder pricing, cross-entity conditions) go into `quick_sensors.yaml`.
+- Post-change verification 20:19 CST: `ha core check` ok, 92 s restart
+  (2026.8.3), `binary_sensor.scribe_database_connection` on,
+  `scribe_states_written` 18581→19426 growing, template entities still 12,
+  csg sensors numeric, no scribe/template log errors.
+
+### Timescale Plotly card + database reader (verified 2026-08-29)
+
+Chart stack over the Scribe TimescaleDB archive. Upstream pair (no HACS;
+manual copies): reader `remmob/timescale_database_reader` **v1.1.0** (main
+`bb8776a`) + card `remmob/timescale-plotly-card` **2.2.0** (main `217961d`).
+
+- **Reader integration**: `/homeassistant/custom_components/timescale_database_reader/`.
+  Config entry `01M165P77QT1FQEAVPNZHDT82W` ("Scribe", `source: user`): connects
+  `hass@192.168.55.15:5432/scribe` (credentials = `secrets.yaml` `scribe_url`),
+  `table: sensor_minute`. Exposes no entities/services — it serves WS command
+  `timescale/query` (window ≤ 365 d, ≤ 50 000 rows, `downsample` bucket seconds).
+  Benign startup warning `Error executing test query: column "time" does not
+  exist`: the self-test SQL assumes the LTSS column name; the scribe table uses
+  `minute` — real queries work (verified: 70 rows for a live power sensor).
+- **Card**: `/homeassistant/www/community/timescale-plotly-card/timescale-plotly-card.js`
+  (root-owned, same convention as HACS dirs). Lovelace resource (storage)
+  id `2e360d17b5aa4ce59c2fd13c43b51215` →
+  `/hacsfiles/timescale-plotly-card/timescale-plotly-card.js`, type `module`.
+  Card config matches the entry by `database: scribe` (name from the reader
+  entry). Updates: replace the file, resource URL unchanged — browsers need a
+  hard refresh or a bumped `?v=` query on the resource URL.
+- **pgdb side** (`sensor_minute_aggregate` cagg + `sensor_minute` hypertable +
+  every-minute refresh job): see [hosts/pgdb.md](pgdb.md) § Databases.
+- **Agent-side HA WebSocket without a long-lived token** (verified 2026-08-29):
+  connect `ws://supervisor/core/websocket` with header
+  `Authorization: Bearer $SUPERVISOR_TOKEN`, then send
+  `{"type":"auth","access_token":"$SUPERVISOR_TOKEN"}` — the Supervisor proxy
+  swaps it for a core token (works as the internal Supervisor admin user). Note
+  `lovelace/resources/create` in HA 2026.8 takes `res_type` (NOT
+  `resource_type`).
+- Scribe stores numeric sensor values in `states_raw.value` with `state` NULL,
+  so `sensor_minute.state` shows `'0'` for numeric sensors; the card plots
+  `avg_state` (from `value`) — expected, not a bug.
+- **Quick 仪表盘（`dashboard-quick`）图表套件**（2026-08-29 创建，经 WS
+  `lovelace/config/save` 写入；W1N-230 修复 + W1N-231 round-2 改进）：
+  5 张 timescale 卡——大功率电器/常驻负载功率（按量级拆图，避免尖峰压扁
+  <70 W 基线）、按插座用电量（`energy_mode` + cumulative/diff，数据质量前提
+  见 pgdb 的 refresh 过程补丁）、室内外温湿度（温度左轴/湿度右轴，4 位置同色
+  配对）、人体感应活动状态（3 个 `motion_state`，banded `state_map`
+  none/small/medium/large → 0-11，per-entity `line_color` 红/蓝/绿）。
+  空调实体引用为 `kong_diao_*`（`kong_tiao` 是笔误，W1N-230 修复；`grep -c
+  kong_tiao` 应为 0）。灯区：2×2 嵌套 grid（`grid_options: {columns: "full"}`，
+  内层 `columns: 2`）+ 4 卡统一 `mushroom-light-card`（显式 name、
+  `use_light_color: false`、内联亮度/色温控制），heading icon
+  `mdi:lightbulb-group`。heading badges：环境 4 温度（迷你/mini数显/数显/广州）、
+  大功率电器 空调/电脑当前功率、常驻负载 总功率
+  （`sensor.dang_qian_zong_gong_lu`，min_max **sum** helper，`round_digits: 0`，
+  任一源掉线 fail-closed → unknown）。常驻负载图卡级 `fill: 'tozeroy'` +
+  冰箱/主网络 per-entity `fill_color`（线色 20% 透明）+ 其余 5 条 `fill: false`
+  （per-entity fill 逐系列退出，卡 JS `seriesConfig.fill !== false`）。
+  布局：视图 `type: sections` + `max_columns: 4`；灯/用电/环境/人体感应
+  `column_span: 4`，功率两图拆两个 `column_span: 2` 分区**并排**（等高 280px，
+  桌面并排、手机回落堆叠；去卡内 title 省半宽图垂直空间）。
+  **分区/卡片是两套尺寸键，不可混用**：分区宽 = `column_span`
+  （`hui-sections-view.ts` 缺省按 1 列渲染，绝不省略）；卡片宽 =
+  `grid_options: {columns: <n|"full">}`（`hui-card.ts` 只读 `config.grid_options`，
+  写在卡片上的 `column_span` 被静默忽略；缺省 12 列，分区内格 = 12 × 分区
+  span，故 span-4 分区里缺省卡片只有 1/4 宽）。
+  修改前备份：`/homeassistant/.lovelace-backups/dashboard-quick-*.json`
+  （W1N-230 修复: `20260829-190256`；round-2 改进: `20260829-194040`）。
+
+- **Quick 时间范围扩容 (2026-09-13, VPS-92)**: 用户反馈「48 小时不够」。
+  各 timescale 卡可选档上调——大功率电器/常驻负载 `…,24h` → `+3d,7d`；
+  环境 `6h,12h,24h,48h` → `+7d,14d,30d`；人体感应 `…,24h` → `+3d,7d`；
+  用电量(按插座) `energy_time_ranges` `today,week,month,custom` → `+3mo`。
+  **默认档未改**（6h / 6h / today / 24h / 12h）。卡片 JS 只接受
+  `<n>m|<n>h|<n>d`（`parseDurationToMs` 正则 `/^(\d+)(m|h|d)$/`，
+  仅 m/h/d，无 w）与命名档 `today|week|month|3mo|6mo|year|years|custom`；
+  `energy_mode` 卡必须用后者。**数据下界注意**：scribe `sensor_minute`
+  目前最早只到 **2026-08-29**，所以 >15d 的档（14d 边缘、30d 明显）前半段
+  会是空白，等归档继续累积才好看。备份
+  `.lovelace-backups/dashboard-quick-20260913-190912-pre-timerange.json`。
+
+### 地图仪表盘：CARTO keyed tiles via `custom:map-card` (verified 2026-08-30, W1N-261)
+
+- **背景:** CARTO 自 2026-08-26 起对无 key 栅格瓦片打 "API KEY REQUIRED"
+  水印，内置地图卡/zone 编辑器全部受影响。Core 2026.8.3 的 `MapCardConfig`
+  **没有任何瓦片配置项**（frontend 20260729.7 源码核对：
+  `setup-leaflet-map.ts` 硬编码 CARTO voyager URL）。上游修复是 2026.9.0b1
+  起改用 OSMF 矢量瓦片（frontend PR #53816），stable 预计 2026-09-02 前后。
+- **变更:** 「地图」仪表盘（url_path `map`，storage）唯一 map 卡替换为
+  `custom:map-card`（[nathan-gs/ha-map-card](https://github.com/nathan-gs/ha-map-card)
+  **v1.16.0**，手动安装非 HACS）：`tile_layer_url` =
+  `https://{s}.basemaps.cartocdn.com/rastertiles/voyager/{z}/{x}/{y}.png?key=<CARTO_KEY>`
+  （配 `tile_layer_options: {subdomains: abcd, maxZoom: 20}` + OSM/CARTO
+  attribution）。实体不变：2 person + 4 zone（zone 用 `display: icon` +
+  `circle: auto`，circle 读实体 `radius` 属性画半径圈）。
+- **CARTO key 是 secret**: 只存在于服务端 lovelace 存储（dashboard `map`
+  的卡片配置）和用户本人处；勿写入本仓库或 Linear。
+- **文件/资源:** `/homeassistant/www/community/ha-map-card/map-card.js`
+  （root:root 644，678554 B，sha256
+  `f30dfb606e858d2216d5198d8cf758ce956d127006ebd7d66d4329153a247ec2`）；
+  Lovelace resource（storage）id `9d2b50b52c60420d89ebd041f722cf60` →
+  `/hacsfiles/ha-map-card/map-card.js`，type module（WS
+  `lovelace/resources/create`，2026.8 参数名 `res_type`）。升级 = 手动替换
+  该文件（不在 HACS 管理下，浏览器需强刷）。
+- **备份:** `/homeassistant/.lovelace-backups/dashboard-map-map-20260830-133714.json`
+  （还原 = 把备份里的 `views[0].cards[0]` 写回后再 WS `lovelace/config/save`
+  url_path `map`）。
+- **验证 8/30:** 同瓦片无 key=水印 / 带 key=干净（256×256 PNG 视觉对比）；
+  resource HTTP 200 text/javascript；WS 读回卡片配置（type/entities/key/
+  attribution/options）全部符合；HA 主机 `curl -4` 带 key 瓦片 200。
+- **Follow-up:** Core 升 2026.9.0 stable 后内置地图/zone 编辑器自动切
+  OSMF 矢量瓦片；届时可保留 custom 卡（继续 keyed CARTO）或用备份还原
+  内置卡。zone 编辑器等其余内置地图的水印在 2026.9 前无解。
+
+## Known issues
+
+**Bluetooth hci0 instability — RTL8821CS (verified 2026-08-13, W1N-74):**
+The local Bluetooth controller hci0 is an **RTL8821CS** combo chip on the
+x88 Pro board. Kernel logs show recurring `hci0: hardware error 0x00`,
+`Opcode 0x200c tx timeout` (HCI_LE_Set_Scan_Parameters), `Unable to disable
+scanning: -110`, `Peer device has reset` — the chip hardware-stalls during
+active scanning. HA's `bluetooth_auto_recovery` power-cycle then times out
+after 5 s and retries every ~2 min:
+`bluetooth_auto_recovery.recover: Could not reset the power state of the
+Bluetooth adapter hci0 ... due to timeout after 5 seconds`. The HAOS image
+already ships custom systemd units to cope (`x88-bt-hci-recovery.service` and
+a "Patch HA Bluetooth scanner mode for x88 RTL8821CS" service, visible in host
+journal). **No user impact:** there are **no BLE entities** in HA
+(xiaomi_ble / bthome / led_ble / bluetooth / esphome domains are all empty;
+platforms merely load from stray advertisements). Real IoT devices are Zigbee
+(via Zigbee2MQTT) or WiFi/MQTT/cloud. An ESPHome Bluetooth-proxy ESP32
+(`/config/esphome/bluetooth.yaml`, bluetooth_proxy: active, WiFi `ubnt-haas`)
+is configured but currently offline (ESPHome add-on stopped, port 6053
+unreachable) and produced no entities. Follow-up (optional): disable the
+local adapter and rely on the ESPHome proxy, or stop the bluetooth
+integration entirely.
+
+**eMMC disk lifetime 10% (verified 2026-08-13, W1N-76):** `ha host info`
+reports `disk_life_time: 10` — the boot eMMC (`/dev/mmcblk2`, CJTD4R
+`0xacacc064`, 64 GB) has ~10% life left. `disk_free: 40.2/56.4 GB`. Full
+backup `pre-maintenance-20260813` (slug `411a4ba5`, 144.26 MB) taken
+2026-08-13 covers current config; monitor `disk_life_time` on each health
+snapshot and plan a disk replacement / data-disk migration before the eMMC
+fails.
+
+## Matter Server (verified 2026-08-21)
+
+- Add-on `core_matter_server` (`homeassistant/aarch64-addon-matter-server`) runs the Matter
+  commissioner on this host (host networking; add-on container `app_core_matter_server`).
+- **After the ISP PD prefix rotates (PPPoE redial), the add-on can cache a stale IPv6 GUA
+  in its mDNS advertisement** — clients trying that dead address make Matter
+  commissioning/connection fail. Fix: restart the add-on so it re-enumerates addresses:
+  `ssh hassio@hass.windy.lan 'sudo -n -i ha apps restart core_matter_server'`
+  (`ha addons restart ...` also works; "addons" is deprecated in favor of "apps").
+- Verified 2026-08-21 (W1N-207): stale `240e:3bd:234:2f22:*` AAAA in mDNS removed by
+  restart; advertisement now carries only current GUA `240e:3bd:235:1fb2:*` + link-local;
+  CASE sessions with Aqara M3 / SmartThings hubs resumed over IPv6 link-local.
+
+> **Open items (2026-08-21, W1N-207):** a phone on LAN55 was querying five known
+> `_matter._tcp` instances of which only HA answered — the other Matter nodes are
+> offline / not announcing (device-side; user to confirm power/Wi-Fi). HA's IPv6
+> default route via NetworkManager was observed missing once (curl -6 intermittent,
+> while ping6 and `curl -6 --noproxy` work) — not the Matter root cause; re-check
+> on the next health snapshot.
+
+Verified 2026-08-23 (read-only, W1N-207): add-on `started`, version `9.0.4`, no
+update pending; current GUA `240e:3bd:238:4812:*` (PD rotated again since 08-22)
+advertised correctly over v4+v6. Both ESP32-C2 bulbs now announce `_matter._tcp`
+(multi-fabric, including this host's fabric `DCE86145C137AF0E`) — but they
+**refuse TCP 5540 on IPv4 and IPv6**, so matter-server holds **zero established
+:5540 sessions** (device-side failure mode C; no errors logged — see
+[docs/matter-pairing-troubleshoot.md §8](../docs/matter-pairing-troubleshoot.md)).
+
+## 马桶换气电源（Matter 插座，半计量）+ 电量估算 (2026-09-13)
+
+**设备**：Matter `Smart Plug`（SIXWGH，`model_id 3596`，hw 1.0 / sw 1.3.0），node 18
+(0x12)，`device_id 5ef1850953466d6e7a9c6b901fbebe1c`，config entry
+`01JF51VQ48PGJGXX3RNAG6MVAA`，区域**卫生间** (`wei_sheng_jian`)，label `power`；
+2026-09-13 17:58 CST 配对。实体：
+`switch.wei_sheng_jian_ma_tong_huan_qi_dian_yuan`（插座）、
+`sensor.…_dian_yuan`（电源 W）、`sensor.…_dian_ya`（电压 V）、
+`sensor.…_you_gong_dian_liu`（有功电流 A）、`sensor.…_dian_li`（电力 kWh，
+**永久 unknown**）。
+
+**根因（实测 Matter 属性，node 18）**：电量簇 0x0091 `FeatureMap = 13`
+(IMPE|CUME|PERE，即**声明**支持导入/累计/周期电量)，但
+`CumulativeEnergyImported (0x0001)` 恒为 `null`，`PeriodicEnergyImported
+(0x0003)` 带载也恒为 `{Energy: 0}`；`CumulativeEnergyExported (0x0002)`
+不存在（EXPE 未声明，自洽）。HA 只用 `CumulativeEnergyImported` 建能量实体
+（`components/matter/sensor.py:1083`，`allow_none_value=True`）→ 该实体
+**永远不会出数**。**功率计量本身正常**：0x0090 `FeatureMap = 2` (ALTC)，
+Voltage / ActiveCurrent / ActivePower 都随负载变化（实测 220.3 V / 118 mA /
+24.7 W，HA `电源` 0.0→24.9 W 有历史）。厂商 `update` 实体报无新固件。
+
+**处理（方案 A：功率积分补电量）**：
+
+- 新建 **Integration (Riemann sum) 辅助元素**：config entry
+  `01M2D53T188FW8WEC547ENHSVH`（domain `integration`，state `loaded`），
+  source `sensor.wei_sheng_jian_ma_tong_huan_qi_dian_yuan_dian_yuan`，
+  `method: trapezoidal`、`unit_prefix: k`、`unit_time: h`、`round: 3`、
+  `max_sub_interval: 60s`。
+- 实体 `sensor.wei_sheng_jian_ma_tong_huan_qi_dian_yuan_energy`（创建时 HA
+  自动生成 `…_dian_yuan_ma_tong_huan_qi_dian_yuan_dian_liang`，随后立即
+  `config/entity_registry/update` 改名为 `<插座>_energy` 以对齐约定；
+  该实体新建、无引用，改名安全），friendly name「马桶换气电源 电力」，
+  unit kWh、`device_class: energy`、**`state_class: total`**——能源仪表盘
+  允许 `TOTAL` 与 `TOTAL_INCREASING`（`components/energy/validate.py:279`）。
+- **能源仪表盘** (`/energy`)：grid 源 `[8]` 由 `…_dian_li` 改为 `…_energy`，
+  其余 8 条插座源未动。注意这 9 条「插座」全部以 `type: grid` 注册，被当作
+  全屋用电代理；`switch` 卡片所在的 Grid 卡片此前第 9 行是空的，即本次修复点。
+- **Quick 仪表盘**：「用电量(按插座)」图第 11 项由 `…_dian_li` 改为
+  `…_energy`；新增 `column_span: 2` 的「开关」区块（heading + tile
+  `switch.…` + `toggle` feature + 功率徽标）→ 视图 6→7 分区。
+
+**口径警告**：`…_energy` 是**估算值**（Riemann 积分，只在 HA 运行期间累计、
+非账单级），与另外 8 个原生计量插座的累计电量口径不同；功率传感器更新
+间隔约 5–10 s（实测 24.9/24.8/25.0 W 抖动），加 `max_sub_interval: 60s`
+保证静默时也继续累计。
+
+**Agent 侧建辅助元素的方法（2026-09-13 实测）**：HA 的 config flow 走
+**REST**（WS 只有 `config_entries/flow/progress|subscribe`，没有 start）。
+经 supervisor 代理即可，无需 HA 长连接/长寿命 token：
+
+```bash
+# SUPERVISOR_TOKEN 由 sudo -n -i 提供
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $SUPERVISOR_TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"handler":"integration"}' \
+  http://supervisor/core/api/config/config_entries/flow      # → {flow_id, step_id:"user", data_schema}
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $SUPERVISOR_TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"name":"…","source":"sensor.x","method":"trapezoidal","round":3,
+       "unit_prefix":"k","unit_time":"h","max_sub_interval":{"minutes":1}}' \
+  http://supervisor/core/api/config/config_entries/flow/<flow_id>   # → create_entry
+```
+
+`auth/long_lived_access_token` 在 supervisor 代理身份下**失败**
+（`unknown_error`），故无法用长寿命 token 开浏览器会话；`DurationSelector`
+的值是 `{"minutes":1}` 形式（`cv.time_period`）。
+
+**备份/回滚**：`.lovelace-backups/dashboard-quick-20260913-181251-pre-ma-tong-plug.json`
+（改动前原件）、`…-20260913-183210-pre-repoint.json`（改名/换源前）；
+`.ha-backups/energy-20260913-183135-pre-ma-tong-repoint.json`（能源 prefs）。
+回滚 = 把能源 prefs 的源 [8] 指回 `…_dian_li` + 还原 Quick 面板 JSON；
+如需彻底放弃估算电量 = 删除 config entry `01M2D53T188FW8WEC547ENHSVH`。
+
+**验证 (2026-09-13 18:3x)**：`…_energy` 0.002→0.003 kWh 且随 24.6 W 负载
+增长（换气扇关掉后回落 0.0 W，累计值保留）；`recorder/list_statistic_ids`
+已含该实体；Quick 面板 WS 读回 7 分区、用电量图 11 项指向新实体、旧
+`_dian_li` 引用 0 处；能源 prefs 读回 9 源、第 9 条为新实体。
+**`energy/validate` 已全绿**（9 源 0 issue）：创建后 ~5 min 内曾报
+`statistics_not_defined`（recorder 的统计任务周期是 5 min，`statistics_meta`
+行由该任务建立），18:39 复核时已自动消失——建辅助元素后**不要**把这条
+瞬时告警当作失败。
+
+## Related docs
+
+- [runbooks/home-assistant-maintenance.md](../runbooks/home-assistant-maintenance.md) — `ha` CLI maintenance runbook + [script](../runbooks/scripts/ha-maintenance.sh); custom-component zip install is §7
+- [docs/lan-overview.md](../docs/lan-overview.md) — LAN map and gw port-forward
+- [hosts/dns.windy.lan.md](dns.windy.lan.md) — `hass.windy.lan` / `hass.local` rewrites
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ See full shape in [docs/pdns-upstream.md](../docs/pdns-upstream.md). Live secret
 | `poweradmin` | poweradmin | Up (healthy) | `poweradmin/poweradmin:stable` |
 | `pdns_pgweb` | pgweb | Up | `sosedoff/pgweb:0.16.2` |
 | `pdns-backup` | backup | Up | `postgres:16` (scheduler) |
-| `powerdns-admin` | *(orphan)* | Exited | legacy PDA UI — not in active compose |
+
+> Legacy PDA UI container `powerdns-admin` (orphan, Exited) was removed 2026-08-12 (W1N-59).

 ### Network model

@@ -100,9 +101,60 @@ See full shape in [docs/pdns-upstream.md](../docs/pdns-upstream.md). Live secret

 **Quirk:** `backend` is internal — backup must not use Alpine + runtime `apk`/`crond`. Uses `postgres:16` + `backup-scheduler.sh` (fixed 2026-08-01).

-## Other software on this host (stubs)
+## RustDesk Server

-`/opt/traefik`, `/opt/adguard`, `/opt/remark42`, `/opt/rustdesk`, `/opt/nginx-manager`, …
+**Status: operational** (hbbs + hbbr Up; image pinned `1.1.14`; relay address fixed 2026-08-12, W1N-59).
+
+| Item | Value |
+|------|--------|
+| Install path | `/opt/rustdesk` |
+| Compose | `/opt/rustdesk/compose.yml` |
+| Containers | `hbbs` (rendezvous), `hbbr` (relay) |
+| Image | `rustdesk/rustdesk-server:1.1.14` (pinned) |
+| Relay (hbbr) | `hk2.chans.xyz:21117` — advertised to clients via `hbbs -r` |
+| Rendezvous (hbbs) | `21115/tcp` (NAT test), `21116/tcp+udp`, `21118/tcp` (ws) |
+| Relay (hbbr) | `21117/tcp`, `21119/tcp` (ws) |
+| Public IP | `154.36.174.161` |
+| Health | [runbooks/rustdesk-health.md](../runbooks/rustdesk-health.md) |
+
+**Note:** the relay hostname in `hbbs -r` must resolve to this host's public IP
+(`154.36.174.161`). `hk2.chans.xyz` resolves correctly; the previously used
+`hk2.wsvc.info` had **no DNS record** and broke relay connectivity for clients
+(fixed 2026-08-12, W1N-59).
+
+## Other software on this host (confirmed 2026-08-12)
+
+Verified live via `docker ps` / port scan. Each runs as a separate compose
+project under `/opt/<name>` and is fronted by Traefik where noted.
+
+| Service | Path | Container(s) | Image | Ports / notes |
+|---------|------|--------------|-------|---------------|
+| Traefik | `/opt/traefik` | `traefik` | `traefik:v3.6.2` | `80`, `443` (TLS entry), `8080` (dashboard) |
+| AdGuard Home | `/opt/adguard` | `adguardhome` | `adguard/adguardhome:latest` | DoH `5443`, DoT `853` (bridge; no LAN `:53`) |
+| Remark42 | `/opt/remark42` | `remark42` | `ghcr.io/umputun/remark42:latest` | no host ports; via Traefik (in-container `8080`) |
+
+### Traefik dashboard auth
+
+| Item | Value |
+|------|-------|
+| Dashboard URL | `https://npm.chans.xyz` (Traefik `api@internal` router), also host `:8080` |
+| Auth | HTTP Basic via Traefik `basicauth` middleware (label `dashboard-auth`) |
+| User | `windy` — stored as a **bcrypt** hash (plaintext never stored) |
+| Hash generator | `/opt/traefik/generate-dashboard-auth.sh` (bcrypt; auto `$`→`$$` compose escaping) |
+| Config | `/opt/traefik/compose.yml` (label `traefik.http.middlewares.dashboard-auth.basicauth.users`) |
+
+**Password rotated 2026-08-12** from apr1/MD5 to bcrypt via the generator script; the
+plaintext lives only in the operator's password manager, never in this repo.
+To rotate again: `cd /opt/traefik && ./generate-dashboard-auth.sh windy`, paste the
+printed label into `compose.yml`, then `docker compose up -d --force-recreate traefik`.
+
+`/opt/nginx-manager` was a leftover (compose + `data/` + `letsencrypt/`, no running
+container) and was **removed 2026-08-12**; pre-deletion backup:
+`/opt/backups/nginx-manager-20260812.tar.gz`.
+
+Health coverage: these auxiliary services are checked by the `hk2aux`
+health-check profile (`ansible/roles/healthcheck`). Run:
+`cd ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/health-report.yml --limit powerdns`.

 ## Ops / runbooks

@@ -133,6 +185,23 @@ dig @202.91.35.141 SOA wsvc.info +short

 On-server docs: `/opt/pdns/README.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`.

+## Disk / logging (VPS-81, 2026-09-02)
+
+Root disk cleanup performed (runbook: [host-disk-cleanup](../runbooks/host-disk-cleanup.md)):
+
+- Root `/` (20G vda1): 76% used → **38% used** (15G → 7.1G; free 4.7G → 12G).
+- **AGH log flood root cause fixed**: `/opt/adguard/conf/AdGuardHome.yaml`
+  `log.verbose: true → false` (backup `AdGuardHome.yaml.bak-20260902-vps81`).
+  Verbose debug was streaming to stderr → container `json.log` (~120MB/day);
+  `log.file: ""` makes AGH's own rotation keys inert. Restart only (no recreate).
+- Journald capped: `/etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/00-vps81.conf`
+  `SystemMaxUse=200M`; journal vacuumed to ~96M.
+- Docker: engine **29.7.2**; 14 unused images removed (kept `pdns-auth-50:5.0.5`
+  rollback pin); 12 orphan anonymous volumes + build cache pruned. In-use
+  volumes intact (`pdns_dbdata`, `b594d738…` PG data, `e855d078…` backup).
+- Follow-up: re-check AGH `json.log` growth **2026-09-09** (one-week checkpoint);
+  global docker log rotation only if still needed.
+
 ## Verified

 Last checked: **2026-08-01 21:40 CST** — operational; docs audit recorded.
@@ -142,3 +211,4 @@ Last checked: **2026-08-01 21:40 CST** — operational; docs audit recorded.
 - `only-notify=` + `also-notify=202.91.35.141`; MASTER `domains.master` cleared
 - https://pdns.wsvc.info → **302**; https://pgweb.wsvc.info → **401**
 - Hardening backlog: API/DB credential rotation + TSIG rotate (see upstream doc)
+- 2026-09-02 (VPS-81): post-cleanup verified — 10 containers Up (adguardhome healthy), DNS SOA/NS + web endpoints OK; see Disk/logging section above.
@@ -50,8 +50,9 @@ See [mailcow-smtp-client](../runbooks/mailcow-smtp-client.md).
 - [mailcow-health](../runbooks/mailcow-health.md)
 - [mailcow-update](../runbooks/mailcow-update.md)
 - [mailcow-smtp-client](../runbooks/mailcow-smtp-client.md)
- Script: [`../scripts/check-mx2.sh`](../scripts/check-mx2.sh)
+
+Routine health: `cd ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/health-report.yml --limit mailcow`.

 ## Verified

-Last checked: 2026-08-01 — `./scripts/check-mx2.sh` exit 0 (compose up, watchdog 100%, empty queue, TLS LE OK, SMTP Postcow, A/AAAA/PTR/MX/SPF OK).
+Last checked: 2026-08-01 — Ansible mailcow health profile OK (compose up, watchdog 100%, empty queue, TLS LE OK, SMTP Postcow, A/AAAA/PTR/MX/SPF OK).
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# pgdb — TimescaleDB (PG18, Docker)
+
+## Role and access
+
+| Item | Value |
+|---|---|
+| Role | TimescaleDB PostgreSQL 18 (Docker) — Home Assistant recorder 后端（`hass`/`scribe` 库） |
+| IPv4 | `192.168.55.15` (LAN55) |
+| DNS | (none) |
+| SSH | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.55.15`（key auth 已验证可用 2026-08-29；agent 沙箱用 `ssh -F /dev/null -o BatchMode=yes`；password auth 亦可） |
+| Host | PVE 管理的 QEMU VM（i440FX，**VMID 100**），Debian 13 (trixie)，内核 6.12.105；宿主机 **pve2 `192.168.55.25`**（Proxmox 9.2.2，SSH `root@192.168.55.25`，`onboot: 1`，QEMU guest agent 已装；2026-08-31 补记） |
+| Resources | 3 GB RAM（08-30 13:58 由 2G 上调、删除 balloon/ksm/shares 后重启生效）/ 30 GB disk（26 G 空闲） |
+| Docker | 29.7.2；容器 `timescaledb` = `timescale/timescaledb:latest-pg18`（PG **18.6** + TimescaleDB **2.29.2**，Apache-2.0 版） |
+| Ports | `192.168.55.15:5432`（PG，IPv4 only）；`192.168.55.15:8081`（pgweb GUI，basic auth） |
+
+## Databases
+
+| DB | Owner | Size | 用途 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `hass` | hass | ~406 MB（2026-09-13） | HA recorder（states/events/statistics），客户端 HAOS `192.168.55.11` |
+| `scribe` | postgres | ~2.6 GB（2026-09-13） | HA scribe 集成（entities/areas/devices 注册表同步 + `states_raw`/`events` hypertable + `csg_history` 长期归档表）；体积由 `sensor_minute` 图表管道主导（2.26 GB），见 Known issues |
+| `postgres` | postgres | ~9 MB | 默认库 |
+
+## Ops notes
+
+- **Docker compose 管理**（2026-08-29 改造）：`/opt/database/docker-compose.yml`（源码在仓库 `compose/pgdb/`）+ `/opt/database/.env`（0600，密钥）+ `/opt/database/pgweb-bookmarks/`（0600，bookmark 含 DB 密码）。三个服务：
+  | 服务 | 镜像 | 端口 | 说明 |
+  |---|---|---|---|
+  | `timescaledb` | `timescale/timescaledb:latest-pg18` | `192.168.55.15:5432`（IPv4 only） | PG 18.6 + TS 2.29.2；healthcheck pg_isready；`restart: unless-stopped` |
+  | `pgweb` | `sosedoff/pgweb:latest`（v0.17.0） | `192.168.55.15:8081` | Web GUI：http://192.168.55.15:8081；basic auth（用户名/密码见 .env `PGWEB_AUTH_USER/PASS`）；`--readonly --sessions --bookmarks-only --bookmarks-dir /bookmarks`（v0.17.0 不读 PGWEB_BOOKMARKS_DIR env，必须用 flag）；bookmarks = hass/scribe |
+  | `pg-backup` | `prodrigestivill/postgres-backup-local:latest`（=PG18 客户端） | — | 每日 02:00（`TZ=Asia/Shanghai`，本地时区）`pg_dump -Fc` 三库 → `/opt/database/backups/{daily,weekly,monthly}`；保留 7 天/4 周/6 月；`BACKUP_ON_START` |
+- **数据盘**：`/dev/sdb1`（32G ext4，label `pgdata`）挂载 `/srv/pgdata`，fstab 按 `UUID=c9e12e79-1f66-404c-ab7f-b8809be81d86`（defaults,noatime）持久化（2026-08-29 迁移）。容器 bind mount `/srv/pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql`。
+- 容器内 postgres 用户 uid/gid = **70**（Debian 系，非 999）；迁移数据后需 `chown -R 70:70`。
+- **密码**：postgres 超级用户已换强密码（hex，存 `/opt/database/.env` 0600，2026-08-29）。HA 用 `hass` 角色不受影响。
+- **备份**：由 `pg-backup` 容器接管（2026-08-29），宿主机 cron 与 `/opt/database/pg-backup.sh` 已退役。恢复用 `pg_restore`（custom format）——2026-08-29 已实测还原 hass 库 dump（states 10014 行）成功。
+- **认证**：外部连接 scram-sha-256（密码必填，改密码有效）；容器内 loopback 为 trust（官方镜像默认）。
+- **回滚**：旧启动命令保留在 `/opt/database/run`（容器无状态，数据在 /srv/pgdata）；旧匿名卷 `9375195843b950f4e04c34872409ca095e1136520dd019a8e86e2794be06c236`（根盘 ~82M）保留作兜底，确认稳定后可 `docker volume rm`。
+- **开机自愈**（2026-08-30）：新增 systemd oneshot `pgdb-compose.service`（enabled，源码在仓库 `compose/pgdb/pgdb-compose.service`）：`After=network-online.target docker.service`，开机后幂等执行 `docker compose up -d`，重试直到 `192.168.55.15:5432` 监听，重试耗尽 `--force-recreate` 兜底（数据在 bind mount，无损）。原因：2026-08-30 开机竞态——docker 恢复容器时 VM IP 尚未可绑（EADDRNOTAVAIL），timescaledb/pgweb 启动失败且 docker 不重试。手动重跑：`sudo systemctl restart pgdb-compose.service`。
+- 本机无防火墙（ufw/nft/iptables 均未装）——待办：如要彻底隔离可加 ufw 白名单 192.168.55.11。
+- `/opt/database/backups/` 根下残留 `*-2026-08-29_1359.dump`（compose 化之前旧备份机制产物）与 `backup.log`——健康检查只看 `daily/`，残留可清理。
+- **Runbooks**：[pgdb-health](../runbooks/pgdb-health.md)（只读健康检查）、[pgdb-restore](../runbooks/pgdb-restore.md)（pg_restore 还原）、[pgdb-update](../runbooks/pgdb-update.md)（镜像/compose 升级）。
+- **CSG 长期归档（2026-08-29, W1N-243）**：`csg_history` 表（`period date / kind('day'|'month') / usage_kwh / cost / ladder / balance / updated_at`，PK(period,kind)，`GRANT SELECT TO hass`）保存南方电网有价值数据：day = 逐日（昨日用电/费用/阶梯/余额，2026-07-01 起），month = 当月累计（用电/费用，2025-01 起）。由 TimescaleDB 每日任务 **1008** `csg_daily_snapshot()`（22:30 Asia/Shanghai；**TS job 非 pg_cron**，本库未装 pg_cron）upsert 维护：取「最新有值行」防瞬态 unknown 竞态；日费用缺原生 `latest_day_cost` 时回退 = 昨日用电 × 当前档费率（模板 `csg_current_ladder_tariff` 0.639）；月费用回退模板 `csg_this_month_ladder_cost`。验证：day 08-28 = 7.66 / 4.89474 / 二档 / 0，month 08 = 302.47 / 180.28。回填来源：集成 attributes `history_data`（59 天）+ `by_month`（19 月）——08-29 前唯一残存历史。回滚：`DROP TABLE csg_history` + `SELECT delete_job(1008)`。
+
+## Known issues
+
+- 2026-09-13：**`sensor_minute` 体积构成与压缩窗口（只读诊断，暂不处理）**。`scribe` 库 2.6 GB = `sensor_minute` **2.26 GB**（850 万行 / 16 天，约 56–59 万行/天 = 331 实体 × 1440 分钟 LOCF）+ `states_raw` 290 MB + `events` 1.5 MB；`hass` 库另 406 MB。2.26 GB 中 1.50 GB 是 chunk `[09-03,09-10]`、0.76 GB 是 `[09-10,09-17]`，**都还没到压缩窗口**——TimescaleDB 的 `compress_after` 按 **chunk 结束时间**判断（09-10 结束 + 7 天 = **09-17** 才合格），所以「7 天 chunk + 7 天 compress_after」的设计下限就是盘上常驻近 14 天原始数据；已压缩的 `[08-27,09-03]` 从 1.04 GB → **1.5 MB**（LOCF 重复度极高，~700:1）。任务 1005 健康（30 成功 / 0 失败，最近 09-13 04:18 跑过但无合格 chunk）；1002/1003/1006/1007 亦全 Success。稳态估算 ≈ 2 个未压缩 chunk（3–4.5 GB）+ 已压缩归档（约 1.5 MB/周 ≈ 80 MB/年）≈ **4–5 GB 平台期**；pgdata 卷 32 G 当前用 3.2 G，可用 27 G，**无需处理**。复查点 **2026-09-17 之后**：`_hyper_4_6_chunk` 应转为 `compressed=true` 且库体积回落；若仍为 false 才需动手（手动 `compress_chunk()` 或调小 `compress_after`）。可选调优：chunk 间隔 7 天 → 1 天 + `compress_after` → 2 天，把常驻未压缩量压到 <1 GB（`set_chunk_time_interval` 只对新 chunk 生效，旧 chunk 不重切）。诊断命令：`select chunk_name, is_compressed from timescaledb_information.chunks where hypertable_name='sensor_minute';` + `pg_database_size('scribe')`。**注意：这是 pgdb 侧对象，HA/scribe 的 `retention_states` 管不到它；HA 侧唯一杠杆是少记/少画（等于砍图）。**
+- 2026-08-29：HA 侧 HACS 集成 `custom_components.scribe`（YAML `scribe: db_url:`，连 `scribe` 库）建表被拒（`permission denied for schema public`，hass 无 CREATE 权限），之后持续报 `relation "entities" does not exist`。**已解决**：① `GRANT CREATE ON SCHEMA public TO hass;`（scribe 库）② 重启 HA Core 触发重跑建表。重启后自动创建 `entities`（1591 行）/`users`/`areas`/`devices`/`integrations`/`states_raw` 表并启用 TimescaleDB 时间序列能力。报错已停止（最后一条 06:06 UTC），`states_raw` 持续写入。2026-08-29 复查：scribe 现有**两个** hypertable——`states_raw`（segmentby `metadata_id`、orderby `time`）与 `events`（segmentby `event_type`、orderby `time`），均 1 维 `time`；压缩已配置（`timescaledb_information.compression_settings` 可见对应行；2.29.x 该视图无 `compression_enabled` 列）。
+- 2026-08-29：**timescale reader 图表对象**（配套 hass 的 `timescale_database_reader` 集成 + `timescale-plotly-card`，上游 SQL `remmob/timescale_database_reader` `SQL/scribe/01+02` @ `bb8776a`，以 postgres 执行）：`sensor_minute_aggregate` 连续聚合（1 分钟桶，last(state)/last(value)，实时聚合开启）+ `sensor_minute_aggregate_entity` 视图（join `entities`）+ `sensor_minute` hypertable（`minute`/`entity_id`/`state`/`value`，LOCF 前向填充）。任务：1005 `sensor_minute` 压缩（7 天）、1006 `sensor_minute` 保留（10 年）、1007 `every_minute_refresh` 每分钟增量刷新（含 5 分钟回溯窗口修正）。授权：`GRANT SELECT ON sensor_minute_aggregate, sensor_minute_aggregate_entity, sensor_minute, entities TO hass`。种子 19529 行（331 实体，自首个数据点起）。**刻意跳过**了上游脚本对 `states_raw` 的 3 个月保留 + 压缩策略语句——与"`states_raw` 永久归档"定位冲突，如需磁盘回收属用户决策（scribe 自己的压缩任务 1000/1001 未动）。
+- 2026-08-29：**`sensor_minute_refresh` 本地补丁（类比 tianqi 补丁，重跑上游 02 SQL 后需重打）**：值 CASE 的 `ELSE 0` → `ELSE NULL`。原因：scribe 对 unavailable 分钟 value 为 NULL，上游刷新过程兜底写 0；对差分模式的用电图，0→计数器回升会把插座的**生命周期累计值**（最高 1588 kWh）算进掉线那一小时。同日一次性清理既有脏 0：头部占位行 DELETE 505 行（各实体首次非零分钟之前的 value=0）；`sensor.%_energy` 与温湿度实体的 value=0 → NULL（10+16 行，物理上不可能的真 0，图表渲染为断点）。功率实体的中途 0 是真实待机读数，保留。
+- `hass` 库的 recorder 表仍为普通表（无 hypertable）；`scribe` 集成负责时间序列历史（`states_raw` + `events` hypertable）。
+
+## Verification history
+
+- 2026-08-31：**13:58 重启根因确认，非停电**（W1N-263）：pve2（`192.168.55.25`）任务日志显示 08-30 **13:58:00 `root@pam` 在 PVE Web UI 修改 VM 100 配置**（`-delete allow-ksm,balloon,shares -memory 3072`），**13:58:06 点 Reboot**（`qmreboot` → 客机 13:58:08 干净 ACPI 关机 → 13:58:13 自动重启）。宿主机全程在线（08-30 09:00 开机至今连续运行 1d12h+），`.66.26` PVE 及各 VM 均无重启——排除停电。HA recorder 在窗口（13:58:46–47）报 2 次 `Connection refused`，DB 恢复后自动重连，**无数据丢失**（`hass.states`/`scribe.states_raw` 13:55–14:02 逐分钟无缺口，recorder 内存队列吸收回写）。13:58:47 三容器已起，13:58:56 自愈单元 `pgdb-compose.service` 执行成功——本次自愈按设计工作。同日下午 12:54–12:55 另有一次**客机内自重启**（无 PVE 任务，工作站 SSH 会话相邻）。08-29 22:19→08-30 09:00 宿主机停机 10h41m 为**干净关机**（systemd 有序关闭，非停电）。
+- 2026-08-30：**开机竞态故障 + 修复**（W1N-260）：09:01 开机后 docker 恢复容器时绑定 `192.168.55.15:5432/8081` 失败（EADDRNOTAVAIL）→ timescaledb/pgweb 停摆至 12:16，pg-backup 开机备份失败（解析不到 timescaledb）→ unhealthy。12:22 `docker compose up -d --force-recreate` 修复（三容器回 `database_default`、端口发布、今日备份、pgweb 恢复）；用户重启 HA Core 后写入管道恢复。12:43 新增开机自愈 unit `pgdb-compose.service`（enabled，已实测幂等 reconcile）。pgdb-health 8 项全绿。
+- 2026-08-29：首次检查（只读）+ 修复 scribe 权限 + 安装夜间备份。见 Linear vps 项目登记。
+- 2026-08-29：**compose 改造完成**（W1N-227，用户已验收）：裸 `docker run` → `/opt/database/docker-compose.yml` 三服务（timescaledb + pgweb + pg-backup）；superuser 换强密码；端口收紧 IPv4；备份容器化（TZ=Asia/Shanghai，cron 02:00 本地）；`pg_restore` 还原实测通过；pgweb UI 用户确认可查 hass/scribe 数据。源码在仓库 `compose/pgdb/`。
+- 2026-08-29：**运维 runbook 落地**（W1N-228，已验收）：新增 `runbooks/pgdb-health.md`（只读，8 项诊断全绿）、`pgdb-restore.md`（流程式，temp-DB 安全还原 + 审批门）、`pgdb-update.md`（门控命令式，回滚=/opt/database/run + 旧卷）；README 索引与 validate-repo.sh 分类同步更新；runbook 命令已对活主机逐条实测（含 `pg_restore -l` 校验当日 dump）。同日修正：SSH key auth 可用（facts 原记"密钥未安装"已过时）；scribe 新增 `events` hypertable。
+- 2026-08-29：**CSG 长期归档 + recorder 365d**（W1N-243）：建 `csg_history` 表 + attributes 回填（逐日 59 + 逐月 19）+ 每日任务 1008（函数 v2：最新有值行读取、日费用阶梯回退）；hass `purge_keep_days` 30→365（备份 `configuration.yaml.bak-20260829-purge365`）。见 Linear vps W1N-243。
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ ssh -4 windy@synapse.chans.xyz
 | DB | ESS embedded PostgreSQL 17 (PVC 20Gi, local-path) |
 | Cache | ESS embedded Redis (PVC 2Gi) |
 | Chart | `oci://ghcr.io/element-hq/ess-helm/matrix-stack`, version `26.7.2` |
+| Plane | Helm `plane-ce-1.8.0` (app `v1.4.1`), namespace `plane` — self-hosted Plane project management |

 ### Matrix service endpoints

@@ -51,8 +52,50 @@ All other ports internal only (no K3s API, no database, no Redis exposed).

 - `ess` — all ESS workloads (Synapse, MAS, Element, Postgres, Redis, HAProxy)
 - `matrix-system` — cluster base resources (ResourceQuota, LimitRange, mrtc-placeholder)
+- `plane` — Plane project management (Helm release `plane-app`)
 - `cert-manager` — cert-manager

+## Plane (project management)
+
+Self-hosted [Plane](https://github.com/makeplane/plane) on the same K3s node, deployed via the official `plane-ce` Helm chart.
+
+| Item | Detail |
+|------|--------|
+| Release | `plane-app` (ns `plane`), chart `plane-ce-1.8.0`, app `v1.4.1`, revision 1 |
+| URL | https://plane.chans.xyz |
+| Install date | 2026-09-01 |
+| Values source | `/home/windy/plane-k3s/values.yaml` (plain file, not a git repo) |
+| Images | `artifacts.plane.so/makeplane/*` (`plane-frontend`, `plane-backend`, `plane-admin`, `plane-live`), pullPolicy `Always` |
+| Ingress | Traefik `IngressRoute` `plane-app-ingress` — `/`→web, `/api` `/auth`→api, `/spaces`→space, `/god-mode`→admin, `/live`→live, `/uploads`→minio; `maxRequestBodyBytes` 20Mi |
+| TLS | Own namespace `Issuer` `plane-app-cert-issuer` (HTTP-01, LE prod, `admin@chans.xyz`); cert `plane-app-ssl-cert` (CN `plane.chans.xyz`) |
+| DB | Bundled Postgres `15.7-alpine` (PVC 5Gi, local-path) |
+| Cache/queue | Bundled Redis (PVC 100Mi), RabbitMQ `3.13.6-management-alpine` (PVC 100Mi) |
+| Storage | Bundled MinIO (`minio/minio:latest`, root user `admin`, PVC 5Gi) — S3 for uploads/docs |
+| Resources | Every workload: cpu 50m/500m, mem 50Mi/1000Mi, replicas 1 |
+| SMTP | Not configured (no `smtp` values) — Plane invites/password resets won't email yet |
+
+Workloads (all 1/1 Running): 7 Deployments (`plane-app-{admin,api,beat-worker,live,space,web,worker}-wl`) + 4 StatefulSets (`plane-app-{minio,pgdb,rabbitmq,redis}-wl`); init Jobs `api-migrate-1` / `minio-bucket-1` Completed. All PVCs Bound on `local-path` (root disk).
+
+### Plane configuration notes
+
+- **`planeVersion: v1.4.1`** pinned in values.yaml; chart tracks Plane's own tags.
+- **Secrets**: Helm-generated Opaque secrets (`plane-app-app-secrets`, `-doc-store-secrets`, `-pgdb-secrets`, `-rabbitmq-secrets`, `-live-secrets`); `requireExplicitSecrets: false`. Values live in `$SECRET_KEY`, `DATABASE_URL`, `AMQP_URL`, `REDIS_URL` etc.
+- **Sentry / CORS**: `sentry_dsn` and `cors_allowed_origins` empty (defaults fine for single-host).
+- **MinIO is `latest` tag** — pin a version for reproducibility.
+- **Backup**: NOT covered by `/var/backups/matrix` (which is paused anyway) — Plane Postgres/MinIO PVCs have no backup tier yet.
+
+### Plane verification
+
+```bash
+# Release + workloads
+sudo helm list -A
+sudo k3s kubectl -n plane get deploy,sts,pods -o wide
+# Cert + ingress
+sudo k3s kubectl -n plane get certificate,ingressroute
+# Endpoint
+curl -4 -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://plane.chans.xyz/
+```
+
 ## Local backup

 | Item | Detail |
@@ -62,7 +105,7 @@ All other ports internal only (no K3s API, no database, no Redis exposed).
 | Retention | 7 days |
 | Disk warning | 80% (healthcheck), 90% (backup stops) |
 | Content | Planned: PostgreSQL `synapse` + `mas` logical dumps, media store archive, `/etc/matrix-bootstrap` |
-| Status | **Not operational** — no current Matrix backup or recovery tier |
+| Status | **Not operational** — no current Matrix backup or recovery tier. **Plane data (its own Postgres + MinIO PVCs in ns `plane`) is also not covered by any backup.** |

 ## Health checks

@@ -101,5 +144,6 @@ diagnosis and imperative recovery work.
 - MatrixRTC / Element Call / LiveKit / Coturn not deployed (`mrtc.chans.xyz` reserved only)
 - SMTP email not yet configured (requires manual secret bootstrap followed by a
  reviewed Ansible stack deployment)
+- Plane `minio` image uses `latest` tag (pin a version)
 - No off-site Restic backup
 - Single-node K3s (no HA for control plane)
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 | IPv4 | `192.168.66.46` |
 | SSH | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.46` |
 | Hostname | `ubnt` |
+| **Host** | **PVE VM 160 (`ubnt`)** — not a separate physical host (verified 2026-08-09) |
 | Privilege | `windy` has passwordless sudo and is in the `docker` group |

 The current SSH ED25519 host-key fingerprint is
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ Verify a changed key out of band before accepting it.
 | Image | `jacobalberty/unifi:v9.5.21` |
 | Network mode | host |
 | HTTPS UI | `https://192.168.66.46:8443` |
+| Device inform endpoint | `http://192.168.66.46:9080/inform` |

 The controller binds `*:8443`. A local HTTPS request to
 `https://127.0.0.1:8443/` is the primary quick health check.
@@ -43,6 +45,19 @@ Without this bypass, a controller request to `localhost:8443` can be sent to
 the OpenClash gateway instead of remaining local. Details and verification are
 in [the UniFi localhost proxy note](../docs/unifi-openclash-localhost.md).

+## Managed access points
+
+The controller manages the APs listed in [the UniFi network record](../docs/unifi-network.md).
+The inform endpoint is deliberately on port `9080`, not UniFi's common default
+of `8080`. During adoption or recovery, use the documented `:9080/inform` URL;
+an AP left on `:8080` can remain reachable by ping and SSH while showing
+offline in the controller.
+
+IPv6 is enabled on the controller's `Default` network (`ipv6_enabled: true`,
+client assignment SLAAC; RA is served by `gw`, so `ipv6_interface_type` is
+`none`); both managed APs hold global SLAAC addresses — verified 2026-08-20.
+See [docs/unifi-network.md](../docs/unifi-network.md).
+
 ## Safe reconciliation and verification

 ```bash
@@ -56,3 +71,15 @@ curl -k -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://127.0.0.1:8443/
 Recreating the service briefly interrupts the controller. Do not use `docker
 compose down -v`; it can remove persistent data.

+## Ansible management
+
+The host is in the Ansible `unifi` group (inventory `ansible/inventory/hosts.yml`),
+deliberately outside `managed` so the generic health report does not run here.
+
+- SSO login setting (idempotent, gated): `cd ansible && ansible-playbook
+  playbooks/unifi-sso.yml --limit unifi` — see
+  [runbooks/ansible-operations.md](../runbooks/ansible-operations.md).
+- Login/MFA state: SSO login disabled 2026-08-08; local accounts
+  (`windy`, `zhiqiangf`) use local passwords, no MFA. `unifi-network-mcp`
+  works for read and write operations. See
+  [docs/unifi-network.md](../docs/unifi-network.md).
@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@
 | Role | Multi-service VPS (Vaultwarden, Traefik, Soft Serve, …) |
 | SSH | `ssh -4 windy@us2.wsvc.info` (prefer IPv4 from WSL) |
 | IPv4 | `193.9.44.165` |
-| Also DNS | `auth.wsvc.info` → this host; `repo.windy.me` → this host (Soft Serve) |
+| Also DNS | `auth.wsvc.info` → this host; `repo.windy.me` → this host (Gitea) |
 | Public HTTPS | Traefik on `:80` / `:443` (`/opt/traefik`) |

 ## Vaultwarden (Bitwarden-compatible)

-**Status: operational** (Postgres live, HTTPS 200, healthy containers, SMTP AUTH OK — last probe 2026-08-01 18:55 CST).
+**Status: operational** (Postgres live, HTTPS 200, healthy containers, SMTP AUTH OK — last probe 2026-08-29).

 Upstream docs: [docs/vaultwarden-upstream.md](../docs/vaultwarden-upstream.md)

@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ Upstream docs: [docs/vaultwarden-upstream.md](../docs/vaultwarden-upstream.md)
 | Env file | `/opt/vaultwarden/.env` |
 | Admin overrides | `/opt/vaultwarden/vw-data/config.json` (**wins over env**) |
 | Public URL / `DOMAIN` | `https://auth.wsvc.info` |
-| Image | `vaultwarden/server:1.37.1` (pinned) |
+| Image | `vaultwarden/server:1.37.2` (pinned) |
 | Live DB | **Postgres 16** (`vw-db` / service `pg`) via compose `DATABASE_URL` |
-| Data (probe) | users=1, ciphers=1327 |
+| Data (probe) | users=1, ciphers=1360 |
 | Cold SQLite | `backups/sqlite-cold/db.sqlite3.pre-pg-20260801` (not used live) |
 | Pre-migrate backup | `backups/pre-pg-migrate-20260801_161204/` |
 | Data dir | `./vw-data` → `/data` (attachments, rsa keys, `config.json`) |
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Upstream docs: [docs/vaultwarden-upstream.md](../docs/vaultwarden-upstream.md)

 | Container | Status |
 |-----------|--------|
-| `vaultwarden` | Up (healthy), `vaultwarden/server:1.37.1` |
+| `vaultwarden` | Up (healthy), `vaultwarden/server:1.37.2` |
 | `vw-db` | Up (healthy) — **live** Postgres |
 | `vaultwarden-backup` | Up (`pg_dump`) |
 | `vaultwarden-pgweb` | Exited (profile `debug`) |
@@ -76,17 +76,37 @@ ansible-playbook playbooks/compose-reconcile.yml --limit vaultwarden \
  -e '{"service_reconcile_confirm": true, "service_reconcile_targets": ["vaultwarden"], "service_reconcile_restart_traefik": true}'
 ```

-## Other software on this host (stubs)
+## Other running services on this host

-`/opt/traefik`, `soft-serve`, `authelia`, `dendrite`/`conduit`, `mastodon`, `rustdesk`, `zitadel`, etc.
+| Container | Status | Image / notes |
+|-----------|--------|---------------|
+| `gitea` | Up | `gitea/gitea@sha256:1c17ecaead42e…` (1.27.3-rootless) — SSH `repo.windy.me:2222`, web `https://repo.windy.me` |
+| `gitea-backup` | Up | alpine + sqlite3/rsync sidecar (daily backup 02:00 / prune 03:00, crond) |
+
+### Gitea (replaced Soft Serve 2026-09-18; [Plane VPS-94](https://plane.chans.xyz))
+
+- `/opt/gitea/compose.yml` (+ `Dockerfile.backup`, `scripts/`, `config/app.ini`, `data/`, `secrets/`, `backups/`); 镜像: `compose/gitea/`(参考, 服务器文件为准)
+- **rootless 镜像** uid 1000:1000; SQLite `/opt/gitea/data/data/gitea.db`; repos `/opt/gitea/data/data/git/repositories/`; app.ini `/opt/gitea/config/app.ini`(600, 含 SECRET_KEY)
+- SSH: 内置 server 容器内 `:2322`(`SSH_LISTEN_PORT` 非特权), Traefik TCP entrypoint `ssh`(`:2222` → `gitea:2322`, `HostSNI(*)`, `tls=false`) on `vw-net`; clone URL `ssh://git@repo.windy.me:2222/windy/<repo>.git`(owner 段 `windy`)
+- **host key 复用 soft-serve**(`SSH_SERVER_HOST_KEYS=/secrets/soft_serve_host_ed25519`, ed25519, 指纹 `SHA256:PdxZRe74…`): 客户端 known_hosts 零变更; 仅公钥认证(密码认证未启用)
+- Web: `https://repo.windy.me`(Traefik websecure + letsencrypt); `DISABLE_REGISTRATION=true`, Actions 关闭; 管理员 `windy`(凭据仅存服务器 `/opt/gitea/.admin-credentials`, 勿入库/入 Plane)
+- 仓库: 16 个(顶层 11 + `cdia/` 4 + `windyboy/go-caatsm`), 2026-09-18 自 soft-serve `push --mirror` 迁移, 逐仓 `ls-remote` ref 全集 + HEAD symref 两端一致; 可见性仅 `dotfiles-personal` private, 其余 public(与 soft-serve 现状一致)
+- 备份: sidecar 每日 02:00 → `backups/gitea_<TS>/{app.ini.tar.gz, gitea.db, repos.tar.gz}`(app.ini 含恢复必需 SECRET_KEY), 03:00 prune 保留 14 份; 已验证手动备份产物 109.9M
+- 回滚: `/opt/soft-serve` 未删(compose stop + sidecar 停, 数据与旧备份冻结保留), 回滚 = Traefik `:2222` 指回 `soft-serve:23231` + 客户端 remote 回改旧无 owner 段路径; 观察 2–4 周后清理(历史: W1N-244~248)
+| `traefik` | Up | `traefik:v3.6.2` (`/opt/traefik`, public `:80`/`:443`) |
+| `nghttpx-proxy` + `squid-backend` | Up | HTTP forward-proxy stack (`/opt/nghttpx`), network `nghttpx_internal-net`; details TBD |
+
+**Disk cleanup 2026-09-18** ([Plane vps VPS-93](https://plane.chans.xyz)): root 71% → **23%** (~33G freed) keeping soft-serve / vaultwarden / traefik (nghttpx kept running per operator choice). Removed: unused Docker images + orphan volumes (incl. `zitadel_data` 801M), dormant `/opt` dirs (dendrite + its disabled `dendrite.service` unit, mastodon, dailysync, keycloak, media-repo, authelia, conduit, npm, manager, fusion, zitadel, rustdesk), rootless podman storage (6.4G stale goauthentik), home dev caches, apt cache, journal 3.8G→162M (+`SystemMaxUse=200M` drop-in, active next boot), truncated container logs (nghttpx 550M / traefik / squid). Follow-up: nghttpx-proxy logs grow ~25M/day (INFO per-connection); root-cause log-level/rotation fix still open (needs container restart approval).
+
+Remaining running services on this host: `gitea`, `vaultwarden` stack, `traefik`, `nghttpx-proxy` + `squid-backend` (undocumented forward proxy, `/opt/nghttpx`). `/opt/soft-serve` kept stopped as rollback (2–4 weeks, data intact). `/home/windy/authelia` (76M) left in place — outside approved cleanup scope.

 ## Verified

-Last checked: **2026-08-01 18:55 CST** — operational.
+Last checked: **2026-09-18** — operational; disk cleanup done (see note above, Plane vps VPS-93). Prior full probe: 2026-08-29.

 - `vaultwarden` + `vw-db` healthy; `DATABASE_URL` → `pg:5432/vaultwarden`
 - `https://auth.wsvc.info/` **200**, `/admin` **200**, `/api/config` OK (`disableUserRegistration: true`)
- Identity wrong-password → **400** business error (DB readable, not 500)
- SMTP: container → `mx2:587` OK; STARTTLS cert CN=`mx2.windy.me`; **AUTH OK** with effective `config.json` password (synced with `.env` / `.smtp-credentials`)
- LE cert CN=`auth.wsvc.info`
- PG counts: users=1, ciphers=1327
+- SMTP: container → `mx2:587` OK; **AUTH OK** with effective `config.json` password (synced with `.env` / `.smtp-credentials`, fingerprint match)
+- PG counts: users=1, ciphers=1360
+- Image `vaultwarden/server:1.37.2` (**upgraded 2026-08-29** from 1.37.1; required for Bitwarden clients 2026.8.0+); post-upgrade 404 fixed by Traefik restart, then 200
+- vps-health local check **installed 2026-08-29** (`vps-healthcheck.timer` daily 06:15 + `/usr/local/lib/vps-health/run`); `health-report.yml --limit vaultwarden` now passes (**ok**, was failing due to missing check infra + script bugs fixed: trim_blocks render, pgweb debug-profile false positive, SMTP probe moved host-side since image lacks python3)
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+# us4.wsvc.info
+
+| Item | Value |
+|------|-------|
+| Role | WireGuard VPN server (LinuxServer Docker image) |
+| SSH | `ssh -4 windy@us4.wsvc.info` (prefer IPv4 from WSL) |
+| IPv4 | `185.201.226.122` |
+| Compose project | `/opt/wireguard` |
+| Compose file | `/opt/wireguard/compose.yml` |
+| Container | `wireguard` |
+| Image policy | Immutable digest, updated only in an approved maintenance window |
+| Public endpoint | `us4.wsvc.info:51820/udp`; DNS publishes only A `185.201.226.122` (no native AAAA) |
+| Tunnel subnet | `10.13.13.0/24` |
+| Routing policy | IPv4-only full tunnel (`ALLOWEDIPS=0.0.0.0/0`); IPv6 traffic is not guaranteed to use the VPN |
+
+Upstream image documentation:
+[LinuxServer.io WireGuard](https://docs.linuxserver.io/images/docker-wireguard/).
+
+## Deployment configuration
+
+The repository-owned, non-secret Compose declaration is rendered from
+`ansible/templates/wireguard-compose.yml.j2`. The live declaration was verified
+on 2026-08-12 with these core settings:
+
+| Setting | Live value / intent |
+|---------|---------------------|
+| Image | `lscr.io/linuxserver/wireguard@sha256:ac43e1226878d2611315172d6ea357a95cb326ee73124b91108118efc8666889` |
+| Image version | `1.0.20260223-r0-ls119` (build 2026-07-30) |
+| Required capability | `NET_ADMIN` only; host kernel already supplies WireGuard/iptables, so `SYS_MODULE` and `/lib/modules` are not granted |
+| Filesystem | Read-only container root; executable tmpfs at `/run`; writable bind mount `/opt/wireguard/config:/config` |
+| Restart | `unless-stopped` |
+| Server mode | Named peers `ha`, `phone`, `mbp`; runtime and configured peer counts both `3` |
+| Client DNS | `1.1.1.1` |
+| Tunnel routing | IPv4 full tunnel, `0.0.0.0/0`; no client IPv6 tunnel |
+| Runtime interface | `wg0`, server address `10.13.13.1/32`, listen port `51820` |
+| Forwarding/NAT | IPv4 forwarding enabled in the container namespace; `wg0` forwarding allowed and egress masqueraded on `eth+`; IPv6 forwarding disabled |
+
+Docker binds UDP `51820` on both host socket families, but the public hostname
+has no AAAA record. Clients using `us4.wsvc.info` therefore reach the server over
+IPv4.
+
+## Other host services and firewall (2026-08-12)
+
+This host also carries the `windy.me` secondary MX and several web applications;
+do not build its firewall allowlist from the WireGuard role alone.
+
+| Port | Owner / purpose | Effective public state |
+|------|-----------------|------------------------|
+| TCP `22` | SSH management | Open |
+| TCP `25` | Postfix, `mx.windy.me` (MX priority 30) | Open; retain until the secondary-MX role is explicitly retired |
+| TCP `80`, `443` | Traefik for `update.wsvc.info`, `us4-gate.wsvc.info`, and `trlm.wsvc.info` | Open |
+| TCP `3000` | Semaphore UI direct Docker publish | Open; redundant with the Traefik route and should be removed or bound to loopback |
+| TCP `8080` | Traefik direct Docker publish | Open; redundant with the authenticated dashboard route and should be removed or bound to loopback |
+| UDP `51820` | WireGuard | Required public endpoint |
+| TCP `9443` | Host nghttpx-to-Squid proxy | Listening but blocked by the current firewall |
+| UDP `123` | ntpsec | Listening but blocked by the current firewall |
+
+PostgreSQL (`5433`/`5434`/`5435`), MariaDB (`3306`), and the host Squid TCP
+listener (`3128`) are loopback-only. Squid also owns wildcard UDP sockets, which
+are not allowed by the current public zone.
+
+UFW is not installed. Firewalld `2.3.1` is active with nftables. On 2026-08-12,
+the reviewed `ansible/playbooks/us4-firewalld.yml` reconciliation removed the
+stale `imap`, `imaps`, `smtp-submission`, and `smtps` services plus TCP `24`,
+`6443`, and `8443` without reloading or restarting firewalld. Runtime and
+permanent public-zone state now match exactly: services `dhcpv6-client`, `http`,
+`https`, `smtp`, and `ssh`, with no explicit ports.
+
+Docker-published ports are accepted through Docker's DNAT/FORWARD chains, so
+the public-zone cleanup does not close `3000` or `8080`. Their Compose bindings
+remain a separate, staged follow-up after the required observation window.
+Firewalld logged Docker chain/policy conflicts during the 2026-08-10 boots;
+treat any firewall reload or service restart as a maintenance-window operation
+and reverify Docker routing. Tracking: Linear `W1N-60`.
+
+`mx.windy.me` also publishes AAAA `2602:f9f3:0:2::878`, while the host currently
+has no global IPv6 address or IPv6 default route. Treat that as a separate
+secondary-MX reachability issue.
+
+## Safety
+
+- Private keys, preshared keys, peer configuration files, and QR codes remain
+  only in `/opt/wireguard/config`; do not copy them to this repository or
+  Linear.
+- Local rollback archives are stored in `/opt/wireguard/backups` (directory
+  mode `0700`, archives mode `0600`). They contain private keys, are not an
+  off-host disaster-recovery backup, and must never leave the server.
+- Live private keys, preshared keys, generated peer configs, QR images, and
+  `wg0.conf` are mode `0600`. Template-only `peer.conf` and `server.conf` files
+  are mode `0644` and do not contain generated key material.
+- `/opt/wireguard/config` is mode `0755`, but its sensitive files are `0600`.
+  The current files are owned by the image's numeric UID/GID rather than the
+  declared `PUID=1000` / `PGID=1000`; the root-run WireGuard processes can use
+  them, but reconcile ownership only after a protected backup and maintenance
+  review.
+- `LOG_CONFS` is currently unset and the inspected container log contained no
+  QR-code/config banners. Do not enable config logging; generated QR images are
+  credentials.
+- Do not delete, move, or regenerate `/opt/wireguard/config` during
+  maintenance.
+- Before a container recreation, validate `docker compose config` and retain a
+  verified SSH session for rollback. Do not run `docker compose down -v`.
+
+## Routine operations
+
+Run read-only checks through Ansible:
+
+```bash
+cd ansible
+ansible-playbook playbooks/health-report.yml --limit wireguard
+```
+
+Preview the narrow, fail-closed public-zone reconciliation:
+
+```bash
+ansible-galaxy collection install -r requirements.yml
+ansible-playbook playbooks/us4-firewalld.yml --limit us4 --check --diff
+```
+
+Apply it only after testing the provider console and keeping an independent SSH
+rollback session open. The playbook creates a protected server-local backup and
+a 15-minute automatic rollback before changing rules; it cancels that rollback
+only after SSH, HTTPS, SMTP, Docker, Fail2ban, and WireGuard checks pass:
+
+```bash
+ansible-playbook playbooks/us4-firewalld.yml --limit us4 \
+  -e '{"us4_firewalld_confirm": true, "us4_console_confirm": true}'
+```
+
+The image update and recreate procedure is deliberately separate and requires
+an immutable image digest in the server-side Compose file plus an explicit
+maintenance-window confirmation:
+
+```bash
+cd ansible
+ansible-playbook playbooks/wireguard-maintenance.yml --limit wireguard \
+  -e '{"wireguard_maintenance_confirm": true}'
+```
+
+Before that recreate, apply the reviewed Compose hardening from the repository:
+
+```bash
+ansible-playbook playbooks/wireguard-harden.yml --limit wireguard \
+  -e '{"wireguard_harden_confirm": true}'
+```
+
+## Verification
+
+- Container `wireguard` is running and interface `wg0` exists.
+- UDP `51820` is listening on the host.
+- Validate a known client can handshake and sends IPv4 traffic through the VPN.
+- Do not treat inactive mobile peers as a failure solely because their latest
+  handshake is old.
+
+## Live audit snapshot (2026-08-12)
+
+The WireGuard service itself is healthy and its installation is broadly
+reasonable:
+
+- The sanitized Ansible health report returned `status=ok`; Compose is valid,
+  the container is running with zero restarts, `wg0` exists, and UDP `51820` is
+  listening.
+- One of three peers had a current handshake during the audit. Two peers had
+  not handshaken since the current container/interface start; confirm those
+  clients only if they are expected to be active.
+- The image is immutable-digest pinned, key-bearing files are protected, the
+  container root is read-only, and the container has `NET_ADMIN` without the
+  broader `SYS_MODULE` capability.
+- Debian `13.6`, kernel `6.12.101+deb13-amd64`, Docker Engine `29.7.2`, and
+  Docker Compose `v5.4.0` were observed. No Debian package updates or reboot
+  requirement were pending.
+
+Open host-level follow-up (do not conflate these with a WireGuard outage):
+
+1. **Disk capacity:** `/` was 90% used with about 3.4 GiB free. Docker reported
+   about 2.48 GB of reclaimable images and the system journal used about 1.9
+   GB, but do not prune or vacuum without reviewing retention and rollback
+   needs first.
+2. **Docker exposure:** the firewalld public-zone cleanup is complete, but
+   Docker still publishes `3000` and `8080` outside the ordinary host INPUT
+   path. Remove those redundant Compose bindings in separate maintenance units
+   after the observation window, and confirm provider firewall rules first.
+3. **Image maintenance:** the upstream `latest` amd64 image had advanced to
+   `1.0.20260223-r0-ls120` (build 2026-08-06). Review and pin its immutable
+   digest in a maintenance window rather than updating unattended.
+4. **Host hygiene:** `apache2.service`, `certbot.service`, and
+   `postgresql@9.6-main.service` were in a failed state while unrelated Docker
+   workloads remained active. Establish ownership and remove or repair stale
+   units separately.
+5. **Resource/log limits:** the WireGuard container has no memory, CPU, or PID
+   limit and uses Docker's `json-file` log driver without a per-container
+   rotation setting. Current log size was small, but limits/rotation should be
+   considered during a reviewed Compose update.
@@ -5,26 +5,41 @@ run through Ansible. SSH endpoints below remain the access path for focused
 diagnosis and procedures that are deliberately interactive or destructive; see
 [the Ansible operations runbook](../runbooks/ansible-operations.md).

-| Host | Role | SSH | IPv4 | Status | Facts |
-|------|------|-----|------|--------|-------|
-| mx2.windy.me | mailcow (primary MX prio 20) | `ssh -4 windy@mx2.windy.me` | 194.163.160.244 | active | [hosts/mx2.windy.me.md](../hosts/mx2.windy.me.md) |
-| us2.wsvc.info | Vaultwarden/Postgres (+ Traefik, Soft Serve, …) | `ssh -4 windy@us2.wsvc.info` | 193.9.44.165 | active | [hosts/us2.wsvc.info.md](../hosts/us2.wsvc.info.md) |
-| mx.windy.me | mail (secondary MX prio 30) | TBD | see AAAA/A | stub | — |
-| repo.windy.me | Soft Serve git (on us2) | `ssh -p 2222 windy@repo.windy.me` | 193.9.44.165 | stub | see us2 |
-| auth.wsvc.info | Vaultwarden public hostname | — (HTTPS) | → us2 | active | see us2 |
-| us1.wsvc.info | PowerDNS secondary (ns2 host) | TBD | 202.91.35.141 | stub | Auth 5.0.5; see hk2 |
-| us4.wsvc.info | Traefik / services | TBD | TBD | stub | — |
-| hk2.chans.xyz | PowerDNS auth (ns1) | `ssh -4 windy@hk2.chans.xyz` | 154.36.174.161 | active | [hosts/hk2.chans.xyz.md](../hosts/hk2.chans.xyz.md) |
-| ns1.wsvc.info | PowerDNS public NS name | — (DNS) | → hk2 `154.36.174.161` | active | see hk2 |
-| ns2.wsvc.info | Secondary NS (AXFR/NOTIFY peer) | — (DNS) | → us1 `202.91.35.141` | active | see hk2 |
-| pdns.wsvc.info | Poweradmin UI | — (HTTPS) | → hk2 | active | see hk2 |
-| pgweb.wsvc.info | PowerDNS Postgres UI | — (HTTPS) | → hk2 | active | see hk2 |
-| **synapse.chans.xyz** | Matrix homeserver (ESS: Synapse + MAS + Element) | `ssh -4 windy@synapse.chans.xyz` | `169.58.86.13` | **active** | [hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md](../hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md) |
-| **gfw.windy.lan** | OpenWrt LAN gateway / OpenClash | `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1` | `192.168.66.1` | **active** | [hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md](../hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md) |
-| **ubnt** | UniFi Network Controller | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.46` | `192.168.66.46` | **active** | [hosts/ubnt.md](../hosts/ubnt.md) |
+For a live-verified map of the **internal LAN** (gw, gfw, dns, ubnt, APs) and
+the software deployed there, see [the LAN overview](../docs/lan-overview.md).
+
+**Ansible 列**：`✓` = 该主机在 [`ansible/inventory/hosts.yml`](../ansible/inventory/hosts.yml)
+（执行真相），用其 inventory key（见括号注）跑 playbook；`—` = 不由 Ansible 管理，
+原因是该平台无 ansible 覆盖或仅是公网别名/服务端点。
+
+| Host | Role | SSH | IPv4 | Ansible | Status | Facts |
+|------|------|-----|------|---------|--------|-------|
+| mx2.windy.me | mailcow (primary MX prio 20) | `ssh -4 windy@mx2.windy.me` | 194.163.160.244 | ✓ (mx2) | active | [hosts/mx2.windy.me.md](../hosts/mx2.windy.me.md) |
+| us2.wsvc.info | Vaultwarden/Postgres (+ Traefik, Soft Serve, …) | `ssh -4 windy@us2.wsvc.info` | 193.9.44.165 | ✓ (us2) | active | [hosts/us2.wsvc.info.md](../hosts/us2.wsvc.info.md) |
+| mx.windy.me | mail (secondary MX prio 30) | TBD | see AAAA/A | — (stub) | stub | — |
+| repo.windy.me | Gitea git (on us2) | `ssh -p 2222 windy@repo.windy.me` | 193.9.44.165 | — (service on us2) | stub | see us2 |
+| auth.wsvc.info | Vaultwarden public hostname | — (HTTPS) | → us2 | — (alias) | active | see us2 |
+| us1.wsvc.info | PowerDNS secondary (ns2 host) | TBD | 202.91.35.141 | — (stub) | stub | Auth 5.0.5; see hk2 |
+| us4.wsvc.info | WireGuard VPN | `ssh -4 windy@us4.wsvc.info` | 185.201.226.122 | ✓ (us4) | active | [hosts/us4.wsvc.info.md](../hosts/us4.wsvc.info.md) |
+| hk2.chans.xyz | PowerDNS auth (ns1) | `ssh -4 windy@hk2.chans.xyz` | 154.36.174.161 | ✓ (hk2) | active | [hosts/hk2.chans.xyz.md](../hosts/hk2.chans.xyz.md) |
+| ns1.wsvc.info | PowerDNS public NS name | — (DNS) | → hk2 `154.36.174.161` | — (alias) | active | see hk2 |
+| ns2.wsvc.info | Secondary NS (AXFR/NOTIFY peer) | — (DNS) | → us1 `202.91.35.141` | — (alias) | active | see hk2 |
+| pdns.wsvc.info | Poweradmin UI | — (HTTPS) | → hk2 | — (alias) | active | see hk2 |
+| pgweb.wsvc.info | PowerDNS Postgres UI | — (HTTPS) | → hk2 | — (alias) | active | see hk2 |
+| **synapse.chans.xyz** | Matrix homeserver (ESS: Synapse + MAS + Element) | `ssh -4 windy@synapse.chans.xyz` | `169.58.86.13` | ✓ (matrix_vps) | **active** | [hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md](../hosts/synapse.chans.xyz.md) |
+| **gfw.windy.lan** | OpenWrt (ImmortalWrt) LAN gateway / OpenClash (PVE VM 140) | `ssh -4 root@192.168.66.1` | `192.168.66.1` | — (OpenWrt, no ansible) | **active** | [hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md](../hosts/gfw.windy.lan.md) |
+| **dns.windy.lan** | AdGuard Home LAN DNS + Mihomo explicit proxy (PVE VM 120) | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.36` | `192.168.66.36` | ✓ (dns_windy_lan) | **active** | [hosts/dns.windy.lan.md](../hosts/dns.windy.lan.md) |
+| **gw** | EdgeRouter X primary LAN gateway | `ssh -4 zhiqiang@192.168.66.254` | `192.168.66.254` | — (EdgeOS, no ansible) | **active** | [hosts/gw.md](../hosts/gw.md) |
+| **ubnt** | UniFi Network Controller (PVE VM 160) | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.66.46` | `192.168.66.46` | ✓ (ubnt) | **active** | [hosts/ubnt.md](../hosts/ubnt.md) |
+| **hass.windy.lan** | Home Assistant (HAOS, x88 Pro physical box, LAN55) | `ssh hassio@hass.windy.lan` | `192.168.55.11` | — (HAOS, no ansible) | **active** | [hosts/hass.windy.lan.md](../hosts/hass.windy.lan.md) |
+| **pgdb** | TimescaleDB PG18 (Docker) — HA recorder backend (PVE VM, LAN55) | `ssh -4 windy@192.168.55.15` | `192.168.55.15` | — (no ansible) | **active** | [hosts/pgdb.md](../hosts/pgdb.md) |

 `status: stub` = known to exist; fill `hosts/<name>.md` when next touched.

+**命名映射**：ansible inventory key ↔ 本表主机名 —— `matrix_vps` ↔ `synapse.chans.xyz`、
+`dns_windy_lan` ↔ `dns.windy.lan`。inventory key 不随主机名改（防止破坏 `--limit` 用法），
+通过 inventory 内的 `display_name` 变量与文档交叉引用。
+
 ### Matrix services (synapse.chans.xyz)

 | URL | Service | Notes |
@@ -33,4 +48,5 @@ diagnosis and procedures that are deliberately interactive or destructive; see
 | https://synapse.chans.xyz | Synapse API | Client-Server + Federation API |
 | https://account.chans.xyz | MAS | Matrix Authentication Service (local passwords) |
 | https://admin.chans.xyz | Element Admin | Admin console (MAS admin auth) |
+| https://plane.chans.xyz | Plane | Project management (Helm `plane-ce` v1.4.1, ns `plane`) |
 | `mrtc.chans.xyz` | MatrixRTC | **Reserved** – not deployed |
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+version: 1
+profile: minimal
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# VPS 維護專案重構：Ansible + systemd timers + Restic
-
-## Objective
-
-將現有 VPS 維運知識庫漸進重構為一個以 Ansible 管理一致性、以 systemd timers 執行每日唯讀檢查、以 Restic 建立加密異機備份的個人 SRE 維運專案。現納管 mx2、us2、hk2 與 Matrix K3s 主機。自動化預設只能觀測與告警；受 allowlist 和顯式確認保護的 Compose reconciliation 可處理已審查的服務重建，DNS、機密與破壞性資料操作仍需人工確認。
-
-## Confirmed Decisions
-
- [x] 定位為個人 SRE／維運手冊庫，而非全自動修復平台。
- [x] 已納管 mx2、us2、hk2 與 Matrix K3s；mx、us1、us4 待完成盤點與緊急存取驗證後才納管。
- [x] 每日自動做唯讀檢查與 Email 通知；每週人工審查、每月人工維護、每季復原演練與權限盤點。
- [x] 以 Email 作為唯一告警與摘要通道。
- [x] 採用本機快速復原加密異機副本的 3-2-1 最小可行策略。
- [x] 真實機密不進 Git；repo 只保存去敏設定結構與操作／驗證紀錄。
- [x] 日常存取使用非 root SSH key；禁止 root/password SSH，維護 provider/recovery console 緊急存取。
- [x] 採用 Ansible + systemd timers + Restic 作為技術基線。
-
-## Implementation Plan
-
- [x] **Status: Done — 建立去敏 Ansible inventory。** 為 mx2、us2、hk2 與 Matrix 建立主機與服務群組，將非機密主機資料與現有人類可讀的 `inventory/hosts.md` 對應；理由是提供可審查的機器可讀編排層，且不取代既有事實來源。
- [x] **Status: Done — 實作 audit-only Ansible playbook。** 只收集連線、OS、磁碟、systemd、Docker Compose 和依賴命令狀態，不做設定或服務改動；理由是先確認控制面與真實現況。
- [x] **Status: Done — 定義跨服務健康檢查結果合約。** 統一去敏結構化結果、日誌位置、嚴重度及 exit code，讓人工執行、systemd 和 Ansible audit 可共同消費；理由是避免各服務告警語意漂移。
- [x] **Status: Done — 保留並模組化 Mailcow 健康檢查。** 持續檢查 Compose、watchdog、queue、listeners、HTTP/HTTPS、TLS、SMTP、DNS/PTR/MX/SPF；理由是現有腳本已覆蓋關鍵郵件服務面向。
- [x] **Status: Done — 實作 Vaultwarden 唯讀健康檢查。** 驗證 Compose/Postgres、HTTPS、有效設定、SMTP AUTH、備份新鮮度及機密指紋一致性，禁止輸出機密；理由是 `config.json` 優先於 `.env`，且 SMTP 漂移已有已知風險。
- [x] **Status: Done — 實作 PowerDNS 唯讀健康檢查。** 驗證容器、版本與安全公告、ns1/ns2 served SOA、API、Web UI、備份新鮮度與必要設定；理由是同時覆蓋公開 DNS 與 secondary 同步。
- [x] **Status: Done — 使用 Ansible 部署 systemd healthcheck service/timer。** 每台主機本機執行每日檢查，具 persistent 排程、權限、logrotate 和一致錯誤處理；理由是控制端離線不應阻止巡檢。
- [x] **Status: Done — 部署 Email 告警與每日摘要。** Critical/unknown 立即通知、健康狀態每日摘要、重複失敗抑制；SMTP 真實認證僅在各主機受限路徑保存；理由是已選定 Email 為唯一通知通道。
- [!] **Status: Blocked — 決定 Restic 異機 repository 與存取隔離。** 選擇具加密傳輸、權限隔離與可承受保留需求的 S3/B2/SFTP 或等價目的地；理由是無異機 repository 即無法滿足已確認的 3-2-1 政策。阻塞：本地實作依要求未虛構 backend、repository 或 credentials。
- [x] **Status: Done (templates gated) — 部署 Vaultwarden 與 PowerDNS 的 Restic 備份。** 將既有一致性資料庫 dump、必要資料目錄及復原元資料加密同步，並加入 snapshot 年齡和 `restic check` 驗證；理由是兩者已有本機備份但缺少異機保護。啟用被 repository 決策和主機端受限設定檔阻擋。
- [!] **Status: Blocked — 完成 Mailcow 備份設計審查。** 官方流程已確認：以 `/opt/mail/helper-scripts/backup_and_restore.sh backup all`（或經明確核准的元件集）先產生一致性備份，再由 Restic 同步該輸出；不得直接複製 Docker volumes。阻塞：仍需決定本機備份位置、保留期、排程及異機 Restic repository。
- [x] **Status: Done (templates gated) — 部署 Restic backup、retention、forget/prune 與 check timers。** 與現有資料庫 dump 時段錯開，所有 repository 認證與密碼留在伺服器端受限檔案；理由是保持備份可用與成本可控。啟用被 repository 決策和主機端受限設定檔阻擋。
- [!] **Status: Blocked — 補齊服務級復原 runbook。** 阻塞：需在選定 Restic repository、建立實際 snapshot 並確認各服務的實際備份輸出後，才能編寫可驗證的 restore 前置條件、順序與 rollback；禁止臆造 backend/credentials 或未驗證還原命令。
- [!] **Status: Blocked — 執行隔離式復原演練。** 阻塞：尚未選定／配置 Restic 異機 repository，亦尚無可供還原的異機 snapshot；演練不得對現有生產資料執行。
- [x] **Status: Done — 實作受控 common baseline 與 maintenance playbook。** 僅在 audit 穩定後納入 SSH 稽核、時間同步、logrotate、更新預覽與人工確認的維護操作；理由是避免工具導入期間同時改變服務狀態。
- [x] **Status: Done (2026-08-03) — 將例行操作收斂為 Ansible 入口。** 新增 on-demand health report 與 allowlisted Compose reconciliation；health、maintenance preview、baseline 現可涵蓋 Matrix。互動式 Mailcow 更新、資料遷移、DNS 與機密操作保留人工程序。
- [x] **Status: Done (separate change defined) — 將 PowerDNS API key、DB password 與 TSIG 輪替列為分離變更。** 已明確保持 API key、DB password 與 TSIG 為三項獨立、需人工核准的變更，並要求逐步驗證 Auth、Poweradmin、AXFR/NOTIFY、DNSSEC 與 ns2 同步；未輪替任何機密。
- [!] **Status: Blocked — 盤點 mx、us1、us4。** 阻塞：inventory 僅記錄 `TBD` SSH／角色或缺少完整事實，尚未提供可驗證的存取方式與 provider/recovery console 資訊；不得猜測或嘗試未授權存取。
-
-## Verification Criteria
-
- [ ] 四台 active 主機能被 Ansible 正確解析；Compose 主機可執行 audit，且 audit 不產生主機變更。
- [ ] 四台主機每日產生去敏健康結果；服務、容量、TLS、公開端點和備份新鮮度異常均能被偵測。
- [ ] 正常狀態寄送 Email 摘要；受控測試異常能觸發一次可讀且不含機密的 Email 告警。
- [ ] 每個核心服務至少有一份加密、異機、可列出且通過完整性檢查的 Restic snapshot。
- [ ] 至少完成一次隔離式實際還原，並確認其結果符合或明確量化偏離服務 RPO/RTO。
- [ ] 自動化排程不包含更新、重啟、修復、秘密輪替或 DNS 變更。
- [ ] Repo、Ansible vars、產出日誌及 Email 均不包含任何真實機密。
-
-## Potential Risks and Mitigations
-
-1. **Mailcow 備份未保持資料一致性。**  
-   Mitigation: 先依官方方式完成備份範圍與還原設計，再上線排程；以隔離還原驗證作為完成門檻。
-
-2. **Ansible 設定錯誤改動生產系統。**  
-   Mitigation: 先導入 audit-only；變更 playbook 必須使用 dry-run/diff、明確 tag 與人工確認，且先限制單一 host。
-
-3. **機密出現在 Git、Ansible output 或 Email。**  
-   Mitigation: 真實值只存主機受限檔案；去敏輸出、no-log 機制和測試用機密掃描為強制要求。
-
-4. **Timer 成功但公開服務實際不可用。**  
-   Mitigation: 同時執行本機 Compose/DB 檢查與外部 HTTP、SMTP、TLS、DNS 檢查。
-
-5. **PowerDNS 密鑰輪替中斷 DNS 管理或 zone transfer。**  
-   Mitigation: API key、DB password、TSIG 分批處理；每步都驗證 primary/secondary 同步、DNSSEC 和管理 UI。
-
-## Alternative Approaches
-
-1. **純 shell + systemd，不使用 Ansible**：初期較快，但設定與排程容易跨主機漂移，且難以審查或擴充；不建議作為長期方案。
-2. **Ansible + 集中式監控平台**：可增加儀表板與趨勢，但平台本身需額外維護；等 Email 摘要無法滿足需求時再評估。
-3. **立即導入 SOPS + age**：可使加密設定進 Git，但需先完成密鑰生命週期與緊急存取設計；建議列為後續階段。
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Runbook index
+
+Entry point for all runbooks. Before operational work, read the repo entry
+[`AGENTS.md`](../AGENTS.md) and the spec [`RUNBOOKS.md`](../RUNBOOKS.md). New
+runbooks start from [`_template.md`](_template.md).
+
+## Route by intent
+
+| Intent | Runbook | Type |
+|---|---|---|
+| mailcow health check | [mailcow-health.md](mailcow-health.md) | read-only |
+| mailcow update | [mailcow-update.md](mailcow-update.md) | change (gated) |
+| mailcow SMTP/IMAP client | [mailcow-smtp-client.md](mailcow-smtp-client.md) | reference |
+| Vaultwarden health check | [vaultwarden-health.md](vaultwarden-health.md) | read-only |
+| Vaultwarden SQLite→PG migrate | [vaultwarden-sqlite-to-postgres.md](vaultwarden-sqlite-to-postgres.md) | change (destructive) |
+| PowerDNS health check | [pdns-health.md](pdns-health.md) | read-only |
+| RustDesk health check | [rustdesk-health.md](rustdesk-health.md) | read-only |
+| Matrix health check | [matrix-health.md](matrix-health.md) | read-only |
+| Plane health check | [plane-health.md](plane-health.md) | read-only |
+| pgdb health check | [pgdb-health.md](pgdb-health.md) | read-only |
+| pgdb DB restore (pg_restore) | [pgdb-restore.md](pgdb-restore.md) | change (procedure) |
+| pgdb image/compose update | [pgdb-update.md](pgdb-update.md) | change (gated) |
+| AdGuard Home health check | [adguard-home-health.md](adguard-home-health.md) | read-only |
+| Host disk cleanup (logs/apt/docker) | [host-disk-cleanup.md](host-disk-cleanup.md) | change (gated) |
+| Matter packet capture | [matter-packet-capture.md](matter-packet-capture.md) | read-only |
+| Home Assistant maintenance | [home-assistant-maintenance.md](home-assistant-maintenance.md) | change (gated) |
+| matrix_e2ee integration update | [matrix-e2ee-update.md](matrix-e2ee-update.md) | change (gated) |
+| Routine Ansible operations | [ansible-operations.md](ansible-operations.md) | change (allowlisted) |
+| Linear issue → mergeable change | [issue-to-merge.md](issue-to-merge.md) | delivery |
+| Failing health/playbook run | [fix-ci.md](fix-ci.md) | change |
+| Release a reviewed change to production | [release.md](release.md) | change (gated) |
+| Roll back a change | [rollback.md](rollback.md) | change (gated) |
+| Controlled network configuration | [network-change.md](network-change.md) | change (gated) |
+| Network outage / service recovery | [network-recovery.md](network-recovery.md) | recovery |
+
+## Notes
+
+- `fix-ci.md`, `release.md`, `rollback.md`, `network-change.md`, `network-recovery.md`
+  are adapted from the upstream guide to this repo's VPS-ops context (execution
+  layer is Ansible + SSH + Linear, not a software CI/CD pipeline).
+- Health runbooks are read-only; they stop (`STOP`) when live state conflicts
+  with the expected state instead of mutating production.
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More