tools(skills): add encrypted-dns-skill (ednsdiag CLI + agent skill)
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windyboy
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# Built-in provider policy
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Provider endpoints and capabilities must be verified against the provider's
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official documentation before they are added or changed. The built-in entries
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below were verified on 2026-08-13.
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## Candidate providers
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| Provider | DoH endpoint | DoT endpoint / authentication name | Official documentation | Profile |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Cloudflare | `https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query` | `one.one.one.one:853` | [DoH](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/encryption/dns-over-https/make-api-requests/) / [DoT](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/encryption/dns-over-tls/) | Unfiltered |
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| Google | `https://dns.google/dns-query` | `dns.google:853` | [DoH](https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/doh) / [DoT](https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/dns-over-tls) | Unfiltered |
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| Quad9 | `https://dns.quad9.net/dns-query` | `dns.quad9.net:853` | [Quad9 services](https://docs.quad9.net/services/) | Security filtered; HTTP/2 required |
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| AdGuard | `https://dns.adguard-dns.com/dns-query` | `dns.adguard-dns.com:853` | [AdGuard providers](https://adguard-dns.io/kb/general/dns-providers/) | Ads, tracking, and security filtered |
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## Registry requirements
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Each built-in provider entry must include:
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- stable provider identifier;
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- protocol and endpoint;
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- authentication domain name;
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- bootstrap addresses only when officially published;
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- filtering/ECS profile;
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- official source URL;
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- last verification date.
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Do not infer one protocol endpoint from another. Do not treat filtering and
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non-filtering services as interchangeable. Provider comparison results must
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remain separate.
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# Security and privacy requirements
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Read this file before changing transports, bootstrap behavior, endpoint
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validation, fallback, or result claims.
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## Non-negotiable rules
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1. Never silently downgrade to plaintext DNS.
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2. Validate certificates and authentication domain names. DoT follows the
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strict privacy profile in [RFC 8310](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8310.html).
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3. Treat certificate, hostname, SNI, and negotiated ALPN mismatches as hard
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failures, not fallback opportunities.
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4. Bound response sizes, per-attempt timeouts, total time, redirects, and the
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number of attempts.
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5. Do not expose an unrestricted endpoint parameter to an Agent. Built-in
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providers are allowlisted; private or custom endpoints require explicit
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user intent and policy approval.
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6. Do not connect to addresses returned in DNS answers.
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7. Do not enable AXFR, IXFR, or ANY queries.
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8. Do not persist full query names or client identifiers by default.
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## DoT ALPN policy
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The client advertises the `dot` ALPN identifier. RFC 7858 and RFC 8310 do not
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require a DoT server on its dedicated port to select an ALPN protocol, so an
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empty negotiated ALPN is permitted and reported as empty. If a server selects
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a non-empty protocol other than `dot`, abort before sending the DNS query.
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## Bootstrap transparency
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Connecting to a resolver hostname may require an initial DNS lookup. Report
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whether the endpoint was reached using a configured bootstrap address, the
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system resolver, or an already-known IP. Do not claim that a query avoided the
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system resolver when bootstrap used it.
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## DNS status and fallback
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An HTTP, TLS, or QUIC exchange can succeed while DNS returns `NXDOMAIN`,
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`SERVFAIL`, or `REFUSED`. Those are DNS outcomes and must not be converted into
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transport errors. Cross-provider or cross-protocol fallback is permitted only
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for explicitly classified transport failures and must be disclosed.
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## DNSSEC language
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The AD bit means the selected recursive resolver reports authenticated data.
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It is not proof that this client validated the DNSSEC chain. Use separate
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fields for resolver-reported and locally validated DNSSEC state.
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## Privacy language
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Encrypted transport protects the path between the client and the selected
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resolver. The resolver can still observe the query. Provider policy, logging,
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filtering, ECS behavior, and jurisdiction remain relevant. See
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[RFC 8932](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8932.html).
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ODoH and Anonymized DNSCrypt add relay models but do not justify claims of
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absolute anonymity. Their proxy, relay, and target roles must be reported
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separately.
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# Standards and authoritative sources
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Verified on 2026-08-13. Protocol behavior must be based on the published
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standard, not on summaries or provider-specific JSON APIs.
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| Capability | Authority | Project scope |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Agent Skills package | [Agent Skills specification](https://agentskills.io/specification) | Required package format |
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| OMP discovery | [OMP Skills documentation](https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi/blob/main/docs/skills.md) | Supported host |
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| DoH | [RFC 8484](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8484.html) | Planned |
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| DoT | [RFC 7858](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7858.html) | Planned |
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| DoT authentication profiles | [RFC 8310](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8310.html) | Strict privacy only |
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| DoQ | [RFC 9250](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9250.html) | Planned |
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| ODoH | [RFC 9230](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9230.html) | Research until a maintained implementation is selected |
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| DNS privacy operations | [RFC 8932](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8932.html) | Security and privacy guidance |
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| EDNS(0) padding | [RFC 7830](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7830.html) and [RFC 8467](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8467.html) | Evaluate per transport |
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| DNSCrypt | [DNSCrypt protocol specification](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-protocol) | Planned, non-IETF |
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| Anonymized DNSCrypt | [Anonymized DNSCrypt specification](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-protocol/blob/master/ANONYMIZED-DNSCRYPT.txt) | Research |
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| Go DNS wire and IDNA support | [Go x/net module](https://pkg.go.dev/golang.org/x/net) | Pinned to v0.58.0; use `dnsmessage` and `idna` |
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## Deliberate exclusions
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- DNS-over-DTLS ([RFC 8094](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8094.html))
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is experimental and is not a target transport.
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- DNS zone transfer over TLS
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([RFC 9103](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9103.html)) is outside the
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client-to-recursive diagnostic scope.
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- Recursive-to-authoritative encryption and resolver/server operation are
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outside the initial scope.
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## Terminology
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DoH3 means RFC 8484 semantics carried over HTTP/3. It is not a separate DNS
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message format. DNSCrypt is an encrypted DNS protocol with its own
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specification; do not label it as an IETF RFC.
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For DoH, accept and send `application/dns-message`. Keep HTTP status separate
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from the DNS RCODE: a valid NXDOMAIN or SERVFAIL response still uses HTTP 2xx.
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For DoT, use the strict privacy profile and verify both the PKIX chain and the
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configured authentication domain name.
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